Irish High Court Research Articles

Ratification of the ISDS Provisions in CETA – Current Court and Legislative Challenges – an Overview

This article considers the recent rejection of challenges to the ratification of the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA), by both the German Constitutional Court in March 2022, the Irish High Court and the Irish Supreme Court decision in November 2022, and the likely future path towards ratification. It considers the background to these court challenges, including the request from the Kingdom of Belgium to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on the compatibility of the ISDS provisions of CETA with EU law, the underlying themes in the German and Irish court challenges, and the position on ratification across other countries in the EU. It concludes that the path to ratification is unclear and that the EU may be forced in the future to adopt a split model to any Free Trade Agreement with Canada.

Ratification of the ISDS Provisions in CETA – Current Court and Legislative Challenges – An Overview

This article considers the recent rejection of challenges to the ratification of the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA), by both the German Constitutional Court in March 2022, the Irish High Court and the Irish Supreme Court decision in November 2022, and the likely future path towards ratification. It considers the background to these court challenges, including the request from the Kingdom of Belgium to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on the compatibility of the ISDS provisions of CETA with EU law, the underlying themes in the German and Irish court challenges, and the position on ratification across other countries in the EU. It concludes that the path to ratification is unclear and that the EU may be forced in the future to adopt a split model to any Free Trade Agreement with Canada.

A shock to the system: sectoral bargaining under threat in Ireland

In Náisiúnta Leictreach Contraitheoir Éireann v Labour Court, the Irish High Court struck down as unconstitutional a key component of Ireland’s industrial relations system for the third time in recent years. The Court determined that the extension of collective agreements erga omnes breaches the constitutional prohibition on the delegation of legislative power. This note explains the background to that decision and critiques the Court’s reasoning from the perspective of a ‘labour constitution’ model of labour law, and in light of international and European legal principles. The decision appears to misunderstand the place of collective bargaining at a sectoral level within European internal market and competition law. It also seems to rule out any form of meaningful participation by workers, employers and their representatives in collective bargaining on a sectoral basis or through dedicated industrial relations machinery. According to the vision of Irish constitutional law put forward in this case, decisions relating to the administration of production and economic life more broadly must be reserved to the legislature. This is a significant loss for the autonomy of the social partners and represents an impoverished understanding of democracy and legitimacy within the constitutional order, and risks leaving Ireland even more of an outlier in Europe than it already is on the issue of sectoral collective bargaining.

Schrems II: Commission 0

On 16 July 2020, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) issued its judgment in Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems C-311/18 (‘Schrems II’). The case concerned a request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) made by the Irish High Court. The reference was made in respect of a longrunning complaint made by Mr Schrems to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in 2013 concerning the transfer of personal data by Facebook Ireland Limited to its parent company, Facebook Inc, in the United States of America (‘US’).

Clashing Interpretations of EU Rights in Domestic Courts

This article examines Ireland’s implementation of the right to work for protection applicants, post Ireland’s opt-in to the EU Reception Conditions Directive Recast (RCDr) in 2018. Ireland sought to exclude persons potentially subject to Dublin Regulation transfers from accessing the labour market. Competing legal interpretations on this issue, now exist in Ireland, between the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) and the High Court. Engaging in an analysis of the legislative intent and emerging domestic case-law, it is argued that Ireland’s wholescale exclusion of persons potentially subject to a Dublin transfer from the labour market is not permitted under EU law. With this ultimately to be decided by the Court of Justice, it is argued that the legal interpretation of IPAT, which would grant protection applicants within the Dublin transfer process an entitlement to enter the labour market, is to be preferred to the interpretation of the RCDr proffered by the Irish High Court. The focus of the High Court on ‘abuse of rights’ obfuscated key legal protections EU law provides to protection applicants. International protection, Common European Asylum System, Dublin III Regulation, Reception Conditions Directive (recast), Labour Market, Abuse of Rights.

Original Intent: The Limits of Legal Imagination in Colm Tóibín’s The Heather Blazing

By charting the decision-making processes of its protagonist, Irish High Court Judge Eamon Redmond, Colm Tóibín’s novel The Heather Blazing traces the contours of a conservative legal imagination as it engages with an Ireland on the cusp of significant societal change. Taking the novel’s primary intertext, the Irish Constitution of 1937, as its critical key, this article traces the jurisprudential tensions revealed by Redmond’s modalities of judgment. In the process, what is revealed are the complex dialogues – between the competing claims of natural law, legalism, originalism, and the doctrine of unenumerated rights – that are at play in the progress of Irish Constitutional law, and its reception in the popular imagination, at the end of the twentieth century.

