Japanese Negotiations Research Articles

재조선 일본인 귀환자의 한일 청구권 문제, 1945-1965

This article examines how the Japanese who lived in Korea during the period of J apanese colonization perceived and responded to the total property of colonial assets confiscate d by the USAMGIK in the South KoreanJapanese negotiations. This is an attempt to analyze c hronologically how the Japanese repatriates' perceived their colonial rule and pulled strings for the issue of claims between two countries. Furthermore, it is possible to show at what point the y showed the limitations of influence on the Japanese diplomacy toward South Korea.

Writing-Mediated Interaction Face-to-Face: Sinitic Brushtalk in the Japanese Missions’ Transnational Encounters with Foreigners During the Mid-Nineteenth Century

Abstract Drawing on Chinese-Japanese transnational and transcultural interaction in the mid-nineteenth century, this article illustrates how Sinitic brushtalk functioned as an effective modality of communication between Chinese and Japanese literati who did not have a shared spoken language. The illustrations are adapted from personal diary-like travelogues of Japanese travelers to Shanghai on board the Senzaimaru in 1862 and participants in the Japanese mission to the United States in 1860. The recollection of the brushtalkers with their Chinese interlocutors whom they met on the way, including those during their return journey from the US while calling at trading ports like Batavia and Hong Kong, provides elaborate details on how writing-mediated improvisation using brush, ink, and paper allowed Japanese travelers with literacy in Sinitic to engage in “silent conversation” with their literate Chinese counterparts. A third historical context where Sinitic brushtalk was put to meaningful use was US–Japanese negotiations during Commodore Perry’s naval expedition to Edo Bay in 1854, where Luo Sen, bilingual in Chinese (spoken Cantonese) and English, was hired to perform the role of secretary. Throughout the negotiations, Luo was able to perform his duties admirably in part by impressing the Japanese side with his fine brushtalk improvisations. While misunderstanding and miscommunication could not be entirely avoided, the article concludes that until the early 1900s writing-mediated interaction through Sinitic brushtalk in face-to-face encounters functioned adequately and effectively as a scripta franca between literate Japanese and their Chinese “silent conversation” partners both within and beyond Sinographic East Asia. Such a unique modality of communication remained vibrant until the advent of nationalism and the vernacularization of East Asian national languages at the turn of the century.

Two-level game analysis of Japan in the TPP negotiations

Starting his second term as Japanese prime minister in late 2012, Shinzo Abe regarded Japan’s participation in TPP negotiations as one of the top priority foreign policy issues. Abe successfully acquired a concession from President Barack Obama in order to enter the TPP negotiations without prior commitment to the total elimination of tariffs. After entry into the negotiations, Japan found a way to offer a tariff elimination on the politically sensitive agricultural products. Although the Japanese negotiation team was a latecomer in the TPP negotiation, its members played an instrumental role in reaching an agreement by helping other negotiating partners in the process. In addition, other factors including Japan-Australia FTA, the break-up of the Japan-US cabinet level meeting, and the Chinese initiative in AIIB motivated the American negotiators to reach an agreement. Japan’s role became even more important with the US withdrawal from the agreement, eventually contributing to a successful conclusion of the TPP agreement among 11 countries. Employing a two-level game framework, this study examines how Japan reached an important agreement with the United States in the original TPP negotiations, and then, after the American withdrawal, with other countries in the TPP 11 negotiations.

Business Culture’s Influence on Negotiators’ Ethical Ideologies and Judgment: An Eight-Country Study

As international business grows, focus on ethical business practices intensifies and insight into negotiators’ attitudes towards unethical negotiating practices is essential. Using a sample of managers from eight countries, we find evidence that a country’s business culture affects the distribution of ethical orientations/positions. Similar distributions are found among countries with similar business cultures versus national cultures (e.g., we find Japanese negotiators similar to U.S. negotiators and differing from Chinese negotiators). We then find ethical orientations and ethical positions drive perceptions of the appropriateness of using various unethical negotiating tactics—important insights for hiring and training negotiators and preparing for cross-cultural negotiations.

