This is the revised and expanded version of a work first published thirty years ago as The British Image of Hungary, 1865–70. As the new title implies, Professor Frank has meanwhile drawn the conclusion that for most British observers Hungary was just part of a larger entity. In fact there is still not much here on the rest of the Monarchy as such: the first representatives of English Czechophilia—Morfill or Wratislaw—are as little in evidence as the entrepreneurs and bankers who helped propel the Austrian economy to its phase of industrial take-off. Yet in terms of the politics which this book mainly treats, the stress on Hungary remains justified. These were the years of negotiation and implementation of the 1867 Compromise, and Frank, as well as providing much valuable information quite unavailable elsewhere, finds himself engaged on what has become a highly topical kind of study: some of his existing material on sources and channels of communication is now suitably wrapped up into a new section on ‘marketing’. Frank shows that whereas until 1866 Britain regarded the Monarchy as a basically German state, indeed still as the Confederation's hegemonic power and expected to win out in any contest with Prussia, in the aftermath of Königgrätz she speedily accommodated to the new German realities, which were on the whole welcomed. Now the Habsburg state was promptly viewed as an eastern power, and thus urged to strike a deal with the entrenched constitutional opposition in Hungary: a ‘compromise’ indeed (though it would have been good to know just how this free translation of the local terms Ausgleich and kiegyezés came into English usage). Gone was enthusiasm for Kossuth and other separatist heroes of the mid-century. Instead Britons looked henceforth for sober arrangements designed to rescue the great-power status of the Monarchy—and perhaps even to serve as a dry run for future British management of the Irish question. Of course, as Frank is happy to admit, the starting-point was a dismally low one: the Victorian public displayed widespread apathy about continental politics as a whole and their central-European dimension in particular, perhaps never more so than in the earlier 1860s; and, even after some galvanisation through war reporting during the Bohemian campaign, much of the still narrow band of expertise remained at least semi-official, associated either with the Austrian embassy in London (which had the Hungarian aristocrat Rudolf Apponyi at its head) or with its British equivalent in Vienna. The latter yields the most important new source for this edition of Frank's book: the reports compiled by Robert Morier as envoy to the Hungarian diet in early 1866 which are printed in extenso in an appendix. These already show the acuteness and insight that Morier would display in his later career, as documented in Agatha Ramm's major study of 1973. It is odd that Frank does not seem to know Scott W. Murray's more recent work on this earlier phase of Morier's diplomatic life which, with its analysis of British views of Germany, furnishes a valuable complement to Frank's approach. But the ignorance was mutual (Murray takes little notice of Austria or Hungary at all), and we must hope that in their handsome new format Frank's significant findings will now command the attention they deserve.