Government Intrusion Research Articles

COVID‐19 and Global Governance

Abstract The COVID-19 epidemic has sent economic and social shockwaves reverberating across the globe, and has shaken governance institutions at every level and across a range of issues, from trade to health and climate change An important question is whether COVID will accelerate, slow, or perhaps reverse some key trends in global governance Most prominently, the global and multilateral governance regimes that developed post-World War II were already weakening and fragmenting before COVID (Acharya, 2016) In a closely related phenomenon, cosmopolitan liberalism, as a set of institutions and ideologies committed to a democratic open society, human rights, and multiculturalism, has also retreated in the face of rising populism and authoritarianism in recent years (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) COVID could also affect a third important trend, the decline of state regulation and the rise of private, voluntary, and disclosure-based governance (Levy, Brown, and de Jong, 2010) The impact of COVID on these trends suggests some fruitful new directions for scholars of global governance and organizations

Kidney Donation and the Consent of the Poor

In Consentability, Nancy Kim tackles an important and current topic—in an age of increasing options about how to live, die, and procreate, what limits, if any, should the law place on those choices? Consentability is a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers alike, summarizing the arguments for and against government intrusion on the choices of consenting adults with encyclopedic thoroughness. After weighing the arguments, Kim proposes that “bodily integrity exchanges” be permitted, subject to limitations. Although we agree with the general conclusion that bodily integrity exchanges should be permitted, we disagree with the specific limitations that treat the decisions of the poor as suspect, proposing instead methods of structuring payments and the consent process that would enhance the decision-making quality and reduce the possibility of impulsive decisions for all donors— not just those meeting an arbitrary definition of poverty. In any event, when it comes to a life-saving transaction like kidney donation, it is ethically important to consider the welfare of the recipient as well as the donor.

Food service uniforms and the symbolism(s) of wearing a mask

When the COVID-19 pandemic began, ‘essential workers’ in the United States – including nurses, delivery drivers, grocery clerks and waitresses – bore the brunt of extreme scepticism over public health measures such as lockdowns and wearing facemasks. Conflicting messages from the president, the Centers for Disease Control and state and local governments turned mask mandates into political battles. Some businesses chose to require masks for employees and/or customers, but others refused to allow them as part of the uniform. This article focuses on a specific category of employees – food service workers, typically women and people of colour – in order to highlight how employers made decisions about masking early in the pandemic and how individual workers were affected by the turmoil. In the United States, employers have tremendous power to decide how employees are (and are not) allowed to dress. For many businesses, uniforms are part of the company’s brand identity. When employees at Starbucks wear their iconic green aprons with the Starbucks logo, they embody the company in their interactions with customers; changes can be made, but they happen more slowly than changes in mainstream fashion. Testimony at public hearings on mask mandates has revealed deep concerns about religious freedom, government intrusion, scientific knowledge and the cost of medical care (since the United States does not have universal healthcare). When businesses decide whether masks should be required, allowed or forbidden as part of the dress code, it is not just a public health decision but a branding decision with short-term and long-term consequences. Even before the pandemic, face coverings were largely associated with criminals, political activists (such as Occupy and Antifa) and ultra-conservative Muslims.

Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal Orders: The Fourth Amendment Endorses Brutality in Protest Policing

Thirty years ago, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court determined that excessive-force claims against police should proceed via the Fourth Amendment, which theoretically protects an individual against unreasonable siezures. However, the Court showed extreme deference to law enforcement’s use of force by using a permissive reasonableness analysis that bestows on police great leeway to make quick split-second decisions in tense and rapidly evolving circumstances. The result is a test that, from its inception, has been too forgiving of police violence and misconduct. This lax reasonableness standard, along with qualified immunity principles, has shielded police from § 1983 civil rights litigation in excessive-force cases. However, the obstacles to relief are worse when the victim is not an individual in a regular street encounter but rather an activist during a protest—particularly an activist of color. This Essay explores this phenomenon through the lens of the Dundon v. Kirchmeier litigation that stemmed from the 2016 police assault on indigenous protestors opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline. The encounter left 200 activists injured after law enforcement blasted them overnight with tear gas, special impact munitions, and fire hoses to remove them from the area. In refusing to enjoin the police’s use of these weapons against water protectors, the judge questioned whether the Fourth Amendment even protected activists since police sought to disperse them, instead of arrest them. The judge then reasoned that even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the police use of force was reasonable considering the volatility of the crowd despite information that the plaintiffs themselves were peaceful—thus attributing the conduct of the entire group to the plaintiffs and erroneously amplifying the threat to law enforcement. Both lines of reasoning threaten the safety of protestors. The first removes from Fourth Amendment protection the emblematic protest scenario where police use force to disperse protestors. The second turns the Constitution on its head, foregoing traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which inquires whether the government intrusion is reasonable in light of the individual’s actions, not the actions of the whole group in proximity to the individual. This is most dangerous to activists of color who are most likely to be perceived as threatening by police and to be the subject of their ire.

