Intuitive Concept Research Articles

Diverse paths, stable differences – role of prior knowledge in learning biology over undergraduate years

ABSTRACT Undergraduate students enrol at university with diverse levels of prior knowledge and intuitive conceptions about essential biological topics. This longitudinal study explored the development of a conceptual understanding about three topics and how domain-specific prior knowledge affects this development. Undergraduate students (N = 50) of biological and environmental sciences participated in three measurement points – baseline (2019), follow-up 1 (2020), and follow-up 2 (2021) – where the same questionnaire with open-ended tasks was given. A mixed-methods approach was used for quantitative scoring of the answers and qualitative thematic analysis to describe the development of individual students’ conceptual understanding. The effect of prior knowledge was studied by dividing the students into two groups based on the baseline performance. The topic of evolution showed the most significant differences in prior knowledge and in knowledge gains. Students with lower prior knowledge experienced desirable shifts in their explanatory models about evolutionary processes, but an equal amount exhibited fragmented learning trajectories. Students with a more robust prior understanding of such an emergent phenomenon can more likely integrate scientific concepts in their knowledge framework. Implications for teaching in higher education are discussed.

Schlick on intuition and prediction

ABSTRACT Textor's The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn Against Metaphysics examines the voluntarist background of Schlick's epistemology, including his conception of knowledge as essentially involving judgements that relate at least two terms, and his connected objection against according intuition epistemic status. Textor interprets Schlick's conception of intuition in light of Schopenhauer's distinction between ordinary and extraordinary cognition. Thus Textor argues that Schlick takes intuition to be a form of “steady contemplation” (Disappearance, 348) of an object that is “either a universal or a particular” (332). I suggest an alternative interpretation, according to which Schlick takes intuition to be an immersion into the contents of the stream of consciousness, which he claims to be a formless “Heraclitian flux” (General Theory, 31, 156). This interpretation allows for a defence, against Textor's objections, of Schlick's thesis that the aim of knowledge is prediction. If the kind of flux given in pure intuition is genuinely ‘Heraclitian’ – that is to say, if the stream of consciousness is ever-changing and unrepeatable – then it is simply impossible for “the devotee of intuition” (General Theory, 150) to predict its course. By contrast, the process of re-cognition that constitutes knowledge is intimately tied to prediction.

From Croce’s intuition to Zhu Guangqian’s Zhijue 直觉: A cross-cultural interpretation

ABSTRACT Zhijue直觉 is the Chinese translation of the English word ‘intuition’. These two terms, however, do not hold completely equivalent meanings. Before this translation, traditional Chinese lacked a precise counterpart for the concept, though intuitive thinking has long been integral to Chinese culture. Consequently, Zhijue not only inherits the cultural connotations of the Western term ‘intuition’ but also integrates traditional Chinese intuitive thought. Translating intuition into zhijue goes beyond linguistic conversion—it reflects a cultural hybrid shaped by intercultural collision and fusion. This paper investigates how the concept of intuition, as developed in Croce’s aesthetics, is reinterpreted and adapted by Zhu Guangqian in the modern Chinese aesthetic context, generating new meanings. By tracking the cross-cultural journey of the term ‘intuition’, this study explores the comparative exchange between Western and Chinese ways of thinking and their cultural implications, offering insights into the traveling of concepts across cultures.

A Survey About Universal Numerical Integrators (UNIs): Part II or Quantitative Approach

AbstractIn Part I, we focused more on the intuitive and geometrical concepts behind Universal Numerical Integrators (UNIs) and their possible classification. This first article worked almost as a categorical analysis for UNIs. In Part I, we also saw an extensive literature review about them. However, in Part II, we examine the mathematics that makes it possible to couple a conventional numerical integrator to some universal approximator of functions. Here, we also present an essential list of the significant mathematical properties related to the design of a UNI. We also hope that the theoretical content in these two articles can help guide researchers aiming to computationally design general problems related to some Universal Numerical Integrator (UNI).

Fréchet and Gateaux gH-differentiability for interval valued functions of multiple variables

In this work we extend concepts of differentiability for Interval-Valued functions (IV-functions) of multiple variables, based on generalized Hukuhara gH-difference. In this context, we introduce a new concept of gH-linearity and characterize the class of gH-linear IV-functions, which are fundamental for a general approach to Fréchet-type and Gateaux-type gH-differentiability of the first order. We moreover consider vector IV-functions and outline the definition of the gH-Jacobian; by representing intervals and IV-functions in midpoint-radius notation, we establish properties and relations between pointwise, Fréchet and Gateaux gH-differentiability. Finally, higher-order differentiability and gH-Hessian matrix are considered. These intuitive concepts are mathematically and computationally easy to work with.