Economics, culture, and electoral reform: The case of Japanese agricultural trade negotiations

ABSTRACTThe effect of electoral structure on foreign policy is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan, which resulted in significant changes to electoral power structures, provide an opportunity to understand if and how electoral structure influences foreign policy. This article examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan’s agricultural negotiating position as an extension of its agricultural policy changed after the 1994 electoral reforms. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on Japan’s trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. The article finds that the Japanese negotiating position did not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of economic factors mediated by democratic electoral structures on economic foreign policy.

Humor and laughter in Japanese groups: The kuuki of negotiations

AbstractThe following article examines concrete examples of naturally occurring humor and laughter taken from simulated Japanese negotiations. Task-oriented negotiations were held in group settings, and participants were assigned conflicting interests to observe the occurrence of laughter in conflict situations. In-depth analyses of several negotiations are conducted in an attempt to reveal how humor and laughter are used to affect the negotiation process, and to shed light on how Japanese negotiators perceive and manage conflict situations. The current study reveals that Japanese conversations are governed by a concept known as

Japanese Negotiation Through Emerging Final Particles in Everyday Talk

This article focuses on the grammar of Japanese kara ‘because/so’ and kedo ‘but’, traditionally understood as conjunctive particles whose function is to mark a “subordinate” clause and connect it to a following “main” clause. This article shows that, in conversation, these forms are often used turn-finally without an apparent main clause and that they are grammaticizing into final particles functioning to yield a turn. Then lexicalized uses of kara ‘because/so’ exploited for turn continuation purposes are considered, showing that different uses of kara ‘because/so’ reflect various stages of its ongoing change. It is argued that the lexicalized independent conjunction dakara is developing from a “consequential” conjunctive particle connecting two clauses to an independent “non-consequential” form. This article shows that this non-consequential form is used for giving explanations for an assertion in an immediately preceding turn and for (re)claiming a turn. Findings shed light on the grammar of turn continuation and highlight the diachronically and synchronically emergent nature of Japanese interactants' grammar.

Hybridity, memory and counter-memory: the short fiction of Sinai C. Hamada

This paper explores engagements with cultural memory in selected short fiction by the prominent Filipino-Japanese mestizo writer in English, Sinai C. Hamada (1912–1991). Hamada's earliest exposure to literature took the form of oral narratives, which ranged from folktales to community events told to him by his Igorot (Ibaloi) mother and maternal grandmother. In as much as his source is the heard narrative rather than the western notion of fiction as an assemblage of elements, his fiction emphasizes the social dimension of creative writing and underscores the link between literature and history. Hamada's fiction depicts Igorot–Japanese encounters and negotiations. These are small chapters of history that are often taken for granted but offer new avenues of intervention by challenging hegemonic American discourse and highlighting a strategy of resistance in managing the everyday. Drawing on postcolonial discourse and semiotic analysis, the essay sets Hamada's images of Igorot–Japanese relations against archive photographs and other popular media forms to assert and re-semanticize the cultural and everyday fas-ang (crossing over) between the Igorots and Japanese at a particular point in history.

Summary of General Discussion on “Determinants of Staging Categories for Tariff Elimination in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Negotiations of Free Trade Agreements”

Summary of General Discussion on “Determinants of Staging Categories for Tariff Elimination in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Negotiations of Free Trade Agreements”

The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity

This article examines Japan's relations with the Soviet Union/Russian Federation during the sixteen-year period between Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 and Putin's completion of his first year as president in the spring of 2001. It identifies five lost windows of opportunity for solving the Northern Territories dispute between these two nations, which might have significantly improved the bilateral relationship. At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986–1988, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989 saw structural rigidity on the part of Japanese policy-makers hampering the faster development of the relationship. The third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992 was the consequence of a failure in policy choices on the Japanese side and of policy-makers not fulfilling their responsibility. At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997–1998, the Japanese side learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at the forefront of Japanese and Russian negotiators’ mind. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast and effectively in 2000–2001, and then were suddenly crushed because of domestic issues in Japan. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in negotiating with the Russians, but the negotiators were unable to overcome domestic constraint.

