Japan Security Cooperation Research Articles

What Made South Korea–Japan Security Cooperation Retreat During the Moon Jae-in Administration?

This article elucidates the reasons behind South Korea’s diminished security cooperation with Japan during the Moon Jae-in administration (2017–2022). The author discovered that President Moon halted ongoing security cooperation activities initiated by his predecessor, even though the North Korean nuclear threat became exponential. In particular, this article argues that not the national-level factors, such as South Koreans’ negative perception of Japan on the basis of their collective memory, but the leader factor was the main reason for the worsening of South Korea–Japan’s security cooperation during the Moon administration, contrary to most people’s expectations. The Moon administration’s progressive political leaders, who had acquired anti-United States/anti-Japan and pro-North Korea/pro-China perspectives during their anti-government protests in the 1970s and 1980s, decided to be confrontational towards Japan to their political benefit. The reality that the security cooperation between South Korea and Japan jumpstarted once the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration leaders replaced them supports this finding.

New horizons in EU-Japan security cooperation.

Alongside the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the EU and Japan entered into force in 2019. Whereas the EPA enshrines the existing interconnectedness between the Japanese and European economies, the SPA remains more aspirational. With an emphasis on shared norms and values and recognising an increasingly hostile external environment, the EU and Japan are seeking to deepen and broaden their security cooperation. For the period 1990–2017, EU–Japan security cooperation is mapped for a broad range of security domains. During this period, cooperation has increased notably in domains such as economic security, cyber-security and civil protection. In other areas, such as military, regional, energy and human security as well as terrorism, the scope of cooperation lags behind. Looking forward, the SPA not only reflects a renewed interest and level of ambition in the EU and Japan but also provides them with a platform to extend security cooperation to address their global and regional challenges.

It’s time to think boldly about Canada–Japan security cooperation

Policy-makers, scholars, and commentators regularly remark upon the unrealized potential of Canada–Japan cooperation, but neither country has taken decisive steps to address it. This reticence is especially noticeable in the security realm. As friendly, like-minded countries with common values, a common vision of international order, and strongly shared security interests in an increasingly tumultuous world, Canada and Japan would be expected to strengthen security ties in meaningful ways. Recent (relatively minor) steps in this direction are welcome. But the time is ripe for the two countries to cement their security partnership through a series of bolder measures ultimately leading to formal alliance.

India–Japan maritime security cooperation: Secondary states’ soft balancing in the Indo-Pacific

ABSTRACTIndia–Japan security cooperation is a critical component in the evolving security mechanism of the Indo-Pacific region. Both states are secondary states in the international system that opposes one country's emergence as a regional hegemon. China's rise and her ambition to dominate the Indo-Pacific would affect the security interests of India and Japan. The U.S., the current preponderant power in the region, seems unable to contain China by itself. So it is looking for strategic partnerships with regional countries who are militarily capable of challenging China, and persuading them to balance China. In this regard, the two powerful states in China's own backyard – Japan in the western Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean – have come together to counter the Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. In this effort, they have gradually built up naval cooperation sans a formal military alliance. They follow soft balancing strategies over hard balancing ones because neither wants to antagonise China. Similarly both countries seek to expand their presence through mutual cooperation beyond South-east Asia. This article explains the nature and context of soft power balancing strategies and the manner in which the India–Japan maritime security cooperation has evolved over the last two decades.

Japan's security cooperation with Russia: neutralizing the threat of a China–Russia united front

Japan's security cooperation with Russia: neutralizing the threat of a China–Russia united front

Japan's security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam

ABSTRACTJapan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships.

Explaining Australia–Japan security cooperation and its prospects: ‘the interests that bind?’

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we assess the drivers of, and prospects for, further security cooperation in the Australia–Japan bilateral relationship. We argue that while balance of threat and capability gaps may restrain the pace of deepening Australian-Japan security relations, these gaps are diminishing and are, in any case, secondary to the specific shared interests we posit as the primary drivers of Australia–Japan security cooperation. These specific interests, however, are shaped not only by a commitment in both countries to liberal-based principles and freedoms at home and in inter-state relations, but also by a common awareness of the importance of continued US primacy to the ongoing maintenance of those interests. Thus, in the absence of any fundamental change in how Australia and Japan understand their respective interests and the US role in the region, Donald Trump's recent and unexpected election as US president notwithstanding, we conclude that the case for further security cooperation – via additional cross-bracing of their respective US alliance relationships – will almost certainly remain compelling for both countries.

Contextualising Australia–Japan security cooperation: the normative framing of Japanese security policy

ABSTRACTOn July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's cabinet commenced a historic transformation of post-war Japan's security policy by overturning previous interpretations of the constitution's pacifist clause, Article 9. The Cabinet Decision on the Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People stated that collective self-defence was consistent with the constitution and, consequently, Japan would immediately develop a more proactive and less constrained security policy. But while this outcome may seem sensible and overdue from a realist perspective of Japan's standing as a mature democratic nation in an increasingly difficult geopolitical situation, the manner in which it is being enacted may seriously undermine the normative legitimacy of Japan's new security identity. In this article, the author examines how Shinzō Abe's administration has attempted to shape the norms surrounding security policy revision in Japan, and how these norms, in turn, have affected or constrained Abe's agency. This is done with specific reference to the external contexts of the USA's ‘rebalance’ policy and the deepening of Japan's security relationship with Australia, with a view to anticipating how normative turmoil might impact on the potential of this relationship.

India–Japan Security Cooperation: A New Era of Partnership in Asia

The evolving relationship between India and Japan is a development of great strategic significance for the Asia-Pacific region. Both India and Japan are militarily strong nations that are opposed to notions of hegemony, yet face numerous security challenges. Each has territorial problems with China, whose maritime conflicts in the South China Sea have made nations in Southeast Asia extremely anxious. The emerging Sino-Indian competition along with eroding US influence in the Indian Ocean Region makes the situation more complex. In the rapidly evolving balance of power equations, the India–Japan strategic relationship could be a significant game changer.

Korea's strategic thoughts toward Japan: searching for a democratic alliance in the past-driven future

Abstract By reviewing the development of relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan up to the present, since Korea was liberated from Japan's colonial rule, the author will show that changes in the security environment have gradually raised the importance of ROK–Japan security cooperation. South Korea and Japan, both allied to the United States, shared the common goal of defending their society from the communist threat, but their dedication to democratic values was not imminent enough to outweigh their past history. After the demise of the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia, the rationale for South Korean–Japanese security cooperation is to be found in their joint contribution to handle comprehensive security threats in the region, including the issues of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, confidence-building, environmental and energy security, etc. The future of the South Korean–Japanese relationship depends on whether the two sides can build a future-oriented relationship as they move to...

Japan's emerging global role

Part 1 Japan's expanding global interests, Daniel Unger and Paul Blackburn: Japan and the New World Order, R. Gilpin. The Japan That Wants To Be Liked, M. Tamamoto Japan's Global Responsibilities, Y . Okawara. Part 2 Security Issues: US- Japan Security Co-operation, N. Levin Northeast Asia and Japanese Security, M. Nishihara Japan - and the Future of Collective Security, K. Pvle. Part 3 Political Economy Issues: Japan's Changing Political Economy, K. Calder Japanese Trade and Investment Issues, E. Lincoln Japanese ODA and the creation of an East Asian Economy, D. Unger Japanese Technology and Global Influence, D. Mowery Japan's Global Economic Influence, A. Alexander.