Japanese Authorities Research Articles

Japanese B encephalitis in Korea; the epidemic of 1949.

An epidemic of Japanese B occurred during the months of 1949 in Korea. The present report concerns epidemiological, clinical and etiological studies pertaining to this outbreak. Because of the general inaccessibility of previous Korean and Japanese reports, a review of such literature pertaining to prior occurrence of the disease in Korea appears desirable. HISTORY OF PREVIOUS ENCEPHALITIS IN KOREA There are no Public Health records concerning previous instances of Japanese B in Korea, because Japanese health authorities did not require that this disease be reported, hence, the only available information on its appearance is in periodic medical publications in the Japanese or Korean language. Prior to 1933 several cases of summer encephalitis were reported, 1 but only a few are strongly suggestive of Japanese B encephalitis. An outbreak of in epidemic proportions occurred in Korea during the months of 1934 and 1935 with clinical observations

In re Eisenträger and Others.

Jurisdiction — Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of United States Military Commissions in China after the War.Warfare on Land — Armistice — Observance of — Unconditional Surrender of Germany — Engaging in Military Activity in Violation of Instrument of Surrender — German Subjects in China Collaborating with Japanese Authorities against United States Armed Forces — War Crimes — Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of United States Military Commissions in China after the War.

Allied Council for Japan

At a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on March 1, 1950, the British Commonwealth representative, Colonel W. R. Hodgson of Australia, urged General MacArthur to take “positive action” on Japanese charges that war prisoners in the Soviet Union had been denied repatriation unless they agreed to join the communist party upon their return. Colonel Hodgson criticized General MacArthur's policy of maintaining that the Allied Council could only discuss the issue, and demanded that the Council order Japanese authorities to make a thorough investigation of the accusations, particularly to determine if charges of treason should be brought against Kiyuchi Tokuda, general secretary of the Japanese communist party. William Sebald, United States representative on the Council, after an original statement that Colonel Hodgson's proposal was “not appropriate,” agreed to suggest that Japanese authorities launch a “positive” inquiry. The Japanese government on the following day announced initiation of an investigation.

Internment Camp Food in Occupied China

This study of the nutritive value of food in the Civilian Assembly Center, Wei Hsien, Shantung, North China, as provided by Japanese authorities for civilian enemy aliens, was made during Dr. Kramer’s six months’ internment at Wei Hsien. Previous to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Dr. Kramer had been chairman, Department of Home Economics, Yenching University, Peiping, and since her return on the Gripsholm she has resumed her duties as Professor of Food Economics and Nutrition, School of Home Economics, Kansas State College, Manhattan. Ralph Lewis, M.D., of the Presbyterian Mission, took charge of the weighing of internees of the Peiping group, and R. C. Sailer, Ph.D, Department of Psychology, Yenching University, supplied the statistical summary of the data.

Problems of War Production Control in Japan

S INCE PEARL HARBOR the American people have had considerable experience of the difficulties involved in placing a complex industrial economy on a modern war footing and in seeing that this war economy is properly administered. There is some degree of satisfaction in knowing that Japan has been experiencing similar difficulties, and in very acute form. The fact that Americans had credited Japan with a thoroughly streamlined economic organization, along with the other elements of a well-oiled war machine, tends to enhance this satisfaction. There is good reason to assert that the United States War Production Board, as an instrument of production control which combines the essential features of flexibility and centralized authority, has been, despite all its troubles, considerably more effective than Japan's unwieldy apparatus, which General Tojo inherited at the outbreak of war and which he has been laboriously remodeling against many political obstacles for the past twelve months. Certain aspects of Japan's economic preparations for war were managed with great efficiency. In the period which preceded Pearl Harbor, the procurement of strategic raw materials and vital machine tools which Japan lacked was planned with extreme care and thoroughly implemented. There is clear evidence that the Japanese military authorities manipulated this program from behind the scenes. They were also instrumental in stimulating an unusually rapid development of the automotive and airplane industries in Japan after 1938. Arguing from these facts, Westerners have been inclined to credit the Japanese military with a greater degree of control over the productive system in Japan than they actually possessed. In this respect, the analogy often drawn between Japan and Nazi Germany is misleading, true as it may be in other respects. The Nazis won virtually full control over the German state apparatus in 1933-34. This political monopoly carried with it practically unlimited authority over the German economic system, which was comprehensively reorganized for war over a six-year period. Nothing like so sweeping and

