Insurgency In Iraq Research Articles

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The Impact of Coalition Offensive Operations on the Iraqi Insurgency

Coalition offensive operations in Iraq seek to disrupt insurgents and their networks, but may also act as a recruitment tool for the insurgency. We use data from Coalition press releases and casualty reports to assess the total impact of these operations. We find that two additional offensive operations come at a future cost of an additional Coalition soldier's life. The evidence suggests that rather than diminishing the insurgents' appetite to wage counterattacks, these operations may act as a recruitment tool for the insurgency. We further find that while the insurgents change their level of operations in response to the Coalition, the Coalition does not react to the insurgents.

The ‘cult of the insurgent’: its tactical and strategic implications

More important than the potential geographical spread of a specific weapon, tactic or expertise is the emulation or inspiration of the ‘culture’ surrounding a terrorist or insurgent movement. This article argues that a ‘cult of the insurgent’ has arisen as a result of the aura of success surrounding both the Iraqi insurgents in their ongoing confrontation with the United States military and Hezbollah in its confrontation in the northern summer of 2006 with Israel. Further, this ‘cult of the insurgent’ will prove the most critical factor in inspiring, motivating and animating the spread of lethal and destructive expertise among other terrorist and insurgent groups worldwide. In the future, therefore, our adversaries will likely conclude that the best and most cost-effective means to confront either a superpower or the superior, conventional military forces of an established nation-state is through a campaign reliant on terrorist and insurgent tactics involving stand-off attacks utilising IEDS (improvised explosive devices) and portable missiles and mortars1.

Surge, Escalate, Withdraw and Shinseki: Forecasting and Retro-casting American Force Strategies and Insurgency in Iraq

Central to the contemporary American foreign policy debate is the issue of reducing insurgency and promoting stability in Iraq and the role of American military forces in achieving these outcomes. Military force–related proposals range from complete withdrawal to a moderate “surge” in troops to a massive escalation of the force commitment. Here, we draw upon an analysis of domestic political stability in 60 imposed political systems occurring during the period 1816–1994 to forecast the effectiveness of said force-related proposals. The analysis underscores, in part, that (i) a policy of surging American troops is unlikely to succeed, (ii) a policy of belated massive escalation reduces insurgency, but much less so than an initial policy of massive invasion coupled with massive occupation, a strategy that preempts the development of a robust insurgency.

Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On

In 1965, James G. Eayrs was asked to give the Alan B. Plaunt memorial lectures.1 lectures had been inaugurated in 1958, and were intended to focus on broad issues in Canadian political life. Eayrs would have been a logical person to invite to give the 1965 lectures. A well-known academic in the department of political economy at the University of Toronto, he had published a number of works on Canadian foreign policy, including a volume in the Canada in World Affairs series published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and Art of the Possible, a pioneering exploration of the foreign policymaking process in Canada.2 Since 1959 he had been the co-editor of the International Journal. He was also well-known outside the university as an accomplished essayist whose commentaries on world affairs appeared in the popular press and were heard on CBC radio. Perhaps most importantly, in 1965 he had just won the governor general's literary award for non-fiction for In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, a work that turned out to be the first volume of magisterial five-volume exploration of Canadian defence policy in the 20th century.1The two lectures were delivered at Carleton University in November 1965, and were published in 1966 as a slim 57-page volume-Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy.* As the title he selected suggests, Eayrs took the opportunity to explore the question of morality in world politics, particularly in contemporary statecraft.The first lecture, The ways of statecraft, began by reminding us of the widespread deception, treachery, and cruelty that is so much a mark of contemporary foreign policy. Eayrs provided a quick cook's tour of some of the most egregious examples of these essential characteristics of foreign policy, ending with a discussion of the cruelty-and immorality-of using the threat of the destructive power of nuclear weapons as a means of advancing national interests. lecture concluded by looking at different ways of treating morality in statecraft.The second lecture, The ways of keeping faith, was a discussion of the difficulties faced by those who seek to be moral in world politics, and looking at how to the practitioners of statecraft moral. Examining the role of both the bureaucracy and the general public, Eayrs concluded that neither the public service nor the public at large is specially equipped...to confront statesmen with their wrong-doing. Rather, in view, that task was best left to intellectuals-particularly university professors. Indeed, the conclusion of the lecture was a spirited admonition to the intellectual to keep faith by refusing to enter the service of the state or consulting for government. Rather, he should maintain his distance from those who want to buy thoughts. intellectual's obligation was thus to embrace the intellect of and engage in detached analysis and condemnation of foreign policy.5Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy, written at a time when the United States was dramatically increasing its military commitment to fight against an externally supported insurgency in Vietnam, reflects the degree to which normative issues were looming larger in Eayrs's work, reflected most clearly in the informed condemnation that marked popular, more journalistic writings in the late 19605 and early 19705.'' Read four decades later, Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy still resonates, and not just because another American administration is enmeshed in another military campaign against an externally supported insurgency in Iraq. It resonates also because Eayrs's reflections on morality in foreign policy provide us with a useful framework for the assessment of Canadian statecraft over the last 40 years.EAYRS ON REALISM AND IDEALISMEayrs's lectures reflected the common view in the academic discipline of international relations at the time that there were two broad historical approaches to the issue of morality in international politics- the realist and the idealist. …

