Invasion Of Kuwait Research Articles

The effects of terrorism on global capital markets

The event study methodology is used to assess the effects of terrorism on global capital markets. We examine the U.S. capital market's response to 14 terrorist/military attacks dating back to 1915 and global capital markets' response to two recent events—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. U.S. capital markets are more resilient than in the past and recover sooner from terrorist attacks than other global capital markets. Evidence suggests that this increased market resilience can be partially explained by a stable banking/financial sector that provides adequate liquidity to promote market stability and minimize panic.

Modern E&P data management in Kuwait Oil Company

An enormous amount of petrotechnical data has been acquired during the 50 years of oil exploration and production (E&P) in Kuwait. More and more data continues and will continue to flow in on a daily basis, as Kuwait remains a major oil producer with reserve expected to last well into the next century. The data classes range from seismic, geological, petrophysical, drilling, production operations, production and injection volumes, surface and downhole facilities, PVT, well surveillance, etc. Historically, these were stored in various media—paper, magnetic tapes, diskettes, and spreadsheets—and scattered over several departments and private files. The level of data quality was not uniformly high and data access/sharing by geoscientists and planners was problematic. Data duplication, data corruption, data loss, and media deterioration were not uncommon. Further disruption in data acquisition occurred during and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990/91. In 1998, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) embarked on the implementation of an integrated E&P database system to serve as a secure corporate repository of its “core business” data. The project was to take advantage of the rapid advances in computer technology and align KOC with the high-efficiency trends in the international oil industry, and promote the concept of “data as company asset”. The company selected a commercial data model called “FINDER” which is built on “Oracle” relational database software. This paper focuses on some of the unique features of the project, technical problems encountered and resolved, and future directions. The project accomplishments so far include: • successful gathering of historical data from disparate sources, data-cleaning, batch-loading, post-loading data validation and quality control; • standardisation in the naming and coding of objects—wells, fields, reservoirs, facilities, symbols, etc; • standardisation of templates (formats) for incoming well surveillance data; • replacement of the legacy production “back allocation” system with a more robust and year-2000 compliant one; • creation of a wide variety of forms and reports for data entry and retrieval; • extension of computing network to all 20 remote oil and gas gathering centers (GCs); • formulation of distinct dataflow processes for capturing each data class; • customization of data model to mimic complex dual completions, selective multi-reservoir completions, well-rerouting from a gathering center to another; • data transfer to a number of engineering and geological software used in KOC; • interface with distributed control system (DCS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The current and future tasks include: • extension to archive petrophysical log traces; • extension to manage physical assets like core plugs, crude samples, tapes, photographs, documents, reports, etc.; • migration of forms and reports to the intranet using Java technology; • development of decision support systems for converting stored data to information. It is shown that judged by industry standards, KOC has attained a high level of maturity in its data management activities.

Saddam's Security Apparatus During the Invasion of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Resistance

(2003). Saddam's Security Apparatus During the Invasion of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Resistance. Journal of Intelligence History: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 61-86.

Conference Papers: 3. The Impact on the Economic and Social Fabric Assessing the Costs of Iraq's 1990 Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait - The United Nations Compensation Commission

Conference Papers: 3. The Impact on the Economic and Social Fabric Assessing the Costs of Iraq's 1990 Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait - The United Nations Compensation Commission

