The Canada-U.S. relationship stands at a crossroads. While in many ways the two countries remain on good terms--for example, they continue to enjoy the world's largest bilateral trade relationship (1)--there have been several disputes in the last few years that suggest a fundamental change in the tenor of the alliance. Perhaps the most important such disagreement was the Canadian debate over the 2003 Iraq war, and the ultimate decision to not support the U.S. and take part in the conflict. This paper will examine this dispute in an attempt to determine what it tells us about the current status of the bilateral relationship. Most critically, the Iraq war underlined a difference between Canada and the U.S. in their preference for, and willingness to pursue, unilateral initiatives (and conversely, multilateral ones). The war also revealed significant differences in the manner in which the two states believe that force can be used to resolve conflicts, and the conditions under which the use of force is appropriate. In this regard, it was not only the Canadian reluctance to support the U.S. that so angered American officials--a judgement, after all, that many countries agreed with--but the seeming Canadian inability to make a decision and stick to it. Ultimately, Canada's position on Iraq demonstrated not only increasing divergence with the U.S. over geo-political interests and goals, but also revealed a lack of trust between the two countries, a problem that the Canadian government of Paul Martin will have to work hard to correct. This paper is divided into three sections. The first examines the historical context of the contemporary bilateral relationship, and focuses on the differing attitudes of the two countries toward unilateralism and multilateralism, the latter being Canada's traditional foreign policy orientation, and an approach which is increasingly raising concerns in Washington. The second looks at Canadian decision making regarding the Iraq war, and in particular Ottawa's erratic and inconsistent approach to the conflict. Lastly, the third section reviews the paper's observations and findings, and discusses some steps that both states might take to lessen tensions in the near-term. Part One: The Historical Pattern of the Canada-U.S. Relationship, and Canada's Preference for Multilateralism Given the degree to which Canada and the U.S. are interconnected, it is perhaps surprising that there is neither a specific agreement nor set of agreements that governs the relationship. Rather, a series of bilateral accords have been designed to structure and manage various aspects of the ties between the two countries. (2) Among the most significant are the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), and the International Joint Commission (IJC). Any institutions created by these agreements are issue specific, a point that successive Canadian governments have insisted upon. In this regard, it should be noted that it has been the Canadian government that has refused comprehensive bilateral agreements, as Canada's preference has been to create ad hoc institutions that highlight particular issues and developments. (3) The rationale for this is that Canada maximizes its leverage with the U.S. by adopting an administrative approach to bilateral relations, thereby negotiating matters at a lower level. (4) By avoiding issue linkage or large scale initiatives, this method tries to prevent the full force of American power from being brought to bear on Canada. In addition, Canada's smaller bureaucracy and the importance that the government typically attaches to bilateral issues means that negotiations can be more easily tracked, and that Canada's power can be magnified. (5) On the other hand, the approach can result in inconsistency and an overall lack of policy coherence. In many ways, the practice of avoiding comprehensive bilateral agreements is consistent with the Canadian desire to treat its relationship with the U. …