ALL IS CALM IN TASHKENT

Abstract

(By Aleksei Malashenko, member of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s research council. Vedomosti, Aug. 31, 2016, p. 6. Complete text:) Speculating about what will happen after someone who is still alive passes away is tactless. But ever since the Uzbek president wound up in an intensive care unit [see article in this section, above], which local authorities have officially reported (this didn’t happen when he fell ill before), everyone is saying, Now what? So, what will happen when Islam Abduganiyevich [Karimov] no longer runs the country? ... The most likely option is that fundamentally nothing will change. Influence groups and intermingled clans are interested in maintaining stability, which ensures them a peaceful existence. Islam Karimov considered stability to be one of the main achievements of his reign. After ruling Uzbekistan as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, he regularly suppressed opposition demonstrations (the most recent and most serious occurred in Andizhan, in 2005 [see Current Digest, Vol. 57, No. 20, pp. 1 - 7]); he survived terrorist attacks and assassination attempts in 1999, 2000 and 2004; and he took on Islamists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir (an organization banned in Russia). ... Karimov subdued regional clans, moderating their ambitions and at the same time playing the role of mediator among them. In this context, it is not so important who will lead the republic (or, under certain circumstances, who will be its formal figurehead). Most frequently mentioned in this regard is current Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyayev, who has held his post since 2003. Among the [other] candidates mentioned (not often) are National Security Service chief Rustam Inoyatov, a gray cardinal; Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov; and even [Karimov’s] daughter Gulnara Karimova, but their chances are quite slim. ... Another obvious is that no one will assume the unofficial mantle of father of the nation. This leads to another prediction: Sooner or later, the focus of power will move ever so slightly toward the parliament. By the way, even Karimov considered that development; he also envisioned strengthening the legislature’s powers. ... At the same time, a scenario cannot be ruled out entirely: the coming to power of a dark horse. In Ashgabat, it was Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the personal dentist of [former Turkmen leader] Saparmurat Niyazov, who, you will note, has continued the policies of his predecessor and even acts like him. ... Another, less likely is a battle among various interest groups for the top post in the country. If that were to suddenly happen, Uzbekistan would face a period of instability. I won’t venture to say how long it would last, but the consequences would be dire. Moreover, it is conceivable that the warring sides, sensing their weakness, could turn to Islam as a convenient political tool, and even make contact with the Islamic opposition. ... Of course, the outcome wouldn’t be anything like the Arab Spring, but Islamism could gain almost legal status, which would impact the overall situation in the Central Asian region. Islamist political activity in a country like Uzbekistan would inevitably set off a chain reaction. And a very significant one at that. Especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where [Islamists] have often tested the authorities’ mettle. ... How active is Uzbek society as power hangs in the balance? Passive, of course; no rallies capable of provoking massive protests have been observed. Human rights demonstrations are sporadic. However, should the transition period drag on, the likelihood of social unrest, especially under religious slogans, could become real. ... But again, the most likely is the first one: a calm in which the transfer of power takes place without incident. ... Now, let’s address two frequently asked questions. First, what will happen with human rights in Uzbekistan? I think a certain thaw might be possible; in other words, the violation of those rights will not be as gross. The new leadership will try to demonstrate greater openness and liberality, if you will. Such an evolution is very typical when one authoritarian ruler is replaced by another. The new leader will want to look more attractive than the previous leader in the eyes of the Europeans and Americans. But no major changes should be expected. ... The second question is: How will Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia develop? The answer is also obvious: Just as it is developing now. Tashkent will continue to pursue a multivector policy in the China-Russia-US triangle, though perhaps the Western vector will become more defined, since the country needs investments and new technologies that Moscow is not in a condition to provide. I wouldn’t expect Uzbekistan to make any advances toward the Eurasian Union; Moscow did not have high hopes in that regard even before.