Beyond the Border: The Good Friday Agreement and Irish Unity after Brexit by Richard Humphreys (review)

Fergus A D’Arcy is professor emeritus in modern history of University College Dublin. His biography of Fr John Spratt O Carm, Raising Dublin, Raising Ireland: A Friar’s Campaign, has just been published. Beyond the Border: The Good FridayAgreement and Irish Unity after Brexit, Richard Humphreys (Newbridge, Ireland: Merrion Press, 2018), 250 pages. What does the Good Friday Agreement really mean? How might the constitutional status of Northern Ireland be changed? Have those who call for Irish unity really thought about what they mean? I have just finished reading Beyond the Border: The Good Friday Agreement and Irish Unity after Brexit, by Richard Humphreys. The author is an Irish high court judge and was a legal advisor to the Fine Gael/Labour/ Democratic Left government. The book explores the meaning of the Good Friday Agreement. It explains that its terms will still apply after Brexit and would still apply, even if Northern Ireland ceased to be part of the UK and joined a united Ireland . The Agreement’s requirements mean that the Stormont institutions, its protections for minority interests and its requirement of respect for both identities would continue after unity. The author favours Irish unity but acknowledges that there will be a continuing UK interest in Ireland even if this happens. He presumes there would be support for unity in the Republic. In this, he relies on Article 3.1 of the Irish constitution, which states this to be the ‘firm will’ of the Irish people, if consent has also been obtained in Northern Ireland. He argues that a 50% +1 vote majority in a poll in Northern Ireland is sufficient to bring this about. Legally, that may be so, but it is hardly enough. It is really surprising that the Brexit experience, of setting out on a major constitutional change, on the strength of a narrow majority in a referendum, has not prompted some rethinking on the author’s part. He does not explore the extra taxation that might have to be paid by the southern taxpayer to replace the current UK subsidy to Northern Ireland, in the event that sovereignty moved from Westminster to Dublin. Nor does he even mention the potential extra security provisions that would be made by the Irish taxpayer, to enforce Irish unity of any kind in places like Ballymena, East Belfast and Portadown (unless, of course, the locals wanted it). After Autumn 2018: Book Reviews Studies • volume 107 • number 427 389 all, effective democratic government requires more than just the will of the majority, it also needs the at least passive assent of the minority. Faced with these realities, the ‘firm will’ for unity in the Republic might not be so firm after all. These omissions expose the limitations of a purely legalistic approach. Judge Humphreys deals with the things an Irish government would have to do to recognise the ‘British identity’ of unionists within Ireland. He argues that these things should be done in any event and long in advance of any border poll, and should not be used as a bargaining counter in negotiations with unionists. He suggests, for example, reactivating Irish membership of the Commonwealth. He adds that there should be appropriate measures ‘to recognise and cherish the British identity within the twenty-six county state’. An opportunity to demonstrate this will arise in the commemoration of the war in Ireland between 1919 and 1921. It is important that casualties on both sides are remembered, those who fought for retaining a link with Britain as well as those who fought against it. Many of the former were Irish, from both the unionist and nationalist traditions, especially members of the RIC. Judge Humphreys points out that, under the Good Friday Agreement in the event of unity, unionists should be able to retain UK citizenship while also being able to avail of all the rights of Irish citizenship. My own sense is that active east/west cooperation on joint projects with Britain would be a big help to mitigate a unionist feeling of isolation, whether or not Irish unity is being contemplated. In that sense the reactivation of the British/Irish Intergovernmental Conference is an important step, especially as Brexit...

Report of Professor Neil Richards in Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook ('Schrems 2'), Irish High Court 2017.

An overview of US privacy law, as well as the remedies available to EU citizens who believe their data protection rights have been violated by the United States, with an emphasis on the US legal doctrine of "standing" in privacy cases. Submitted in the case of Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook (Irish High Court 2017), also known as the "Standard Contractual Clauses Case" or colloquially "Schrems 2."

Surrogacy legislation remains complex and unsatisfactory.

