Jabhat al-Nusra Research Articles

Can Jihadis’ Strategic Interests Trump Their Ideology? Foreign Support and Insurgent Survival in Syria

The role of ideology in civil wars is particularly contentious, especially when it comes to Jihadi insurgents. Ideology is one of these groups’ defining characteristic, which questions what happens when Jihadis’ ideological commitments contradicts their strategic interests. This article explores these tensions with a particular focus on the issue of foreign support for the Syrian insurgency after 2011. The article argues that ideology matters and has contributed to division and infighting between Syrian insurgents for most of the conflict. But this research also contends that armed groups – including Jihadis – can adapt their ideological positions in line with their strategic interests as long as they manage to implement such changes without jeopardizing their internal cohesion. This careful balance explains the operational strategies of numerous armed groups in competitive environments such as Syria’s. The article draws on extensive interviews with Syrian insurgents over the past few years, including leaders and commanders of Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra as it transformed into HTS.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s attitudes towards tangible heritage in Syria: the disengagement from Al-qaeda

ABSTRACT On 28 July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra announced its disengagement from militant international Islamist organization al-Qaeda and became Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In January 2017, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham rebranded yet again when it merged with several other Syrian groups to establish Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS formed a civilian ‘Syrian Salvation Government’ to manage its regions. Among the transformations was in its attitudes towards the looting and destructions of antiquities, which had become endemic in Syria. HTS had targeted archaeological sites for destruction and looting. After its disengagement from al-Qaeda, HTS reopened the Idlib Museum in 2018, and claimed to protection of antiquities. This article aims to study the reasons and motives for the transformation in strategy of HTS regarding Syrian tangible heritage during the ongoing war in Syria and argues that this strategy remains one in which Syrian heritage is exploited for political gain within the context of a larger conflict.

The female jihadist narrative: a comparative analysis

The research analyses the representation that different jihadist organizations make of women through their official propaganda. The aim is to analyse the construction of the feminine ideal designed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra through their leading magazines and to identify if there are differences in their representation of women. A content analysis is carried out on the narrative in which females are portrayed by those organizations. The study is also supported by a quantitative analysis of three features, which provide data on prominence of women in jihadism: the number of times they are mentioned, the illustrations targeting females and the existence (or not) of a specific section for women in the magazines of these groups. The research shows that the portrayal of women as victims and weak individuals is recurrent but is not limited to this role. There are differences in the content and subject matter in the official discourse of the three groups, such as with regard to violence perpetrated by women. The strategic and political differences between AQAP, ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra affect the construction of female roles in their official propaganda.

Redefining Global Jihad and Its Termination: The Subjugation of al-Qaeda by Its Former Franchise in Syria

The globalization of jihad has proceeded in several stages from the mobilization against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s to Islamic State’s current campaign. The end of global jihad is nonetheless less understood, including the conditions in which jihadi groups could reject al-Qaeda (AQ) or Islamic State (IS). This article examines this question through the trajectory of a former AQ franchise, jabhat al-nusra (JaN), that became hay’at tahrir al-sham (HTS) in 2017. This article argues that global jihad is not absolute. Global jihad exists on a spectrum of four inter-connected dimensions that can be disaggregated. In Syria, JaN was only partially globalist when it emerged. JaN’s rejection of IS and AQ resulted from its opposition to their strategic objectives against the backdrop of the evolution of the Syrian conflict, which eroded JaN’s globalism and made it particularly costly. This article is based on extensive field research and interviews with HTS’s leadership in Idlib and other insurgents that have interacted with the group over the years.

Sectarian Identity and Mobilization Amongst the Druze: How Do Sectarian Minorities Respond to Religious Terrorism?