Year Zero for the Archaeology of Iraq

The heritage of Iraq, ancient Mesopotamia, has suffered devastating blows in recent months, and continues to suffer at a truly grievous level. The looting of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad and of other regional museums, as well as ongoing illicit digging at archaeological sites, particularly in the south of the country, are steadily depleting a rich and varied heritage resource that can be matched in value and historical significance by few countries in the world. Through extensive coverage in press and web-site media (e.g. Brodie 2003; Fisk 2003), these events are known to all and are almost universally condemned as appalling, the more so when viewed as probably avoidable. In this paper I do not propose to cover once more the ground of what happened in Iraq during those few days in April 2003 when the Iraq Museum fell prey to wreckers and looters as the regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed. Much ink has been spilt on this subject and there is little more to add unless and until fresh evidence appears (for a recent summary see Lawler 2003). Nor do I wish to consider in detail ways in which scholars and interested parties of the world might assist our Iraqi colleagues in the long and arduous task of repairing damage done to buildings, sites and artefacts caught in the crossfire of war. There are many better qualified than I to tackle that subject, and they are already bending their skills and energies to that end in difficult and dangerous circumstances. What I wish to discuss here is the broader and longer-term question of how the archaeology of Iraq, as a practice and as an academic discipline, might develop in the years ahead. The archaeology of Iraq, once one of the most thriving and vibrant regional archaeologies of the world, is perforce in disarray, and it is little exaggeration to say that the discipline must start again from Year Zero. Here I argue that while participating in the universal mourning for the terrible losses and setbacks suffered by the heritage of Iraq, we should at the same time strive to take advantage of a unique opportunity to start afresh in our academic engagement with the discipline of Mesopotamian archaeology. We are now at liberty to reformulate a discipline that has developed in a largely haphazard fashion over the past 150 years, principally in contexts of imperial exploitation, colonial administration, and more recently, post-colonial angst (Bahrani 1998; Matthews 2003). We are free, should we wish, to turn our backs on that past, while perhaps appreciating its achievements, and to construct a new framework for the future. What then might be a manifesto for a new archaeology in Mesopotamia? It is likely to be some time before foreign archaeologists return en masse to work in Iraq. Following a long period of disciplinary development, particularly in the period between 1950 and 1990, the years following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the

Positions and attitudes of Israeli Arabs regarding the Arab world, 1990–2001

Scholars have debated intensely whether Israel's Arab citizens are increasingly becoming hostile to the State, working within the system, or aspire to some form of cultural and political autonomy short of insurrection and potential secession-I Whatever position they take in the debate, most would agree that Israeli Arabs have become increasingly politically assertive over the past two decades in Israeli politics. The following article analyses whether this assertiveness characterizes Israeli Arab attitudes and behaviour towards the Arab world (rather than the Palestinians) since Iraq's occupation of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 up to 2001. It begins by exploring their attitudes and behaviour regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war waged between the Allied coalition and Iraq and Israel's policies in Lebanon during the 1990s until the final withdrawal on 24 May 2000. Another milestone that elicited many reactions amongst the Israeli Arab public and elite was the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty signed in October 1994 in Wadi Araba near the Gulf of Akaba. It proceeds to investigate the positions Israeli Arabs adopted toward the intensive struggle waged mainly by professional unions in states such as Egypt and Jordan that signed formal peace treaties against the 'normalization7 of relations (muqawamat al-tatbi') between Israel and Arab states and their respective societies2 This was by far the most complex issue facing Israeli Arabs not only because it extended into the cultural realm but also because it raised the issue of their legitimacy in the Arab world. The article concludes by asking how these positions on foreign affairs issues help identify whether Israel's Arabs are embarking on a radical approach, taking the more moderate alternative of working within the system, or maintaining some position in between. The article is based on an analysis of the Israeli Arab press, the major Hebrew-language newspapers and the little secondary source material that exists on the subject.

From central to peripheral: The United Nations and the recent Iraq crisis

The United Nations was founded on the principles of sovereign equality of its member states. The sovereignty exercised by states in their domestic jurisdiction and external relations was to be upheld in the conduct of international relations especially through the UN. However, the recent developments culminating in the United States‐led war in Iraq have raised several doubts about the efficacy of the UN in preserving the sovereignty of its member‐states while maintaining international peace and security. This paper attempts to focus on the recent Iraq crisis. It analyses the close involvement of the UN in Iraq for over a decade beginning from the 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Many Security Council resolutions became the basis of the deep entrenchment of the UN in the political, economic and security issues of Iraq. The present crisis in Iraq is a reflection of the enormous potential and capability of the UN to engage itself in resolving a conflict and the limitations of that exercise. The UN, while charting a unique journey in Iraq through Resolutions 660 to 1511, has essentially proved its significance in the face of increasing American attempts to impose a unilateral world order.

Watching the war against Iraq through pan-Arab satellite TV

It was the first Gulf War in 1991 which led to the satellite television explosion in the Arab world. Arabs then knew about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait through CNN. Today, Arab satellite channels reach almost every Arab capital and many Middle Eastern and African nations — from Mauritania on the Atlantic coast to Iran in the east, from Syria in the north to Djibouti in the south. This battle for the airwaves and boom in satellite channels in the Arab world has become both a tool for integration and dispersion. It is raising a glimpse of hope that the flow of information will no longer be pouring from the West to the East, but from the East to the West. Questions, however, remain about the credibility of news coverage by Arabic networks like the maverick Qatar-based al-Jazeera and whether Arab journalists adhere to journalistic norms upheld in the West.