Annex 8: American Nationals Who Have Been Reported To Have Been Assaulted, Arbitrarily Detained, Subjected to Indignities, Et Cetera, Since July 7, 1937, by Japanese Authorities or Agents

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Changing Far Eastern Policies of the Soviet Union

destined to face the northward sweep of Japanese forces alone. During the opening months of warfare the Soviet Foreign Office repeatedly denied reports that it was giving assistance to the Chinese, and it charged in answer that the stories of such assistance were inspired by certain groups in Japan in order to provoke a conflict. Indeed, Soviet policy at that time was to adjust as amicably as possible any difficulties with Japan. As early as December 1931, the first offer of a nonaggression pact was tendered by Litvinoff to Japan. Although this correct attitude was observed throughout the first phase of the war, many incidents occurred between Japanese authorities and Soviet citizens in Manchuria, and in 1932 the first border clash was reported. During this period all adjustments were attempted through bilateral negotiation; the Soviet Union refused to co-operate with the Lytton Commission, as it later, in 1933, refused to serve on the League Advisory Committee. Its reasons, as stated at the time, were that it did not trust the motives of the Commission, and further, that since it was neither a member of the League nor recognized by some of the most important countries involved (viz. the United States), it could not be sure that its interests would

The Yen and the Sword

CURRENCY has proved to be one of the decisive weapons in the present war between Japan and China. Much though its importance is underrated by many close observers of the great conflict, the two participants have long been well aware of this fact. More than two years before military hostilities actually started, the SinoJapanese currency war was already in full swing. The Japanese took the offensive when they attempted, early in I935, to link North China's currency with that of the Bloc. It was hoped that by this means the five big northern provinces could be severed from China and virtually conquered by Japan, without any expenditure of blood and ammunition. It was not only by Japan's diplomatic and military pressure, coupled with a great variety of subversive political activities in North China, that this scheme was to be forced on the unwilling country. China's old and obsolete silver currency being in a precarious state at that time, the Japanese realized the chances of direct, aggressive action in the monetary field itself. This took the form of an attempt at denuding China, and especially the Northern provinces, of silver, the legal tender. Under the careful direction of the Japanese authorities on the spot, therefore, very large quantities of silver coins and bars were bought up by Japanese agents in the North, at the abnormally low prices, measured in terms of foreign exchange, which then prevailed in China. In spite of the Chinese Government's ban on silver exports, it was smuggled out to Japan, where its arrival was not shown in the official import returns. But the re-shipping of the silver to Britain was done quite openly, Japan's official foreign trade statistics giving a total of more than Yen 275,000,000 of such silver exports for the years from I934 to I936. The Chinese origin of the metal was obvious enough, for Japan is not itself a producer of

Von Siebold and the “Flora Japonica”

PHILIPP FBANZ VON SIEBOLD was born at Würzburg on Feb. 17, 1796. He studied at his home university, where he received his doctorate in medicine in 1820. In 1823 he arrived at Decima, Japan, as a military doctor, but he also devoted himself to the natural history, medicine, ethnology, ethnography, and history of Japan. At Nagasaki he founded a medical school and clinic, but for political reasons some of his ever-increasing botanical, zoological, mineralogical, and geological collections were confiscated by the Japanese authorities in 1828; fortunately, not long before he had sent many specimens to Leyden. He also sent a living tea plant to Java, thus originating tea culture on that island. In 1827, Siebold published a small catalogue of Japanese economic plants. On Dec. 30, 1829, political unrest was so acute that he was ordered to leave Japan, and he then settled in Holland. He met the German singer, J. J. Hoffmann, who was also a linguist. In 1845, Hoff-mann published a description of Siebold's books, manuscripts, and maps which he had brought from Japan. Zuccarini, the Munich botanist, helped with the classification of botanical material. Publication of the “Flora Japonica” was begun in 1835 and continued until 1842, but after Zuccarini's death, von Siebold discontinued further publication and the materials became the property of the Government Herbarium at Leyden, where the Von Siebold Collection is still visited and consulted by botanists. Von Siebold's influence on horticulture was even greater. His imported specimens formed a nucleus for horticulture in Belgium and Holland, but the original “Jardin d'Acclimatisation: Nippon” no longer exists. His zoological collections are preserved in the Museum of Natural History at Leyden and his ethnographical material at the Leyden Ethnographical Museum. Von Siebold died at Munich on Oct. 18, 1866.