Getting What You Want: The Role of Culture and Partner’s Needs in Predicting the Effectiveness of Influence in Negotiation

Consistent with a dynamic constructivist approach to culture, we propose the negotiation context activates a different set of needs for U.S. and Japanese negotiators. While both U.S. and Japanese negotiators have needs to be logical and to uphold social norms, we propose that the effectiveness of influence strategies will be explained more by a need for logic in U.S. negotiations and a need to uphold social norms in Japanese negotiations. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 15 U.S. and 15 Japanese dyads that negotiated a conflict simulation. Results indicate that the interaction between a negotiator's use of influence and the partner's underlying needs in predicting how much value negotiators claim is distinct in the U.S. and the Japanese culture. Findings offer extensions to existing theory on culture and negotiation and implications for managers in cross-cultural negotiation and conflict settings.

Starting Out on the Right Foot: Negotiation Schemas When Cultures Collide

AbstractWe investigate the intercultural negotiation schemas of 100 experienced Japanese and U.S. negotiators. Specifically, we examine the assumptions negotiators make about appropriate behavior when primed to negotiate with an intercultural (vs. intracultural) counterpart. We find that intercultural negotiation schemas clash on six of nine elements, meaning U.S. and Japanese negotiators have significantly different expectations about what it is like to negotiate with the other. This clash occurs not because negotiators stay anchored on their own cultural assumptions about negotiating, but rather because they try to adjust to their counterpart’s cultural assumptions about negotiating. But negotiators adjust their schemas by thinking about how their counterpart negotiates in an intracultural rather than intercultural setting. That is, they fail to account for the fact that their counterpart would also adjust expectations for the intercultural context. The phenomenon we uncover is one of schematic overcompensation, whereby negotiators’ intercultural schemas do not match because each negotiator expects the encounter to be just like the counterpart’s within‐culture negotiations. Our theory of schematic overcompensation receives some support, and negotiators’ perceived knowledge and experience with the other culture somewhat attenuates the phenomenon. Implications for negotiator cognition, intercultural negotiation, and global management are discussed.

The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856 (review)

Reviewed by: The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856 A. Hamish Ion The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856. By John D. Grainger. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 2008. ISBN 978-1-84383-354-3. Maps. Notes. Sources and bibliography. Index. Pp. xv, 207. $90.00. The title is an attempt to attract readers. The book is about the Crimean War in the Pacific, which was certainly not the First Pacific War. John D. Grainger is writing here popular history and he writes fluidly, making good use of the British Admiralty records; but this book is of no interest to the specialist and even the general reader has to be skeptical about some of its claims about the consequences of Crimean War for the Pacific region. For instance, recent studies by Mitani Hiroshi and Michael R. Auslin on Japanese negotiations with the Western powers in the 1850s and 1860s would not back up the contention that it was British, French and Russian maritime activity in the waters around Japan during this [End Page 1298] war “which brought home to the Japanese government the real dangers of their isolation” (p. 188). Grainger’s book simply lacks the depth and breadth of poly-lingual sources featured in the well-written and interesting books and articles on the Russian push toward Japan and the Pacific in the mid-nineteenth century by specialists like John Stephan and the late George Lensen. Grainger divides his book into nine chapters: The Royal Navy in the Pacific; the Pursuit to Petropavlovsk; Japan, China, the Amur River; Petropavlovsk Again; the Gulf of Tartary; the Sea of Okhotsk; the Amur Estuary; Plans, and lastly, Victims. Royal Navy operations begin with its Pacific Squadron searching with its French ally for two Russian warships known to be in the vast stretches of the north Pacific, which quickly leads to the abortive Anglo-French attack on Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The China Squadron subsequently searched the Sea of Okhotsk where British efforts were hampered by a lack of good maps and the pusillanimous caution of a Commodore. Ice meant that operations could only be conducted in that northerly Sea during a relatively short summer season, and the war ended before it could be taken to the Russian strongholds on the Amur River. Even if they were not spectacular, British actions were effective in preventing Russian warships from posing any danger to British merchant shipping and in avoiding a further deterioration of Anglo-American relations. Grainger points out the British were concerned about the possibility of United States involvement in the war (p. 64), and Russian posts in Alaska were treated as neutral for fear of giving offence to the Americans (p. 32). Within a few years of the end of the war the Russians had expanded southward at the expense of Imperial China to where Vladivostok now stands, and had sold Alaska to America, but the China Squadron barred any extension of Imperial Russia to Tsushima, Hokkaidô and northern Honshû. Despite its flaws, it is hoped this book will contribute to sparking further interest in things naval in the Pacific during a century that was marked by high imperialism and by high adventure. A. Hamish Ion Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, Ontario, Canada Copyright © 2008 Society for Military History

