Invocation Of Article Research Articles

Cyber-attacks on Space Activities: Revisiting the Responsibility Regime of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty

Both international society and individual states are placing considerable emphasis on the imminent threats of cyber-attacks on space activities. States play a major role in combatting against cyber-attacks in the space; thus, their international responsibility regime requires re-examination within this unique context. This study analyzes the responsibility regime established by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) aiming to adapt the time-honored provisions to the current challenges posed by space cyber-attacks. Simultaneously, it aims to focus on three aspects: attribution rules, the scope of obligations of States Parties and the specific measures that states should undertake. This study concludes that in situations of space cyber-attacks, a case-tailored method should be adopted to identify the responsible state. This may likely involve the broadening of states' obligations, invocation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the due diligence obligations, and other lex specialis obligations, such as conducting space activities for peaceful purposes, due regard obligations and non-interference obligations. Furthermore, the conclusion suggests that states should act nationally as well as internationally to successfully combat against cyber-attacks on space activities.

NATO adaptation to current challenges and mechanisms of Ukraine’s cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The purpose of the article is to describe the changes NATO undergoing in response to the challenges of our time. Today NATO, as a key element of European and Euro-Atlantic security, is adapting to changes in the modern security environment by increasing its readiness and ability to respond to any threat.
 Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. Responsiveness NATO Response Force enhanced by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, was established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a new Allied joint force that deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. NATO emphasizes, that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
 Cooperation with NATO already contributes to the implementation of national security and defense in state policy. At the same time, taking into account that all decision-making in NATO based on consensus, Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance quite vague perspective. In such circumstances, in Ukraine you often can hear the idea of announcement of a neutral status. It is worth reminding that non-aligned status did not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Neutral status will not accomplish it either. All talks about neutrality and the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO are nothing but manipulations, as well as recognition of the Ukrainian territory as Russian Federation area of influence (this country seeks to sabotage the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine). Think about it, Moldova’s Neutrality is enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1994. However, this did not help Moldova to restore its territorial integrity and to force Russia to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria.

Brexit, Archaeology and Heritage: Reflections and Agendas

This brief reflection considers some of the inter-relationships of, and implications for, archaeology and heritage in the narrow majority ‘Leave’ vote in the 2016 referendum on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, and the subsequent invocation of Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union by Theresa May’s administration in March 2017. We argue that heritage and archaeology were intimately implicated in the referendum result, and have and continue to play an important role in the rise of what have been termed ‘new nationalisms’ in Europe. We aim here to consider some of the ways in which this might be said to be the case, and to begin to explore what an emerging Brexit, archaeology and heritage research agenda might look like. In doing so, we aim to engage with a broader popular critique against ‘expertise’ and to forge a new role for research in archaeology and heritage studies which embeds itself within the very political context it seeks to study.

Self-Defence as a Circumstance Precluding the Wrongfulness of the Use of Force

Roberto Ago, the International Law Commission’s second Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, defined self-defence as a faculte of a state to use force in response to an act of another state through which a breach of the principal obligation under Article 2(4) Charter is committed. On this basis, he then inserted a provision in Chapter V to Part One of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility expressing self-defence as a specific factual circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the use of force which constitutes a response to state aggression. This conception of self-defence, although misunderstood from the onset, remained in the backdrop of the study of the law of state responsibility for a considerable period. It was only dismantled during the reign of the last Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, James Crawford. The last Rapporteur, at the onset, submitted that it is not the function of the Draft Articles to specify the content of the primary rules, including that referred to in Article 51 Charter. He then redefined the function of the circumstance of self-defence as that of precluding the wrongfulness of non-performance of certain obligations other than the general prohibition insofar as such non-performance is connected with the exercise of the right under Article 51 Charter. This contribution first scrutinises this paradigmatic shift and finds it to be symptomatic of the conviction on the part of Crawford that the notion of self-defence could also encompass the use of force against speculative threats of state origin as well as actual threats that emanate from individuals or groups which are disconnected from the organisation of any state. It then uses this finding as a springboard towards the examination of the controversy surrounding the notion of self-defence under international law. In that connection, it first outlines the findings of the World Court on the requirements of armed attack and attribution and describes the points of criticism which those findings have elicited. Next, it argues that state practice is unable to settle the controversy concerning the scope of the concept of self-defence and that the question whether or not valid invocation of Article 51 Charter must be preceded by a state’s breach of the general prohibition can be conclusively answered only as part of efforts geared to devising an explanatory account of self-defence which accurately translates its normative origins and which preserves its logical relations with the other, more ordinary but fundamental legal concepts. The study’s conclusion is that respect for such criteria demands that the notion of self-defence under international law be defined in line with Ago’s proposition, i.e. in terms of a de facto situation, recognised by a secondary rule, whereby the principal obligation under the primary rule contained in Article 2(4) Charter is pushed into abeyance to the detriment of a state which conducts itself in breach of that very same obligation in respect of another state; or, correlatively, in terms of a factual circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the use of force which constitutes a riposte to an unlawful armed attack of another state.