The Multi-faced Sunni Insurgency: A Personal Reflection

In October 2005, I met an official from the Pentagon in Washington and asked him if the US forces are aware of whom they are fighting in Iraq. He replied: ‘We have a lot of intelligence reports but our information about whom the insurgents are, and most importantly how many they are and where they are, is still limited.’1Four years after the invasion of Iraq and the insurgency still remains somewhat of an enigma. Working as journalist in Baghdad, I have personal experience of the difficulties in collecting and disseminating objective information over the true nature of the insurgency in Iraq. In December 2004 while conducting an interview with some Iraqis in a Shia district of Baghdad, I was arrested by the Iraqi Police who, without an explanation forced me inside a car, pointed a gun to my head and drove me to a house in a remote district of Baghdad. I was lucky to have survived that incident, not least because according to the International Federation of Journalists over, 135 reporters have been killed in Iraq since the US-led invasion in March 2003.2 Even so, enough material has emerged from the shadows of the insurgency to question what many regard as its unitary nature and structure. By concentrating on the scope and dynamics of the Sunni based insurgency, this article highlights the fragmented nature of many of the insurgent groups, and examines whether the violence that threatens to dismember Iraq along sectarian lines can be assuaged by the very factors that now drive the insurgency.

Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq

This paper examines how and why the American military helped create and exacerbate the current insurgency in Iraq and the actions it has taken since summer 2004 to address perceived operational and tactical errors. Of key importance in this process of reform were the influence of the British and their articulation of a plan which has exerted a strong influence on subsequent political and military operations within Iraq. Whilst the paper generally supports the counterinsurgency plan that is currently being implemented it identifies a series of challenges that could cause this strategic solution to unravel.

Arab-Israeli military forces in an era of asymmetric wars

The reality of the Arab-Israeli balance now consists of two subordinate balances: Israel versus Syria and Israel versus the Palestinians. The book analyzes these two balances in detail and their impact on defense planning in each country and on the overall strategic risk to the region as a whole. It covers military developments in each of six states-Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine-and provides an analytical view with charts and tables of how the changing natures of the military and political threats faced by each is impacting its military force readiness and development. The book has the most comprehensive data on past, current, and future military force structure currently available, drawn from the widest range of sources. Responding to the most recent of events in the region, this book is the first to deal with the effects on the Arab-Israeli military balance of the strategic uncertainty created by the Iraqi insurgency and the Iranian nuclear program. It also studies how the Gaza pullout, the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the changing political landscape in Israel, and the threat of nuclear proliferation are having impacts on the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace accords and the prospects for a settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis. The roles of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are analyzed in light of the changing political landscape in both Israel and Palestine. Given the role of Syria in the Palestinian-Israeli affairs, the book also explores the ways that internal instability in Lebanon could escalate into a regional conflict.

From ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq

This article recounts the initial difficulties of the US occupation of Iraq that enabled the growth and maturation of the Iraqi insurgency. The focus will be on how the US military adapted, while in combat, to a situation for which its prior training and doctrinal focus had left it ill prepared. The article will explain the challenges faced by military leaders to move from a hierarchical, cold war-designed approach to warfare, to a more adaptive, decentralised mode of operations that requires distributed authority and decision making. The story will be told from the perspective of two strategic planners who helped shape the campaign plan for the coalition forces in Iraq, including the challenges they encountered when attempting to unify all elements of US national power against the Iraqi insurgency.

The battle for Iraq: Islamic insurgencies in comparative perspective

This article constructs a model of three types, or clusters, of Muslim insurgency over the past two centuries. It analyses how each cluster shares a common ideological formulation, impetus, leadership type, propensity for violence, organisational structure and level of durability. Examples from each of the three clusters are briefly examined and compared on these criteria. The article then examines Iraq's insurgency (more correctly, insurgencies) from mid-2003 to the present in light of the models to suggest how the insurgency ‘fits in’ with other insurgencies in the Muslim world. Understanding its characteristics in light of the models sheds light on how durable the insurgency may be. The most durable insurgencies have been ones in which the mantles of nation and Islam are successfully fused.

Is the Insurgency Growing? A Novel Analysis of the Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of the Iraqi Insurgency

Is the Insurgency Growing? A Novel Analysis of the Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of the Iraqi Insurgency

Vietnam: Lessons for Intelligence in Wartime

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsNancy E. BirdNancy E. Bird, a military analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence, was inducted into its Senior Analytic Service in 2005. She most recently fulfilled a mission-critical need of analyzing the Iraqi insurgency, and has worked on the issue of Russian nuclear weapons security, command and control, and forces operations. Ms. Bird earned graduate degrees from the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. During 2005–2006 she was an Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City.

Rolling the Dice of War

strategic fact of historical experience is that once the dice of war are rolled, policy achievement is largely hostage to military performanceColin CrayModern StrategyHistory, of course, never repeats itself precisely, former secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in an op-ed last year examining the lessons of the Vietnam War as applied to the current insurgency in Iraq.' The Pentagon's political and military leadership repudiated such an analogue and so did US Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US-led occupation agency, according to journalist Thomas Ricks. In the summer of 2003, a retired Marine colonel, expert in small wars, went to Baghdad to advise Bremer on how to counter the growing insurgency. At a meeting between the two men, the colonel innocently suggested to the ambassador that some of the programs implemented in the Vietnam War might be useful. The suggestion set Bremer off, raging that Iraq was not Vietnam. As Ricks observes, [t]his was one of the early indications that US officials would obstinately refuse to learn from the past as they sought to run Iraq.2The refusal to learn from history actually began more than two years earlier when senior Defense Department officials ignored or dismissed case studies conducted by the RAND Corporation and the US Army Strategic Studies Institute on US experiences in postconflict occupation as well as the initial post-invasion planning Department of State experts conducted. Further, these officials marginalized former army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, when he provided his military judgement that the force required to occupy Iraq would be more substantial than his civilian superiors were admitting. Instead, using a variation on an operational plan used in Afghanistan, Pentagon leaders put a premium on technology and minimal force levels to attain victory because they confused military aims with political objectives.Such an indictment should not be imposed solely on the Pentagon's civilians-military leaders bear responsibility as well. In the immediate aftermath of tactical success, US military units failed to suppress the emerging anarchy and became estranged from the Iraqi population by guarding the oil Ministry while sanctioning the looting and destruction of the remaining fragile institutions and infrastructure of Iraq. Perhaps the inaction resulted from the US military's traditional unease with nation building, a role in which military and political aims are both complementary and interdependent. Regardless of the genesis, one of the lessons from Iraq is that a more expansive review of military effectiveness must be taken, not simply in terms of conducting combat operations but in administrating civil affairs. It requires an understanding of how military capability must be reconciled with military necessity. This is not only an imperative of international law but is dictated by common sense as well: some agency must plan for and assume this onerous responsibility in order to advance the nation's political interests. Thus, national policy compels more from the soldier than obedience to orders; it calls for statesmanship.THE BEGINNING OF NATION BUILDINGIf the battle streamers attached to the US army's official flag could give voice, they would tell of not only of the campaigns the organization has fought but also its role in military government, another name for nation building, which occurred after the Mexican War (1847-48), in the Confederate states during and after the American Civil War, in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish-American War, and in the Rhineland after World War I. In every instance, however, American politicians and intelligentsia were wary of the army assuming civil authority, an anxiety arising from the longstanding historical and legal traditions of the United States. Pragmatism dictated that the military undertake this role since no other government entity had the human and financial resources to perform it. …

Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary

The ongoing conflict in Iraq has sparked a renewed interest in the study of counterinsurgency, leading many to comb the wars of the twentieth century, the golden age of insurgencies, for lessons that can be applied to today. (1) Much of this recent analysis has focused on the knowledge gained from fighting Marxist revolutionaries. The insurgent of today, however, is not the Maoist of yesterday. His organization and methods are strikingly different from his twentieth century predecessors. The modern insurgent aims to defeat his opponent by psychological warfare and terrorism instead of military action. (2) He draws his support from criminal networks as opposed to popular mobilization. He fights a netwar not a People's War. These dissimilarities raise the question of just how much of twentieth century counterinsurgency thought can be applied to twenty-first century conflicts. Methods from past wars are put forth as guiding principles with only a nod towards these differences. (3) Applying these principles without examination could lead, at best, to wasted effort, at worst, to defeat. Sun Tzu said, Know your enemy. (4) The structure of a movement, meaning its organization and methods, is the key to understanding it. Modern and Maoist insurgencies are structurally different. In order to be effective, those conducting counterinsurgencies must take into consideration these differences and adapt their methods to the structure of modern adversaries. This article examines the distinction between Maoist and modern insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency methods. First, it contrasts the two types of insurgencies in terms of their organizations and strategies. Building on that information, it analyzes the vulnerabilities of Maoist and modern insurgencies in their organization, political cohesion, support base, and use of information technology. From this analysis, it draws conclusions about how to modify twentieth century methods to combat the modern insurgent. The purpose of this article is not to propose a comprehensive strategy for a modern counterinsurgency. Instead, it examines one component of such a plan--understanding and exploiting the insurgent's structural vulnerabilities. It does not exhaust this analysis; the conclusions drawn here are demonstrative of the possibilities inherent in this methodology. Throughout this article, the conflict in Iraq is used as an illustrative example of a modern insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is thus far the most advanced embodiment of netwar, where small groups coordinate, communicate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command. (5) As such, this conflict is a powerful predictor of the future of insurgency. Structure of the Maoist and Iraqi Insurgencies The first step in learning to defeat this new netwar adversary is to understand how its structure differs from past movements. The following contrasts the organization and strategy of the Maoist and Iraqi insurgencies. Organization The last half of the twentieth century witnessed the appearance of several effective revolutionary movements based on Mao's strategy of the People's War. (6) Examples include the Hukbalahap in the Philippines, the Malaya Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in Malaya, and the Viet Cong in Vietnam. These groups were all organized in similar hierarchies. (7) For example, at the head of the Viet Cong was the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), a committee composed of the top political and military leaders. Below the COSVN were six regional committees, each of which oversaw several provincial and district offices. At the district level was an extensive support organization including medical personnel, weapon manufacturers, training teams, and fiscal auditors. At the lowest level, the cadres organized the entire population to support the movement. Armed bodies consisted of main force units, local guerrillas, and village militias. …

Policing Post-War Iraq: Insurgency, Civilian Police, and the Reconstruction of Society

We present an analysis of the ongoing dynamics of civilian police reform in Iraq since an end to major hostilities was declared in the Spring of 2003. Analyzing the development of Iraq's new police forces since the fall of the Ba'ath regime, our study particularly focuses on the Iraqi police as a preferred target of insurgent attacks. Theoretically, we rely on sociological perspectives on the transformation of the police function in the process of democratization of the polity and apply these insights comparatively to the democratic reform of Iraq's autocratic regime. We argue that the Iraqi insurgency is disproportionately targeted at the new Iraqi civilian police, not because of the role police would fulfill as representatives of the state, but because a well-established and regularly functioning police would represent an important and highly visible indicator of a pacified Iraqi society. First and foremost, we maintain, the insurgency is aimed at the Iraqi police forces in order to prevent a normalization of Iraq's civil society.

