Iraqi Armed Forces Research Articles

Maximizing the performance of the Iraqi Armed Forces and determining the optimal path for them using the dynamic programming

The Iraqi Ministry of Defense decided that there would be no escape for the terrorist gang members from the death which it proceeded to it with a false doctrine until it is eradicated from Iraq which can never be an incubator of terrorism, accordingly and with the capabilities available to the ministry, the ministry has developed two strategies: The first is allocating ten regiments from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) to maximize the performance of the Iraqi armed forces (IAF) in defending the homeland and maintaining its security and stability from terrorist gangs in four border regions in Iraq. The second is to reduce the arrival time of the ISOF to the battlefield by determining the optimal possible paths using an efficient scientific approach which is the dynamic programming (DP). The results of this study after solving a real-life problem proved that the proposed approach is an effective mathematical approach for taking a series of related decisions by finding maximization level of performance of ISOF and the shortest time for them to reach the battlefield.

Iraq's Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation

In the summer of 2014, the Iraqi government lost control of much of the country. Insurgents - including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), former Ba 'thists, and an array of Sunni tribes - captured Mosul, and then much of western Iraq. Although complex factors lay behind these developments, this article focuses on one theme of central importance: attempts to consolidate power in Baghdad and the concomitant evisceration of Iraq 's constitution. When key provisions of a very decentralizing federal constitution were ignored or violated, the blowback from disenfranch ised groups in Iraq brough t the country to the brink of collapse.In early June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and a constellation of Sunni Arab tribes and former Ba'thists captured Mosul, Iraq's second largest city. Much of the Iraqi Armed Forces disintegrated, and the rest fled southward from the Sunni rebel advance.1 As most of the majority-Sunni Arab areas of the country quickly fell to the insurgents, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government scrambled to fortify Baghdad's defenses. Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), meanwhile, took the opportunity to advance farther south and take control of virtually all the territories disputed between Erbil and Baghdad, including Kirkuk, which has some four percent of the world's proven oil reserves around it. As authorities in Baghdad stmggled to mount a response to the breathtaking developments, ISIS declared the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate straddling Syria and Iraq, and the KRG announced their intention to hold a referendum for Kurdish independence.2 More than ever before, the dissolution of Iraq suddenly appeared both likely and imminent.What precipitated such a collapse of one of the most important states in the Middle East and North Africa region? Rather than seeing a predetermined fate that doomed Iraq after the toppling of President Saddam Husayn, the explanation provided here focuses on agency - choices made within a structural context that offered real alternatives. The stmctural context presented huge difficulties to be sure, with a society and political system ravaged by wars, neighboring states meddling in Iraq, and a civil war raging next door in Syria since 2011. But explanatory weight needs to be assigned to the choices that Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and his administration made over the last several years as well. Although Prime Minister Maliki likely pursued his poli- cies with the best intentions, the highest authorities of a state bear the greatest onus to strengthen, not weaken, its constitutional foundations. While many people warned that the 2005 Iraqi constitution's strongly decentralizing provisions could threaten Iraqi territorial integrity, subsequent developments and the current crisis demonstrate the opposite: key elements of the Constitution's robust provisions for decentralization and power-sharing were never respected, leading to the total alienation of Iraq's disparate Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations. Even some Iraqi Shi'i political groups appear dis- affected today,3 reviving old militias to oppose Baghdad's authority. As Prime Minister Maliki assiduously worked to concentrate power in his own hands, American policy makers continued to back him almost unconditionally. In doing so, they squandered the blood and staggering sums of money spent rebuilding Iraq.The following pages provide an overview of the key components of the Iraqi con- stitution that Prime Minister Maliki's administration eviscerated. While an exhaustive treatment of all the varied factors that led to the current crisis in Iraq remains impossi- ble to provide here, it is the author's contention that the 2005 Iraqi constitution, despite its necessary ambiguities on many issues, provided a legal and political structure that could have led the country to a much more propitious future. This would also have re- quired wise and inclusive leadership in Baghdad, of course. …

Iraq—managing the peace

In a little over three weeks in March and April 2003 American-led Coalition forces invaded Iraq, defeated the Iraqi Armed Forces, removed Saddam Hussein's regime and occupied a country the size of France. In terms of military power and political will, it was a display of extraordinary detemination and might. To have achieved it in such a short time, with almost negligible military casualties and with limited war damage to the country's infrastructure was a feat of almost unimaginable military precision and planning. To have further avoided the dire consequences of the much talked of 'Stalingrad scenario' in andaround the built-up areas of Baghdad and Basra displayed maturity and wisdom inthe senior military leadership. That conditions for success were set, irrespective of outside pressures to act, is both commendableand surprising in a time of instant news, instant reaction and demands forinstant success.

Arabs at war: military effectiveness, 1948-1991

MILITARY AFFAIRS Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, by Kenneth M. Pollack. Lincoln, NE and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. xv + 583 pages. Maps. Tables. Notes to p. 653. Sel bibl. to p. 675. Index to p. 698. $69.95. Ken Pollack, the author of the widely quoted book, The Threatening Storm: A Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Bantam Books, 2002), has also produced a much-- needed analysis of Arab military capabilities. In Arabs at War, which is an expansion of Pollack's unpublished 1996 doctoral thesis at MIT, the author lays out a conceptual framework to analyze the performance of six Arab countries from the War of Liberation with Israel in 1948 through the liberation of Kuwait by the US-led coalition in 1991. But, instead of analyzing military effectiveness, the book turns into an expose of Arab military ineffectiveness. Pollack lists ten categories to frame his analysis of why the Arab militaries have been generally ineffective for over 40 years. The categories include: unit cohesion; generalship; tactical leadership; information management; technical skills and weapons handling; logistics; maintenance; morale, training; and, finally, cowardice. The performance of the Egyptian and Iraqi Armed Forces constitute the longest chapters in the book, since they were involved in the majority of fighting during the period that Pollack reviews. Syrian, Jordanian, and Libyan military actions are analyzed in progressively shorter chapters, while Saudi Armed Forces' actions during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 are covered in just over 20 pages. Over 35 maps are scattered throughout the text, illustrating the battles and forces involved in major campaigns or key military engagements. These maps help orient the reader to the situation on the ground, though additional maps would have helped the reader through this voluminous work, as very few tables were used. In each chapter, Pollack summarizes his view of the strengths and weaknesses of the six armed forces that engaged in combat with other Arab countries, Israel, Iran, or the United States. Pollack then draws together the key points from his analysis of each of the six armed forces into his final chapter, Conclusions and Lessons. Here, he explains why the Arab armies performed so poorly in combat during the latter half of the 201 Century - certainly not for a lack of money spent on their armed forces or on expensive arms purchases from the United States, from other Western countries, or from the Soviet Bloc. …

Nine years after the invasion of Kuwait: the impacts of the Iraqi left-over ordnance

The Iraqi regime occupied the State of Kuwait for seven months. During this period the Iraqi Armed Forces brought into Kuwait massive quantities of army materials. These included heavy military equipment, armoured vehicles, tanks, missiles, munitions and mines. The worst of these were the mines and munitions. During the first five years of liberation, casualties in Kuwait were high and they reached hundreds of cases of both civilians and military personnel. Since 1995, the number of casualties has dropped sharply, largely as a result of the clearing efforts, but casualties are still occurring. This paper describes the type, quantities and distribution of the ordnance within the Kuwaiti desert, together with the clearance efforts. Because of the particularly adverse impacts of land mine use, strict international measures are required to prevent them being made.