Japan's Exports Research Articles

Japan and South Korea's engagement in the Chinese market post-RCEP implementation: A case study of the semiconductor industry

After the RCEP implementation in 2022, trade differences emerged between Japan and South Korea with China, especially in semiconductors. Japan's exports to China declined, while South Korea's grew. This study uses qualitative and quantitative methods to explain post-RCEP semiconductor trade differences, focusing on value chain complementarity, new tariff rates, and U.S. factors. Three conclusions: 1) Within the global value chain, the different positions of Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor sectors compared to China result in varying levels of market complementarity between Japan and China and South Korea and China; South Korea, in particular, exhibits a significantly higher potential market. 2) In terms of reducing tariff barriers under RCEP, compared to Japan, South Korea experienced a more substantial decline in semiconductor tariff rates in the Chinese market. 3) The non-tariff barrier sanctions imposed by the United States on Chinese semiconductors in 2022 influenced trade choices for Japan and South Korea. Japan, being more loyal to the United States, tends to align with U.S. policies, leading to a reduction in semiconductor trade with China.

Investigating How Exchange Rates Impact Japan’s Machinery Exports since 1990

Japan exports sophisticated capital goods. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Japanese companies have offshored the production of lower-end goods and parts and components to Asian countries. Because of this, several researchers argued that a weaker yen no longer stimulates machinery exports much because an increase in Japanese exports increases parts and components imports from overseas Asian subsidiaries. This paper finds that, after the GFC, a weaker yen no longer increases Japanese machinery exports to Asia but continues to stimulate exports outside of Asia. Thus, the weaker yen since 2020 does not help Asian firms to import vital Japanese capital goods but does increase the profitability of Japanese manufacturers and their exports to non-Asian countries.

Elements Affect Japan GDP Growth

After a severe economic crisis, the Japanese economy entered a recessionary phase. Since the 1990 bubble economy, consumption, investment, and export became essential factors to support Japan GDP growth. This paper is supported by data collected by the International Financial Statistics (the base year is the 2015 Japanese Yen). Therefore, this paper also applies the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the cyclical rate of change of the variables and analyze the de-trend correlation of each factor with GDP. This method estimates the best-fitting directional line from a frequently fluctuating data set. According to the analysis, Japan's GDP remained generally unchanged with a slight increase after the bubble crisis, which again proved the country's economic stagnation. However, Japan's exports grew significantly this year, effectively giving a short-term increase in GDP. In addition, consumption has the least fluctuation with GDP, and focusing on the development of consumption can bring stable long-term growth to GDP. In summary, this paper analyzes and argues that factors of production such as consumption and exports may get Japan out of this predicament.

An Analysis of the Effect of CPTPP on Japan's Export Using the Spatial Panel Gravity Model

The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively measure the effect of the CPTPP on Japan's exports to member countries, and to find out various factors affecting Japan's exports. In this study, we adopt the spatial Durbin gravity model to consider the spatial dependency and spillover effects of trade flows between Japan and CPTPP member countries during the period from 2017 to 2021. While the CPTPP did not directly increase Japan's exports, it had an indirect spillover effect due to increased trade among other CPTPP member countries, which decreased Japan's exports. The factors that have a more direct impact on Japan's exports to CPTPP member countries are currently GDP of both countries, distance between countries, and the exchange rate. In particular, the direct effect of the exchange rate is most significant, as a depreciation of the Japanese yen enhances the price competitiveness of Japanese products, resulting in increased exports.