Faith in democracy: Islamization of the Iraqi polity after Saddam Hussein

This study addresses systematically the rising phenomenon of insurgency in Iraq and concurrent democratic developments since the fall of Saddam Hussein. It demonstrates two main features of the democratization process. First, not only that democratization is taking place within an unstable post-war environment but that much emergent Islamist discourse is also stifling the rebuilding of institutions where democratic rights are protected. Second, democratic discourse is subject to a consistent tension between secular and religious interpretations which in turn inhibits the post-war reconstruction process more widely. The analysis examines the prospects for democracy in Iraq as a Muslim polity and examines the factors that both facilitate and hinder state and polity reconstruction post-war. It offers the hypothesis that the Muslim polity needs to be intimately involved in its own processes of democratization of state and society in order for the present transition to lead to an outcome that is not characterized by state authoritarianism. The final section contends that democracy in Iraq is a long way off and it is most likely to emerge, if at all, as Muslim rather than liberal in character.

Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report begins with a statement of strategic clarity: The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a (1) From the suburbs and cities of North America and Europe, the deserts, jungles, and villages of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, the long is indeed a global one that has been and will continue be a challenge for the professionals tasked with waging it. This war is characterized by its transnational nature, and although our military forces are heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be vigilant in our appreciation of the breadth and depth of the strategic battleground. One gets a sense of the magnitude of the challenge by examining the service and support mechanisms of al Qaeda and its progeny. ways in which our enemies learn and adapt pressure, as well as recruit followers and resupply combatants, offer important insights into the nature of the conflict. Using safe houses, smuggling rings, secured communications, and personnel who connect individuals training and support networks, our enemies benefit from an interconnected global system that enables violent groups and handicaps intelligence and law enforcement agencies. recent example of a Belgian woman traveling Iraq perform a suicide attack against a US military convoy is a case in point. (2) A convert Islam, the woman typifies the growing threat facing Europe, America, and the nascent democracy in Iraq. Both the global jihadist movement and insurgent forces in Iraq utilize support networks that are best characterized by their mobility, flexibility, and fluidity. (3) Understanding and successfully targeting the service and support networks of terrorist groups is a prerequisite for success in the war. Importance of Mobility and Support Networks In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, a disproportionate amount of effort was devoted targeting and eliminating the sources of terrorist financing the detriment of other, more critical support mechanisms. (4) While eliminating the terrorist and insurgent leadership cells, waging the ideological war against the Salafist historical narrative, and addressing the root causes of radicalization are critical success in the war on terrorism, these efforts must be supported by counterterrorism strategies that target the connective tissue between the enemy's strategic desires and their operational or tactical efforts. Transnational support networks are an overlapping feature of both the global jihadist movement and the Iraqi insurgency, and, if properly targeted, they constitute the Achilles' heel of these networks. (5) Efforts at understanding, targeting, and eliminating transnational support networks should be a main effort of counterterrorism strategy. If successful, these efforts will greatly aid the United States and its allies in both prosecuting the war on terror and quelling the insurgency in Iraq. ability train, move, and nourish combatants across vast distances in time and space is a constant feature of modern warfare. War, with its numerous tentacles, according Carl von Clausewitz, prefers suck nourishment from main roads, populous towns, fertile valleys traversed by broad rivers, and busy coastal areas. (6) ability of a commander maneuver forces rapidly or clandestinely contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability. (7) Clausewitz believed that service and support capabilities in a protracted conflict were critical success, writing, Where a state of equilibrium has set in, in which troops move back and forth for years in the same province, subsistence is likely become the critical concern. In that case, the quarter-master-general becomes the supreme commander, and the conduct of war consists of organizing the wagon trains. …

Washington: To Engage or to Change the Regime in Iran?

