Iran's Nuclear Program Research Articles

CHIŃSKA REPUBLIKA LUDOWA WOBEC PROGRAMU NUKLEARNEGO IRANU PO ZIMNEJ WOJNIE

The aims of the article are to analyze and assess the political and economic circumstances that determine the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards the nuclear program of Iran after the Cold War. Its main thesis is that China's approach towards Iran's nuclear aspirations has evolved from support, through abstinence to limited efforts to extinguish them. The development of illegal nuclear programs by states, including Iran, at the turn of the century became contrary to the interests of the Middle Kingdom. China's support for these activities lowered their international authority and aggravated their relations with the United States and, more broadly, with the West. Because of that it has engaged in strengthening the international regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China, however, was keen to stop the Iranian nuclear program at the lowest possible cost to the partner. This attitude was to convince Tehran that in the long-term Beijing is interested in tightening bilateral relations. Therefore, China categorically opposed the possibility of using military solutions, and opposed excessive economic sanctions. International negotiations with China on the Iranian nuclear program brought an agreement in 2015. Although Beijing's activity was limited, its goals were achieved, i.e. Iran undertook to freeze the nuclear program in exchange for the lift of economic sanctions, and it happened through diplomatic channels. The problem, however, has not been resolved definitively, and tensions are mounting again around the question of Iran's nuclear program, what is against China's interests.

A GLANCE AT IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM FROM BEGINNING TO NUCLEAR DEAL 2015 AND THE ROLE OF RUSSIA

Iran’s nuclear program was launched in the 1950s with the help of US president Dwight D. Eisenhower as part of the UN “Atoms for Peace” project. During Raza Shah’s Era, many developments occurred in the Iranian nuclear program. After the Islamic revolution, the nuclear program experienced a halt but was shortly resumed again, this time with a wide range of sanctions imposed. The development of the Iranian nuclear deal is beneficial for the world in general, as well as the Middle East’s security and stability. It is a diplomatic victory, demonstrating how issues can be resolved in a peaceful way. The negotiation process started in 2003, with the EU3 and Iran early in the game, and China, Russia and the US subsequently joining in. After a brief discussion, an agreement was reached. Russia described the consensus as a “huge sigh of relief” for the world. The neighboring countries, however, have a different take on the things. Saudi Arabia and Israel, for instance, feel threatened by the nuclear program and call the deal a “historic mistake”.

A Systems Theoretic Approach to the Security Threats in Cyber Physical Systems Applied to Stuxnet

Cyber physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly being adopted in a wide range of industries such as smart power grids. Even though the rapid proliferation of CPSs brings huge benefits to our society, it also provides potential attackers with many new opportunities to affect the physical world such as disrupting the services controlled by CPSs. Stuxnet is an example of such an attack that was designed to interrupt the Iranian nuclear program. In this paper, we show how the vulnerabilities exploited by Stuxnet could have been addressed at the design level. We utilize a system theoretic approach, based on prior research on system safety, that takes both physical and cyber components into account to analyze the threats exploited by Stuxnet. We conclude that such an approach is capable of identifying cyber threats towards CPSs at the design level and provide practical recommendations that CPS designers can utilize to design a more secure CPS.

SAUDI-IRAN RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL POLITICS

Historically, Iran has dominated the regional politics in several aspects, but after the Second World War, Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant player in regional politics. Both states have several differences; Saudi Arabia is Sunni dominated state with monarchical system of governance while Iran has a Shia dominated population and Islamic republic nature of governance. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in a conflict with each other for several decades and there have been a number of issues that have intensified the Saudi-Iran rivalry for the several decades and created instability in the region. Iranian nuclear programme and capital punishment of Shia cleric by Saudi government have also further increased their rivalry. But, their recent enmity has had a drastic impact on the West Asian region. Therefore, regional conflicts have been becoming very complex and affecting the regional politics as well as international politics. The main aim of this paper is to examine the causes of Saudi-Iran rivalry and how does it impact on regional politics. Article visualizations:

A rhetorical change that changed reality

Abstract This paper is the first to explore the development of Iranian rhetoric from former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the current president Hassan Rouhani, in messages delivered to the international community. The study compares eight speeches given by Ahmadinejad at the UN, to two speeches given on the same platform by Rouhani. The speeches were explored by qualitative research of the prominent rhetorical strategies employed by each president, as well as by quantitative research of the frequently used words in each president’s speeches. The findings reveal a radical change in Iran’s rhetoric since Rouhani succeeded Ahmadinejad in 2013. The newly elected president adopted a moderate, modern and rational discourse regarding both Iran’s attitude to the West and the Iranian nuclear program. The findings suggest that this change made the new president and the “new” Iran possible partners to negotiating with the West, and eventually enabled the historic nuclear deal in 2015.