ABSTRACT Taking its point of departure in the sectarian dynamics in the Middle East, namely the Sunni–Shiʿa schism that is taking the largest share in the current debates, this article studies sectarian identity and religious terrorism against the Druze minority during Syria’s sect-coded civil war. It argues that while religion can act as a mobilizational tool and marker of group solidarity amongst Druze as well as amongst Sunni and Shiʿa, the Druze did not instrumentalize sectarian identity to implement their geopolitical agenda. Rather, for far too long the Druze used sectarian identity as a defense mechanism to unite against violent motifs and actions by the sectarian “other.” The latter, for our purposes, happens to be Sunni jihadist groups such as Daesh (The Islamic State or ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). Further, Druze is not a tabshiri sect. Put it another way, it is a sectarian minority that prevents conversions. Therefore, for the Druze, sectarian identity had always been a marker of group solidarity only. This article brings to the fore the response of sectarian minorities to religious terrorism following the Arab Uprisings era, and stresses that sectarian mobilization has parallel means but not always similar ends.

Escalate or Negotiate? Constraint and Rebel Strategic Choices Towards Rivals in the Syrian Civil War

ABSTRACT Theories of interaction among rebel groups in civil wars, like other works in the armed conflict literature, continue to see force as foundational to the trajectory and outcome of conflict. But evidence from inter-rebel conflicts in the Syrian war, which has been one of the major civil wars of our times, shows that military force is not always the preferred tool even in situations where violence is presumably cheap: in conflicts between dominant rebel groups and weaker rivals. Rather than using force, Jabhat al-Nusra, one of the strongest groups in the Syrian conflict, frequently chose to negotiate with rivals. Existing theories of inter-rebel conflict fail to explain such variation in responses. As an explanation of this puzzle of non-force, I argue that the constraint emanating from the conflict with the main enemy determines rebels’ strategies towards rivals. To investigate this argument, the paper draws on the triangulation of original data on inter-rebel conflicts in Syria, encompassing written agreements between Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel groups, a database of important military operations in the Syrian civil war since 2011, and interviews with civil and military participants in the insurgency. The findings have important implications not only for our understanding of inter-rebel dynamics in the Syrian conflict but also for other complex civil wars concerning the relationship between inter-rebel negotiation, cooperation, success, and war duration.

The problem of the return of the Islamic State’s Balkan volunteers

According estimates, the number of the men and their family members from the Western Balkan countries exceeded 1000 person who travelled to the territory of Iraq or Syria for supporting their Muslim comrades. Most of them joined the Islamic State there, while the minority enriched the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra or other smaller jihadist groups. However, hundreds of them have already returned from the Middle East to their country of origin in the recent years or months where they faced different treatment depending on their gender and age.

Turkey’s Response to International Terrorism Eastern

The article analyzes the interconnection between the direction of Turkey's struggle against terrorism with modern Islamist and nationalist ideas of Turkey. A majority of Turkish citizens following the Hanafi school of Islam, have historically opposed the purist religious doctrine of the Salafists. The author emphasizes that neither Turkey’s secular tradition nor its predominant, moderate Islamic theology has made Turkish citizens immune to radicalization. Modern Turkish history has produced several violent Islamist organizations advocating Salafi views in line with the Islamic State’s ideology. Turkish jihadists have been found among the ranks of foreign fighters in several recent conflict zones abroad. The article proves that when the uprisings began in Syria in 2011, Turkey threw its full support behind the opposition – harboring and mobilizing dissidents, arming rebels, and allowing free passage along the Syrian-Turkish border. Jihadists began to exploit the security vacuum, including ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra (now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. The article also addresses the problems of Ankara’s indifference at the first stage towards the ISIL’s activities within and across Turkish territory. While the crossings between Turkey and ISIL territory officially were closed in 2014, smuggling through the frontier continued apace and Ankara only later started to engage ISIL militarily. The author concludes that the period of active struggle against al-Qaeda in Turkey (2003-2011) gave way after 2012 to a reduction in counterterrorism operations and now supporters of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham thank Turkey for protecting them against Syrian government forces, Russia and Iran.