DINAMIKA PERDAGANGAN DAN ADAPTASI STRATEGIS: RESPON KOREA SELATAN TERHADAP PEMBATASAN IMPOR SEMIKONDUKTOR JEPANG, 2019-2021

The semiconductor sector, pivotal in the global value chain, sees countries like South Korea carving specializations. Notably, South Korea leads in semiconductor memory but relies heavily on Japanese imports, causing significant trade deficits. This dependency became problematic when historical tensions spurred Japan's export restrictions to South Korea, threatening the semiconductor supply chain and bilateral relations. Addressing this between 2019-2021, South Korea invoked Friedrich List's productive power theory, strategizing via infant industry nurturing and forced capital infusion. They launched the K-Semiconductor Strategy, promoting domestic growth to counterbalance import reliance. This proactive stance attracted 510 trillion KRW in investments, including private, foreign, and government subsidies, bolstering the local semiconductor materials sector. The outcome was twofold: reduced import dependence and a demonstration of South Korea's productive power, affirming its capability to sustain and fortify its semiconductor stronghold despite geopolitical strains. This period underscored the criticality of self-reliant industrial advancement in the face of international dynamics and supply vulnerabilities.

소재・부품・장비 산업 지원정책의 평가와 시사점

This paper provides an overview of Korea's competitiveness-strengthening policy for materials, parts, and equipment (PME policy), which was implemented in response to Japan's export regulations on strategic materials in 2019. The study conducts empirical analysis and case studies to evaluate the policy's effects and derive policy implications. Specifically, panel data from 2,165 companies, including policy beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, are collected for the period from 2017 to 2021. Using a two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model, the analysis reveals positive policy outcomes in terms of profitability, employment, and patent registration for the policy beneficiary companies. The paper proposes policy improvement measures, such as upgrading through the restructuring of the PME policy, expansion of PME technical workforce, and tailored support based on company characteristics, including R&D support. Furthermore, the study discusses the establishment of an effective data management strategy and a continuous policy performance evaluation system. However, due to data limitations, only four specific support policies were analyzed, and the small number of companies studied is a limitation of this research.

기지국가 일본의 對 베트남 원조외교

After the war, Japan laid the groundwork for the establishment of the ideology of a “peaceful state” by stipulating the renunciation of war in Article 9 of the Constitution. However, a contradictory situation arises when Japan assumes the role of a rear base for US warfare during the Korean War and Vietnam War. In other words, the concept of a ‘peace state’ was a ‘base state’ that entrusted Japan’s security guarantees to American-style diplomacy. Japan gained enormous benefits from the special effects of the Korean War, accounting for 63% of Japan’s exports at the time. On the other hand, the Vietnam War accounted for only 7-8% of Japan's exports, even including direct and indirect impacts, and there was no economic gain as much as in the Korean War. However, due to the Vietnam War, some countries in Southeast Asia, including Korea, have been on the trajectory of economic development, and Considering the structure of the international environment that has supported Japan’s rapid economic growth and economic development, the impact of the Vietnam War was much greater than expected. The Vietnam War is generally evaluated by Japanese as ‘Fire Across the Sea’, and in the discussion surrounding Japan’s role, it is pointed out it is a ‘participant in the aggression’. From the point of view of the Japanese people who regard Japan as a “peace country” and the Japanese people who have accepted democracy as a national identity, it has become natural for Japan to oppose the US war in Vietnam. Therefore, during the Vietnam War, citizens and students each participated in the nonviolent anti-war movement called Bepyongryeon (Peace in Vietnam! Citizens’ Union) and the ‘Zenkyoto Battle’ movement, which was organized around the students of the new left, in connection with the movement developed with the residents around the base, and Civil society began to be embraced. In this paper, we try to explore the form of the Japanese government's aid to Vietnam in this social awareness. In this paper, I try to explore the form of the Japanese government’s aid to Vietnam in this social awareness. In particular, in accordance with the mandatory implementation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the Japanese government provided a base to the United States and played a role in the Vietnam War and at the same time engaged in aid diplomacy. I think it will be meaningful to review and explore the direction of aid diplomacy through characteristics.

