Japan's Foreign Policy Research Articles

Ubiquity of ‘Power’ and the Advantage of Terminological Pluralism: Japan's Foreign Policy Discourse

This article demonstrates that ubiquitous references to ‘power’ in English-language foreign policy discourse can be understood in the light of the inclination in international relations theory to place power on a par with capability. It makes two claims: that such a concept of power is ill-fitted for foreign policy analysis; and that much clarity would be gained by following the Japanese example of terminological pluralism and thus abandoning ‘power’ as a catch-all term. Foreign policy analysis would benefit from adopting a concept that takes power to reside in specific relationships. Its adoption would moreover dissolve a power paradox associated with the analysis of Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy.

Quiet power: Japan's China policy in regard to the Pinnacle Islands

How should Japan's foreign policy or role in the world be characterized? This question has been under discussion for some four decades, and answers have often been put in terms of ‘power’. By using a new framework for analyzing foreign policy – what is called ‘relational power analysis’ – this article aims to offer a conceptually more coherent picture of Japan's foreign policy or role in the world in terms of power. It does so by assessing a ‘litmus test’ for Japan's foreign policy, namely the dispute with China over the Pinnacle (Diaoyu/Senkaku) Islands. In particular, the article analyses new materials on Japan's response to the Territorial Waters Law passed by China in 1992, which strongly reasserted China's claim to the islands. It concludes that Japan exerted power over China in regard to the issue and suggests that it did so using mostly civilian instruments along non-traditional dimensions, for example, positively and defensively. What is called ‘ideational statecraft’ – or attempts to exert influence relying primarily on the transmission of ideas, norms and symbols – is a part of the relational power framework, and it proves appropriate to the present analysis. Japan's ability to affect the PRC with such instruments, however, is helped by the fact that leading Chinese policy-makers prioritized economic development and modernization over sovereignty. The wider implication of such conclusions is the idea that Japan is a quiet but not silent power in world affairs.

Japan's foreign policy, 1945-2003: the quest for a proactive policy

Now in its third edition.This is a fascinating insider account of postwar Japanese foreign policy written by a former senior Japanese diplomat. The author examines Japanese foreign policy as it approaches a crucial reorientation towards a more proactive policy stance. The book is exceptionally clear, accessible and interesting for anyone interested in modern Japan.

Rice, Oil and the Atom: A Study of the Role of Key Material Resources in the Security and Development of Japan

AbstractThis article examines the impact on Japan's political economy and foreign policy of its lack of natural resources. Applying the concept of Japan as a ‘reactive’ state to linked case studies of rice, oil and atomic power it explores aspects of the relationship between culture, institutions and political processes in domestic politics and foreign policy. In so doing it argues that Japan's poor resource endowments have driven it to engage (re)actively – and often unwisely – in international affairs, an engagement both facilitated and constrained by its close alliance with the United States. This mediated engagement will continue into the foreseeable future.

Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909–1937

Historians often characterize Japan's foreign policy regarding China during the 1920s as dominated by economic priorities and a commitment to peaceful cooperation within a collaborative system of treaty port imperialism. In that narrative, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 thus stands as a watershed moment in modern East Asian history when Japan returned to a policy of acquiring formal colonial territory. Akira Iriye made this thesis famous with his groundbreaking international history of East Asia during the 1920s. More recently, Peter Duus has reinforced this paradigm in his summary of Japan's informal empire, pondering why it was that ‘just when Japan appeared to be emerging as the paramount foreign economic power in China within the framework of the treaty system, it embarked on a new policy of establishing direct political control over Manchuria’ in the autumn of 1931. Similarly, Mark Peattie has also suggested that ‘in the overheated atmosphere of the 1930s, the Japanese empire once more became expansive,’ clearly emphasizing the notion that a return to previously abandoned patterns of colonial conquest was underway.

Japan’s peace building diplomacy in Sri Lanka

In May 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro declared: Japan will "strengthen cooperation for the consolidation of peace and nation building in countries suffering from conflicts. This policy has become a new pillar of Japan's international cooperation. ''1 The targets of Japan's peace building diplomacy include: Afghanistan, East Timor, Mindanao, Aceh, and Sri Lanka. Underpinning Tokyo's peace building diplomacy is the desire to play an active political role commensurate with its status as the second largest economy in the world. Since the 1991 Gulf War (when Japan was roundly criticized domestically and internationally for passively engaging only in checkbook diplomacy), it has sought to play a larger political role in Asia. A persistent image of Japan's foreign policy behavior is its passive and reactive nature, and a focus on mercantilism and economics. 2 Explanations for Tokyo punching below its economic weight in international affairs include: the legacy of militarism and defeat in World War II; an allergy among its East Asian neighbors toward a more assertive Japan in the military sphere; constitutional restrictions (Article 9) on Japan exercising the use of force to settle international disputes; a pacifistic political culture among the Japanese; resistance within the ruling coalition and opposition parties to Japan playing a more active military role abroad; and the idea that Japan, being a junior partner to the US superpower, should follow the lead of Washington in foreign relations. My central argument is that Japan has been seeking a more active political role in international affairs since the 1991 Gulf War. While the urge to play a larger political role is not new, the attempts to specifically consolidate peace in countries suffering from severe ethnic conflict and violence mark a new development in Japanese foreign policy. Tokyo is now committed to play a political role even in civil war-torn countries where thousands have perished and peace yet to be fully restored. The commitment to engage in peace building is evidenced by Japan's diplomacy in Sri Lanka. This political initiative is also reflected in Japan's reformulated Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy: there is a shift away from an empha-