In the Age of Decriminalization, Is the Odor of Marijuana Alone Enough to Justify a Warrantless Search?

The words “I smell the odor of marijuana” have historically granted police access to search persons and their vehicles without any further justification. However, with vastly differing marijuana and hemp laws quickly arising across America, courts have begun to disagree on how to approach search and seizure based on odor alone. An area of law that once seemed untouchable has now been challenged, creating a lack of uniformity across states and jurisdictions, and a need for resolution. The Fourth Amendment warrant exception of the plain-smell doctrine has consistently been used to “rubber stamp” governmental intrusion into fundamental rights. The legalization and decriminalization of hemp and marijuana for medical and recreational use makes the application of the plain-smell doctrine inconsistent and inadequate, and often prejudicial. Additionally, police use boilerplate language to bypass procedural mechanisms set in place for the protection of the people. The Article offers the solution of an odor-plus standard via alternate routes: Supreme Court decision or Congressional intervention. Under such a standard, officers may not use the smell of marijuana alone as reason for probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, but must also meet at least one other delineated criterion.

Carpenter v. United States: Brief of Scholars of Criminal Procedure and Privacy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner

Amici curiae are forty-two scholars engaged in significant research and/or teaching on criminal procedure and privacy law. This brief addresses issues that are within amici’s particular areas of scholarly expertise. They have a shared interest in clarifying the law of privacy in the digital era, and believe that a review of scholarly literature on the topic is helpful to answering the question in this case. This brief is co-authored by Harry Sandick, Kathrina Szymborski, & Jared Buszin of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP. Carpenter v. United States presents an opportunity to reconsider the Fourth Amendment in the digital age. Cell phones are only one of the many new and pervasive digital technologies which automatically collect and reveal intimate personal data, such as Cell Site Location Information (“CSLI”), to third parties. This Amicus brief argues that the Supreme Court should resist extending the reasoning of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) — a 38-year-old case built on a faulty privacy premise — to the modern, hyper-connected, technology-dependent world. Instead, the Court should recognize that the new realities of this world require new legal doctrines to fit the privacy expectations shared by most Americans. Criminal procedure and privacy scholars are in near-unanimous agreement that an extension of what some have called the “third-party doctrine” could eliminate citizens’ privacy in the modern age. CSLI (and other data transmitted to third parties in the modern age) can reveal an individual’s interests, friendships, activities, travel, associations, beliefs, health concerns, financial problems, employment, and education. Smith is grounded in a pre-digital era, and cannot support future application of the Fourth Amendment. An extension of Smith’s reasoning would give law enforcement ever increasing access to the most private details of individuals’ lives without a warrant or probable cause. As a matter of Fourth Amendment practice, extending the third-party doctrine would curtail digital privacy and encourage arbitrary government intrusions into the lives of American citizens. As a matter of Fourth Amendment theory, applying the third-party doctrine to the digital world would undersell the value of privacy, and contradict the logic of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). And, as a matter of precedent, Smith offers an inapposite and inadequate doctrinal foundation to support the future of a digital Fourth Amendment.

