Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Research Articles

REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE TRENDS IN CENTRAL ASIA

In an interconnected world, the security of a nation is closely intertwined with the security of its neighboring regions. Regional security changes have the potential to significantly impact a nation's overall security. In the geopolitical and geo-economic scenario, the strategic position and possession of a state or region remains a challenging issue as evident from the evolving strategic scenario of 21st Century international politics. In this framework, the Central Asian region is considered to be of major strategic significance because of its geopolitical position. In addition, the region possesses some of the important energy resources, mainly oil and gas, and access to them is of strategic significance to all involved – regional as well as external players. This study aims to provide an overview of the current situation of Central Asian countries and their prospects in security. Geographically Central Asia, the central part of Asia, this region is directly bordered by influential players in international relations. Central Asia is bordered by the Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east, Afghanistan in the south, and Russia in the north. The region consists of former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
 Central Asia has been an area of geopolitical interest due to its strategic location and abundant natural resources. To understand the current situation and future trends in regional security, it is essential to consider a few key factors. First of all, the Political Stability: Central Asia comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While these nations have made progress in political stability since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, challenges persist. Authoritarian governance, limited political pluralism, and ethnic tensions have occasionally affected stability in the region. Next, Terrorism and Extremism: Central Asia has faced the threat of terrorism and extremism, primarily from groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Taliban, and now the Islamic State (IS). Also, it is Poverty, lack of economic opportunities, and political repression have contributed to the vulnerability of Central Asian populations to radicalization. The intricate balancing act of Central Asian states is examined through the concept of multi-vectors, a strategy used by these nations to diversify foreign alliances and resist domination by any single power.

The relations between political Islam and the state in central Asia “The case of studying the islamic renaissance party (IRP), hizb ut-tahrir (Ht), and the islamic movement of uzbekistan (IMU)”

The relations between political Islam and the state in central Asia “The case of studying the islamic renaissance party (IRP), hizb ut-tahrir (Ht), and the islamic movement of uzbekistan (IMU)”

Afghanistan Factor in Enhancing Extremism and Terrorism in FATA

Afghanistan's incursion by the Soviet Union in 1979 enhanced the elements of extremism informer FATA. In the post-9/11 period, tribal areas of Pakistan became a hub of militants and terrorists.Meanwhile, the role of Pakistan in the War on Terror (WoT) increased elements of terrorism and instability in the country. Many terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and other small terrorist groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) andLashkar-i-Jahangvi started terrorist activities in the shape of suicide attacks. The study attempts to explainvarious internal and external factors (Afghanistan) which contributed to enhancing extremism and terrorism in former FATA. Furthermore, the research explains the anti-state activities of above mentioned militant groups in the area.

«Исламское государство провинции Хорасан» – угроза Центрально-азиатскому региону

Over the past several years, there has been an influx of immigrants from Central Asian states into the ranks of “Islamic State” (IS) militants in Syria and Iraq. Those who survived after the defeat of the main detachments of terrorists on their return cannot escape the territory of Afghanistan, the northern regions of which are inhabited by related ethnic groups. It is easy to find supporters of radical Islam in Central Asian countries. The weakness of state and public institutions contributes to the politicization of Islam, especially in the periphery. Islamist preachers, skillfully using the mistakes of local authorities, call for the creation of alternative state structures. Most of the former IS fighters do not hide their intentions to return home. They can gain support in the border provinces of Afghanistan, among their comrades-in-arms in the war, and also join some of the Taliban groups. The planned withdrawal of American troops and their allies from Afghanistan does not yet imply the coming of peace in the region. Therefore, among the main threats to the security of the region are the activities of transnational terrorist groups such as “The Islamic State of Khorasan Province”, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” and “The Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan”.

