Introspective Evidence Research Articles

Knowledge of universals

ABSTRACT The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's work in contemporary philosophy of perception. Using Block's arguments, I propose that we have an independent empirical route to specify the content of a non-conceptual perception which is not subject to the ‘myth of the given’ objection.

Mental measurement and the introspective privilege

AbstractAccording to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits.We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require that introspective evidence prevails in cases of conflict with extrospective information. However, we will show that this is not the case: extrospective claims can prevail in cases of conflict. These conflicts are resolved by an inference to the explanation that best accounts for the available evidence. This explanation may speak in favor of extrospection.Second, given an introspective privilege, the development of extrospective measurement techniques should be restricted by the accuracy of introspective reports. We will argue that this problem is part of a more general issue that comes up with the establishment of measurement in the natural sciences. We will identify three strategies that have proven successful in dealing with the problem in the natural sciences. It will turn out that all these strategies are available for extrospective measurement as well. Consequently, the insufficiencies of introspective reports do not impose a limit on the accuracy of extrospective measurement methods.We conclude that neither an introspective privilege nor basic extrospective deficits exist. This does not mean that extrospection will ever replace introspection. Rather, both approaches provide independent and indispensable forms of epistemic access to the mind.

Developing Dark Pessimism Towards the Justificatory Role of Introspective Reports

This paper argues for a position of ‘dark pessimism’ towards introspective reports playing a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, based on the application of frameworks and concepts of measurement. I first show that treating introspective reports as measurements fits well within current discussions of the reliability of introspection, and argue that introspective reports must satisfy at least a minimal definition of measurement in order to play a justificatory role in consciousness science. I then show how treating introspective reports as measurements makes it possible to identify the foundational methodological problems that underlie much of the current philosophical and scientific debate about the status of introspective evidence in studying consciousness. I argue that these problems prevent introspective reports from playing a strong justificatory role and resolving long-standing debates in consciousness science, both in contemporary work and in the future.

Tesla’s Legacy for New Millennium: Path to Quantum-Holographic Primal SourceTesla’s Legacy for New Millennium: Path to Quantum-Holographic Primal Source

Nikola Tesla is undoubtedly the greatest inventor in the history of electrical engineering, and what makes him especially fascinating was his unusual mental control of creative visions. Regarding presented Tesla’s extraordinary creative experiences in his altered states of consciousness (categorized in his time as nonphysical phenomena) – Tesla’s conviction "when we start to study nonphysical phenomena, we will progress more in ten years than we have for centuries" then becomes clearer. In this context, it seems that Tesla's legacy for the new millennium is introspective evidence of his transpersonal creative communications, with fascinating possibility of his meditative eidetic control & increase of macroscopic quantum correlations with the quantum-holographic primal source of collective consciousness. ...

Phenomenal compositionality and context effects

The thesis that conceptual content is experiential faces a prima facie objection. Phenomenology is not in general compositional. For example, the experienced color of a thing will change depending on its context. If conceptual phenomenology is also subject to context effects, then thought contents will not be compositional. However, the compositionality of thought content (like the compositionality of linguistic meaning) is, arguably, explanatorily indispensable. This paper considers several different conceptions of compositionality, but in the end maintains there is no introspective evidence for conceptual context effects.

Cognitive Linguistics’ seven deadly sins

AbstractCognitive Linguistics is an approach to language study based on three central premises: that the function of language is to convey meaning, that linguistic description must rely on constructs that are psychologically real, and that grammar emerges from usage. Over the last 40 years, this approach to studying language has made enormous strides in virtually every aspect of linguistic inquiry, achieving major insights as well as bringing about a conceptual unification of the language sciences. However, it has also faced problems, which, I argue, must be addressed if the approach is to continue to flourish. Some of these are shared with generative linguistics, while some are peculiar to the cognitive approach. The former include excessive reliance on introspective evidence; paying only lip service to the Cognitive Commitment; too much focus on hypothesis formulation (and not enough on hypothesis testing); ignoring individual differences; and neglecting the social aspects of language. The latter include assuming that we can deduce mental representations from patterns of use and equating distribution with meaning. I conclude by sketching out how these pitfalls could be avoided.

Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?

The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e., the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the phenomenal intentionality view (PIV), according to which intentionality is in some strong way dependent on phenomenal character. If this line of argument succeeds, then not only TE does not speak in favor of Representationalism, but it actually speaks against it, contrary to the philosophical common-sense of the last two decades. Moreover, the representationalist project of naturalizing phenomenal character turns out to be seriously undermined on the same intuitive grounds that were supposed to make it plausible. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV and argue that our introspective intuitions (TE) do not push us in the direction of PIV. On the contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak to force us to conclude that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required for PIV to be true.

A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism

ABSTRACT:This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence.

Three Types of Metaphoric Utterances That Can Synthesize Theories of Metaphor

This article argues that there are three types of metaphoric utterances that can be defined by (a) the contextual stability of the utterance’s interpretation and (b) the presence or absence of a conceptual source–target mapping. Evidence for these three types of metaphoric utterances comes from introspective evidence about metaphor-in-language, from a survey-based study of metaphoricity, from a computational model of metaphoricity, and from a meta-study of the examples used in published metaphor research. These three types of metaphoric utterances are used to narrow the scope of existing theories of metaphor and thus to synthesize them, showing that competing theories describe and are concerned with different types of metaphoric utterances.

Doubts about One’s Own Existence

The aim of this paper is to show that it is not irrational to doubt one’s own existence, even in the face of introspective evidence to the effect that one is currently in a certain mental state. For this purpose, I will outline a situation in which I do not exist, but which cannot be ruled out on the basis of any evidence available to me—including introspective evidence about my current mental states. I use this ‘superskeptical scenario,’ as I will call it, to formulate an argument to the conclusion that I do not know that I exist. In order to substantiate my argument, I draw upon Terence Parsons’ theory of non-existent objects. I conclude that, inasmuch as Parsons’ theory is reasonable, doubts about one’s own existence are reasonable as well.

Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes.

Datos sensoriales, introspección y la realidad de las apariencias

En la actualidad la teoría de los datos sensoriales es frecuentemente descartada por los filósofos de la percepción como algo extravagante sin otorgar calificaciones adicionales o argumentos detallados, pese a su importancia histórica y a la influencia que aún tiene. En este artículo pretendo reevaluar adecuadamente sus compromisos básicos y consecuencias a la luz de nuevos desarrollos en las filosofías de la mente y la percepción. Examinaré con detalle la naturaleza de los datos sensoriales y señalaré que esta teoría no solo conlleva las inaceptables consecuencias ontológicas y epistemológicas que se identifican con frecuencia, sino también que esta no puede ser establecida o refutada conclusivamente solo en base a nuestra evidencia introspectiva como muchos autores han sugerido.

Modeling Learning Processes in Lexical CALL

To devise ways of tracking learning processes is one of the goals of current CALL research. However, the data collected must be able to account for the learner's approach as well as his/her performance. A study of a novice learner of Spanish using a CALL system designed for vocabulary enlargement, shows that introspective evidence may be used to validate performance data within a theoretical framework which characterizes the learning approach as "surface' or "deep," depending on the degree of the learner's engagement with principles of structure underlying the target language lexis. It is proposed that this framework offers a basis on which effective computer based vocabulary teaching strategies can be developed.

Special Section: On Looking Inward

Much of mainstream psychology and psychiatry has come under the umbrella of cognitive neuroscience and attempts to provide mechanistic accounts of mental processes. On the other hand, therapeutically oriented branches of psychiatry are concerned with giving accounts at a personal, experiential level of explanation. Relating introspective evidence (first-person perspective) to objective (third-person perspective) evidence is a key challenge for psychology and psychiatry and will be of significance for the unification of the two approaches. In this paper we show that in current neuroscientific experiments different forms of introspective evidence are used. Guided introspection inplies a conscious response to an ongoing stimulus. In unguided introspection, subjects are invited to report freely about `what it is like' to be a subject undergoing an experiment. In neurophenomenology, a method is offered to guide reflexive examination of ongoing subjective experience. Some neurophenomenologists presuppose that it is possible to derive phenomenological `invariants' from the analysis of phenomenal experience. We conclude that contemporary neuroscience allows subjective report to be part of its methodology, but that the added value and specificity of the neurophenomenological training remain to be established.

