ABSTRACT The idea of ‘counter-control’ has greatly added to Philip Pettit's theoretical framework of freedom as non-domination, not only helping Pettit to meet prominent analytical criticisms from contemporary liberal theorists, but also helping to better illuminate the possibility of ‘unmoralized’ interference without domination. But while this idea has helped to increase the attractiveness of freedom as non-domination as a philosophical ideal, it has also revealed some disparities between Pettit’s theoretical framework and the practical model of governance to which he ascribes – disparities which call into question the model’s overall ability to guard against imperium and tackle the issue of political legitimacy. In this paper, I review two of these disconnects. First, I discuss how Pettit’s interpretation of ‘individualized’ influence leads him to overlook some of the institutions that would be necessary to satisfy this theoretical constraint. Second, I illustrate how Pettit fails to account for his own axiom of positionality when discussing the institutions that allow citizens to exert ‘unconditioned’ influence, or ‘control’ over legislative direction. In concluding, I draw several inferences from these arguments for neo-republicans continuing to engage in democracy-building.