O caso prático como método de ensino em teoria das relações internacionais: o programa nuclear iraniano segundo os níveis de análise

This article presents the practical case as an important instrument for the development of active learning within the context of teaching theory of international relations for undergraduate students. Focusing on stimulating learning and on knowledge retention of the concept of levels of analysis, this article details the application of a practical case about the Iranian nuclear program, and its respective resolution in the classroom.

Unia Europejska wobec problemu proliferacji broni masowego rażenia. Wpływ kryzysu dotyczącego irańskiego programu atomowego na kształtowanie się oraz implementację strategii Wspólnoty

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been one of the most prominent threat discussed in the post-Cold War security studies. The article presents analyses of the European Union policies towards proliferation of WMD and the impact of the political crisis around Iranian nuclear programme on them. Based on documents of the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency, two processes are identified as the main source of the EU agenda on non-proliferation. Firstly, internal dynamics of the negotiations on the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, including performance of a specific agents promoting their ideas and interests. Secondly, the evolution of the EU role in the debate around Iranian nuclear programme between 2003–2015. Negotiations with Iran are identified as the biggest challenge for the EU policy on WMD so far, with positive conclusions about successful implementation of multilateral mechanisms.

Iran's nuclear program and international law: from confrontation to accord*

Iran's nuclear program and international law: from confrontation to accord*

What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal

The 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War stands as the pivotal event for Iran's national security strategy, especially as it pertains to the country's controversial nuclear program. The “imposed war,” as it is known to Iranians, caused Iran to view itself as isolated and on the defensive, striving for self-reliance and survival in what it continues to perceive as an unjust international order. The war has shaped both Iran's strategic outlook generally and its nuclear policies specifically. It was a decisive factor in determining the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear activities, as well as in Iran's approach to the international negotiations surrounding those activities, which in 2015 produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Both during those talks and after the implementation of the deal began, Iranian decisionmakers regularly invoked the history and lessons of the war to construe their decisionmaking process and define their bottom lines. Yet the war and its implications for Iran's strategic culture and nuclear thinking remain understudied and misunderstood. If the implementation of the deal and a longer-term resolution of the conflict over Iran's nuclear program are to succeed, the history of the Iran-Iraq War and the vital lessons that Iran has drawn from it must be appreciated.

Foreign policy decision making in Iran and the nuclear program

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes how foreign policy is made in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To do so, it analyzes the role of various state institutions, factions, and individuals in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Actual powers of various institutions in Iran have evolved greatly since 1979. The history and causes of such institutional changes are discussed briefly. Iran is not a one-man dictatorship. Rather, it is ruled by an oligarchy comprised of fundamentalist Shia clerics and lay fundamentalists. The ruling elite is composed of competing factions such as hard-liners, expedients, and reformists, as well as sub-factions such as pragmatic hard-liners and ultra-hard-liners. The oligarchy is deeply divided on many issues, including on foreign policy. This article presents, in great detail, the views and policy proposals of the top members of the oligarchy regarding Iran's nuclear program, relations with the U.S., and Iran's regional policies. Finally, this article applies the findings of this research to the case of Iran's nuclear program. Evidence shows that Iran has had a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This article analyzes the ruling oligarchy's responses to the global reaction to Iran's nuclear program.

No EU, no Iran deal: the EU's choice between multilateralism and the transatlantic link

ABSTRACTThe Iran deal is a European success story of “effective multilateralism.” An initiative by three European states, initiated in response to the US-led military action in Iraq, ultimately demonstrated that proliferation risks can be addressed by diplomacy. Over a decade's time, the European Union (EU) framed the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in a way that enabled two hostile parties—the United States and Iran—to meet in talks leading to a successful understanding. Two years after its implementation, the deal seems to be working. However, despite Iranian compliance, the deal now faces an uncertain future. The Donald J. Trump administration's Iran policy remains unclear, though there are indications to expect diverging views between the United States and the European Union, further challenging a transatlantic link that had already faced challenges during the negotiations. This article re-examines the history of the negotiations through the lens of the strategic choice the EU faces in its foreign and security policy: steering between effective multilateralism and transatlantic relations.