The Clash of Civilizations in the Syrian Crisis

The Syrian crisis may be the beginning of a new conflict of civilizations. Ethnic and religious pluralism is clearly evident in this country: Muslims (Sunnis, Druze, Alawites, Shiites and Ismailis); Christians (Orthodox, Catholics, Maronites, Protestants) and Turkmen and Kurdish ethnic minorities. The Syrian crisis of 2011 seemed to go against the ruling elite (Alawis). With the escalation of the conflict, the country gradually became the scene of a civil war characterized by international dimensions. In this way, the conflict became a multilateral battle in which, on the one hand, the participants in it were the local element in the form of the government of Bashar al-Assad and extremist terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL and Ahrar al-Sham; and on the other hand, the United States and its European allies, Saudi Arabia and some States of the Persian Gulf; and Iran and the axis of resistance, as well as Russia and China. Due to the presence of diverse cultures and religions, it appears that this will make the Syrian crisis a prelude to a renewed clash of civilizations. This research seeks to answer these questions: What are the basic propositions of the theory of the clash of civilizations and how is it represented in the Syrian crisis? Since, according to Samuel Huntington, the main sources of the clash of civilizations are the foundation of civilizations, religious and cultural antecedents, and cultural and religious identities. Consequently, they are expressions of the clash of civilizations: the war on terrorism, the Syrian crisis, the rise of ISIL and the presence of US military and international interventions, the competition of regional and transnational powers.

From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria

The article explores the complex interaction between war-dynamics and non-state armed groups’ approaches to governance and politics at the local, sub-national level. It focuses on understanding how broader conflict trends influence rebel groups’ choices with respect to establishing local governance partnerships, both with civilian agents and other armed factions. The study examines this question through the lens of the Syrian landscape and through an overview of local governance arrangements by Jabhat al-Nusra1 in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces between 2012 and 2017. In tracing the evolution of rebel co-governance arrangements at the local level,2 the article highlights two dynamics: first, how the breakdown of centralized governance and the gradual processed of militarization of local authority3 altered the balance between civilian and armed actors, shifting power in the hands of the latter. Second, how the combination of prolonged strategic stalemate, resource scarcity and ideological competition between armed factions resulted in a shift from cooperative to competitive rebel governance. The article seeks to further nuance the study of rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions by focusing on how multi-level relationships affect armed groups’ governance choices.4

Sunni-Shiah Conflict Post Arabic Spring: Searching The Political Motives Behind The War on Sustainable War in Syria

The Syrian War is one of a long-standing conflict that has lasted for eight years. The difficulty of finding a peaceful spot is the cause of the conflict eradication efforts in the country. This study aims to explore the motives behind the war in Syria using the Historical approach. The results of the study and analysis found that Syria as a secular state, separating between state and religious life, besides that Syria is also a peaceful ethnoreligious state before the war-damaged the joints of life there. Bashar al Assad as Syrian president embraced the Shia teachings of the Awali sect which is a minority sect in Syria, his appointment as well as his father were supported by most of the military figures who were Sunni schools. The above explanation clearly shows that the differences in schools between Sunnis and Shiites in Syria are not the main cause of a long war. Deeper, the results of the analysis show that there are various conflicting groups in the country, namely the Syrian Government, the Syrian Democratic Forces (Rojava, SDF, QFD), the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian Opposition. Difficult resolution of conflicts that occur is not only caused by the many internal warring groups that have their own goals and interests, but this is also made worse by the involvement of other countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Turkey, America, Britain and France that carry a variety of motives and interests, this is what makes it difficult to create a consensus that leads to peace in Syria.

Sunni-Shiah Conflict Post Arabic Spring: Searching The Political Motives Behind The War on Sustainable War in Syria

The Syrian War is one of a long-standing conflict that has lasted for eight years. The difficulty of finding a peaceful spot is the cause of the conflict eradication efforts in the country. This study aims to explore the motives behind the war in Syria using the Historical approach. The results of the study and analysis found that Syria as a secular state, separating between state and religious life, besides that Syria is also a peaceful ethnoreligious state before the war-damaged the joints of life there. Bashar al Assad as Syrian president embraced the Shia teachings of the Awali sect which is a minority sect in Syria, his appointment as well as his father were supported by most of the military figures who were Sunni schools. The above explanation clearly shows that the differences in schools between Sunnis and Shiites in Syria are not the main cause of a long war. Deeper, the results of the analysis show that there are various conflicting groups in the country, namely the Syrian Government, the Syrian Democratic Forces (Rojava, SDF, QFD), the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian Opposition. Difficult resolution of conflicts that occur is not only caused by the many internal warring groups that have their own goals and interests, but this is also made worse by the involvement of other countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Turkey, America, Britain and France that carry a variety of motives and interests, this is what makes it difficult to create a consensus that leads to peace in Syria.