Alone in a crowd of sheep: Asymmetric perceptions of conformity and their roots in an introspection illusion.

The results of 5 studies showed that people see others as more conforming than themselves. This asymmetry was found to occur in domains ranging from consumer purchases to political views. Participants claimed to be less susceptible than their average peers to broad descriptions of social influences, and they also claimed to be less susceptible than specific peers to specific instances of conformity. These studies further demonstrated that this asymmetry is not simply the result of social desirability, but it is also rooted in people's attention to introspective versus behavioral information when making conformity assessments. The participants displayed an introspection illusion, placing more weight on introspective evidence of conformity (relative to behavioral evidence) when judging their own susceptibility to social influence as opposed to someone else's. Implications for self-other asymmetries, implicit social influence, and interpersonal conflict are discussed.

Phonetics and Phonology of Thematic Contrast in German

It is acknowledged that contrast plays an important role in understanding discourse and information structure. While it is commonly assumed that contrast can be marked by intonation only, our understanding of the intonational realization of contrast is limited. For German there is mainly introspective evidence that the rising theme accent (or topic accent) is realized differently when signaling contrast than when not. In this article, the acoustic basis for the reported impressionistic differences is investigated in terms of the scaling (height) and alignment (positioning) of tonal targets. Subjects read target sentences in a contrastive and a noncontrastive context (Experiment 1). Prosodic annotation revealed that thematic accents were not realized with different accent types in the two contexts but acoustic comparison showed that themes in contrastive context exhibited a higher and later peak. The alignment and scaling of accents can hence be controlled in a linguistically meaningful way, which has implications for intonational phonology. In Experiment 2, nonlinguists' perception of a subset of the production data was assessed. They had to choose whether, in a contrastive context, the presumed contrastive or noncontrastive realization of a sentence was more appropriate. For some sentence pairs only, subjects had a clear preference. For Experiment 3, a group of linguists annotated the thematic accents of the contrastive and noncontrastive versions of the same data as used in Experiment 2. There was considerable disagreement in labels, but different accent types were consistently used when the two versions differed strongly in F0 excursion. Although themes in contrastive contexts were clearly produced differently than themes in noncontrastive contexts, this difference is not easily perceived or annotated.

Alone in a Crowd of Sheep: Asymmetric Perceptions of Conformity and Their Roots in an Introspection Illusion

Five studies show that people see others as more conforming than themselves. This asymmetry is documented in domains ranging from consumer purchases to political views. Participants claimed to be less susceptible than their average peers to broad descriptions of social influences, and they also claimed to be less susceptible than specific peers to specific instances of conformity. These studies further demonstrated that this asymmetry is not simply the result of social desirability, but it is also rooted in people's attention to introspective vs. behavioral information when making conformity assessments. Our participants displayed an introspection illusion, placing more weight on introspective evidence of conformity (relative to behavioral evidence) when judging their own susceptibility to social influence as opposed to someone else's. Implications for self—other asymmetries, implicit social influence, and interpersonal conflict are discussed.

Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology.

On the Very Idea of Thinking in Words

The common view of thought as a kind of inner speech, whether in a natural language or in some other language-like representational system, gains much of its intuitive force from the introspective evidence of what appears to be thinking in words. Presumably, silent uttering is a way of thinking something in the same way that vocal uttering is a way of asserting something. But upon closer examination this analogy does not hold up, and the very idea of thinking in words turns out to be conceptually confused

Volition as cognitive self-regulation

Living organisms exhibit various levels of self-regulation, the highest of which is man's ability to regulate the operation of his conceptual faculty. Ayn Rand's theory of free will, the basis of this article, identifies this level of self-regulation with volition. The locus of direct volitional choice is placed in the choice “to think or not to think,” where thinking is understood as rational, purposefully directed cognition. The nature of this choice is analyzed in detail, with special emphasis on Rand's concept of mental “focus.” The epistemological status of the theory is discussed, including the role of introspective evidence in its behalf. It is argued that one's volitional control over one's own thinking has the status of an axiom, and that any attempted denial of this control is self-refuting.