Controlled Substances Act At 50: A Blueprint for Reform

The year 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the Controlled Substances Act. By bringing together various strands of federal regulation under one organizing framework, this legislation vastly expanded the federal government’s role in drug policy. It also served as a foundation for an extensive progeny of federal, state, and local legal instruments to further its regulatory scheme. Vigorous critiques of the CSA’s structure and function are as old as the Act itself. Over time, historians have presented compelling evidence casting this statute as an instrument of the culture wars, including racist and xenophobic drug panics. In the name of public safety, the CSA has ushered in unprecedented governmental surveillance and intrusion, while eroding individual rights. Contrary to its stated rationale, in the years since CSA enactment, the supply of controlled substances on the American and global illicit markets has only increased, while prices have dropped. The legacy of the current Act renders it un-American, given its extensive collateral harms. This Blueprint proposes a revisioning of the CSA as a flagship drug policy statute, based on America's foundational principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

From Piggie Park v. Newman to Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission: Application of the Outward Facing Actions Test to LGBTQ Nondiscrimination Provisions

For over a century courts have embraced a framework distinguishing the behavior of religious organizations on the basis of whether the actions are inward or outward facing. This standard safeguards the rights of organizations to develop and enforce their religious tenets among their members and engage in self government without unconstitutional government intrusion. However, courts have also been clear that the rights of religious organizations to engage in actions that impact members of the general public and non members are not unlimited. As a federal court held in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, the right to believe is not “absolute” and can not be practiced in “utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other citizens.” As the legal rights of LGBTQ people become more cemented, it is imperative that courts remain faithful to this well established standard and recognize the rights of LGBTQ people in a way that is consistent with this nation’s civil rights jurisprudence.

State Court Protection of Reproductive Rights: The Past, the Perils, and the Promise

I. Introduction In the United States constitutional system, the protection of individual rights depends upon the federal and state judiciaries. The role of the federal courts in protecting reproductive rights provides a particularly well known, if controversial, example. Roe v. Wade is among the most widely recognized of all judicial decisions. (1) The U.S. Senate, for example, routinely questions Supreme Court nominees about their views on Roe, as well as Roe's principal precedent, Griswold v. Connecticut. (2) Although the Supreme Court's invalidation in Roe of Texas's criminal ban continues to be debated, Griswold's invalidation of a Connecticut law that made it illegal for even married couples to use contraception stands as a pillar of modern constitutionalism. (3) The courts of the fifty states also possess broad authority to safeguard or diminish reproductive autonomy and, as a consequence, the status of health care, reproductive justice, and the well-being of women, children, and families in their jurisdictions. State courts interpret the meaning of state laws--constitutional provisions paramount among them--that may provide greater protection for individual rights than the federal Constitution. The movement for marriage equality provides a powerful and related example: the first states to allow couples of the same sex to marry did so only after a state court interpreted a state constitutional guarantee to require what increasingly is recognized as a matter of right. (4) Americans regularly have battled governmental intrusions on their reproductive rights in state as well as federal courts, dating back to when not only and contraception were illegal, but so, too, was the distribution of information about how to prevent unintended pregnancy. (5) Now, more than forty years after Roe and fifty years after Griswold, state courts are as important as at any time since those landmark decisions. Overlapping factors converge to create special urgency for attention to state courts. A brief review of five such factors helps situate this Essay's analysis of the contemporary relevance of state courts to the fight for reproductive justice. First, this is a time of heightened threat to the availability of legal services, which diminishes the effectiveness and availability of women's health care services more generally. (6) Several facts illustrate this trend: * State legislatures enacted more restrictions in the last three years (2011-2013) than in the previous decade. (7) * Between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of women living in states hostile to rights nearly doubled, from 31% to 56% (as measured by the Guttmacher Institute). (8) * The number of providers in the United States has fallen over 40% since 1982 (9) and has declined 4% between 2008 and 2011 alone; 89% of all United States counties lack an clinic. (10) * The number of providers will continue to fall from 2011 levels unless courts enjoin new restrictions, as illustrated by the situation in Texas where in 2014 the number of clinics shrunk from forty-one to nineteen and threatened to fall to seven. (11) * In six states, only a single clinic remains open in the entire state, (12) placing them at special risk of soon becoming, as opponents describe their aspiration, abortion free. (13) Second, women increasingly depend upon state courts not only to protect their rights to terminate pregnancies but also to safeguard their liberty, equality, and dignity during pregnancy. The assault on reproductive rights seeks broadly to define fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses as persons possessing rights independent of pregnant women. (14) National Advocates for Pregnant Women has documented hundreds of instances since Roe in which states have used criminal and civil law in efforts to specially punish or control women because they had an abortion, experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth, or engaged in behavior a prosecutor or physician deemed harmful to embryonic or fetal development. …

Local Governments and Economic Freedom: A Test of the Leviathan Hypothesis

Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis states that “potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units” (p. 211) and that “total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized [and]…the smaller the jurisdictions” (p. 185). Using data for US metropolitan statistical areas, we provide the first local-level test of that hypothesis (that we are aware of) that uses “economic freedom” as the dependent variable, which provides a better measure of “total government intrusion into the economy” than the less comprehensive measures (taxes or spending) used in the previous literature. We find mixed support for the Leviathan hypothesis. The number of competing jurisdictions is positively associated with economic freedom, driven largely by the labor market freedom component as opposed to the government spending and tax components (the very measures used in the previous literature).