The UK Surrogacy Agreement Act came into force in 1985, the same year as the first known UK surrogacy birth. Three decades later, the Surrogacy Agreement remains legally unenforceable in the UK. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 2008 section 33 dictates that the surrogate is the legal mother until the court grants a parental order transferring parental rights to the intended parents. Parental order is granted only in limited conditions: the intended parents must domicile in the UK; be in a proven long-term relationship, partnership or marriage; one or more parent must be genetically related to the child; and most controversially, surrogates must be paid only ‘reasonable expenses’. Surrogacy laws struggle to keep pace with changing social attitudes, growing demand for surrogacy, and ultra-dynamic family structures. Within the past decade, the HFEA 2008 part 3 gave same sex and unmarried couples the same legal rights as married heterosexual couples in applying for parental orders. The legal definition of motherhood was successfully challenged in the Irish High Court and the intended mother's name was added to the birth certificate (R and Another v An TArd Charaitheoir and Ors). The recent Law Commission 13 Programme of Reform Public Consultation included Surrogacy. Issues reviewed included: (1) Single Parenting – currently the UK courts have no power to grant parental orders to single parents although there has been a recent High Court judgement ruling that was incompatible with article 14 of the European Convention (Re Z [A Child] [No 2] [2016] EWHC 1191 [Fam]); (2) The Birth Certificate – in the UK two parents are registered but they do not have to be the biological parents (Birth and Death Registration Act 1953). More than half a century since this act, the modern family structure has changed and, limiting registration to two parents may not reflect the actual parenting structure. Arguments have supported adding a third ‘parent’ if they were intimately involved in their creation (e.g. mitochondrial replacement). There are different rules of registration for parents in marriage or civil partnership, requiring re-registration if the parents marry later; (3) Parental Order restrictions – include that one or more parent must be genetically related to the child; (4) Surrogate Agreements – in the UK parental orders are only granted after birth, unlike the USA where the Uniform Parental Act 2002 allows states’ federal guidelines and legislation to transfer parental rights before delivery; (5) Maternal and Paternal Rights – the surrogate remains the legal mother with full responsibility until the parental order is granted. In overseas surrogacy the child may be born stateless, as the intended mother is not considered the ‘legal’ mother under either UK or overseas legislation. English law may not automatically recognise a foreign birth certificate (RE X and Y [Foreign Surrogacy]). This is curious as UK legislation dictates that the surrogate's husband or civil partner is the ‘legal’ father unless he does not consent. With the increase in surrogacy, the legal situation urgently needs clarification, with the paramount focus being the best interests of the child. None declared. Completed disclosure of interests form available to view online as supporting information. Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.

The Data Protection Commissioner and Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems, Affidavit of Peter Swire

This testimony of 300 pages explains U.S. surveillance law to a non-U.S. audience. The testimony was provided to the Irish High Court in litigation brought by Max Schrems against Facebook, challenging the use of standard contract clauses for transfers of personal data to the U.S. Under Irish rules, the author was selected by Facebook and required to provide his independent expert opinion to the court on U.S. law. The comprehensively footnoted testimony makes conclusions in four areas: (1) US systemic remedies. As found by a team of Oxford experts, “the US now serves as a baseline for foreign intelligence standards.” Chapter 3 of the testimony provides a detailed explanation documenting systemic protections under US law for foreign intelligence surveillance. Chapter 4 documents strong safeguards for law enforcement surveillance. Based on the Oxford study, Chapter 6 shows how well the US safeguards compare with EU safeguards. (2) US individual remedies. Chapter 7 documents how the US legal system provides numerous ways for an individual to remedy violations of privacy, including individual suits against service providers, Federal Trade Commission and other agency enforcement, state law protections, and class action litigation. Chapter 8 explains reasons for a national security exception to individual access to surveillance records, where such access would threaten national security by revealing sources and methods. (3) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court oversight. Chapter 5 presents original research, based on a review of all of the FISC opinions and related materials that were declassified between 2013 and the filing of the testimony in November 2016. The overall conclusion is that the FISC provides far stronger oversight than many critics have alleged. (4) Broader implications of the SCC case. Standard contract clauses are used pervasively for transfers of personal data out of the European Union. An inadequacy finding in the current case would have a great impact even if the finding applies only to a single country (transfers to the US) under a single basis for cross-border data flows (SCCs). Chapter 1 of the testimony, however, explains why an inadequacy finding in this case likely would have far greater implications. The implications appear greater geographically, as shown by analysis of surveillance rules in the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and China. For those and other countries whose safeguards are less than in the US, it would appear that a finding of inadequate protections in the US would logically mean that transfers from the EU to these countries would similarly be prohibited. The testimony also explains why an inadequacy finding for SCCs may also apply to other legal bases for transfer of personal data, including Privacy Shield and Binding Corporate Rules. Taken together, a finding of inadequacy in the current case in Ireland could have far more sweeping ramifications than many observers have contemplated.