Will the Iran nuclear deal change the geopolitics of the Middle East?

As the September 17, 2015 deadline set by the U.S. Congress for the implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA) approached, the media was flooded with headlines, comments, and blog posts, presenting arguments both for and against the agreement. Those who supported the deal, despite considering it flawed, argued that it was the best deal that could be reached through intrusive inspections, which would ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains peaceful and does not achieve its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, opponents of the deal put forth arguments such as "Iran is an untrustworthy partner, and we prefer sanctions," "Iran should not possess any nuclear capability," "Iran is an enemy of Israel," and "The agreement will only last for fifteen years." It appears that both sides in this debate agree that this agreement will fundamentally change the geopolitical reality of the Middle East. But is this really true?
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Between European and national role conceptions – the EU3 initiative regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme

ABSTRACTThis paper addresses whether Germany, France and the UK (the EU3) – with the EU in the background – can shape their own approach to a common Europeanised position or even a European role conception regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme. As the EU3 initiative appears situated between Europeanisation and national role conceptions, it seems that the EU3 members – after a coherent start – were finally inclined to readapt themselves to certain of their national role conceptions, resulting in a “mix” of national and European role patterns in the process leading up to 2016. Currently, this mix hints at still-prevailing hindrances involved in genuine European conflict management, although this outcome holds the promise of greater European coherence in the future.Abbreviations: E3: Germany, France and UK (without formal support of the EU); EU: European Union; EU3: Germany, France, UK and the “High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union”; EU3 + 3: official designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China; IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency; P5 + 1: informal designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China (Permanent Security Council Members [P5] plus Germany); UK: United Kingdom; UNs: United Nations; UNSR: Security Council of the United Nations

Analysing intersubjective resources in Persian and English newspaper opinion/editorials

AbstractThis study is to uncover the persuasive means of inviting or restricting alternative voices in Iranian and American press. About 10,000 engagement tokens were gathered from 216 newspaper opinions/editorials written between 2005 and 2010 on the Iranian nuclear program in two Persian newspapers,

Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: Reflections on the Iran Nuclear Agreement

This article examines constitutional validity of President Obama's decision, as part of his 2015 with Iran, effectively to repeal 17 different sanctions laws for 15-year life of agreement. Although Congress had legislated extensively in this area, President effected this change by entering into a nonbinding political agreement with Iran and by aggregating individual waiver provisions in sanctions laws into an-across-the-board waiver of sanctions. We argue that commitments made by President in Iran violate a fundamental separation-of-powers limit on executive power—what we term the Steel Seizure principle, after Youngstown Steel Seizure Case. As Supreme Court reaffirmed in Steel Seizure Case, President does not have lawmaking power even where national-security and foreign-relations concerns are at stake. A vast literature has grown around Steel Seizure Case, especially influential concurring opinion by Justice Robert Jackson. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to majority view of Justices that President Truman’s seizure order was unlawful not because it contravened any express statutory prohibition but because it flouted congressional plan for addressing particular policy issue. This central aspect of Steel Seizure Case highlights what is particularly problematic about President Obama's decision to aggregate authorities in sanctions laws and to commit United States to an across-the-board waiver of nuclear-related sanctions pursuant to his with Iran. The President treated waiver provisions as an invitation to end congressionally prescribed sanctions regime for addressing Iran's nuclear weapons program and to replace it with his own non-sanctions regime for addressing same issue. Yet President lacks unilateral power to overturn Congress's prescribed policy and to replace it with his own.The President is both an agent and, particularly in foreign relations area, can be viewed as a co-principal with Congress. The Steel Seizure principle highlights limits of co-principal conception of President. Once Congress has developed a legislative framework for a subject matter, that framework occupies field; President's role becomes one of a responsible agent. In Iran sanctions laws, Congress provided bounded waiver authority, acting responsibly to allow limited executive discretion rather than requiring President to seek new legislation each time flexibility was needed. It did not, however, invite President to override sanctions framework altogether, as occurred in connection with Iran nuclear agreement. An emergent literature in administrative law has praised Congress's delegation of waiver authority to executive branch as providing needed flexibility and other policy benefits. Yet that literature recognizes that President's exercise of waiver authority must be carefully circumscribed to avoid problem of President revising a statutory regime out of disagreement with Congress's policy choices. Such limiting principles are no less necessary in foreign-affairs context, where President has used purported waiver authority in Iran sanctions statutes to pursue his own independent policy in defiance of Congress.

