Answering question: No, though to read commentators, we'd never know An Author for All Seasons Some works are so broad in scope, so inclusive, even of contradictions internal to themselves, that they can be used to justify almost anything. One such book is that patchwork written over many centuries and by many hands that we call Bible. For Renaissance, it was Virgil's Aeneid, opened at random to provide divination (Sortes Virgilinae). For Victorian era, it was works of Shakespeare, a mine of quotable quotes removed from their contexts. For theorists of in last several decades, it has been Carl von Clausewitz's On War. The Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, for example, considered by many strategists template of first Gulf War, is both drawn from and cites Clausewitz. (1) Widely held to have summarized lessons of Vietnam War, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's six points for committing troops called for broad public support before engagement and a clear definition of objectives, things that were presumably lacking in case of Vietnam. Weinberger invoked Clausewitz to justify necessity of defining objectives clearly: No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it. Clausewitz's most celebrated assertion, however, as almost all commentators point out, is that war is a continuation of policy [or politics: German is Politik] by other means. This is linked to his equally famous of violence, chance, and subordination, which is commonly represented as people, military, and government. In recent years this trinity has typically been invoked to justify necessity of achieving backing of people. Weinberger refers to this in fifth of his points. And his final point, that the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort, seems a reasonable conclusion from Clausewitz's insistence that is not separate from politics, but a continuation of In Second Gulf War as in first, (second) Bush Administration was clearly acting with an eye to this reading of Clausewitz. After all, Administration achieved widespread domestic if not international support precisely by defining its reasons for war. To be sure, these have changed over time. Initially Administration beat a largely one-note drum of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to justify invasion. More recently, absent any such weapons found to date, justifications given have been those of removing a dictator and establishing a democracy in Iraq. (2) Much post-Vietnam theory is like Weinberger's in invoking Clausewitz as patron philosopher of decisive, well-supported, and purposeful action. Usually it tries to show us in hindsight what went wrong, and how paying attention to Clausewitz could have steered us right from start. The problem is that what counts as decisive action for one viewer may count as a colossal misreading of situation for another. Those who disagreed with Administration invoked Clausewitz as well. Randolf T. Holhut quotes Clausewitz's most famous phrase and then goes on to propose that real reason Administration went to was because Iraq was a test case for using bombs to accelerate privatization of a nation's economy. (3) Administration critic William S. Lind, in an article titled A Warning from Clausewitz, quotes Clausewitz to warn that statesmen and commanders must be clear about what sort of they are fighting. (4) The Administration might with justification have responded that they were very clear about this. According to Lind, Administration was trying to fight a second generation (nation against nation) war, when in fact what it should have been embarked upon was much less well defined fourth generation involving irregular forces, fifth column fighters, and guerilla actions. …