Self-regulatory and metacognitive instruction regarding student conceptions: influence on students' self-efficacy and cognitive load.

Self-regulatory and metacognitive instruction regarding student conceptions can help students become metacognitively (or more specifically, metaconceptually) aware of their conceptions and self-regulate their intuitive conceptions in scientific contexts when they are not appropriate. Two approaches have been found effective in enhancing conceptual knowledge: (a) self-assessing one's conceptions and (b) acquiring conditional metaconceptual knowledge about why and in which contexts specific conceptions are appropriate or not. However, it is unclear how these approaches influence other cognitive and affective variables, such as self-efficacy and cognitive load. Nevertheless, it is essential to investigate whether making students aware of their intuitive conceptions affects their self-efficacy and to what extent reflecting on one's conceptions requires additional (meta-)cognitive resources. Thus, we conducted an experimental intervention study using a 2×2 factorial design with N = 602 upper secondary biology students. Becoming metaconceptually aware of one's (intuitive) conceptions did not lower students' self-efficacy but enabled more accurate beliefs about their abilities. However, the self-assessment increased mental load, which partly suppressed the beneficial effect of the self-assessment on conceptual knowledge. In contrast, the instruction on conditional metaconceptual knowledge did not result in higher mental load and, thus, aligned more with students' cognitive capacities. Furthermore, students with more pronounced general metaconceptual thinking reported lower mental load, implying that regular instruction focusing on metaconceptual thinking may reduce load. Thus, it is suggested to continuously promote students' metaconceptual thinking and to embed metaconceptual activities (e.g., self-assessments) repeatedly across longer instructional units.

Exploring the Emergence of Chemistry in Preschool Education: A Qualitative Perspective

The objective of this study was to deepen our comprehension of how children develop understanding in the field of science, particularly in chemistry. Using the framework theory as a theoretical lens enabled a focus on emergence as a dynamic change and transition. According to the framework theory, children’s science learning involves a wide range of intuitive and counterintuitive scientific concepts related to ontological and epistemological perspectives. How children transition from everyday to scientific thinking during their early years of education is influenced by ontological and epistemological stances. The objective of this study is to introduce science content—including chemical concepts to preschool children—by utilizing a play-based learning approach in a longitudinal study. The exploration of verbal and non-verbal material, specifically pertaining to chemical content and individual differences, involved implementing educational experiments and real-life or animated zooming-in videos. The results indicated a well-established physical ontological framework utilized for the systematic interpretation of submicroscopic phenomena.

Why be a Height Potentialist?

According to height potentialism, the height of the universe of sets is “potential” or “indefinitely extensible,” and this is something that a (formal) theory of sets should capture. Height actualism is the rejection of height potentialism: the height of the universe of sets isn’t potential or indefinitely extensible, and our standard non-modal theories of sets don’t need to be supplemented with or reinterpreted in a modal language. In this paper, I examine and (mostly) criticize arguments for height potentialism. I first argue that arguments for height potentialism that appeal to its explanatory powers are unsuccessful. I then argue that the most promising argument for height potentialism involves the claim that height potentialism follows from our intuitive conception of sets. But, as I explain, on the most plausible way of developing this argument from an intuitive conception of sets, it turns out that whether height potentialism or height actualism is true is a verbal dispute, i.e., a matter of what meanings we choose to assign to our set-theoretic expressions. I explain that only pragmatic considerations can settle such a dispute and that these weigh in favor of actualism over potentialism. My discussion is also intended to serve two broader aims: to develop what I take to be the most promising line of argument for height potentialism, and to elaborate the height actualist position in greater detail than is standardly done.

The power of intuition in decision-making under operational stress

The decision-making process represents one of the most interesting subjects in the field of cognitive sciences, as it is a concept that requires a complex multi- and interdisciplinary approach. Modern warfare involves operations in environments characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, presenting multiple challenges, and radical and unexpected changes in the situation, which require a sound knowledge of how human thinking works and how we can develop the cognitive processes involved in formulating a decision. The article proposes a brief analysis of the decision-making process by military leaders in situations that involve significant stressors and demand quick and intuitive decisions. For this purpose, the main theoretical and practical aspects discussed in the specialized literature are presented, with an emphasis on applications in the military field. Additionally, the concept of expert intuition is introduced. Although there have been attempts to study this concept since antiquity, the systematic study of this revolutionary concept began in the middle of the 20th century and continues to arouse lively interest even today, remaining the subject of lively academic disputes.

