Japan National Railways Research Articles

A passenger service revolution? Transport design and passenger experience on Tokyo’s urban railway network, c. 1945–2010

This article discusses the history of efforts to shape passenger experience aboard urban railways through transport design. Taking Japan National Railways (JNR) trains as a case study, it examines the development of design interventions and organisational polices seeking to increase passenger comfort on Tokyo’s urban railway network in the second half of the 20th century. Industry and popular accounts have often tied the improvement of transport quality and passenger experience aboard JNR trains to its privatisation in 1987. In contrast, this article shows that passenger-oriented transport design has been an integral component in a continuous project to make urban railway travel more pleasant that long preceded this 1987 change in governance structures but has been held back by organisational and structural challenges. In doing so, it highlights that transport design involves the conscious shaping of both the “hardware” (i.e. physical transport infrastructure) and “software” (i.e. passenger-staff interactions) of service, as well as the backstage modification of organisational structures and processes that facilitate this framework. Built on a qualitative analysis of Japanese industry publications, newspapers, and secondary sources, the article thus contributes to literature on passenger experience, mobilities design, and transport history.

国鉄における職階給の導入とその変容 : 身分・職・能力の相互関係を中心に

国鉄における職階給の導入とその変容 : 身分・職・能力の相互関係を中心に

Social Shaping of Technological Trajectories of Shinkansen

IntroductionThe Shinkansen, or bullet train, is a world-class Japanese innovation. The Tokaido Shinkansen began operating in 1964 and generated speeds exceeding 200 kmph, which were unheard of at that time for electric trains. This made it a global breakthrough. However, progress on the Shinkansen stagnated thereafter. After running on a provisional schedule for the first year in operation, the Shinkansen schedule was revised in November 1965. The service connected Tokyo and Shin-Osaka stations in 3 hours and 10 minutes at a top speed of 210 kmph. Because the Shinkansen competed with aircraft, speed improvements were essential. Despite this, the speed of the Shinkansen did not improve further until just prior to the splitting and privatization1 of Japan National Railways (JNR) in 1987.First, this paper overviews changes in various types of speed indicators for the Shinkansen. These speed indicators include maximum speed, scheduled speed, and test car maximum speed. The former two speeds are related to actual operations, whereas the latter is a proxy indicator of the technical limits. The maximum speed refers to the fastest speed logged within an operating section; the scheduled speed is calculated by dividing the number of kilometers travelled within an operating section by the time required to travel that distance (including the time required to stop at stations).Upon beginning operation in 1964, the Shinkansen ran on a provisional schedule in a wait-and-see approach; the scheduled speed was quite refrained, so even the express Hikari service between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka stations required 4 hours. The scheduled speed significantly improved in the following year with changes in schedule; subsequently, no changes were observed in both maximum and scheduled speeds until 1985. One may think that the reason for this is the lack of technological developments. However, according to Shinkansen professionals, increasing the speed itself was a simple matter. This can be verified by examining the transition of maximum speeds of test vehicles during the public railways era. Figure 1 provides a summary changes to these three speed indicators.Please note the trend indicated in the circle. We can discover the lack of increases until mid-1980s in scheduled and maximum speeds despite the maximum speed of test vehicles. The changes in schedule in 1985 and 1986 slightly improved the scheduled and maximum speeds; subsequently, these speeds rose dramatically in the first half of the 1990s. Given this, the following two research questions are considered.RQ1: no parallel efforts were made to improve speed related to speed improvements of test cars and operation?RQ2: How were factors preventing the incorporation of technical progress into operations eliminated?This paper responds to these research questions in order.Factors Preventing Technical ProgressThis section considers the first research question, Why no parallel efforts were made to improve speed related to speed improvements of test cars and operation? Primarily inhibiting factors that were uncovered in the study include 1) environmental issues and 2) labor issues.1. Environmental issuesBecause the Shinkansen operates at speeds exceeding 200 kmph and sprints through Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and other areas, which are dense in population, noise pollution is a serious problem. Similar to air and water pollution that became an issue in Japan in the 1970s, noise pollution was considered to be an emerging issue. Thus, regulations were set for noise pollution in 1975 based on Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control. During that time, noise pollution levels were set at 70 dB or less when passing through residential areas, with a goal of achieving this level by 1985. When measuring the noise of the Tokaido Shinkansen in 1973, levels varied widely by location but were generally in the range of 80 to 100 dB. …