Treading on Sacred Land: First Amendment Implications of ICE's Targeting of Churches

In the last few years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has begun to target religious institutions—specifically churches—as a means to find and arrest undocumented immigrants. This technique is in legal tension with the First Amendment rights of free exercise of religion and free association. It is unclear, however, how these legal rights protect those most affected by this targeting tactic: undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants may lack standing to challenge ICE’s tactics on their own and may require the help of related parties to protect their interests. This Note explores a potential solution to the ambiguity surrounding undocumented immigrants’ protection under the First Amendment. Specifically, this Note argues that while undocumented immigrants may be barred from filing suits challenging the constitutionality of ICE raids on religious institutions, U.S. citizens who worship alongside these immigrants can and should bring such suits and demand injunctions to end the practice. These citizens not only have the undisputed legal rights to bring such potential claims but also may use those rights to provide a legal and practical shield for undocumented immigrants who seek to attend church without government intrusion.

From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan

Reviewed by: From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan Florence Galmiche, Associate Professor From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018. xii, 196 pp. This book is a useful contribution to several fields of research. It adds to current research on the relationship between the state and Buddhism and also offers a global vision of the history of mainstream Korean Buddhism since the end of the nineteenth century. This ambition—to present the contemporary history of Korean Buddhism in an accessible and concise volume in English—is extremely helpful. Despite the magnitude of the task, Mark Nathan manages to give a coherent account by following a specific approach: the development of propagation (p'ogyo) within Buddhism. This clear angle leaves some themes aside, but Nathan presents this focus on propagation in a very convincing way and shows the relevance of this issue for understanding the contemporary history of Buddhism in Korea. The development of Buddhist propagation [End Page 351] strategies in the twentieth century is the opposite of an epiphenomenon. As this book demonstrates, they have not only strengthened the role and status of Buddhism in society but also contributed to its profound reform. The merits of this approach are twofold: it makes it possible to draw lines of continuity in the contemporary history of Korean Buddhism that contribute greatly to the understanding of its evolutions and it also makes it possible to address less investigated aspects of Buddhism such as the evolution of its legal framework or its media. The book is organized chronologically. The introductory chapter situates the concept of propagation within Buddhist traditions in Asia. It describes how the place of propagation within the history of Buddhism has been debated and provides useful conceptual clarifications (for example, on the difference between dissemination and conversion). After this introduction, chapter 2 discusses the end of Chosŏn and highlights the relation between the concept of modernity, the normative framework for what constitutes a religion, and the valorization of propagation. It sheds light on the many factors that contributed to the lifting of the ban on Buddhist nuns and monks entering major cities. It also explores the meaning and influence of the "mountain Buddhism" trope. Nathan shows how the relation between the principle of religious liberty and the freedom to propagate one's religion was established at the end of the nineteenth century. Clarifying the relation between these two notions as well as the consequences of this connection is an important contribution of this book. Like Vincent Goossaert in the case of China, Nathan disentangles the relationship between different legal frameworks, a normative definition of religion, and the evolution of religious practices. Chapter 3 furthers this reflection on Buddhism in the context of Japanese colonization. It shows how the anchorage of propagation within the normative and legal framework of recognized religions allowed monastics to legitimately engage in this activity but also allowed the colonial government to ensure control over these issues. Nathan thus contributes to the debate about the influence of colonization on the evolution of Buddhism in Korea and shows how the new legal context surrounding temples and their activities has served both as leverage for the spread of Buddhism and as an instrument of control and domination for the colonial government. Chapter 4 discusses the period from 1945 to the end of the 1970s. It describes how divisions ignited by colonial rule were complicated by government intrusion—both by the US Army Military government and the South Korean government—into monastic affairs, facilitated by the legal framework resulting from colonization. Nathan points out that despite all the major crises and [End Page 352] difficulties, propagation has continued to be a major reference for Buddhist reformers and the main guideline for the monastic community's engagement with society. Moreover, he also analyses how the transformation of the political and legal framework surrounding Buddhism in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to renewing its propagation strategies. In particular, he emphasizes the development, from the 1970s onward, of individual propagation initiatives and sheds light...