Getting What You Want: The Role of Culture in Predicting the Effectiveness of Informational and Relational Persuasive Strategies in Conflict Resolution

Theory on culture and influence in negotiation predicts cultural differences along the lines of informational versus relational persuasion. We review empirical findings that do not offer consistent support for the existing theory. We then uncover a refined four-factor model of persuasion in cross-cultural negotiations. We find that U.S. negotiators endorse interests-based persuasion whereas Japanese negotiators endorse rational persuasion, both of which are forms of informational persuasion. We also find that U.S. negotiators endorse ingratiation whereas Japanese negotiators endorse sanction-based persuasion, both of which are forms of relational persuasion. Consistent with prior cross-cultural research, we also find that the use of culturally-normative strategies assists negotiators in resolving a dispute simulation.

The timing and function of offers in U.S. and Japanese negotiations.

The authors examined the function of offers in U.S. and Japanese integrative negotiations. They proposed that early 1st offers begin information sharing and generate joint gains in Japan but have an anchoring effect that hinders joint gains in the United States. The data from the negotiation transcripts of 20 U.S. and 20 Japanese dyads supported 2 hypothesized interactions: Early offers generated higher joint gains for Japanese negotiators and lower joint gains for U.S. negotiators, and the exchange of information prior to the 1st offer generated higher joint gains for U.S. negotiators and lower joint gains for Japanese negotiators. Additional analyses supported predictions that early offer patterns represent information gathering in Japanese negotiations and information consolidation in U.S. negotiations. The results contribute to theories of negotiation and culture by showing that the use and efficacy of early offers and information exchange differ across cultures.

Cross-Cultural Negotiating: A Japanese-American Case Study from Higher Education

AbstractThis article discusses a cross-cultural negotiation process between a new Japanese university and an established American university to create a joint business venture – a dual-degree program. The parties failed to sign a contract, and there were indicators during negotiations pointing to the likelihood of a failed outcome. Negotiation style convergence was evident, with the Japanese adopting an erabi ('either-or') style and the Americans an awase ('more-or-less') style. The 7-Step framework used to structure the negotiation discussion may be better suited to analyzing Japanese negotiation processes than American. The implications will be of value to Japanese and American/Western businesspeople or educational administrators involved in joint venture-type negotiations.

Effects of Culture, Power, and the Problem-Solving Approach on International Bilateral Negotiations: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Simulated Negotiation Processes and Outcomes

The issues of culture and power have been frequently debated in the study of negotiation. The problem-solving approach which considers needs and concerns of the adversary has received growing attention. This study is designed to investigate effects of these variables on the process and outcomes of international bilateral negotiations. Using simulation research methods, the study makes comparisons between U.S. and Japanese negotiators and between symmetric and asymmetric negotiations. The study further examines the effectiveness of the problem-solving approach by comparing negotiations in which one of the negotiators is instructed to use the approach to those in which neither of them is instructed to use it. Results indicate that the cultural variable affects the process and outcomes of international bilateral negotiations more significantly than the power and approach variables. For instance, U.S. dyads spent fewer minutes to resolve negotiation issues and reached more agreement.

Doing business with the new Japan

A view from the Ambassador's chair the Aisatsu the American negotiation style the Japanese negotiation style life in a cultural thicket negotiator selection and team assignment negotiation preliminaries the conduct of negotiations at the negotiation table after negotiations culture and personality issues experiences of four American companies the big picture a summary of prescriptions for Americans.

Japanese and American negotiators: Overcoming cultural barriers to understanding

The article focuses on how cultural differences affect the outcome of intercultural negotiations. Evidence suggests that cultural differences may impede communication between negotiators from different cultural backgrounds. A lack of appreciation for the implications of cultural differences may affect the success of business negotiations. The results of research on the cultural differences that lead to the different negotiating styles of Japanese and American businesspeople are discussed, and the findings of the research are analyzed.

Inter- and Intracultural Negotiation: U.S. and Japanese Negotiators

Inter- and Intracultural Negotiation: U.S. and Japanese Negotiators