The economic and trade effects of the UK–Korea free trade agreement on the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the European Union

AbstractWe explored a comparative static computable general equilibrium model with six regions and 12 sectors to estimate the impacts of the recent UK–Korea free trade agreement (FTA) along with the European Union (EU)–Korea FTA. The empirical results provide quantitative evidence of the impact on national GDP, national exports and imports by sector, and the changes in exports or imports among the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the EU. The UK–Korea FTA, along with the EU–Korea FTA, increases GDP and welfare for the United Kingdom and Korea; moreover, there is a large increase in automobiles, transport equipment, and machinery exports between Korea and the United Kingdom. The GDP and welfare level of non‐member countries such as Japan and China will slightly decline. Exports from the United Kingdom and Korea to non‐member countries are also expected to decrease in most manufacturing sectors. The UK–Korea FTA will lead to increases in imports between the United Kingdom and Korea due to mutual trade creation effects and trade diversion effects. However, non‐member countries such as Japan's exports are expected to experience a large decline in automobiles to the United Kingdom and in most manufacturing products to Korea due to the negative impact of the UK–Korea FTA.

Testing the Ricardian Model: Do the Data Confirm the Assumptions?

The insight of David Ricardo’s international trade theory can be proved by the way he managed to capture the economic problems of his era and by the fact that his theory is still studied and applied in the construction of new economic models and theories. Ricardo has accepted Adam Smith’s idea, that the “absolute advantage” determines domestic output and trade between countries, under the assumption of perfect mobility of factors of production. The aim of this paper is to do an empirical analysis of Ricardo’s model not only to test the validity of his assumptions, but also to see what are the main categories of goods that the European Union, the United States and Japan export and which specialization should each of them choose.

Environmental impact assessment of China's waste import ban policies: An empirical analysis of waste plastics importation from Japan

In January 2018, the Chinese government implemented a ban on importation of foreign waste, including waste plastics and other miscellaneous waste. Consequently, this ban has changed the global plastic recycling options. The aim of this study is to clarify the environmental impact of the ban between China and Japan, which is the largest exporter of plastic waste. The question of whether these policies are fundamentally helping to reduce the environmental burden has also been discussed from the viewpoints of China and Japan. Plastics have been classified into seven categories. Material flow analysis (MFA) and CO2 emissions derived in the MFA were applied to examine the material flow of waste plastics and compare CO2 emissions of virgin and recycled resins in Japan and China before, and after, the ban. A scope for the MFA including the recycling process of waste plastics, virgin resin production, and shipping between countries was proposed, and the transition of the material flow and CO2 emissions caused by China's waste import ban were evaluated. Material flow relevant to both Japan and China was set as the scope. Material flow crossing the scope, such as import of waste plastic into China from countries other than Japan, and export of waste plastic from Japan to countries other than China before the ban was excluded. The main finding of MFA is that the transition in material flow between 2016 and 2018 in China demonstrated high virgin resin imports and exports in 2016, and 28% of recycled waste plastics in China were derived from imported waste plastic. After the ban, the amount of waste plastic imports decreased by more than 99%, causing domestic virgin resin production to increase. Other findings include that CO2 emissions of the input of virgin materials increased by up to 10%, and the CO2 emissions derived from virgin resin production increased by up to 11% in 2018 compared those reported in 2016. With this transition, the CO2 emissions of 1 kg of raw materials in 2018 increased by 0.24 kg compared with 2016. In contrast, Japan's exports decreased, and domestic recycled plastic input increased. The CO2 emissions of 1 kg of raw materials in 2018 decreased by 0.07 kg compared with 2016.

Japan's export specialization in 2000–2020

By empirically examining the commodity structure of Japan's exports in 2000–2020, the authors have identified product groups with increased, diminished, newly emerged, and lost revealed comparative advantages (RCA). In 2020, Japan had RCA in 24 product groups with relatively high levels of product complexity and thus managed to maintain its highly diversified trade portfolio. However, increasing global competition poses potential risks to Japan's exports. Eight product groups with diminished and two product groups with lost RCA are signs of Japan's unsuccessful adaptation to the structural changes on the world markets. The newly emerged RCA, predominantly in the chemicals and allied industries, still mostly have lower index values in comparison to major trade partners, however, their contribution to Japan's exports is likely to expand. To enhance its comparative advantages, Japan should foster innovation which may positively affect national competitiveness but this depends on how the country will adapt to domestic and global challenges.