The Idea of Public Property

Political theory lacks a compelling account of public property. Addressing this gap, I present a “deep public ownership” model, according to which the body politic ultimately owns all the resources within its jurisdiction. I argue that this model is compatible with liberal intuitions regarding private property. I then contend that the model expands the scope of government’s duty to uphold the equality of all citizens, by challenging private property constraints on antidiscriminatory government policies. I anticipate the worry that the model supports excessive government intrusion into private affairs. I close by discussing abuse of public property by elected leaders.

Res Nullius vs. Res Communis in Matters of Communal Lands of Smallholder Farmers in Ethiopia

Communal land is among the key factors in the enhancement of rural livelihood because it enables mixed farming practices. Although communal lands are prime sources of livelihood in rural farming communities, empirical evidence shows gaps in their legal recognition and protection in Ethiopia. There are encroachments which include government intrusion, informal land sale, distribution, and handing out land (selling communal land in informal markets) as Kebele’s contribution for development projects. These factors entrench poverty by sidelining the rural poor at the grassroots whose life is anchored on these lands. These problems also entail violation of human rights of the rural population. This article interrogates the misconception which tends to consider communal lands (customary land tenure) as res nullius (ownerless property) while such lands are in fact res communis (community property). The article uses the Hadiya Zone as a case study. It is argued that there is the need for the effective implementation and amendment of land laws which require political will to ensure tenure security of communal lands thereby securing and diversifying the livelihoods of poor smallholder rural farmers and ensuring human rights . Key terms Communal lands · Livestock · Poverty · Livelihoods · Rural Poor · Tenure security

“Privileges And/Or Immunities” in State Constitutions Before the Fourteenth Amendment

Before the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans had used the words and immunities in close conjunction with each other in a constitution more than two dozens times. Almost all these were in state constitutions. State constitutional use these words therefore can provide clues as to the original public meaning the Privileges or Immunities Clause the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article catalogues and analyzes every time a state constitution used these terms before the framing the Fourteenth Amendment. It finds that they were overwhelmingly used in three contexts: the rights corporate bodies, equality protections, and the protection fundamental liberties. This began in 1776 and continued through the Civil War. The exact words or or various similar words, did not matter, but were used in various formations to protect a wide variety interests from governmental intrusion. When this history is applied to the Fourteenth Amendment we learn that the most important words in the Privileges or Immunities Clause are not privileges or immunities, but are of citizens the United States. But we also learn that those words are broad enough that they suggest the Clause can be interpreted both to protect equality and fundamental liberties.

"Save 100,000 Babies": The 1918 Children's Year and Its Legacy.

In April 1918, President Woodrow Wilson, alarmed at the high draftee rejection rate, proclaimed the second year of American engagement in World War I as "Children's Year." The motto of the nationwide program was to "Save 100,000 Babies." Children's Year represented a multipronged child welfare campaign aimed at gathering data on best practices regarding maternal and child health promotion, documenting the effects of poverty on ill health, reducing the school drop-out rate, ensuring safe play spaces for children, and addressing the unique needs of targeted populations such as orphans and delinquents. Thousands of communities across the country participated in Children's Year, which was overseen by the Children's Bureau and the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense. The 1919 White House Conference on Children's Health synthesized all of the Children's Year findings into concrete recommendations. But in an effort to minimize conflict with organized medicine and those who feared governmental intrusion into family life, stakeholders accepted a series of compromises. By so doing, they inadvertently helped enshrine the means-tested, class-based, fragmented approach to child well-being in the United States that persists to this day.