Threat inflation and the Iranian nuclear program

Much of the debate over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program reached in 2015 between the P5+1 and Iran–has centered on whether the limits the plan imposes on Iran's nuclear program are sufficient to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear “breakout” in a year or less. However, “breakout time” is misleading: it involves implausible worst-case assumptions and ignores important factors influencing Iran's nuclear path. It also overlooks important elements of the agreement such as safeguards and transparency measures that likely do the most to prevent Iran from getting a weapon. Why, then has breakout time occupied such a central position in the debate? This paper argues this case is an example of how the over-reliance on technical threat estimates biases policy debates. Technical assessments are critical to understanding threats, but when removed from the political and strategic context can fuel worst-case estimates. Moreover,they create an illusion of precision and certainty that leads policy makers and the public to overlook important areas of uncertainty and factors that can impact policy outcomes that are difficult to measure or are not easily quantified.

The Iranian Challenge to Gulf Security

This study attempts to analyze the Iranian challenge to Gulf security, as Iran aims to dominate the Middle East region, so the study focuses on the Imbalance of power between two sides. Also the study dealt with the differences issues between Tehran and the Gulf countries like, The Three UAE Islands, Iran's nuclear program, Tehran's interference in Arab affairs, particularly in the crisis in Syria and Yemen.

Договор об Ирaнской ядерной прогрaмме: процесс междунaродного урегулировaния в контексте безопaсности Центрaльной Aзии

The goal of this paper is to examine and analyze historical background, evolution and settlement of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the Iranian nuclear deal that was concluded in July 2015 and its implications for Central Asia. It is well-known that the proliferation and the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies is one of the main concerns of international community. From this perspective since the beginning Iran has been perceived as a source of possible proliferation of nuclear technologies and a threat that would put regional and global stability and security in jeopardy. Simultaneously the Iranian and western diplomats began conducting negotiations in order to settle deep disagreements and misunderstandings over the Iranian nuclear program. In spite of deep suspicions and difficulties, Iran and so-called P5+1 group of countries reached the needed deal in July of 2015. This huge achievement became possible due to wise policy of the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani on the one hand, and Barak Obama’s sincere willingness to bring peace to the whole world and to prevent another war in the Middle East from happening on the other. As a result of this deal, all sanctions on Iran gradually began to be lifted. It is undeniable that the successful Iranian deal has been significant and beneficial for Central Asia first and foremost in terms of security issues. Since then the Central Asian countries have begun to cooperate with Iran, which is truly beneficial for both sides.Key words: nuclear program, Iran, P5+1, Central Asia, nuclear deal, Middle East.

Addressing Iran Ballistic Missile Program. Three Lessons from the Negotiation Over the Iranian Nuclear Program

After deep and intense negotiations, Iran and the UN Security Council members together with Germany (P5 + 1) finally reached a “historic” agreement on Tehran’s controversial nuclear program two years ago. While this agreement foreshadowed a certain regional lull,there is an upsurge in tensions between Iran and its regional neighbours, and the bone of contention is its ballistic missile program.Regarding this issue, Trump administration, on the one hand, has firmly required from Iran a substantial change in its regional behavior, and foremostly the inclusion of its ballistic program in the nuclear agreement the package.

Koniec specjalnych relacji Stanów Zjednoczonych z Arabią Saudyjską?

The Saudi special relationships with the U.S., unlike that of the U.S. with Israel, are mutually beneficial. Saudi Arabia sells about 10 million barrels of oil a day and all those transactions are denominated in American dollars, which helps that currency to perform the role of the currency of account (world, s currency) and has been of crucial help to the American ambition to dominate the global economy. On the other hand the United States did its part to uphold the relationship be granting the security to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil states. This was demonstrated for example in 1990 during Iraqi attack on Kuwait, that also menaced Saudi Arabia. At that time the U.S. deployed 400,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The priority of American foreign policy in that region has been to keep Gulf oil in friendly hands. Since the increase of the production of shale oil in the United States that priority has been less important. Another factor which has exerted an influence on the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship was the signing the permanent agreement with Iran in July 2015 on the limitation of the Iranian nuclear program and normalization of political-economic relations with the West. This has led to further worsening of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia alliance which has always been like a ”marriage of convenience” where behind the façade of friendship and harmony there is cold calculation of benefi ts and losses. That alliance will last as long as the potential benefi ts will still be bigger than possible losses.