In Limited Demand: The Other Foreign Volunteers in the Syrian Civil War

ABSTRACT The wars in Syria and Iraq attracted about 45,000 individuals from outside the arenas. Most joined the Islamic State, but interestingly, other prominent armed groups showed less interest in foreign volunteers. This paper introduces the Demand for Foreign Volunteers Theory (DFVT) to explain the diverging choices Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the People’s Protection Units made. The theory links four variables that shape groups’ positions: political considerations, operational needs, organizational capacity, and ideational fit. Both operational and political considerations emphasize the motivation for using foreign volunteers, though the two are not equally important; when they conflict, political considerations take priority. Organizational capacity, on the other hand, determines a group’s ability to translate need into action, serving as a necessary—but insufficient—condition for foreign mobilization. Finally, ideational factors, specifically a group’s identity and ideology, determine the pool of potential recruits. The case studies show that political considerations made all three actors cautious about recruiting foreign fighters, though these considerations differed between groups. Ultimately, despite the availability of sufficient organizational capacity, all groups found it risky and even undesirable.

Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013–2014

Social media offer unprecedented opportunities to terrorist groups to spread their message and target specific audiences for indoctrination and recruitment. In 2013 and 2014, social media, in particular Twitter, overtook Internet forums as preferred space for jihadist propaganda. This article looks into Arabic statements by Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State and jihadist forum administrators and online activists to argue that, beside the easier use of social media and disruption and infiltration of the forums, the conflict between the jihadist groups accelerated the migration to social media and the building of a presence on Twitter that provided relative resilience to suspensions.

Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power

Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power

Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power

Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power

«ДЖАБХАТ АН-НУСРА» - ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ И УЧАСТНИК СИРИЙСКОГО КОНФЛИКТА

The article focuses on the history and evolution of the jihadist terrorist organization “Jab-hat al-Nusra” (“The Support Front for the People of the Levant”). It also reveals the ideological principals of the organization, its main goals and objectives and the methods used to achieve them. “Jabhat al-Nusra” was created as a branch of “Al Qaeda” in Syria. Subsequently, the organization changed its name twice. From July 2016 known as the “Jabhat Fateh al-Sham” (“The Liberation Front of the Levant”) and from January 2017 - as the “Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham” (“Organization for the Liberation of the Levant”. The replacement of the signboard was determined primarily by the fact that “Al-Nusra” had been designated as a terrorist organization in many countries around the world, including Russia. The main goals of “Jabhat al-Nusra” are follows: first - to overthrow the legitimate government of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; second - to create a Muslim Sunni state governed by the laws of Sharia on the territory of Syria. The article shows that now the front “Al-Nusra” is the most powerful military and political force among all political organizations and military groups of the Syrian opposition. “Al-Nusra” is actively trying to become a more respectable movement and persistently seeks to get rid of the image of a terrorist organization. The article reflects the official position of the Russian Federation toward “Jabhat al-Nusra”.

Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism

Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism

Universal soldiers or parochial actors: Understanding jihadists as products of their environments

ABSTRACTWhy did the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)—two groups that shared similar ideological preferences and were both initially part of the Al Qaeda network—take different paths in the Syrian conflict? Part of the answer lies in the fact that JN is primarily a Syrian organization, whereas Iraqis lead ISIS. A jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile (the two are not always the same) helps to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior. Yet no method of categorization based on jihadist-state relations exists. I fill this gap by theorizing an explanatory typology based on a jihadist group’s relationship with its country of origin and/or domicile. This typology consists of two tiers. The first classifies jihadist organizations based on whether they are nationally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether they are based in their country of origin, exile, or multiple locations. The second tier categorizes groups based on the nature of their engagement—collaborative, belligerent, or neutral—with a state. This new typology enables the generation of multiple hypotheses and has practical implications given that most U.S. counterterrorism efforts require cooperation from partner nations.

FORCING EACH OTHER TO MAKE PEACE

FORCING EACH OTHER TO MAKE PEACE