Japan and Israel: an evaluation of relationship-building in the context of Japan's Middle East policy

This article evaluates relationship-building between Israel and Japan from 1952 to the present in the context of Japan's Middle East policy as a whole, while focusing on the period in which this relationship became closer and complementary, from the mid-1980s to the present. Two central elements are detected as major influences on Israeli–Japanese relations: Japan's compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel, and Japan's bilateral relations with the US. Nevertheless, in contrast to previous studies, which have emphasized these variables, this article argues that a proper understanding of their relative influence on Japan's foreign policy towards Israel can be detected only within the framework of Japan's overall Middle East policy.

Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive?

This article revisits the thesis put forward by Kent Calder that Japan's foreign policy is made by a reactive state incapable of sustained, innovative policy. Reviewing six recent books, we find that, while the reactive state thesis continues to inform scholarsip on the subject, new frameworks offer possibilities for seeing Japan's foreign policy as innovative and at times strategic. This article considers the strengths and weaknesses in recent attempts to create a more proactive foreign policy.

Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

(2003). Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. American Foreign Policy Interests: Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 79-86.

Japan's foreign policy and human security

Following on from the first article about how human security has become part of the discourse of international relations and how it affects the Japanese state and its people in particular, this article examines the development of the concept with specific reference to its interpretation by different Japanese prime ministers and other leading politicians. It follows the concept from its origins within the United Nations Development Programme during the early 1990s and charts its path through a range of domestic and international policy-making agendas. Particular attention is paid to the role of late Prime Minister Obuchi and his personal ambitions to place human security at the heart of Japanese policy making.

Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975–2002

Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975–2002

Japanese foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific: domestic interests, American pressure, and regional integration

Foreword R.C.Angel Introduction A.Miyashita Japan's Foreign Economic Policy with the United States Y.Sato Consensus or Compliance? Gaiatsu and Japanese Foreign Aid to China and Russia A.Miyashita Continuity and Discontinuity in Japanese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: Freezing the KEDO in 1998 H.Sakai Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan's Foreign Policy Toward Indochina K.Hirata The Layered Japanese Policy Toward the Middle East: A Plea for Truly World Perspective in Understanding Realities Y.Kuroda Non-Proliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance W.Long Japan in APEC C.K.Yeung Determining Factors of Japan's Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with the United States: The Case of Asian Financial Crisis Management, 1997-1999 S.Katada Diplomacy of the Ministry of Finance: Politics of Foreign Exchange Y.Sato Conclusion Y.Sato

Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy After the End of the Cold War

Introduction Two prominent and interrelated traits of Japanese foreign during COLD WAR were close relations with Western democracies and a minimalist approach. did not need to take bold initiatives on international stage when it relied on West. Thus, willingly went along with rules set by other countries because it wanted to concentrate on its own economic development and refrained from taking on extra tasks. However, political changes in 1990s gave an impetus to transform its old-fashioned diplomatic style into a more independent and progressive way to conduct foreign policy. In 1991, vice-minister in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and a leading proponent of diplomatic activism, Takakazu Kuriyama, asserted that passive diplomacy, that took a given international order for granted, was no longer relevant. As he put it, Japan must take an active role in reconstruction of world order. (1) Kuriyama called for a sharing of responsibilities for peace and prosperity among United States, Western Europe, and in an arrangement that he termed global partnership. More importantly, Kuriyama defined Asia-Pacific region as the main theatre of Japan's foreign policy in post-Gold War period, and global partnership meant a leadership role for in East Asia. (2) An important reason why is set to play an active role in East Asia is that sees itself as part of Asia and Japanese consider themselves Asian. As Ishizuka put it: Despite strong political and economic ties with West, Japanese people are inclined to identify themselves with Asia. This is only natural. (3) A top officer in MOFA, Toru Bessho, has pointed out that for a long time refrained from taking initiatives in Asia. However, in 1990s, search for an identity and diplomatic role prodded to reassess its relations with rest of Asia. As a result, Bessho claims that in future, may be more willing to come up with new initiatives for region. (4) In a similar vein, Lincoln has argued that in 1990s, Japanese Government began to consider possibility of assuming a leadership role in Asia. He has noted: end of Cold War opened way for to pursue an independent foreign (using foreign aid as a key element) focused primarily on Asia. If intends to play a more significant role in Asia, it is important for to find a balance in its diplomatic relations with Western and countries. On one hand, Western democracies abide by universal such as human rights, democracy, freedom, and market economy, and consider those as ideals to be shared by every country. As Jack Donnelly has argued, in new international society, all members must share common values, and human rights emerge as a standard of civilisation. (6) On other hand, some leaders eschew universal and insist that there exists another set of values -- Asian values. These leaders claim that Asia has its own history, culture, and traditions, and therefore Western concepts of human rights and democracy cannot be applied to Asia. The Asian argument could become a contentious issue of Japanese diplomacy. This is partly because Japanese Government has traditionally shown solidarity with West and often criticized other countries' policies. countries, in their turn, might begin to consider a betrayer of interests. Thus, Japanese Government once came under attack from other countries for being too Western in its approach when at Regional Conference on Human Rights in Bangkok in 1993 insisted on need to promote human rights. (7) governments suggested that issue should be considered in context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind significance of national and regional particularities, and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds. …