After the invasion of Iraq it was predicted that Iran would be America's next target, if President George W. Bush were re-elected. The massive electoral endorsement that he received for his second term, increased, that is before the insurgency in Iraq, the potential for confrontation with Iran. This article argues, among other things, that Washington has five options to deal with Iran: invasion/occupation, fomenting instability and supporting dissident groups, bombarding Iran's nuclear energy facilities (or allowing Israel to do it), getting the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against it, or engaging Teheran. At present the most controversial issue between them concerns Iran's decision to continue with its nuclear energy program, but there are also other serious issues that have divided them for years. Those issues are discussed and analyzed here. Essentially, however, theirs is a clash between a superpower intolerant of a perceived dissident state, and an assertive regional power that has had the “temerity” to challenge that superpower, and the almost total distrust that each has of the other.

Fighting insurgency on sacred ground

Iraqi insurgents are using their own mosques as operational bases, often forcing U.S. military commanders to choose between desecrating a sacred space or letting insurgents escape. Israel and India, along with experience from Iraq to date, offer four core lessons for how to respond.

Covering the Iraqi Insurgency

Journalists covering war and fractured peace in Iraq have had to grope for facts in a fog of broken telephone networks, tribal politics, military jargon, and a seething rumour mill. The result has not been a cool, definitive analysis of conflict (that will be a job for historians in future), but a very current, patchy composite of fighting, peacemaking, small victories, and large policy reversals as well as blood, sweat, tears, and tragedy. This war has arguably been covered more completely, by more journalists, than any in modern history.Over time, our reporting has yielded a big picture, like slow reveal of a photographic print in a bath of developer. But as details merged into a whole, a crucial blank spot appeared. There was, and is, very little information about what's become known as the insurgency. The ruthlessness of both its leaders and its fighters have made close contact too dangerous for everyone-obviously American military and Iraqi security forces, but also western and Arab reporters. Ultimately, it is this blank spot-the failure to see how strong insurgency would become, or to come to grips with its makeup-that most seriously threatens America's victory in Iraq, and Iraq's own long-term stability.Rereading my field notes, which date back to before war, I am reminded how slowly we all woke up to potential danger of sustained armed resistance. Consider this upbeat entry written in Baghdad not six months after fall of city. The first frenzy of looting (one of freedom's untidy features, according to US Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld) had abated, and deadly bombings had not yet begun in earnest.9 September 2003: American authorities and those Iraqi civil servants who have trickled back to work are reopening schools and hospitals. We don't report often that they have done a good job-but in this case they have. By dint of massive currency imports, they've even set up regular paydays.In Baghdad, Amarah and Kut grieving and complaining voices are still loudest: people who have lost family members, jobs and their place in a stable world; those who are afraid thieves will attack their homes and those who are simply outraged by American soldiers patrolling their country.But there's a descant to this chorus too, and it is just as important.It comes from people who are delighted with their new regular, and relatively generous, wages. The Coalition Provisional Authority (the American administration in Iraq led by Paul Bremer) is giving a regular salary to every government employee-and there are hundreds of thousands of them, many of them women.Female civil servants, nurses, and teachers have seen their pay (and buying power-in spite of inflation) rocket up. In some cases, they have had a hundred-fold increase, from three to three hundred dollars a month. In addition, markets are full of goods that have been unattainable for years because of sanctions.You should see head-high piles of satellite dishes stacked on sidewalk all along main shopping street in Mansour... Satellite TV-the link with world-was forbidden for so long. Now, it's first thing families want to buy.Then there are electrical appliances, medicine, and cosmetics too. People, especially women, are giddy with choice and opportunity.This is buying patience for American occupation. These people have no desire to see Islamists or former Sadaamites-all basically totalitarians-get control.I think peace is far from won, of course, but war on many fronts is over.Bustling markets, satellite TV, and optimistic women seduced me, that September day, into believing country might be settling down to rebuild its future. But in background, Iraq's violent history was resurfacing. A mere month later I covered one of very first riots in area that is now notorious as the Sunni triangle. …