ISLAMSKI RUCH UZBEKISTANU - OD LOKALNEGO EKSTREMIZMU DO PAŃSTWA ISLAMSKIEGO

This article presents one of the terrorist group in Central Asia. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a fundamentalist Islam organization acting at first in Uzbekistan and then going beyond even to Afghanistan with its actions. This article will present the causes of existence of Islamic extremism in Central Asia, events which were enhancing the ideas of radicalism, as i.e. civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) or the Batken crises (1999, 2000), specific IMU actions or circumstances of connection to so-called Islamic State. It is the analysis of extremism in Central Asia and the explanation of this phenomenon; moreover the role of external factors in Islamic mobilization in the region and how the Organized crime works there.

A Comparative Study of the Conditions and Factors for the Appearance of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)

A Comparative Study of the Conditions and Factors for the Appearance of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)

ALL IS CALM IN TASHKENT

(By Aleksei Malashenko, member of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s research council. Vedomosti, Aug. 31, 2016, p. 6. Complete text:) Speculating about what will happen after someone who is still alive passes away is tactless. But ever since the Uzbek president wound up in an intensive care unit [see article in this section, above], which local authorities have officially reported (this didn’t happen when he fell ill before), everyone is saying, Now what? So, what will happen when Islam Abduganiyevich [Karimov] no longer runs the country? ... The most likely option is that fundamentally nothing will change. Influence groups and intermingled clans are interested in maintaining stability, which ensures them a peaceful existence. Islam Karimov considered stability to be one of the main achievements of his reign. After ruling Uzbekistan as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, he regularly suppressed opposition demonstrations (the most recent and most serious occurred in Andizhan, in 2005 [see Current Digest, Vol. 57, No. 20, pp. 1 - 7]); he survived terrorist attacks and assassination attempts in 1999, 2000 and 2004; and he took on Islamists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir (an organization banned in Russia). ... Karimov subdued regional clans, moderating their ambitions and at the same time playing the role of mediator among them. In this context, it is not so important who will lead the republic (or, under certain circumstances, who will be its formal figurehead). Most frequently mentioned in this regard is current Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyayev, who has held his post since 2003. Among the [other] candidates mentioned (not often) are National Security Service chief Rustam Inoyatov, a gray cardinal; Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov; and even [Karimov’s] daughter Gulnara Karimova, but their chances are quite slim. ... Another obvious is that no one will assume the unofficial mantle of father of the nation. This leads to another prediction: Sooner or later, the focus of power will move ever so slightly toward the parliament. By the way, even Karimov considered that development; he also envisioned strengthening the legislature’s powers. ... At the same time, a scenario cannot be ruled out entirely: the coming to power of a dark horse. In Ashgabat, it was Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the personal dentist of [former Turkmen leader] Saparmurat Niyazov, who, you will note, has continued the policies of his predecessor and even acts like him. ... Another, less likely is a battle among various interest groups for the top post in the country. If that were to suddenly happen, Uzbekistan would face a period of instability. I won’t venture to say how long it would last, but the consequences would be dire. Moreover, it is conceivable that the warring sides, sensing their weakness, could turn to Islam as a convenient political tool, and even make contact with the Islamic opposition. ... Of course, the outcome wouldn’t be anything like the Arab Spring, but Islamism could gain almost legal status, which would impact the overall situation in the Central Asian region. Islamist political activity in a country like Uzbekistan would inevitably set off a chain reaction. And a very significant one at that. Especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where [Islamists] have often tested the authorities’ mettle. ... How active is Uzbek society as power hangs in the balance? Passive, of course; no rallies capable of provoking massive protests have been observed. Human rights demonstrations are sporadic. However, should the transition period drag on, the likelihood of social unrest, especially under religious slogans, could become real. ... But again, the most likely is the first one: a calm in which the transfer of power takes place without incident. ... Now, let’s address two frequently asked questions. First, what will happen with human rights in Uzbekistan? I think a certain thaw might be possible; in other words, the violation of those rights will not be as gross. The new leadership will try to demonstrate greater openness and liberality, if you will. Such an evolution is very typical when one authoritarian ruler is replaced by another. The new leader will want to look more attractive than the previous leader in the eyes of the Europeans and Americans. But no major changes should be expected. ... The second question is: How will Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia develop? The answer is also obvious: Just as it is developing now. Tashkent will continue to pursue a multivector policy in the China-Russia-US triangle, though perhaps the Western vector will become more defined, since the country needs investments and new technologies that Moscow is not in a condition to provide. I wouldn’t expect Uzbekistan to make any advances toward the Eurasian Union; Moscow did not have high hopes in that regard even before.