Japan's Dual Hedge

LAST FALL, just eight days after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, announced that his country would provide military support to the United States for the war in Afghanistan. His statement seemed to signal a long-awaited shift in Japan's foreign and security policy. Stung by criticism that it had hesitated to lend a hand during the Persian Gulf War, this time Japan quickly declared solidarity with the United States. New legislation was rapidly passed, allowing for the dispatch of naval vessels to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, nearly 3,500 miles away. American strategists lauded Japan for showing the flag, providing unfettered access to its bases, and sticking by its ally. Many wondered aloud if Japan might become a U.S. ally more along the lines of the British. In the weeks after Koizumi's speech, however, it became clear that the fundamental approach of Japanese foreign policy had not changed. Japan hastily backtracked on the bolder elements of Koizumi's plan and ended up contributing very little militarily to the Afghan war-much less than did Germany or Italy, which also have constitutions repudiating war. And although Tokyo may undertake additional symbolic military measures in the future to meet U.S. ex pectations, it is unlikely to be any more supportive of active military

Japan and Climate Change: Responses and Explanations

The purpose of this paper is to assess Japan's response to climate change negotiation in the last decade, and to forecast it in the future. For Japan, hosting the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the Convention was a significant milestone that changed Japan's response from reactive to proactive. Since then, Japan has been keen on taking a lead in the negotiation, but without much success. This failure is due to several reasons: (1) Japan's high standard on energy efficiency per GDP and thus its difficulty to make further improvement; (2) Japan's foreign policy has considered U.S.–Japan relation to be the most important, and (3) Japan's culture that cherishes harmony rather than becoming a leader. These features are likely to remain in the future as long as Japan's decision-making system itself remains the same.

Japan's Grand Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism

Korea is one of the most complex, critical, and yet understudied of Japan's foreign policy relationships. While much attention in US policy and academic circles has focused on Japan's future relations with China as the key variable for regional stability in the twenty first century, an integral part of the security dynamic in East Asia has been driven by the Japan–Korea axis. In the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century, two major power wars in Asia (i.e., Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese) had this relationship as a proximate cause. During the cold war, the Japan–Republic of Korea (ROK) axis facilitated the American presence as an Asia-Pacific power and security guarantor. And in the post-cold war era, outcomes in the Japan–Korea (united or still divided) relationship are critical to the shape of future balance of power dynamics in the region and with it, the future American security presence. How then should we be thinking about future Japanese relations with the Korean peninsula? What are Tokyo's hopes and concerns with regard to Korea? How do they view the prospect of a united Korea? Is there a Japanese ‘grand strategy’ regarding the peninsula?

