Abstract

Following NATO's historic invocation of Article V in the aftermath of the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the United States was inundated with Allied offers of moral and practical support for the 'War on Terrorism' declared by the Bush Administration. For the most part such offers were spurned, as the United States chose instead to build ad hoc coalitions on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. The Bush Administration's decision to bypass the alliance reignited a simmering debate over its future, prompting many to once again speak of NATO's imminent 'demise'. This paper suggests that while the US emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation have...

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