Live or Let Die?: Fine Margins Between Life and Death in a Brain-Dead Pregnancy.

In PP v Health Service Executive, the Irish High Court was recently asked to decide on the lawfulness of maintaining somatic treatment that was being provided to a brain-dead woman who was 15-weeks pregnant. In delivering judgment, Kearns P held that the treatment should not be maintained and that the artificial support being provided to the woman could lawfully be withdrawn. The legal basis for this ruling, however, is not free from criticism. The focus of this discussion is to consider how an English court would deal with a case similar to this should the need ever arise. There are crucial differences between English and Irish law which could impact upon the reasoning and, quite possibly, the outcome. Given that it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a similar case could occur in England at some point in the future, it is important that a number of legal questions are explored and their implications illuminated.

Mitochondrial replacement therapy and 'three-parent children'-who should be registered as the legal parents?

The UK has become the first country in the world to authorise a licence for mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT). This Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) landmark ruling, made in December 2016, will allow children to be born with DNA from three parents. MRT creates embryos containing the nuclear DNA from a couple, with healthy mitochondrial DNA from a female donor. MRT was developed in the UK, but the first successful pregnancy was reported in Mexico (https://www.newscientist.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-new-3-parent-technique). Mitochondrial DNA mutation is transmitted along the maternal lineage affecting about 1:200 babies and 2500 women in Britain, and about 800 babies in the USA. It causes severe disabilities and premature death. The ethics of MRT, pre-implantation therapy, selective reproduction (selecting out mutated genes) versus embryo modification (treatment and replacement of defective genes) have been discussed extensively (World Congress on Bioethics 2014, Bionews 763). Opponents of MRT argued strongly against creating ‘designer babies’ and against germline gene manipulation, which affects subsequent generations. Proponents vigorously defended MRT, stating that it replaces only 37 genes (0.1% of the adult genome), which perform separate functions from the 23 000 genes that dictate our personality and main features. Who should be the legally registered parents for children with three parents remains controversial. The doctrine that ‘mater semper certa est’ (the birth mother is definitely always the mother) was successfully challenged in the Irish High Court in a gestational surrogacy case, and the commissioning mother was granted permission to sign the birth certificate as ‘the mother’ because of her genetic relationship to the child (MR & Anor v An Tard Chlaraitheoir and Others [2013] IEHC.) Gestational surrogacy and MRT results in children having three parents, and although the commissioning mother contributes the overwhelming majority of the maternal genetic contribution, the proposition that she should be registered as ‘the mother’ has not yet been tested in law. Only MRT allows couples to produce a genetically related child without the mitochondrial disorder carried by the commissioning mother but the contribution of the surrogate mother is considerably more than the epigenetic influences of a surrogate mother, who does not provide the donor egg cytoplasm or mitochondrial DNA. Although the UK was the first country to introduce legislation on surrogacy (Surrogacy Agreement Act 1985), this has only progressed slowly in a reactive manner as Courts issue judgements after delivery, thereby establishing precedents (Mason J and Laurie G. Law. Medical Ethics (2010)). Surrogacy was similarly controversial when it was introduced in the UK (Warnock Report 1984). The HFEA Parenteral Election Form addresses parental rights, as it allows the commissioning mother to sign the birth certificate and to nominate a man other than the biological father as the legal father (HFEA Code of Practice 2013), but in the UK a surrogacy agreement is not legally binding. Moreover, the HFEA Act 2008 section 33 dictates that at the time of birth the surrogate is the legal mother, and section 54 only grants a parental order to commissioning couples after the birth has taken place. In contrast, in the USA, the Uniform Parental Act 2002 Article 8 give individual States the option to transfer parental rights to the commissioning parents before delivery. It states that the woman who carries a child to birth pursuant to a gestational agreement is not the legal mother. The US courts must validate and enforce a gestational agreement once all parties have consented. The UK courts have not yet been tested on a MRT case, but HFEA legislation applies for intravenous fertilisation pregnancies. Irrespective of ethical debates questioning procreation at all cost, and the utilitarianist's view of sacrificing the good of a few for the benefit of many; the best interests of the child must remain paramount, but how this is best achieved is still the subject of controversy. None declared. Completed disclosure of interests form available to view online as supporting information. Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.

