The Making of Israeli Militarism, by Uri Ben-Eliezer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 278 pp. $35.00. The election of former IDF chief of staff Ehud Barak as Prime Minister, and the inclusion of retired generals on Barak's personal staff, have prompted renewed interest in civil-military relations in Israel. Indeed, Uri Ben-Eliezer's The Making of Israeli Militarism is only the latest contribution to an impressive body of literature on this topic.1 What distinguishes this book from earUer works is the author's determination to apply to the civil-military paradigm the assumptions and methodologies associated with the new, critical generation of Israeli historiography and sociology. Specifically, BenEliezer sets out to explain the existence in Israel of a sociological phenomenon that he variously terms cultural militarism, politics, nation-in-arms, positive militarism, or civilian militarism, and which he defines as the institutionalization in Israeli political culture of the propensity to solve all national problems through military force. Interestingly, the author does not attribute this phenomenon to a military coup or praetorianism, i.e., the unsolicited intrusion of military commanders into the political affairs of the state. Rather, he attributes it to a complex arrangement established in the pre-state period between the Yishuv's older generation of European-bom political leaders and the younger native-bom generation, who were by the late 1930s becoming increasingly impatient with the policies of selfrestraint (havlagah) and static defense adopted by the Jewish Agency and the Hagana in reaction to both Arab terror attacks and the anti-Zionist drift of British policy in Palestine. For Ben-Eliezer, the major protagonist in this civilian-military entente was David Ben-Gurion. Although part of the older generation, Ben-Gurion was nonetheless disposed toward the more activist approach demanded by sabras like Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin. Ben-Gurion also saw parochial advantage in establishing close ties with this group, by pre-empting political challenges to himself and his dominant Mapai party from such groups as Revisionist Zionism (and its paramilitary offshoots, the Irgun and LEHI), the socialist-Zionist Mapam party, and the Ahdut Ha'avodah kibbutz movement that was the major breeding ground for the Palmach, the Yishuv's semi-autonomous strike force. Finally, Ben-Gurion saw accommodating the new military elite as an integral step toward implementing his concept of statism (mamlakhtiuf), premised on tight centralized control over all instruments of authority in the nascent country. Ben-Eliezer attributes most important developments in Israel's early history to the influence of cultural - including the decision by the Zionist leadership (at the Biltmore Conference of May 1942) to end all cooperation with the British Mandatory authority; the significant degree of autonomy accorded to field commanders in the 1948-49 war to encourage the permanent evacuation of Arab villages; and the Altalena affair (of June 1 948) in which the civil-military establishment used lethal force against Irgunists to signal that no challenge to state authority would be tolerated. Similarly, the build-up to the 1956 Suez War is attributed to positive militarism. The author claims that a cadre of elites - most notably, Ben-Gurion and his proteges, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres - conspired to eliminate all options other than a military one for responding to the threat posed by Egypt' s Gamal Abdul Nasser (a threat which, it is implied, was deliberately exaggerated by Ben-Gurion & Co. in order to satisfy their militaristic thirst for war). According to Ben-Eliezer, militarism dominated Israel's response to the crisis preceding the June 1967 Six-Day War - to the extent that all non-military options for calming border tensions with Egypt and Syria were rejected out of hand - and also characterized Israel's relations with West Bank-Gaza Palestinians and with the Arab states after the war. …