Interactions between Japan's “weaponized interdependence” and Korea's responses: “decoupling from Japan” vs. “decoupling from Japanese firms”

PurposeThis paper aims at exploring the interactions between Japan's export curbs against Korea, dubbed as “weaponized interdependence,” and Korea's decoupling from Japan' phenomenon in response. Thereby, it sheds light on the characteristics of the semiconductor industry, where the two economies' effective division of labor takes place. In addition, it attempts to typology the “decoupling from Japan” into two types. Furthermore, it deals with the political-economic implications of bilateral trade disputes and projects in the future.Design/methodology/approachThis paper segregates the economic concept of “decoupling” into “decoupling from Japan” and “decoupling from Japanese firms” to better analyze the related phenomenon that occurred in Korea in response to the Japanese government's export restrictions in 2019. Along with it, the paper attempts to observe the trade dispute between Korea-Japan from a political-economic point of view.FindingsThe main findings are: First, Korea's decoupling from Japan' does not necessarily mean “decoupling from Japanese firms”. When Korean firms had to decouple from Japan due to non-economic factors, some has circumvented the decoupling to maintain economic ties with Japanese firms in the market, stemming from long-term transaction relationships in the semiconductor industry. Second, the two countries were confronted in a modest manner, even though they seemed to be fighting like a fierce tit-for-tat chicken game as those economies are interdependent with one another. Hence, both put effort to avoid sober damages or disruptive results on two economies and the global semiconductor supply chain.Originality/valueThe originality of this paper is to typologize the characteristics of “decoupling from Japan” in Korea by segregating it into two types of decoupling. On the other hand, other previous studies appeal to focus on the decoupling phenomenon per se and are interested in its potential for success.

The dual margin of Chinese agricultural products export to Japan

The purpose of the article is to investigate the reasons for the decline in trade activity between China and Japan, considering the fact that China is the largest source of Japanese agricultural products imports. Agricultural products trade plays an important role in the economic and trade relations between China and Japan, and the proportion of China's agricultural products exports to Japan's exports is increasing year by year. However, after 2013, China's agricultural exports to Japan have shown a downward trend year by year. What are the reasons for this change in trade? What is the structure of China's agricultural exports to Japan? This is a problem that must be understood. This article uses the HS4 quantile code data of China's agricultural exports to Japan from 2010 to 2019 by the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), and applies the binary marginal decomposition method to analyze China's agricultural exports to Japan. The results show that China's agricultural exports to Japan In export growth, the marginal contribution of expansion is weak, while the marginal contribution of intensive is larger. After further decomposing the intensive margin into the quantity margin and the price margin, it is found that the growth of China's agricultural exports to Japan is mainly due to the rapid growth of the quantity margin, while the price margin does not contribute much to export growth. In the future, if China wants to expand its exports of agricultural products to Japan, it must become familiar with and adapt to the access standards of the Japanese market as soon as possible, increase the added value of agricultural products, and enhance the comprehensive competitiveness of agricultural exports to Japan. JEL Classification: F1 F12, F14.

