Abstract

This paper argues for a position of ‘dark pessimism’ towards introspective reports playing a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, based on the application of frameworks and concepts of measurement. I first show that treating introspective reports as measurements fits well within current discussions of the reliability of introspection, and argue that introspective reports must satisfy at least a minimal definition of measurement in order to play a justificatory role in consciousness science. I then show how treating introspective reports as measurements makes it possible to identify the foundational methodological problems that underlie much of the current philosophical and scientific debate about the status of introspective evidence in studying consciousness. I argue that these problems prevent introspective reports from playing a strong justificatory role and resolving long-standing debates in consciousness science, both in contemporary work and in the future.

Highlights

  • Consciousness science does not currently make much use of introspective reports in a strong justificatory role; in particular they are not used to inform or provide empirical confirmation for theories of consciousness. Both empirical and philosophical, this is a poor state of affairs, and they argue that introspective evidence can provide necessary, unique, and potentially revolutionary data, poised to resolve long-standing debates in consciousness science concerning the boundaries and contents of subjective experience (Hurlburt 2011; Jack and Roepstorff 2002; Kriegel 2013; Olivares et al 2015; Overgaard et al 2006a, b; Petitmengin 2006)

  • This paper argues for a position of ‘dark pessimism’1 towards introspective reports playing a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, based on the application of frameworks and concepts of measurement

  • These problems most obviously apply to the current state of affairs with respect to introspection, but I further argue that these problems prevent introspective reports from ever playing a strong justificatory and decisive role in consciousness science

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Summary

Introduction

Consciousness science does not currently make much use of introspective reports in a strong justificatory role; in particular they are not used to inform or provide empirical confirmation for theories of consciousness. For various researchers, both empirical and philosophical, this is a poor state of affairs, and they argue that introspective evidence can provide necessary, unique, and potentially revolutionary data, poised to resolve long-standing debates in consciousness science concerning the boundaries and contents of subjective experience (Hurlburt 2011; Jack and Roepstorff 2002; Kriegel 2013; Olivares et al 2015; Overgaard et al 2006a, b; Petitmengin 2006). Supporters of introspection claim that these problems must be, and can be, overcome, while detractors are more sceptical

Irvine
The Role of Introspective Reports
Introspection as Measurement
A ‘Bottom‐Up’ Approach
Developing Measurement Systems
Application to Introspective Reports
Ontological Assumptions
A Comparative Approach
Stage One
Stage 2
An Objection
Conclusion

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