Introspective Reports Research Articles

An Experimental Study of the Role of Expectation and Variation in Music

PSYCHOLOGISTS, MUSICIANS, AND LAYMAN are agreed that music is often a powerful source of affect.1 Yet we know relatively little about the basis for this power of music to arouse emotion in the listener. Studies have attempted to show that music is capable of inducing a mood effect, or that there are affective qualities in music which can be identified by listeners; they have also correlated certain musical attributes, such as the minor mode, with specific emotional reactions. But such experiments, employing introspective reports, check lists of emotions, and Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) measurements, have yielded no information about the characteristics of the musical stimuli actually involved in evoking the response. Directly relevant to this question is the theory of musical aesthetics formulated by Leonard Meyer, as presented in his Emotion and Meaning in Music. Starting from a psychological theory of emotions first proposed by Dewey, Meyer invokes the concept of expectation as a central factor determining the aesthetic response. His basic hypothesis states that affect or emotion-felt is aroused when an expectation-a tendency to respond-activated by the musical stimulus situation, is temporarily inhibited or permanently blocked.2 Expectations are products of our knowledge of the particular musical style, the individual work, and the modes of human perception and cognition. Any musical figure which deviates from the expected musical sequence is felt to be a disruption in the normal process of continuation and, hence, arouses tension in the listener, which is then resolved when a satisfactory musical resolution appears.

Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?

BY SENSE PERCEPTION we can become aware of the current state of our physical environment, including our own body. It is very natural to say that, in similar fashion, we can become aware of the current events in our own minds. Instead of turning outward to physical events, the mind turns inward on itself and perceives a procession of mental events. Locke spoke of the faculty of reflection, Kant spoke of inner sense, modern philosophy often speaks of introspection. believe this traditional view to be essentially correct. But, it is often held, introspection differs from sense perception in one very important respect. Introspective reports of current mental events are alleged to be logically or logically indubitable. If make the sincere statement I seem to be seeing something green then, it is alleged, it is logically impossible for me to be mistaken in my statement. may be lying, of course, but then will know that my statement is untrue. For, it is argued, if mistake were a possibility then it would make sense to say I think seem to be seeing something green now, but perhaps am wrong. But this is nonsense, it is said, and so introspection is logically or logically indubitable. (In the rest of this paper shall simply say incorrigible or indubitable, and shall use the two words interchangeably.) Incorrigibility, or indubitability, must be distinguished from logical necessity. Whether or not the sincere statement I seem to be seeing something green now is incorrigible, it is certainly not logically necessary. This is most easily seen if we remember that a logically necessary truth is true in all possible worlds. Now we can certainly describe worlds where do not seem to be seeing something green now. Contrariwise, it may be noted, a logically necessary statement need not be incorrigible. It is not true that we assent to any logically necessary statement as soon as we understand it. We may mistakenly think it is false. It took a long

A FURTHER STUDY OF ESTIMATING AVERAGES

An investigation is described of the types of averaging response made to several volues of a variable when these nre presented symbolically or graphically. Symbolic information was presented to subjects on small white cards on which were typed either 10 or 20 two-digit numbers. Graphical information was presented as 10 or 20 points on inch ruled tenths graph paper. Sets of data differed according to whether they were normally or skew distributed about the arithmetic mean value, and in the extent of scatter about the mean. The results confirmed previous work in showing that error of judgment increased as scatter increased, and to a greater extent with symbolic than "with grnphical material. Error was also greater with skew than with normal information. Comparison between the results obtained with the two types of distribution showed that the previously reported finding that error also increased with increasing amount of information was incorrect and was duo to inadequate experimental control of scatter for different amounts of information. Analysis of individual performances showed that subjects' responses differed in type and that their introspective reports related to their performance. In particular the proportion of judgments which could be classed as of ' arithmetic mean ' type varied significantly with the methods described. Further experiments are suggested to try to discover which of two possible models of mental averaging is correct and why error increased with increased scatter in the information.

The effects of meprobamate on time perception.

The change in time perception produced by the administration of drugs has received a fair amount of attention. Frankenhaeuser (6) has reviewed the work on the effects of hashish and mescaline intoxication on the estimation of time. She concludes that “there seems to be some agreement in that time seems longer than usual in passing but shorter when regarded in retrospect”. But this work dealt with introspective reports regarding the passage of time rather than with quantitative changes and will not be discussed further here.

Experimental Disorientation and Conceptual Confusion

Thirty-two subjects were examined on a visual matching task. They were tested for their ability to maintain an orientation with respect to a particular direction in the horizontal plane, while being kept in circumstances designed to minimize their input of information and create thereby some conceptual confusion. The results suggest that subjects tend to make corrections as if they were in the same position in space throughout, even though they have no necessary reason for supposing this to be true and some reasons for supposing the opposite. It seemed that non-verbal information had to be presented to the subjects in order to suppress this tendency. Voluntary rotation of the subject from one setting to the next produced no more than chance errors, while arbitrary rotations only produced errors when cues were inconsistent, or possibly where no cues were available at all. In the cases where no cues—or minimal cues-were available, assumptions were made by the subjects about the nature of the environment. This caused both errors and correct responses for reasons that were not justified by the evidence in the hands of the subject. Introspective reports revealed some interesting results as to the cues utilized and concepts consciously formulated by the subjects for their use.