Humanitarian considerations in the work of the United Nations Compensation Commission

RésuméLa Commission d'indemnisation des Nations Unies a été créée par le Conseil de sécurité pour examiner les demandes déindemnisation et verser des indemnités aux victimes de l'invasion et de l'occupation illicites du Koweït par l'Irak (1990-1991), Cet article examine I'importance que les considérations d'ordre humanitaire revêtent dans le cadre des travaux de la Commission, notamment dans la procédure d'examen des demandes d'indemnisation et dans les mécanismes pour la répartition des indemnités accordées aux requérants dont la réclamation a abouti. L'article examine également les sources des contributions versées au Fonds d'indemnisation des Nations Unies (à partir duquel les indemnités sont versées) dans le contexte de la situation humanitaire qui prévaut en Irak, et il établit une distinction entre le mandat de la Commission et les autres institutions et processus mis en place par le Conseil de sécurité après l'invasion du Koweït en 1990. Finalement, l'article explore brièvement comment les considérations d'ordre humanitaire peuvent jouer un rôle dans des futures procédures de réparation des dommages de guerre.

Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990

February 2003 marked the 12th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait by the United States and its global allies and their near-total victory over the military forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. However, much to the surprise of members of the first Bush Administration, academic scholars, military analysts, media pundits, foreign policy experts, and the average layman, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq and continued to successfully defy the international community. Regardless of the military success of the US war with Iraq prosecuted by the second Bush Administration in 2003, Saddam's longevity should in itself serve as a significant warning to policymakers that something may be amiss in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. In this article I reexamine the fundamental intellectual assumptions of what is known as engagement, the foreign policy doctrine that guided US behavior toward Iraq in the decade preceding Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Despite the whol esale failure of engagement in Iraq before 1990, the fundamental assumptions that guided US engagement policies have remained largely unexamined. This failure to acknowledge historic mistakes raises the disturbing possibility that similar failures of engagement may occur in Washington's strategic relationships with other problematic international actors and rogue states. Engagement in Practice: US Relations with Iraq, 1982-1990 Engagement serves as a core policy doctrine of US national security strategy in the 21st century. (1) In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on the manipulation of economic incentives, primarily in the areas of trade and finance, to influence the behavior of other states. Engagement uses economic interdependence, or mutual dependence, to create ties that bind states together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that economic interdependence should be understood in terms of the power to influence, or the effects on each state of their trade linkages. Indeed, as many scholars have indicated, states have long recognized the truth that power generally flows from asymmetrical (or imbalanced) interdependence. (2) In keeping with this tradition, Keohane and Nye stress that when planning an effective diplomatic strategy, It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdepend ent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues. (3) At its core, economic statecraft is founded on the principle of asymmetrical power. In 1979 political turmoil in the Middle East forever changed the regional strategic landscape. In January of that year a groundswell of Islamist protesters drove the Shah of Iran from the Persian throne, in December the Soviet Union launched its ruinous war in Afghanistan, and in September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. Thus, the Middle East stage was radically changed as the Reagan Administration entered the White House. In the minds of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy team, US national interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf now faced two significant new threats: communist expansionism by direct military means from the Soviet Union and the spread of anti-US Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. With these two factors in mind, Iraq's sponsorship of international terrorism was seen as a lesser of evils, and therefore Baghdad was perceived as a potential partner that could serve US strategic interests in the region. In March 1982, the US government officially began engaging Saddam Hussein by removing Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The official reason was to recognize Iraq's improved record, (4) a claim that a Defense Department official later rebutted in stating, No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism.... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran. …

'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.

The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: a Power Cycle Assessment

The application of power cycle theory to Iraq's war decisions reveals the dynamics of an increasingly competitive Middle East system. Iraq's power share rose sharply from 1975 to an abrupt inflection by 1980, just after Iran's inflected decline, an explosive mix that provided the context for Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran. Although Iraq gained slowly in relative power during the war with Iran, by 1987 Iraq had entered a period of decline relative to its Gulf rivals that continued through its invasion of Kuwait. The relative power winners, at Iraq's expense, were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. That Iraq was in relative decline before invading Kuwait reconciles the seeming contradiction of Iraq as both an expansive potential hegemon and a desperate war-exhausted economy.