АМЕРИКАНСЬКО-ЯПОНСЬКІ ВІДНОСИНИ ЗА АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ ДОНАЛЬДА ТРАМПА

This paper describes and discusses the major developments in the U.S.-Japan relations under the administration of Donald Trump (January 2017–January 2021) in political, commercial and economic, and energy areas. In political sphere, the research focuses on continuity and changes in the U.S. policy towards bilateral security alliance with Japan. The research has revealed that D. Trump's statements on security relations with allies and trade during his presidential campaign were cause for concern in Japan. To avoid their implementation, the prime-minister Shinzo Abe (Liberal Democratic Party) managed to establish close personal relations with Donald Trump and successfully navigated them until his resignation in September 2020. Importantly, Abe succeeded in separating issues of security and trade in a bilateral dialogue with the U.S. As a result, Trump's preelection statements on security with Japan had not been implemented. Moreover, the U.S.-Japan security cooperation strengthened based at the mutual support of "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy. In commercial and economic area, new trade policies of Trump administration since 2018 had an impact on Japan. Abe failed to persuade D. Trump to return to multinational Trans Pacific Partnership free trade agreement. A large U.S. deficit in trade with Japan caused bilateral negotiations on trade issues. Their first stage was completed in September 2019. However, the trade agreement did not cover cars and auto parts, which composed 75 percent of Japan's export to the U.S. In energy sector, the focus of bilateral cooperation shifted from clean energy and environmental initiatives of Obama administration to energy security and integration of regional energy market in the Indo-Pacific. Two countries prioritized cooperation in Liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, in which they had complementary interests. The policy of Shinzo Abe with respect to the U.S. was continued by the new government of Japan by Yoshihide Suga (Liberal Democratic Party).

A study on Korea's countermeasures following Japan's export control measures

A study on Korea's countermeasures following Japan's export control measures

Export Changes Due to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Expanding the scale of shift-share analysis

Introduction: Disasters can impact national economies in many ways, one of which is through international trade components such as export. with estimated direct damages of over US$211 billion, the Great Eastern Japan earthquake of 2011 has been the costliest disaster in the history of Japan. Although this disaster occurred in an area with lower share in the national and global economy, many Japanese and non-Japanese firms outside the affected area were affected by the ripple effects of this disaster. This study aimed to investigate the extent to which changes in post disaster exports of Japan can be attributed to this disaster. Methods: A modified version of shift-share method was employed to examine the impacts of the disaster on Japan’s export. Considering the regional economic analysis, shift-share analysis is often used to compare regional economic changes with regard to national changes. It decomposes the regional economy changes into universal, industry mix, and competitive advantage components. In this study, an up-scaled shift share analysis was conducted that examined the changes of Japan export versus the world. Two datasets were used in this study. The first dataset included Japan’s exports and the other contained the world’s exports. . The World Trade Organization (WTO)’s online database constituted the main data source. Results: According to the shift-share analysis, Japan experienced some increase in export during the study years, which was due to the overall universal export increases. In the same period, Japan lost some of its exports due to the industry mix component. The results showed that the 2011 Great East Japan disaster had a substantial impact on Japan’s exports through the export reduction caused by the competitive effect. Conclusions: Large-scale disasters may have a significant impact on the overall national economy and export. The results of this study highlighted that the disaster had a negative competitive advantage for all economic sectors of Ja

US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past, the Present, and Implications for the US–China Trade War

The United States and Japan have been involved in trade frictions over a number of products including textiles, steel, automobiles, semi‐conductors, and agricultural products over the last 50 years. US–Japan trade frictions have taken basically two forms: (i) the United States attempting to restrict Japan's exports to the United States; and (ii) the United States attempting to increase its exports to Japan by “opening” the Japanese market. By putting pressure on Japan to adopt necessary measures, the United States sought to achieve two main objectives: (i) to reduce its trade deficit vis‐à‐vis Japan; and (ii) to protect and/or promote US industries. The United States failed to achieve the first objective, while some success was achieved for the second objective. The United States triggered a trade war against China with the objectives of: (i) reducing the bilateral trade deficit; and (ii) stopping unfair trade practices by Chinese firms such as violations of intellectual property rights and forced technology transfer. Based on the experiences from the US–Japan trade frictions, the United States may achieve some success for the second objective, but not for the first. The chances of achieving the second objective would increase if the United States cooperates with countries such as Japan and the European Union, which are faced with similar problems.