The New Face of Political Islam in Central Asia: The Rise of Islamo-democrats

Political Islam in Central Asia is currently undergoing a transitional phase. Radical groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir no longer monopolize the Islamist scene. There is now a new generation of Islamist leaders in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan that advocate a public role for Islam without seeking regime change. They can be called Islamo-democrats because they participate in elections and recognize the constitutional process. The article will examine and compare the biography, political career, and beliefs of three representatives of this political trend: Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, Bekbolat Tleukhan, and Mohiddin Kabiri. It will claim that the emergence of Islamo-democrats is partly the result of developments in Turkey, especially the rise to power of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi. Two factors account for the Turkish influence in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan: the successful diffusion of ideological norms and the importance that governments attach to maintaining good relations with Turkey.

Islamist movements in the Fergana Valley: a new threat assessment approach

Existing threat assessment analyses of crime and terrorism rely on a series of indicators, first and foremost violence. However, these approaches tend to neglect local specificities. In Central Asia and especially in the Fergana Valley, there are radical groups that do not necessarily commit violent behaviour, but yet represent a threat for both their operational areas and the international community. How can the threat of radicalisation be assessed when violence is not a characterising element, and what processes and structures should be taken into consideration to this end? Based on primary data collected during field research, this article challenges conventional threat assessments and the crime–terrorism nexus by looking at how the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have infiltrated indigenous social structures. This analysis suggests that the nature of security threats in Central Asia needs to be reconsidered by focusing on the informal institutionalisation of radicalisation, and it proposes the use of alternative threat assessment indicators.

Der deutsche Dschihad - Taten und Worte

In 2009 at the latest there appeared a new type of Islamist militants originating from the Federal Republic : increasingly, young men and women with or without a migration background, who had been born and raised in Germany, decided to join foreign terrorist organisations to, by their orders, carry out militant actions or terrorist attacks against the West and Germany. From Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn and other German cities and regions the "Jihad Caravan" went to Waziristan or Syria where a number of German converts, Turks, Afghans and Arabs, had joined groups such as Al Qaida ( AQ ), "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" (IBU ) and "Islamic Jihad Union" ( IJU ). The contribution sketches the lines of development of German jihad against the background of conflicts both in Germany and in foreign countries.

German jihad: on the internationalization of Islamist terrorism

List of AbbreviationsAcknowledgmentsPrologue: Lone-Wolf Attacks and the Europlot1. Unlikely Internationalists: Putting German Jihadism into Perspective2. Two Hamburg Cells: History of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany3. A Second 9/11: Sauerland Plot4. Islamic Jihad Union5. Turkish Dimension6. Leaving Kuffaristan: Radicalization and Recruitment in Germany7. German Taliban Mujahideen8. The Worst Enemy of Islam: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Against Germany9. Germans in the Taliban Stalingrad: Fighting the Kunduz Insurgency10. This Is the Last Year America: Threats and ProspectsNotesIndex

On the brink: The resurgence of militant Islam in Central Asia

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, Central Asian militants, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have fled to Pakistan from their previous strongholds in Afghanistan. However, many militants have begun returning to Central Asia. Thus questions are raised as to what extent militancy has the potential to thrive with the pending North Atlantic Treaty Organization withdrawal from Afghanistan set for 2014? Is militancy a legitimate security threat to Central Asia? What strategies might militants implement? Thus, this article examines the current state of militancy, analyzes militant trends, introduces Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Central Asian equation, and determines the militants' capability and overall strategy. The article concludes that militant Islam, regardless of its current numbers, remains a viable threat to regional security, Afghanistan will be an essential factor for the future of Central Asian militancy, and the form this re-emergence will take becomes apparent.