Tokyo´s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent´s Nuclear Tests

Among Japan's recent international initiatives, its responses to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have been largely overlooked. Major Japanese diplomatic initiatives in the wake of these tests included promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and taking a leadership role in resolving the India-Pakistan dispute. Japan's energetic responses were driven by domestic considerations of public opinion, coalition politics, and bureaucratic interests. Externally, Japan was motivated by a desire to highlight its contributions to international peace and security, solidify its claims to a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, and exhibit its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, as well as by the relative paucity of concrete interest in India and Pakistan. However, Japan achieved few of its objectives. A repeat of such episodes may well influence Japan's future efforts to be more active in international affairs. Introduction. Japan's foreign and defence policies are beginning to exhibit signs of rising activism. An unprecedented parliamentary debate on Japan's constitution, an announcement by the foreign ministry that it is considering participation in multilateral anti-piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca, the dispatch of delegations around the world to promote the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's recent suggestion that Japan's soldiers might be able to carry weapons on peace-keeping operation (PKO) missions are just some examples of the trend towards a more engaged international posture by Japan. Japan's neighbours and others have been watching Tokyo's emerging normalization closely, seeking clues to Japan's future international behaviour and ambitions. One little noticed example of Japan's recent initiatives in international affairs was its responses to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests conducted in May 1998. Japan's energetic responses to the nuclear blasts provide fresh insights into its broader international behaviour and ambitions. Although the subcontinent itself is marginal to Japan's economic, political, and security concerns, the nuclear tests raised fundamental questions about Japan's foreign policy, including the balance between economic and political diplomacy, the application of its official development assistance (ODA) charter, the role of public opinion, as well as domestic and bureaucratic politics in making foreign policy, Japan's relations with the great powers of the Permanent Five (P-5) and Group of Eight (G-8), the relative importance of specific security factors in shaping foreign policy, and Japan's relations with the United States. What emerges from a consideration of this episode in Japan's contemporary foreign relations is quite telling. Motivated mainly by the desire to demonstrate responsible political rather than economic leadership, burnish its claims to a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, and exert initiative on nuclear matters, Japan launched strong but largely overlooked efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as to help resolve the India-Pakistan dispute. Not only did Tokyo fail on these scores, but the international community and the major powers were indifferent, Delhi and Islamabad uncompromising, and the Japanese public unmoved. Tokyo's dynamic diplomacy fell flat. Whether a repeat of similar episodes and outcomes in other contexts will push Japan towards a sullen isolationism, assertive unilateralism, or what the Japanese commentator Yoichi Funabashi, writing in Foreign Affairs, called a reluctant realism, [1] remains to be seen. Political Animals South Asians are political animals, while Japan is an economic animal, the late Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Al Bhutto supposedly once said. The world is accustomed to Japan's economic diplomacy. It is hence surprising that political initiatives in the wake of India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have eclipsed Japan's economic actions. …

“The Japanese Way in Warfare”: Japan's Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

Abstract Japan's foreign and defense policy is now at a crossroads. The end of the Cold War opens the door for a possible policy renaissance in Japan. By “renaissance,” it is meant that instead of merely responding passively to the changes in the international environment, Japan might positively shape the international environment. This marks a departure from the Japanese stance since the Second World War and should be appreciated as such. At the same time, however, it is also fair to say that Japan is still muddling through, failing to define clear national objectives and a grand strategy needed to achieve them. This article is designed to provide a useful framework upon which Japan's future foreign and defense policy could be based. To this end, the experience of Britain will be examined. Though historical, the British model in fact provides many relevant lessons for Japan, and the author will draw on his discussion of these lessons in order to envision a grand strategy suitable for Japan's survival and prosperity in the security environment of East Asia in the twenty-first century. In so doing, problems on the Korean peninsula and the China-Taiwan issue will be examined as case studies and developed as fully as possible. It should be noted that this article aims to provide a framework through which Japan's foreign and defense policy could be developed in the future. As such, its focus will be conceptual rather than factual, and historical rather than current events-driven.

La politique étrangère du Japon depuis Meiji : essai d'interprétation

Japan's Foreign Policy Since the Meiji Era : an Attempt of Interpretation, by Jean-Marie Bouissou Joining the modem world during the Meiji era (1868-1912), Japan has still not found its real place within the international community. At first having failed in its attempts to establish in Asia its own imperial dominion, and having still failed to transform its tremendous economie efficiency into an equivalent political power, and finally not enjoying its rehabilitation in the Asian community till the very beginning of the 1990s, Japan seems to have been endowed only recently with a global and coherent vision in foreign policy. This vision today tries to impose the image of a strong Japan, capable of bringing peace, prosperity and safety to an Asia Pacific area still in the grip of turbulences, while playing its own part in a process of globalization largely dominated by the United State.

Gaiatsu and Japan's Foreign Aid: Rethinking theReactive-Proactive Debate

This article examines the role of the United States in Japan's foreign aid policy. The Japanese government often alters its course of action under U.S. pressure even if doing so would apparently undermine its own interests. Japan's unusual responsiveness to U.S. preferences appears counterintuitive given the fact that at least in the realm of foreign aid Japan's power clearly surpassed that of the United States. This article posits that Japan's responsiveness stems in large part from the asymmetry of interdependence between the two countries. After critically reviewing the existing literature, it conducts two case studies to examine the validity of the argument. The article concludes that the United States played a crucial role but Japan's responsiveness to American pressure reflects an act of will rather than a lack of coherent policy stemming from bureaucratic politics. The findings have important implications to the ongoing debate over whether Japan is a “reactive state.”