Hrozba sekulární stagnace

Advanced countries are losing their predominant position in the world economy. With the long-time productivity slowdown and the present long recession, a question arises about the threat of secular stagnation of the advanced world. In searching for the roots of this threat, leading world economistst accentuate either the demand side, or the supply side of the economy. In this respect, the authors add globalization as another important factor. Globalization has resulted in long-term global and internal imbalances, and caused deep problems in the advanced countries - deindustrialization, unemployment, growing dependence on the social safety net, and a permanent increase of government intrusion into the economy. After the 2008 crisis, fiscal and monetary policy concentrates on short-term support of economic recovery, leaving aside the deeper long-term deficiencies. With multiple negative trends acting in the same direction, the threat of secular stagnation should not be overlooked.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Recent Developments in U.S. Cyberlaw

This article surveys recent developments in domestic U.S. law relating to key issues in Internet (or Cyber) Law. Rapid technological advances have posed serious challenges to traditional legal doctrines and approaches relating to (for example) fundamental issues of privacy, freedom of speech and expression, and protection against unwarranted governmental intrusion. How has the law responded to these key challenges? Since the United States lacks a comprehensive legislative structure addressing these issues, most of the recent developments have come in the form of judicial decisions.

Self-Evident Truths: Contesting Equal Rights from the Revolution to the Civil War by Richard D. Brown

Reviewed by: Self-Evident Truths: Contesting Equal Rights from the Revolution to the Civil War by Richard D. Brown Elaine Forman Crane Self-Evident Truths: Contesting Equal Rights from the Revolution to the Civil War. Richard D. Brown. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-300-19711-2. 400 pp., cloth, $40.00. For all of us who thought we understood the precept that "all men are created equal," Richard Brown's exhaustive study proves us wrong. The Declaration of Independence's inspiring words sound definitive, but, as Brown points out, they were meant to be aspirational rather than a paean to accomplishment. Besides, was the expression inclusive? At a time when class, race, and gender divisions trumped equality, did it really mean all Americans? How did "all men" eventually become all people? In short, we can only wish Jefferson and his generation had explained what they meant—even if they meant what they said. This, according to Brown, is the point, and one that is often overlooked: colonial convictions about liberty and equality were based on a tacit and collective understanding that rendered further explanation unnecessary. Self-Evident Truths is a gracefully written book that traces the history of equal rights in America. It is divided into chapters that discuss the subject from different perspectives: religion, nationality, race, gender, children, and class. Religion seems to have presented the thorniest test of equality, since the Declaration's theoretically definitive words were committed to paper before the great migration of Irish Catholics to the United States in the nineteenth century. The First Amendment supported the Declaration's precept by sidelining governmental intrusion in religious matters. Nevertheless, Brown concedes that "Americans never resolved the status of religious equality definitively," even though the momentum leaned toward toleration (60). Drawing heavily on primary sources as well as secondary literature, Self-Evident Truths confirms America's long history of chauvinism while immigrants [End Page 209] from the four corners of the world populated the continent. Yet if Brown calls attention to the American distrust—even dislike—of foreigners in the nineteenth century, he balances the story by acknowledging that those same newcomers were often (but not always) treated equitably in American courts of law. By the nineteenth century, however, tensions between America as an "asylum of the oppressed" and "Yankee xenophobia" had increased in proportion to the soaring numbers of Irish immigrants (93). Because they were likely to be white, the Irish fared better in terms of civil rights than African Americans during the first half of the nineteenth century—even better than people of color who had been born in America. But the law lacked consistency; Brown indicates that within different jurisdictions, state bodies often applied civil rights standards that varied from place to place. What remained constant, however, was the ongoing decline of civil rights for African Americans over the half century before the Civil War. "All men . . ." Did the statement really mean to exclude women? Given Jefferson's patriarchal attitude, no doubt it did. Yet in this chapter, Brown may have relied too much on legal theory, since multiple sources indicate that women led far more egalitarian lives than Brown allows. Married women skirted coverture on a regular basis by running businesses independently. They bought and sold goods both locally and internationally on their own accounts. They appeared in court without their husbands. Yet Brown is right that the laws disfavoring women were slow to change, a matter that Abigail Adams brought to John's attention in 1776. It took many decades more, Brown reminds us, before women could claim the civil rights that men—even poor and non-white men—had enjoyed for decades. Suffrage was an important goal, but women chafed even more at the economic restrictions that coverture imposed. It is unlikely that Abigail's grievance was, as Brown puts it, "virtually unique" (170). While much of the information in Brown's book is well known, Brown's interpretation challenges the reader to reevaluate the mainstream interpretations of nineteenth-century American history. For Brown, it is not always a positive story about the evolution of civil rights. On the plus side, equality before the law was unquestionably...