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Leaders often turn to history for guidance. Margaret Thatcher and George Bush were no exception when they responded to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Bush and Thatcher used analogies to the 1930s, the Vietnam War and the Falklands War to frame the crisis, which significantly influenced their policies. They argued that Saddam Hussein was another Adolf Hitler and were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Western response to the Axis in the 1930s or of the Vietnam War. There would be no 1930s-style appeasement of Iraq, and no slow escalation as had occurred in Vietnam. The prompt use of overwhelming force in the Gulf would succeed, Bush and Thatcher believed, just as the use of force had succeeded in the Falklands crisis, and just as such a policy, they believed, would have deterred the Axis in the early 1930s.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

Gulf war syndrome

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States launched Operation Desert Shield, in which a coalition of armies gathered in the desert of Saudi Arabia bordering Iraq and Kuwait. The war Desert Storm was launched when the troops moved into Iraq and Kuwait from Saudi Arabia. When the Iraqi army attempted to leave Kuwait, tens of thousands of Iraqis died during air strikes by the coalition armies. The total death count for US troops reached 372. Tragically, many of the deaths can be attributed to human error: 148 died in combat, 184 from accidents (primarily related to training and motor vehicles, in addition to WHAT), and 40 from illnesses.1 By the end of the Gulf War in February 1991, the number of military personnel in the Gulf zone included 697,000 Americans, 53,000 British, and 4,500 Canadians, in addition to a few thousands from other allied Arab countries. The war created a need for extensive medical support to meet the expected large number of casualties.2,3 In fact, morbidity and mortality rates were lower in comparison with those in previous wars.4 Desert Storm was not a war that involved direct confrontation. Instead, the war mainly involved the use of artillery, rockets, and missiles launched from air, sea, and ground, which led to fewer casualties. After American personnel deployed to the Gulf War returned to civilian life, thousands of veterans have sought medical care for symptoms that they perceive to be related to their wartime service. Many complaints have remained unexplained, despite extensive evaluations.5 During Desert Storm, many military personnel experienced war injuries, but more were exposed to a wide variety of hazardous substances. This exposure resulted in significant morbidity and played a role in the development of some skin disorders.6 Geography, Climate, and Environment of the Gulf Zone and Their Hazards

The UN Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, not Retribution

Over the decade of the United Nations Compensation Commission’s work, there has been voiced by some a vague sense that the UNCC, although created to give some justice to those directly injured by Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, should instead be viewed as a part of the system of international economic sanctions. While it is true that any compensatory mechanism may be said to sanction the wrongful actor, the UNCC is not an economic sanction as that term is understood in international relations and law. Rather, the UNCC provides a measure of practical justice to those who suffered damage as a direct result of the crime of aggression. In this essay, the authors ask when it may be said that that which ostensibly is a compensation procedure partakes more of a scheme of retribution, and should be analysed in terms not of the adequacy of compensation to the victims, but rather of the extent of the punishment that is indirectly inflicted on the population of the wrongdoing state. Applying such an analysis, it is concluded that the UNCC should not be viewed as an economic sanction, but rather an institution that has delivered practical justice to millions of victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq

The 'case of Iraq' is the most important single issue the UN Security Council dealt with in the 1990s. It has strongly influenced the role and functioning of the Council in the international legal order. The case, which began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and continued with a prolonged effort to induce Iraq's compliance with the post.conflict regime imposed by the Council, has brought together and exemplified the manifold problems, opportunities and pitfalls encountered by the Council on its way to establishing itself as the principal executive organ of the international community. The history of how the Council proceeded in the Iraq case since 1991 is one of the Council taking uncertain steps into a post-Cold War world. The Council was able to revitalize the collective security scheme devised in the UN Charter of 1945, therey claiming and maintaining its validity after the ruptures in the international system brought about first by the East-West antagonism and then by its sudden conclusion. Further, the Council embarked on a programme of work with profound normative consequences in international law. In a sort of tour d'horizon, this article tries to single out and discuss the most important aspects of the Council's role and functioning as influenced or altered by its handling of the Iraq case, in particular the problem of sanctions and the comprehensive post-conflict regime of Resolution 687 (1991), the extent of the Council's powers, the constitutional reform and procedure of the Council, and the enduring problem of 'legitimacy'.