Of Life and Torture: Differences in the 'Mistreatment-Threshold' for the Invocation of Article 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Through an extensive analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law, this paper intends to answer the question, “what distinguishes the conduct as exercised against the personal integrity of a victim so as to invoke either Article 2 of the ECHR, Article 3, both, or neither?” It clarifies the applicability of these Articles rationae materiae, and develops various ‘tools’ which can be used to understand the perspective of the Strasbourg Court in its examination of facts before it in order to determine the Articles’ applicability. Numerous qualifiers, i.e. applicability criteria which the Court has considered, have been distilled and comparatively analyzed to find reoccurring patterns that are used to phrase guiding questions. Despite any conclusion that the Court’s approach appears ambiguous, which may arise from its desire to avoid any protection gaps, some general patterns are identified. The paper suggests the differences in the Court’s approach to examining various conduct is best described by applying a ‘Survival vs. Suffering’ hypothesis; the Court’s leading question in deciding whether a case comes within the ambit of Article 2 is whether the victim has died or could have died, whereas for Article 3 it asks whether the victim suffered, regardless of any potential terminal impact. Other relevant hypotheses are ‘Scars vs. Scars and Tears’, ‘Victims vs. Relatives’ for cases of disappearance, and partially ‘Objective vs. Mixed Approach’. Lastly, the paper draws upon inconsistencies in the identified case law to offer recommendations on how to address the Court’s apparent ambiguities in judicial lawmaking.

The Transatlantic Alliance renewed: the United States and NATO since 9/11

Following NATO's historic invocation of Article V in the aftermath of the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the United States was inundated with Allied offers of moral and practical support for the 'War on Terrorism' declared by the Bush Administration. For the most part such offers were spurned, as the United States chose instead to build ad hoc coalitions on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. The Bush Administration's decision to bypass the alliance reignited a simmering debate over its future, prompting many to once again speak of NATO's imminent 'demise'. This paper suggests that while the US emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation have...

The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age

In 2003, hardly a keynote speech goes by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as important as ever. This is perhaps true – a timelier question is whether the same can be said for the perception of common values and common threats that used to define this partnership and its sole institutional link: NATO. This essay explores five security policy conundrums that point towards a revised burden-sharing and power-sharing in the transatlantic strategic partnership: the UK's ambiguous role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the blocking of the formal bond between NATO and the EU; the implications of a change in US policy towards Europe; NATO's improbable move into soft security and, finally, NATO's invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

The EAPC/PfP as an Instrument to Combat Global Terrorism

There is no multilateral security framework whose mandate has not been reexamined – and, in many cases, fundamentally redefined – in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.1 The search for an effective response at a multilateral level to global terrorist networks and the organized crime structures supporting these networks mirrored the extensive national measures and bilateral efforts undertaken to enhance homeland security. While it has been fashionable in academic circles to refer to the blurring of the distinction between national and international security, the magnitude and the nature of the terrorist attacks delivered the most convincing argument in favor of merging and intensifying the coordination between domestic intelligence, foreign policy, and defense policy. The invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was the swiftest multilateral response to the terrorist attacks on the United States masterminded by the al Qaeda network. On 12 September 2001, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) adopted a package of measures designed to combat the scourge of terrorism. Within a week of the terrorist attacks, more than thirty countries had offered disaster relief assistance to the United States through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Center. By December 2001, the EAPC had adopted the new EAPC Action Plan for 2002–2004 based on innovative counter-terrorist approaches suggested in a joint Finnish–Swedish “food-for-thought” paper.2 One year later, at the Prague Summit, the EAPC member states endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT), including practical mechanisms and an action plan ranging from intensified consultation and information sharing and increased prepared-

As Viewed from Europe: Transatlantic Sympathies, Transatlantic Fears

September 11 briefly brought European governments into an unprecedented degree of solidarity with the United States. NATO's invocation of Article 5, however, did not lead either to a revitalization of the Alliance or a transformation of the Atlantic relationship. Long-term trends since the end of the cold war have reduced the centrality of Europe to American foreign policy. European governments are uncomfortably aware of their relative weakness compared to the USA, above all in military capability, and of their lack of influence over a self-confident and self-contained US foreign policy debate.