Japanese Peace Settlement Research Articles

The Question of South Korean Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

This article examines why South Korea could not sign the Japanese peace treaty. Using American, British and Korean records, it shows that South Korea’s exclusion from the treaty owed to international and Korean domestic factors. While the US, the most important decision-maker in crafting the peace treaty, sought to invite South Korea as a signatory as part of the effort to build up the legitimacy of that government, Britain was adamantly against it. London reasoned that South Korea was neither a former belligerent that fought against Japan nor legally an independent country, and thus not entitled to sign the treaty. Furthermore, Britain worried that inviting the non-communist South Korea could dissuade neutralist Asian states from co-signing the treaty. Japan was equally against having its former colony (Korea) sign the peace treaty, arguing that Koreans might use this as a pretext to demand compensation, which would damage the US schemes to rebuild Japanese economy. But most notably, South Korea itself indicated willingness to forgo signing the treaty. When pressed for time, the US decided to exclude South Korea and proceed promptly with a Japanese peace settlement.

Anchor for peace: the United States Navy in the shaping of the Japanese peace settlement

This essay sheds new light on the formation of the Japanese peace settlement of 1951 by tracing the history of the United States Navy’s occupation, development and retention of its major base at Yokosuka. It argues that peace making was a process that proceeded from the individual and local community to the national and international levels. By promoting mutually beneficial civil–naval relations in Yokosuka, base commander Captain ‘Benny’ Decker educated Japanese and American leaders in the desirability of the navy’s retaining a base there – even before the outbreak of war in Korea made its value obvious. Decker helped build consensus within the American government on base retention and demonstrated its practicality to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Thus diplomats and political leaders came to peace making in 1951 having already voluntarily concluded, on the basis of local conditions no less than large geopolitical circumstances, that continued American naval and military presence, within the framework of a broader security agreement, was the preferred way to preserve Japan’s security. Their decisions a half-century ago laid the foundations for a new maritime security order in the Pacific that continues to this day.

The Diplomacy of Dependency: The Philippines and Peacemaking with Japan, 1945–52

Historians have examined the Japanese peace settlement of 1951 in a variety of ways. A few have treated it as an episode in the ongoing evolution of the structure of international relations in the Pacific and East Asia. Most have focused on the interaction between the principal victor, the United States, and vanquished Japan, weighing the negotiating successes and failures of each and assessing the impact of the settlement on subsequent Japanese-American relations. Recently still other historians have exploited newly available archival materials to analyze the role middle-range powers such as Australia and Britain played in shaping the 1951 peace treaty. While this research has revealed a great deal about the San Francisco peace settlement, it has left unexplored the part small powers played in a major restructuring of the Pacific/East Asian international order.

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, by Bernard C. Cohen

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, <i>by Bernard C. Cohen</i>

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement

Journal Article The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement Get access The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By Bernard C. Cohen. Foreword by Frederick S. Dunn. Princeton University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. xi+293 pp. Index. $6. 48s. C. J. C. C. J. C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 34, Issue 3, July 1958, Page 405, https://doi.org/10.2307/2605259 Published: 01 July 1958

Review: The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, by Bernard C. Cohen

Book Review| May 01 1958 Review: The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, by Bernard C. Cohen The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace SettlementBernard C. Cohen Ruhl Bartlett Ruhl Bartlett Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Pacific Historical Review (1958) 27 (2): 209–210. https://doi.org/10.2307/3636094 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Ruhl Bartlett; Review: The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, by Bernard C. Cohen. Pacific Historical Review 1 May 1958; 27 (2): 209–210. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3636094 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentPacific Historical Review Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1958 The Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement.

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement.

The “Exclusion” of the United Kingdom from the Anzus Pact

The signing of the ANZUS Pact represented a confluence of attitudes. Australia and New Zealand were disturbed at the liberal Japanese peace treaty, while the United States wanted the treaty to go through with as little opposition as possible. All three countries were afraid of the march of communism in the Far East. The ANZUS Treaty made the Japanese peace settlement palatable to the Pacific Dominions, and at the same time it improved the channels of military cooperation in the Pacific. The significance of ANZUS lay as much in what it did not say as in its formal provisions; the United Kingdom was not included in ANZUS, and its absence gave rise to an extended debate in several countries. There were objections from certain Australian and New Zealand political leaders, and in the United Kingdom the Conservatives lamented “exclusion” while the Labor government declared “… it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact”.

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By Bernard C. Cohen. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies. 1957. Pp. x, 293. $6.00.)

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By Bernard C. Cohen. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies. 1957. Pp. x, 293. $6.00.) Get access The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By Cohen Bernard C.. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies. 1957. Pp. x, 293. $6.00.) Roger F. Hackett Roger F. Hackett Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 63, Issue 1, October 1957, Pages 158–159, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/63.1.158 Published: 01 October 1957

Political Communication on the Japanese Peace Settlement

Journal Article Political Communication on the Japanese Peace Settlement Get access BERNARD C. COHEN BERNARD C. COHEN *Mr. Cohen is Research Associate at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, and Managing Editor ofWorld Politics. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 1, SPRING 1956, Pages 27–38, https://doi.org/10.1086/266595 Published: 01 January 1956