만철의 길회선 부설과 북선철도 위탁과정에 관한 연구

This paper analyses the decision process of the Gilhoe Line construction of the Manchurian Railway and consignment process of the North Korea Line to the South Manchuria Railways as part of the 12-year Chosun railway plan. It was found that these two events were connected and could be explained by Japan's consistent continental policy, which had expanded its territory toward China. This paper explicates Japan's railroad policy and the characteristics of the Chosun railway. Moreover, evidence to identify connections among Japan's national railway, the Manchurian railway, and the Chosun railway has been scrutinized. One territory policy between Chosun and Manchuria is also examined. Comparison of new resources on the Gilhoe Line construction of the Manchurian railway and the 12-year plan of the Chosun railway, and their correlations, is expounded. This paper elucidates that the Gilhoe Line construction and the North Korea line consignment operation by the South Manchuria Railways had the intention of obtaining Japanese military and economic supremacy over East Asia.

Who Leads Change Processes?: From the Case Study of Japan Railways Kyusyu

Due to a serious deficit during the 1970s, Japanese government meant to transform Japan National Railway (JNR) in profit organizations. After a lengthy political battle over it, the bill of the privatization of JNR was enacted in 1986 and finally, JR Kyusyu (JRK) was born in 1987. This case shows intriguing change processes, that is, enthusiastic small attempts for change proliferated in the early stage. Throughout the change processes, some who survived spread across the different parts of the organization like a pollination process. Learning back and forth across JRK went on running; consequently, swift change movement started to transform their old organizational culture to new one. It is a teaching case.

Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Focusing on Organizational Structure Change†

In October 2005, the Japan Highway Public Corporation was privatized and separated into three expressway companies. Three other public corporations were privatized as well: the Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation and the Honshu‐Shikoku Bridge Authority. The main purpose of this study is to overview the privatization policy taken by the government and to assess the preliminary organizational reforms. We will focus especially on policy issues such as horizontal separation, vertical (management‐holding) separation and regulatory changes, comparing the before‐privatization and after‐privatization periods of the Japan Highway Public Corporation. Evaluations will be based on empirical investigation and theory, as well as on lessons learned from the privatization of the Japan National Railway. † The previous version of this paper was presented at the 46th Congress for the European Regional Science Association, held at the University of Thessaly, 30 August–3 September 2006.

The Effect of Privatization on Productivity and Capital Adjustment

A JR is one of several freight and passenger railway companies created in 1987 after Japan National Railway (JNR) was privatized and separated. The authors use econometric techniques to examine total factor productivity (TFP) increases and to analyze how performance has changed among the JRs. The authors also examine whether, before privatization, capital input overcapitalization existed. Privatization raised annual TFP growth by 1.62%, bringing total annual TFP growth to 2.97% after privatization. Privatization has largely corrected the former JNR's over-capitalization.

On the Land Use Conversion of the Japan National Railway Properties

On the Land Use Conversion of the Japan National Railway Properties

On the Land Use Conversion of the Japan National Railway Properties

旧国鉄債務は、土地、株式を財源とし償還することとされ、旧国鉄から引き継いだ土地の土地利用転換および売却処分が全国各地で行われている。こうした旧国鉄跡地は、大規模かつ駅周辺にあることから、その土地利用転換は周辺地域の土地利用、都市構造にも多大な影響を及ぼすことが考えられる。さらに単なる土地利用転換でなく債務返還の財源の種地となるため、円滑な債務償還に資する価格での売却が必要であった。つまり旧国鉄跡地は売却による旧国鉄債務の解決および都市課題の解決の両方の観点に基づいた土地利用転換が必要となっていた。 そこで本研究では、旧国鉄跡地について分布状況、規模、活用実態等その全体像を明らかにし、さらに大規模跡地に関連した自治体へのアンケート調査を実施して、旧国鉄跡地の活用プロセスとそれに伴って生じた課題などを明らかにすることを目的とする。 その結果、旧国鉄跡地の分布や規模、土地利用転換等の全体像を明らかにすることができた。またアンケート結果より、跡地利用については概ね高い評価が得られているが、一方で合意形成や要する資金と時間の問題など、解決すべき土地利用転換プロセスの課題も抽出することができた。