The Concept of Transcendental Apperception and its Role in the Second Edition of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction

The aim of this article is to trace the meaning that Immanuel Kant assigns to the concept of transcendental apperception and to present its role in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason. It will be shown that the doctrine of transcendental apperception resolves some problematic features of the theories of consciousness in the traditions of Rationalism and Empiricism. In this regard, Kant’s transcendental apperception will be examined in contrast with the concepts of inner sense (John Locke and David Hume), Cogito (René Descartes), and intellectual intuition (Gottfried Leibniz). This comparative approach will allow us to gain a clearer understanding of the meaning of transcendental apperception. Finally, its role in the justification of the pure concepts of understanding will be considered.

Miejsce intuicji w zdigitalizowanym świecie

Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.

The place of intuition in the digitalized world

Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.

A Closer Look at Classification Evaluation Metrics and a Critical Reflection of Common Evaluation Practice

Abstract Classification systems are evaluated in a countless number of papers. However, we find that evaluation practice is often nebulous. Frequently, metrics are selected without arguments, and blurry terminology invites misconceptions. For instance, many works use so-called ‘macro’ metrics to rank systems (e.g., ‘macro F1’) but do not clearly specify what they would expect from such a ‘macro’ metric. This is problematic, since picking a metric can affect research findings and thus any clarity in the process should be maximized. Starting from the intuitive concepts of bias and prevalence, we perform an analysis of common evaluation metrics. The analysis helps us understand the metrics’ underlying properties, and how they align with expectations as found expressed in papers. Then we reflect on the practical situation in the field, and survey evaluation practice in recent shared tasks. We find that metric selection is often not supported with convincing arguments, an issue that can make a system ranking seem arbitrary. Our work aims at providing overview and guidance for more informed and transparent metric selection, fostering meaningful evaluation.

More than meets the gut: a prototype analysis of the lay conceptions of intuition and analysis

ABSTRACT Using a prototype approach, we assessed people’s lay conceptions of intuition and analysis. Open-ended descriptions of intuition and analysis were generated by participants (Study 1) and resulting exemplars were sorted into features subsequently rated in centrality by independent participants (Study 2). Feature centrality was validated by showing that participants were quicker and more accurate in classifying central (as compared to peripheral) features (Study 3). Centrality ratings suggested a single-factor structure describing analysis but revealed that participants held lay conceptions of intuition as involving two different types of processes: (1) as an automatic, affective, and non-logical processing, and (2) as a holistic processing that can assist in problem-solving. Additional analyses showed that the centrality ratings of intuition’s facets were predicted by participants’ self-reported intuitive style, suggesting intuition is differently perceived by intuitive and non-intuitive people. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of intuition and analysis.

Haram Lost and Found

With its great religious significance, the Holy Mosque in Makkah welcomes millions of tourists every year. The problem of misplaced objects at this holy site poses a problem for both guests and guards. In order to tackle this issue and improve worshippers' and visitors' overall experience, this study project explores the ideation, creation, and testing of a state-of-the-art mobile application called the "Lost and Found Assistance" app. This software makes use of modern technologies to expedite the process of finding misplaced items inside the Holy Mosque. The 'Lost and Found Assistance' app's main objective is to offer a workable answer to anyone who have misplaced their belongings inside the enormous Holy Mosque. It presents an easy-to-use and effective platform that enables users to report misplaced things, facilitating their prompt recovery. Additionally, it enables users to look for misplaced items, providing comfort to individuals who could have momentarily misplaced priceless items while visiting. In order to provide insight on the Holy Mosque's hallowed legacy and importance in the Islamic world, this study initiative examines the historical significance of the building. It explores the issues surrounding misplaced objects at this hallowed location, highlighting the demand for an up-to-date, technologically advanced solution. In addition, the research highlights the revolutionary role that mobile applications play in a variety of contexts as it examines the current state of lost and found services. Through an analysis of current applications and technological breakthroughs, it pinpoints chances to modify these advances to meet the particular difficulties presented by the Holy Mosque. The entire development process of the 'Lost and Found Assistance' app is described, from the first conceptualization to the design and coding stages. The project emphasizes the value of intuitive design concepts and user-friendly interfaces in making sure that the software is useful and accessible to a variety of users. An analysis of the app's usefulness in helping users find misplaced goods within the Holy Mosque completes the research endeavor. It talks about user pleasure and feedback, highlighting how the software improves users' experiences. It also looks at how widely the app might be used and offers ideas for improvements down the road. The 'Lost and Found Assistance' app helps to maintain a calm and serene atmosphere inside the Holy Mosque by utilizing contemporary technologies. The ability of technology to solve long-standing issues and improve the pilgrimage and visitor experience for millions of worshippers and tourists who visit this holy site is demonstrated by this study effort.