The Dragon Terrestrial and the Dragon Celestial: A study of the Lung, , and the Ch'ên,

The Dragon is a Being, or rather, a nonentity, that though he never existed, has had to be invented. The human race soon found that it could not get on without him, and the imaginative fecundity of primitive man was called in to redress a biological oversight of Nature. When summoned to mythologic but influential life, he discovered no sinecure in his functions. Constant appeals from Oriental Rulers, Shamans, and the populace generally, to “co-ordinate” and “rationalize” his resources, in other words, to distribute rain more often, more widely, and more seasonably, may have seemed hardly compensated by his decorative popularity, or the flattering attentions of his pious but insistent devotees., Still noblesse oblige, and so the Dragon reigns among the thunder clouds above, and the thunder clouds (sooner or later) rain upon the earth beneath. Considerable research has been devoted to the Dragon by Western scholars, among whom may be mentioned Elliot Smith, and especially M. W. de Visser, who cites abundant passages from Chinese and Japanese authorities in his attractive volume. Japanese authorities in his attractive volume. And much earlier than either of the above, Gustave Schlegel had descanted fully upon the Dragon and its astronomic symbolism. The present essay, however, has a less ambitious aim, and a more restricted scope. Its object is twofold. In the first part it will present and publish (among the others) a form of the character lung “dragon”, which seems to have escaped the notice of all the Oriental epigraphists, whether Chinese or Japanese, so far as I can ascertain, but must be one of the most archaic, as it is perhaps the most elaborate, of the designs for the character in question.

American influence in municipal government in the orient

AbstractOn two occasions, Dr. Beard has been called to Japan to advise with the Japanese authorities on municipal government.

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IN KOREA

The great influenza pandemic made its appearance in Korea during the month of September, 1918. There seems to be no doubt that the infection came from Europe, via Siberia. The disease spread from north to south along the line of the Southern Manchurian Railway. The first cases seen by us in Seoul, the capital, were during the latter part of September. Before the middle of October the epidemic was at its height. The insanitary conditions of oriental life greatly enhanced the spread of the infection. At present it is impossible to estimate either the number of cases or deaths, as accurate information has not been received from the Japanese authorities. From one quarter to one half of the population must have been affected. Most of the schools were closed, owing to the high incidence among the scholars and teachers. As elsewhere the serious nature of the outbreak was due to

THE JAPANESE AND OPIUM.

The use of opium in China is apparently regarded by the Japanese authorities as one of the causes of the decadence of that empire. To such an extent does this feeling exist that it is said that out of a number of Japanese coolies employed in the China-Japanese War, a certain portion contracted the opium habit and for this were brought before the Japanese commander. Rather than allow them to return to Japan and introduce the habit there, it is reported that he had them lined up and shot. Considering the community of political interests in the Orient, and general friendly feeling between Japan and Great Britain, the pro-opium tendencies of the British government are perhaps worth considering as bringing in a discordant element that may give trouble in the future.

Eastern Asia at the Fisheries Exhibition

THE sections of the Fisheries Exhibition devoted to China, Japan, and the British settlements and protected native states in the Malay Peninsula, are in some respects disappointing. The interest and beauty of the Chinese section are indeed unsurpassed; but the other sections fall far below what might have been anticipated. At the Fisheries Exhibition in Berlin three years ago, Japan was excellently represented; and when we recollect that fish forms one of the principal—probably next to rice and millet, the principal—staples of Japanese food, that the fishing-grounds extend from the most northern Kuriles almost within the Arctic circle, through various zones down to the most southern islands of the Loochoo archipelago, where they approach the sub-tropical regions, and that the primitive methods of catching and preserving fish of more than one race are now daily practised in various parts of this chain of islands, known as the Japanese Empire, it will be seen what scope the Japanese authorities had to make their section of much practical and scientific interest. At Berlin their section did possess such interest, and the collection formed for exhibition there has, we believe, been made the nucleus for a domestic and permanent Fisheries Exhibition in Tokio. Failing the time or funds necessary to make a representative collection for London this year, it was open to the Japanese Government to take a single portion of their vast fishing-grounds-such as Yezo, or the Inland Sea, or the Loochoo Archipelago-and represent that only. This has been done by China with marked success. As it is, Japan is represented in the small space allotted to her by specimens of the fish tinned at the Government canning establishments at Sapporo in Yezo, and by a stall full of pictures on silk, lacquer, &c., of fish and fishing. These latter are all marked, “for sale at the close of the Exhibition.” Doubtless the Japanese authorities had good reasons of their own for thus limiting their participation in the present Exhibition; still it is permissible to express regret that they did not add, as they undoubtedly could have done, more to its value and interest.