In the past two years, U.S. relations with China have undergone a dramatic transformation. The war on terror; the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan; simmering tensions in South Asia; the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) challenge; and, most recently, the North Korea nuclear surprise have provided a compelling strategic dimension to the bilateral U.S.– Chinese relationship, enabling Washington and Beijing to coordinate and cooperate in ways that few thought possible under the presidency of George W. Bush. Not since the cold war have security issues occupied such a central place in Sino–U.S. ties. Although the Bush administration came to power condemning its predecessor’s policy of building a constructive, strategic partnership with China, more concrete progress has been made toward that goal under President Bush than was made under President Clinton. This is remarkable given that Bush and his advisers termed China a strategic competitor during the presidential campaign and advocated strengthening American alliances in Asia and developing relations with India to counterbalance China and constrain Beijing’s ability to pursue policies that would negatively affect U.S. interests. Since the resolution of the EP-3 incident in April 2001, relations between the United States and China have been on a gradual yet certain upward trend. The tragedy of the terrorist attacks on the United States that year provided enormous impetus. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, U.S. policymakers recognized that the potential threat to American interests from China was remote by comparison to the immediate dangers posed by Al Qaeda plots; Iraq’s refusal to disarm; and, more recently, North Korea’s withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and possible nuclear fuel reprocessing. Bush administration officials—and most important, the president himself—acknowledged the need for Chinese cooperation in the war on terror and related security matters. By early 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice listed China publicly among those “major powers” with which the United States would seek to work to fight the common strategic threat of international terrorism. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued in September 2002, listed China among the “potential great powers” concerning which “hope [exists] that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape.” The document also expressed U.S. intention to seek “a constructive relationship with a changing China.”1 September 11 created a positive set of issues on which U.S. and Chinese officials could consult and coordinate, including (a) stemming the proSino–American Relations: A Work in Progress*