The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis

Contemporary terrorist movements in Afghanistan are frequently alleged to be fueled, in part, by the country's voluminous opium trade. Experts argue that terrorist groups currently active in Afghanistan, like the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizbul Islami, and various al-Qaeda affiliates, use drug trade profits to recruit and pay cadres, acquire weapons and equipment, and bribe officials while becoming more powerful, and deadly, in the process. This study empirically examines the relationship between the opium trade and terrorism in Afghanistan by conducting a series of negative binomial regression estimations on terrorist attacks and casualties in the 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996 to 2008. The analysis also considers various economic development, infrastructure, geographic, security, and cultural factors when examining causes of terrorism in the provinces. The study determines that, across all model specifications, provinces that produce more opium feature higher levels of terrorist attacks and casualties due to terrorism, and that opium production is a more robust predictor of terrorism than nearly all other province features. Furthermore, tests indicate that the direction of causation runs from opium production to higher rates of terrorism, not otherwise. The study concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the findings.

Russia's Very Secret Services

Russia's <i>Very</i> Secret Services

Talibanistan: History of a Transnational Terrorist Sanctuary

This article traces the movement of foreign jihadis to the Pashtun tribal lands situated on the volatile Pakistani-Afghan border from the time of the CIA-sponsored Operation ‘Cyclone’ to the re-emergence of the Taliban in 2006–2007. The role of autonomous jihadi groups such as the Kashmiri parties, Uighurs, Chechens, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as well as the neo-Taliban insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorist and 055 fighting forces are also analyzed. The article concludes with an overview of fighting and terror trends and future prospects along the Pakistani-Afghan border.

A Central Asian Security Paradigm: Russia and Uzbekistan

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a Central Asian terrorist organization that has carried out series of attacks in countries like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for years. With the ultimate goal of creating a Central Asian Caliphate, the IMU, even in its current weak state, is a regional threat. A military solution to this problem appears to be the likely answer. Regional powers like the Russian Federation and China should be militarily involved in Uzbekistan, along with Uzbek and neighboring forces in order to defeat the IMU militarily. This will promote greater integration among these countries and eliminate a violent organization which could become a destabilizing factor if not dealt with.

Pakistan's Strategies in Central Asia

Pakistan's policy and interactions with Central Asia are significantly shaped by its competition and concerns about India's role. India's ties in the Central Asian region remains an important factor in the formulation of Pakistan's strategies and it has made consistent efforts to counterbalance or neutralise India's influence in the region. However, two factors make it difficult for Central Asian regimes to ignore Pakistan: first, its geo-strategic location; and second, its ties with the extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. For Pakistan the Central Asian region presents considerable diplomatic challenge as it has to strike a balance between its support for extremist groups and its efforts to seek closer economic and political relations with existing regimes in the Central Asian Republics. This could further get complicated if fundamentalist Islamic groups enhance their influence in the Pakistani establishment. The effectiveness of Pakistan's balancing diplomacy as well as the political situation in Afghanistan will determine, to a large extent, its inroad into Central Asia in the coming days.

Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre

IntroductionOn May 16, 2006, a group of scholars, policy experts, and journalists convened at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, for the unveiling of a video that promised to reveal the truth about the violent events in the city of Andijon, Uzbekistan, one year before. This video demonstrates that the organizers of the uprising may not have been, as some have claimed, 'peaceful Muslims,' proclaimed the cohosts of the event, Zeyno Baran of the Hudson Institute and S. Frederick Starr of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute, in an invitation to colleagues.1 According to Baran and Starr, this new video, which had been made available to them by the Uzbek embassy, would put to rest reports declaring the Andijon events to be a Tiananmen Square-style massacre of defenseless citizens by the Uzbek government. Proof of the falseness of this allegation, they claimed, lies in the fact that the video clips recorded by members of Akromiya (a Hizbut Tahrir splinter group) during the uprising in Andijon on May 14, 2005.2Roughly twenty-six minutes long, the video consisted of three main parts: clips of remorseful Akromiya members pleading for the forgiveness of the government; conversations with alleged witnesses and victims; and an interview with Shirin Akiner, a professor and close colleague of Starr who has condemned Akromiya and supported Uzbek President Islam Karimov's claim that the use of force was necessary. Titled Andijan Tragedy: The Course of Investigation, the Englishlanguage documentary was shown to an audience composed largely of Westerners, many of whom remained doubtful of the video's veracity given the policies of the Karimov administration toward independent Muslims. Had an average Uzbek television viewer been in attendance, however, he or she might have been skeptical for wholly different reasons. Andijan Tragedy: The Course of Investigation is known, in Uzbekistan, as Qabohat (Villainy), a state-produced propaganda video about the attacks that Uzbek television played repeatedly during the summer of 2005. A comparison of the video with English-language transcripts of Qabohat, made available by Eurasianet.org last summer, shows that the two contain many identical segments,3 a fact mentioned by neither Starr nor Baran.The creation and promulgation of Andijan Tragedy: The Course of Investigation is only the latest move by certain Uzbek and international scholars, policy analysts, and state propagandists against Akromiya, the alleged Islamic terrorist group blamed for the attacks in Andijon. According to these individuals, Akromiya armed the militants, Akromiya gave the orders, Akromiya was responsible for the deaths of Uzbek citizens in Andijon.4 There is one significant problem with this theory. Akromiya, by the accounts of many Uzbek and international human rights groups, political organizations, journalists, citizens, and accused Akromists themselves, does not exist.In researching Akromiya, one is struck not only by the paucity of sources on the group, but of what these few sources consist. Unlike other Central Asian radical Islamic organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Akromiya went almost completely unnoticed and unexamined by both Uzbek and international scholars and policymakers prior to May 2005. While organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir have developed elaborate Web sites and distributed literature to advance their goals and win adherents, Akromiya has produced no publicly available materials, save one work by the group's eponymous leader, Akrom Yo'ldoshev. While the violent actions of organizations such as the IMU are a genuine threat to Central Asian security, Akromiya has remained dormant since its alleged founding in 1992, only to suddenly be held accountable for the Andijon massacre.Given Akromiya's negligible status as an organized force prior to 2005-if, indeed, it existed as an organization at all-the few resources available on Akromiya raise serious concerns about the reliability of the group's public profile. …

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent

ABSTRACT Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational movement that currently finds support among young Muslims in Central Asia and Western Europe. It presents a complex challenge to both Western and Muslim governments because it calls for the unification of all Muslim countries into a single Caliphate but has consistently rejected violence as a tool of political change. In this paper we focus on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan, a country that is a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Central Asia, we find that social movement theories (resource mobilization theory, political opportunities theory, framing theory) cannot explain why Hizb ut-Tahrir has remained opposed to violence under the same circumstances in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the other important radical Islamic group in the region, has embraced violence. We suggest that ideology is crucial for understanding why Hizb ut-Tahrir remains peaceful, and consider several scenarios in which the group might reconsider its ideology and turn to terrorism.

Religious Extremism in Ferghana Valley

A series of disturbing events — from the Tashkent bombing in February 1999 to the May 13, 2005 incidents in Andijon city in Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan — have drawn attention to the growing role of the religious extremist forces in Central Asia. The Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT), also known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) until the middle of 2003, and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) — the two leading extremist groups — have openly declared their objective of overthrowing the constitutional system and to create an Islamic state in Central Asia. While declining economic conditions, corruption, sense of injustice and non-accommodative polity have given more space to IMT and HT to operate, the ideological onslaught by often foreign-backed religious forces, an unremitting flow of foreign funds and the unresolved conflict in Afghanistan are the principal factors for the growth of extremism in the Ferghana Valley.