The Effect upon Incidental Learning of Varying the Information about the Irrelevant Material

When incidental learning has been demonstrated experimentally, it has often been presumed to be due to a set to learn which has transferred from previous learning-situations in which instructions to learn have been made explicit1 or to a set which generalizes from the specific instructions related to the relevant material.2 Such a set to learn incidental material as well as instructed material probably varies greatly with different Ss. The set may be one of which S is aware; noticing the irrelevant material, S may from time to time direct his attention toward it, possibly as a diversion from the instructed task; or even naive Ss, knowing that they are participating in an experiment, may be on the alert for a 'trick' and be aware of the possibility that they may be tested for knowledge of the irrelevant material. In fact, reports from Ss participating in incidental learning experiments indicate awareness varying from no notion at all that such learning might be tested to certainty that some such 'trick' is in the offing. Uncontrolled variation in the strength of the set to learn incidental material might be a serious source of error in experiments on incidental learning. Jenkins, in an analysis of his Ss' introspective reports, showed that variations in the set to learn on the part of incidental learners will greatly affect the amount of incidental learning which takes place.3 In his experiment, the Ss in the incidental learning group were told to read aloud words for other Ss to learn, then were themselves tested on the material. This is an experimental set-up which is probably highly conducive to the occurrence of a great 'deal of learning, since no other learning activity occurs simultaneously as the S reads out the material. In many experiments in this field, the learning in question is incidental to the learning of other material that S is instructed to accomplish. Although S may be aware of the irrelevant material, he has been clearly directed to learn other material. Under such circumstances, can there be a variation in the amount of incidental learning produced by different sets?

The After-Effect of Seen Movement When the Whole Visual Field Is Filled by a Moving Stimulus

In his study of the after-effect of seen movement A. Wohlgemuth reports series of 34 experiments whose results he uses disprove current theories and support his own theoretical construction.1 One of these experiments, the 22d, is devised to ascertain how the after-effect is affected if the whole visual field is filled by an objective movement. The outcome is negative: there is a total absence of any after-effect. Wohlgemuth, apparently dissatisfied with this finding, repeats the experiment, with identical result. He accordingly concludes that after-effect is produced by an objective movement occupying the whole visual field.2 Later, his theoretical sections, he reviews and rejects all current theories for priori reasons or on account of incompatibility with experimental evidence, and proceeds, on the basis of McDougall's theory of drainage, the construction of theory which shall be in harmony with the ascertained facts.3 But relating this theory the facts he fails consider the results of his own Experiment 22.4 Yet these results, if they stand, appear contradict the theory, according which the phenomenon is no way conditioned upon size or spread of the stimulus but is wholly dependent on priority of entry and the consequent decrease of synaptic resistance. If the after-effect fails appear when the whole field is stimulated, the theory must either be discarded or radically revised. We hold no brief for the theory; but we were not either convinced by the outcome of the critical experiment, which we therefore decided repeat. We hoped also, by extending the method, by requiring introspective reports of process as well as statements of meaning, and by improving the apparatus and technique, contribute something toward complete phenomenology of the illusion. Observers.-We had two groups of O's. The members of the first group were Mr. W. A. Andrews (A), and Mr. S. Takaki (T), graduate students psychology; Mrs. I. G. Whitchurch (W), graduate scholar psychology; Dr. F. L. Dimmick (Di), assistant psychology; and Dr. K. M. Dallenbach (Da), instructor psychology. We gave these O's preliminary practice-series that should bring them

An experimental study of dizziness.

In brief, this is our present problem, (a) What are the mental processes aroused during stimulation of the end-organs of the semicircular canals and what is their relative significance to the experience of rotation as a whole? And (b) what effect will continued repetition and other factors have upon these mental processes? Our method of experimentation involves periodic repetition. In each trial our subjects were revolved ten times. There were ten successive trials taken each day for a considerable number of days. Introspective reports were called for after each trial. We have found the experience of dizziness or vertigo to be made up of a large number of processes the most prominent of which are (1) kinesthesis from the eyes and neck and in the arms, (2) pressure from the region of the abdominal viscera, the chest and head, and (3) certain vascular processes which supply an obscure background and which give to the whole experience a characteristic shading. We have found, moreover, that the whole experience of dizziness becomes less complex and less intensive under periodic repetition. Nowhere have we been able to discover a process which could be called a 'sensation of rotation' or a 'sensation of movement.' As a result of our analysis, we are warranted in speaking only of the perception of movement. Furthermore, we are justified not only in saying that all of the mental processes resulting from rotation may be modified by a variety of physical and physiological factors, but also that certain mental factors modify all of the results of rotation, both organic and mental. That is to say, the organic and mental effects of rotation are an integrated group of events highly sensitive in their appearance and duration to the direction of attention, psychophysical determination, the character of the visual field, and the mode of ocular fixation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)