Cross-Disciplinary Technology Transfer in Trans-World War II Japan: The Japanese High-Speed Bullet Train as a Case-Study

This empirical case study examines a successful cross-disciplinary technology transfer in a non-Western country. The author argues that the invisible hand of contextual variables defined the contours of the cross-disciplinary application of engineering knowledge. More specifically, the migration of engineers, shaped largely by sociopolitical and cultural factors, constituted the pivotal part of the technology transfer. The central focus is the international and domestic context in which wartime aeronautical engineers developed the car truck of the Japanese high-speed bullet train after World War II. First, the paper analyzes the domestic and institutional context of postwar Japan—namely the Japan National Railways and Railway Technical Research Institute—to illustrate mainly sociopolitical factors that promoted the migration of the wartime engineers and cross-disciplinary technology transfer. As a case study, Dr. Tadashi Matsudaira's laboratory amply demonstrates the successful outcome of the process. The second half of this paper contextualizes the aircraft-to-bullet-train transition in a larger international framework. A series of German-Japanese comparisons highlights the sociopolitical cultures at the national level that contained accumulated wealth of wartime knowledge inside Japan. This case study is among the first to examine the cross-disciplinary transfer of military technology in an international framework.

An assessment of the Japan Railway companies since privatization: Performance, local rail service and debts

This paper deals with three issues related to the privatization of Japan National Railway: the performance of each Japan Railway (JR) since privatization, the state of local rail service since the privatization and the handling of JNR's long-term debts. First, after a summary of what happened during the privatization of JNR in 1987, I will analyse the JRs' performance since privatization, taking the following performance measures: operating revenue cost ratio as an indicator of financial situation; average fare; wage; labour productivity; and average operating costs. In this analysis, I will investigate factors that attain performance improvement, such as competitive pressures and practical options related to organizational structure, incentive schemes, corporate strategies, etc. Second, I will focus on the question of whether the local rail service in small communities has remained intact since privatization. Opponents to privatization had argued that such service would atrophy. With JRs' typical local lines as samples, service quality is observed as reflected in frequency, operating time, departure of first and last train, with all figures taken between 1987 (the onset of privatization) and 1997 (10 years after privatization). Finally, the current issue of the long-term debts of JNR is discussed. In addition to the sale of JNR land and stock, it is inevitable that taxpayers' money will have to be used against this massive debt. I will outline the liquidation plan upon which the government has decided and look into the kind of political involvement brought about by the debt predicament.

EFFECTS OF JAPAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS' PRIVATIZATION ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

ABSTRACT Japan National Railways went private in 1987, the first of many national railways to do so, and the Japanese experience could provide lessons to other nations. This paper evaluates the effects of Japan National Railways' Privatization on labor productivity and employment in the passenger sectors. The main data was obtained from the Annual Rail Statistics of both the Ministry of Transport and Japan National Railways. Quantitative methods such as labor productivity models were used to evaluate the effects of privatization. Large private railways, which are considered the most efficient railways in Japan, are often compared to privatized Japan Railways. Major findings are as follows: First, Japan Railways still have 20% more employees than large private railways. Second, current productivity differences between Japan Railways and large private railways appear in station and maintenance activities. Third, reduction in employment during the transitional periods of privatization greatly contributed to increases in the productivity of Japan Railways. Fourth, it is not clear whether or not productivity differences among regional Japan Railways have been decreasing since privatization. Finally, the effect of privatization on productivity growth was about 29%. Moreover, even if productivity increases, safety is not compromised, with serious accidents clearly being unrelated to productivity growth.