Modeling the yields on noninvestment grade bond indexes: Credit risk and macroeconomic factors

To accurately price credit derivatives, it is necessary to understand the underlying factors that determine credit spreads and the influence that external shocks can have on required yields. We model the factors that influence the yield on the most volatile segment of the corporate bond market, noninvestment grade bonds. A long-run equilibrium is found between the yield on BB- and B-rated bonds and Treasury yields, Moody's default rate, and the leading economic indicator. In the short run, changes in Treasury yields, Moody's default rates, and mutual fund flow continue to affect the movements in noninvestment yields. We also find that the resulting error correction models are useful in forecasting the yields. External shocks have a greater effect on the more volatile B-rated bonds. We find that the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the Russian and Asian financial crises, and Long-Term Capital Management collapse all have influence on noninvestment grade yields. Evidence is also found suggesting a significant flight to quality for BB- and B-rated bonds during the Russian financial crisis.

Oman: Political Development in a Changing World. By Carol J. Riphenburg. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. 248p. $67.00.

This is an excellent general study of Oman in the late twentieth century. It gives a broad overview of the political and social structures and institutions of that small country, as well as a fair and balanced assessment of its progress in the last thirty years and of the problems that lie ahead. As Carol Riphenburg describes it, Oman in 1970 “had only the most rudimentary social and economic infrastructure but has since been transformed under Sultan Qaboos into a modern oil-producing state. More recently rich than other states in the area, it serves as sort of a bellwether for the region . . . as it faces the prospect of diminishing oil revenues along with the challenges of an area shaken by the turbulence of the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait” (p. xi).

Is the Current UN and US Policy toward Iraq Effective?

On a day like this day 10 years ago, evil and all those who made Satan their protector lined up one place, facing those who represented the will to defend what is right. Iraq has remained, the people have remained, the army has remained. Iraq has triumphed over the enemies of the Saddam Hussein, 17 January 2001 (1) More than ten years ago, President George Bush ordered US troops into the Persian Gulf response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. At the end of the Gulf War 1991, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq-UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661--which were to remain place until the provisions of UNSCR 687 were complied, with, mainly the certification that Iraq has destroyed all of its weapons of mass destruction. In 1991, the UN expressed grave concern over the humanitarian situation and proposed a number of measures that would allow Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to meet the population's basic needs while the sanctions remained place. Iraq refused all offers. Over the following five years there was widespread suffering, with food shortages, absence of essential medicines, and a general deterioration essential social services. (2) In 1996, the UN established the Oil-for-Food program, which allowed Iraq to sell oil for the purchase of goods essential for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Weapons inspections Iraq, conducted by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), stopped prior to the December 1998 bombing of Iraq. Inspections have not been resumed, while sanctions and the Oil-for-Food program remain effect. Is this policy successful? Sanctions have kept Saddam in his box, but the Oil-for-Food program has allowed him to blame the UN for doing little to stop the widespread suffering and deprivation of his people. In addition, Saddam has not allowed weapons inspectors inside Iraq for the last three years, and support for the economic embargo on the international front is wavering. Now the situation is made even more complicated by the war on terrorism and Saddam's stated support for those who would harm the United States and the Western world. Still, President George W. Bush and his administration have opportunity to revisit the policy toward Iraq and devise a strategy that will work. This article reviews the current sanctions and Oil-for-Food policy Iraq from both national security and humanitarian intervention perspectives. The article is organized into three main sections--a review of the background, analysis of the current policy terms of national security and humanitarian criteria, and a recommendation for future policy. Background The comprehensive sanctions of UNSCR 661 were some of the strictest sanctions ever levied against a nation. In addition, April 1991 the UN passed UNSCR 687, which required Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stop all research into WMD, and which subjected Iraq to monitoring and verification. Soon after the implementation of the sanctions, the UN sent a mission to Iraq, which reported the makings of an imminent [human] catastrophe...if minimum life supporting needs are not rapidly met. (3) It was not until May 1996, however, that Saddam agreed to the Oil-for-Food program when he accepted UNSCR 986. The start of the program was delayed another seven months until December 1996 while Iraqi officials argued over the terms of implementation. Under the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq is allowed to sell oil for the purchase and import of food, medicine and medical equipment, and other goods for essential civilian needs. It is also allowed to import repair parts, equipment, and materials for use water sanitation, education, electricity, agriculture, and de-mining operations. UNSCR 1153 expanded the program to include repair to the civilian infrastructure and upgrading of the Iraqi oil infrastructure to enable it to pump the increased $5. …