An Introduction to ‘Agile for HR’ Through the Development of an Agile Operating Mindset

An understanding of Agile principles and a readiness mindset for human resources professionals play a crucial role in determining the application of Agile for HR in an organisational context. With the rise in extended and non-linear workforce configurations and geo-neutral team arrangements, Agile organisations necessitate that the nature of the HR function evolve from working through traditional architectural models and quickly adopting Agile models of functional excellence. The dearth of literature on understanding and implementing Agile practices in the HR function within enterprises requires a clear examination of the advantages of going Agile for HR. This essay explores the intuitive concept of Agile HR and operating schema, which can develop as a starting point in examining an understanding of how Agile practices in HR can evolve for sustainable enterprises and some challenges that are encountered.

Accuracy-First Epistemology and Scientific Progress

The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be regarded as a precisification of our intuitive concept of epistemic value.

How to be a perspectival pluralist

AbstractThe temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of perspectives on reality: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective privileged above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a pluralist conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the absoluteness of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival.

Life Cycles beyond the Human: Biomass and Biorhythms in Heraclitus

All parts of Heraclitus’ cosmos are simultaneously living and dying. Its constituent stuffs (“biomasses”) cycle endlessly through physical changes in sweeping patterns (“biorhythms”) that are reflected in the dynamic rhythms of Heraclitus’ own thought and language. These natural processes are best examined at a more-than-human level that exceeds individuation, stable identity, rational comprehension, and linguistic capture. B62 (“mortals immortals”), one of Heraclitus’ most perplexing fragments, models these processes in a spectacular fashion: it describes the imbrication not only of humans and gods but of cosmic masses more generally, and its language mimics the natural relations that it names, or rather intimates through its grammatical and syntactical indeterminacy. The remaining fragments amplify the uncertainties and the exhilarations of Heraclitus’ worldview along the same lines. His approach to nature raises urgent questions about how human beings fit into the cosmos, not least by challenging our intuitive conceptions of life and death, our material makeup, and our entanglements with our natural surroundings. In doing so, he provides vital lessons for contemporary ecological awareness, and proves to be an unexpected ally.

Influence of self‐assessment and conditional metaconceptual knowledge on students' self‐regulation of intuitive and scientific conceptions of evolution

AbstractIntuitive conceptions based on cognitive biases (teleology, anthropomorphism, and essentialism) often prove helpful in everyday life while simultaneously being problematic in scientific contexts. Nonetheless, students often have intuitive conceptions of scientific topics such as evolution. As potential approaches to enable students to self‐regulate their conceptions in the context of evolution, we investigated the effectiveness of two instructional approaches that are based on metacognition and self‐regulated learning: (a) a formative criteria‐referenced self‐assessment of one's conceptions and (b) instruction on conditional metaconceptual knowledge (metacognitive knowledge about why and in which contexts specific conceptions are appropriate or not). We conducted an experimental intervention study using a 2 × 2 factorial (plus an additional control group), pre‐post‐follow‐up‐test design in German upper secondary level biology classes (N = 730). The groups that received one or both interventions had higher conceptual knowledge (i.e., used less intuitive conceptions and/or more scientific conceptions) afterward than those whose conceptions were not addressed: The self‐assessment resulted in higher use of scientific conceptions; the instruction on conditional metaconceptual knowledge additionally resulted in lower use of intuitive conceptions based on cognitive biases, more reported thought processes relating to inhibition of cognitive biases, and a better ability to identify inappropriate phrasing based on cognitive biases. No effects were found on students' self‐reported metaconceptual awareness and regulation. However, the fact that students inhibited their intuitive conceptions in the post‐test indicates that they were indeed metaconceptually aware of and self‐regulated their conceptions. The results suggest that students can be taught to become aware of the differences between intuitive and scientific conceptions and to regulate the use of their intuitive conceptions in a scientific context.