Effects of Japan National Railways' Privatization on labor productivity

Japan National Railways went private in 1987, the first of many national railways to do so, and the Japanese experience could provide lessons to other nations. This paper evaluates the effects of Japan National Railways' Privatization on labor productivity and employment in the passenger sectors. The main data was obtained from the Annual Rail Statistics of both the Ministry of Transport and Japan National Railways. Quantitative methods such as labor productivity models were used to evaluate the effects of privatization. Large private railways, which are considered the most efficient railways in Japan, are often compared to privatized Japan Railways. Major findings are as follows: First, Japan Railways still have 20% more employees than large private railways. Second, current productivity differences between Japan Railways and large private railways appear in station and maintenance activities. Third, reduction in employment during the transitional periods of privatization greatly contributed to increases in the productivity of Japan Railways. Fourth, it is not clear whether or not productivity differences among regional Japan Railways have been decreasing since privatization. Finally, the effect of privatization on productivity growth was about 29%. Moreover, even if productivity increases, safety is not compromised, with serious accidents clearly being unrelated to productivity growth.

旧国鉄遊休トンネル活用による熟成酒開発

旧国鉄遊休トンネル活用による熟成酒開発

Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations in Japan's National Railways

Research Article| July 01 1994 Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations in Japan's National Railways Charles Weathers Charles Weathers Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1994) 34 (7): 621–633. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645372 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Charles Weathers; Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations in Japan's National Railways. Asian Survey 1 July 1994; 34 (7): 621–633. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645372 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1994 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations in Japan's National Railways

Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations in Japan's National Railways

Restructuring labour unions in Japan's National Railways

Restructuring labour unions in Japan's National Railways

Reaction of Radical and Co-operative Unions as Japan National Railways Prepares for Privatization

The Japan National Railways was a major state-owned enterprise whose history was fraught with conflict between leftist unions and management. This paper addresses the labour relations impact of the Japanese government's decision to prepare it for privatization. This included trimming the workforce and restructuring the railway into a number of regional companies. As intended, the plan has had substantial conse quences for the structures, policies and relative well-being of rival unions, which represent orientations ranging from ideological leftism to pragmatic leftism and 'typical' Japanese unionism. While the most militant union has been crippled by management's use of the historically effective 'second union' strategy, the government's plan may only have succeeded in sowing the seeds for a more difficult situation in the future.

Relative risks of death due to liver disease among Japanese male adults having various statuses for hepatitis B s and e antigen/antibody in serum: a prospective study.

Taking advantage of the compulsory annual medical check-up at the Central Institute of Health, Japan National Railways, hepatitis B seromarkers were tested in male employees at work and their "dead and alive" status was followed for more than 6 years for their prognostic significance. Two prospective studies were carried out. In the first study, two groups (cohorts) of males age 40 to 55 years were tested in 1973 and 1978, respectively, for HBsAg and anti-HBs. The relative risk of dying from primary liver cancer in HBsAg-positive carriers (n = 126) as compared to the controls who were negative for both HBsAg and anti-HBs (n = 5,322) was 30.03 and significantly high, whereas those positive for anti-HBs (n = 1,470) had no increased risk of dying from primary liver cancer or from other liver diseases. The follow-up period ranged from 6.5 to 11.5 years, averaging 8.5 years. In the second study, three male cohorts of the same ages were tested for HBsAg and HBeAg/anti-HBe (micro-Ouchterlony method) in 1977, 1978 and 1979, respectively. There were 513 HBsAg-positive carriers among 25,547 examinees, who were followed for an average of 7.3 (6 to 8) years. Among these HBsAg carriers, those who were positive for HBeAg on entry had the highest risk of dying from primary liver cancer (relative risk, 50.25) and from other liver diseases (78.06), followed by those negative for both (28.95 and 21.78, respectively) and those positive for anti-HBe (9.47 and 6.43) when compared with 25,034 noncarriers.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Centralisation and Decentralisation in Japan's ‘Information Society’

Not long after midnight on 29 November 1985, a small group of guerillas belonging to the radical organisation Chukaku-ha, slashed the underground communications cables serving the Japan National Railways network in Tokyo and Osaka. They were protesting at government plans to privatise the railway system, but their action was perhaps more important for the way in which it focused attention on a quite different economic and social issue. In a single swift sortie, a handful of people had been able to prevent the movement of some 4.5 million computers, and bring the life of one of the world's largest cities to a temporary halt. Nothing could more effectively have demonstrated the great and growing dependence of contemporary social systems on the communication of information, not only between individual and individual, but also between computer and computer.