Japan's Export Curbs on Korea: An Unjustifiable Threat to the Global Trading Order

Japan's Export Curbs on Korea: An Unjustifiable Threat to the Global Trading Order

Carbon footprint management of unconventional natural gas development in the export scenario

In Australia, exploitation of shale gas is at an early stage. Western Australia has estimated its technically recoverable gas resources at 235 trillion cubic feet (tcf). It is viewed as an exciting economic prospect and decarbonising option for transition to climate change mitigation. The central focus of this paper is to estimate the climate impacts of Australian shale gas fracking and compare with other energy sources. Electricity generation has been considered as end use of gas in export scenarios to Japan and China. Analysis has been done for resource development periods of 20 and 40 years. Carbon footprints of shale gas range from 604MtCO2e to 543 MtCO2e per annum for China and Japan export cases, respectively, for 20 years field lifetime, if 66 tcf of shale gas is exploited and used. This result is roughly equivalent to 115% of Australia's total national emissions for the year 2014. If all technically recoverable shale gas (235tcf) from the Canning Basin in the Kimberley is exploited and exported to China and Japan over 40 years, the annual emissions are double the total Australian national emissions. The result suggests that shale gas has low carbon intensity compared to coal and oil but solar PV and wind are much cleaner energy options for GHG mitigation. The solar PV and wind electricity would produce 8% and 5% of the shale gas electricity emissions, respectively. Unless accompanied by stringent regulation and compliance on the upstream resource development, stage shale gas cannot be an appropriate energy source for sustainable development as opposed to renewable energy sources.

(Complementarity in Northeast Asian Trade)

Korean Abstract: 국제무역의 품목별 구조에서 나타난 한국, 중국, 일본 등 동북아시아 삼국간 경쟁 및 보완적 관계를 살펴보고, 특히 무역상응지수(trade conformity index)를 이용하여 한국과의 수출입을 중심으로 동북아시아 국가들의 무역에 있어서 향후 잠재적으로 그 규모의 증가가 클 것으로 기대되는 품목들을 찾아보고자 하였다. 잠재적인 의미에서 한국의 수입은 중국으로부터 보다는 일본으로부터 상대적으로 더욱 크게 증가할 것으로 예상된다. 또한, 한국의 수출은 일본 및 중국에 대하여 모두 상대적으로 크게 증가할 것이나 중국보다는 일본에 대한 수출이 잠재적으로 조금 더 증가할 것으로 기대된다. 예를 들면, 한국의 일본에 대한 수출이 잠재적으로 증가할 것으로 기대되는 품목들은 의류, 가방 및 기타 섬유제품; 수산물 및 육류; 사무용기기 부분품; 제조업 잡제품; 알루미늄 등 화학 잡제품; 시계 및 벽시계 등으로 나타났다. 국가간 무역의 품목분류를 세분하고 각국의 전체무역뿐 아니라 양국간 무역을 함께 살펴봄에 따라 국가간 보완적인 관계를 더욱 잘 찾아볼 수 있었다. English Abstract: This paper reviews the degree of competition and complementarity among three Northeast Asian countries China, Japan and Korea. An attempt is made to identify sectors or commodities that are expected to potentially increase trade between Korea and China or Japan. For the analysis, bilateral, as well as total trade at a somewhat disaggregated commodity level, are considered. We try to analyze the extent of the structural similarities (between one's exports and the other's imports and vice versa, therefore, comlementarity) in international trade between the Northeast Asian countries with the index of trade conformity (ITC). The ITC analysis yielded the following implications. Korea's imports from Japan are much more likely to increase than those from China, in a potential sense. Potentially speaking, Korea's exports to the two other countries will increase relatively, somewhat more for Korea's exports to Japan than to China. Looking at it another way, in terms of potential, Korea's exports to China are much more likely to increase than are China's exports to Korea. The overall aggregate trade structures (between one's exports and the other's imports and vice versa) of Japan and Korea are quite similar, therefore complementary, and Japan's exports to Korea are potentially a little more likely to increase than are Korea's exports to Japan. We also try to identify some commodities which are expected to increase bilateral trade between Korea and China or Japan. For example, Korea's exports to Japan have the potential to increase in apparel, bags, and textile articles; fish and meat; arts for office machines; miscellaneous manufactured goods; aluminum, copper; miscellaneous chemical products; and watches and clocks. It was possible to identify even more complementary relationships between the countries as the product classification was disaggregated further.