Some Aspects of South African Cross-Border Insolvency Relief: The Lehane Matter

The Lehane matter wound its way through the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court and reached the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Dunne, the debtor, lived in the United States of America and ran an international web of companies. One of these companies, Lagoon Beach Hotel, operated a Cape Town hotel. Mr Dunne later filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States and soon was also bankrupted by the Irish High Court. The Irish official trustee, Lehane, applied to the Cape court for the recognition of his status as a foreign trustee and for an anti-dissipation order preventing the disposal of South African property to which Mr Dunne was connected. Lehane succeeded at every stage of the South African proceedings.
 Initially, Steyn J recognised Lehane as the trustee as though a sequestration order had been granted against Mr Dunne in terms of the Insolvency Act 1936, thus diverging from the approach taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda). Subsequently, Yekiso J's approach to applying the Insolvency Act without derogating from its generality opens up the possibility of applying section 21 of the Insolvency Act to significant effect against Mrs Dunne's South African property. Yet the territorialist restriction in Yekiso J's order that only creditors with causes of action which arose in South Africa were entitled to claim against the insolvent estate excluded many foreign creditors, even those from Ireland.
 Of the many issues raised by the Lagoon Beach Hotel company, two that are chosen for discussion in this case note are the possible application of the automatic stay under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 1978 to the South African proceedings, and the standing of Lehane because of the litigants' dispute whether Mr Dunne was domiciled in the United States or Ireland.
 Yekiso J and subsequently Leach JA held that the American automatic stay did not govern the South African proceedings. Significantly, the American and the Irish trustees were co-operating with respect to proceedings in Ireland and South Africa that involved Mr Dunne. And Leach JA deftly deferred to the Irish court the decision regarding the application of the American automatic stay and its relevance to the Irish proceedings.
 As for the disputed domicile of Mr Dunne, Yekiso J and Leach JA both considered that Mr Dunne had retained his Irish domicile. The established principles of recognising a foreign domiciliary trustee before he might deal with South African property, whether movable or immovable, were confirmed. Leach JA, however, went on to discuss the assistance that might cautiously be accorded to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled elsewhere than in Ireland. Even then, the relevance of domicile could not be gainsaid.
 In the comments, it is pointed out that trustees appointed in countries other than the insolvent's domicile may still be recognised by South African courts. The insolvent's submitting to the jurisdiction of a court that is not the court of his domicile is discussed; on its facts, the cited authority does not bear out the relevant principle. And the possibility of recognising non-domiciliary trustees in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional convenience is explored. The cases cited in support of this principle are shown to yield differing results.

Caesarean Section Refusal in the Irish Courts: Health Service Executive v B.

In the Irish High Court case of Health Service Executive v B, it was held that a competent woman could not be forced to have a caesarean section against her will notwithstanding the fact that her refusal increased the risk of injury and death to both her and her unborn child.1 This case is of particular interest since it is the first reported case on caesarean section refusal in Ireland. This commentary provides a critical analysis of the judgment, focusing on aspects of the law on informed consent and the way in which the judge reached the conclusion that an order for an enforced caesarean section should not be made. It is argued that, while the outcome can be justified, the reasoning appears at times to be unpersuasive.

Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the Moral Life of Judges

In Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 834 (1972), then-Justice Rehnquist famously declined to recuse himself in a case in which he had been intimately involved, and about which he had spoken publicly. In a spirited defense of his position, he wrote: “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” The point is an important one. Clearly, we do not think that judges should have minds that are totally unformed. On the other hand, open-mindedness or impartiality is universally recognized as a critical component of judicial decision-making. This essay seeks to explore a question at the heart of the judicial process: To what extent do we expect judges to have an open mind about difficult questions of law, or, at least, to be able to give a fair hearing to interpretations of law with which they might be predisposed to disagree? Or, more generally, what do we expect of judges in their decision-making?The essay proceeds to consider this question through a discussion of two novels: The Heather Blazing by Colm Toibin and The Children Act by Ian McEwan. The main character in The Heather Blazing is an Irish High Court judge who decides three significant cases in the course of the novel. The main character in The Children Act is an English High Court judge who also decides three difficult cases during the course of the novel. Through a close reading of the two novels, the essay explores what it is that we expect of judges, and, in particular, how we expect them to strike the balance that is inevitably required to be struck between open-mindedness and the (sometimes false) sense of certainty that comes from expertise. Among other things, the essay reflects on Justice Holmes’s observation that a key difference between his and Justice Brandeis’s approaches to their work was that Justice Brandeis wanted to know as much as he possibly could about a case, whereas Justice Holmes “wish[ed] to know as little [about a case] as [he could] safely go on.”

Court-directed mediation in the Irish High Court: Compelling voluntary processes

Court-directed mediation in the Irish High Court: Compelling voluntary processes

An expanded definition of environmental information? Minch v Commissioner for Environmental Information [2016] IEHC 91

A recent Irish High Court decision has overturned a decision of the Commissioner for Environmental Information not to grant access to a report on broadband networking infrastructure on the grounds that the document sought was too remote from environmental decision-making. The Commissioner had held that information must fall within one of the categories in Article 3(1) of the European Communities (Access to Information on the Environment) Regulations 2007–2014 in order to constitute environmental information, not simply relate to one of them. The High Court held that this ‘remoteness’ approach was not the correct test as it failed to take into account that Article 3(1)(c) includes measures, programmes, and policies which are likely to affect elements of the environment, not just those which have affected those elements, but did not provide an alternative test. Irish practice in this regard may therefore be following that of England and Wales, which may not be welcome as it undermines the Freedom of Information regime. The decision may make some difference in practice, but it is too early to be certain. While some had hoped that this decision would provide clarity on the definition of environmental information, this will have to await at least the reconsideration by the CEI of the request which gave rise to this case, and possibly further High Court appeals.

A court-ordered graduated response system in Ireland: the beginning of the end?

The Irish High Court recently became the first court to order a ‘common law’ based graduated response system (GRS) to deal with the problem of unauthorized peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing of sound recordings on the Internet. Such systems have previously been the subject of legislative measures in other EU Member States such as the Hadopi Law in France. A small number of voluntary arrangements have also arisen on a pan-industry basis such as the recent Creative Content UK initiative. In Ireland, the largest Internet service provider (ISP), Eircom, voluntarily agreed to adopt a type of GRS as part of a settlement. No court has previously ordered a GRS and the music industry was previously unsuccessful in obtaining such a relief in Ireland in 2010. This article examines the history of P2P file-sharing litigation in Ireland from Norwich Pharmacal order ten years ago to the more recent attention on GRS. The article examines the recent case of Sony v UPC Communications Ireland Limited, where a GRS was ordered under Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive. While this recent decision is currently under appeal, there are multiple issues that the court had to consider which demonstrate how difficult it is to craft an Order to provide for a GRS. This begs the question of whether the cost and complexity of such a relief is better left to the legislature and that is why courts, such as the Australian High Court in Roadshow Films Pty v iiNet Ltd, have previously declined to grant such relief.

China's One Child Policy, forcible sterilisation and membership of a particular social group: an Irish perspective

Whether persons subject to China's One Child policy may constitute members of a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention or the Qualification Directive has been considered in a number of jurisdictions including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and the UK. In the recent cases of L.R.C. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Others [2014] IEHC 500; and S.J.L. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 608, the matter came before the Irish High Court for consideration for the first time by way of judicial review of an appeal by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. This article will consider these decisions in light of China's One Child policy and existing common law authorities and in the context of defining membership of a particular social group.

The Influence of Catholic Doctrine on Medical Law when X’s Life Poses a Threat to Y’s Life

This case comment examines the influence of religion on a case from the Irish High Court in which a pregnant woman was artificially kept alive for 23 days because of doctors' fear of legal consequences if they terminated her somatic support, thereby hastening the death of her unborn child. The case is compared with an English Court of Appeal case involving the lawfulness of an operation to separate conjoined twins, where the twins' parents' religious views were acknowledged, but ultimately ignored, by the court.