Public attitudes play an important-sometimes crucial-role in the process of European integration. This is evident from the two most recent attempts at institutional and geographical reform of the European Union (EU). In a June 1992 referendum, the Danish public effectively halted the further institutional and economic integration of Europe by rejecting the Treaty on European Union. Two years later, Norwegian voters chose to reject membership in the EU. Less obviously, but more regularly, public attitudes influence EU policymaking through traditional political channels such as elections and lobbying. How do Europeans structure their attitudes toward integration? Given that economic growth and development are both central motivations for integration and among the predominant responsibilities of the European Union (EU), it seems reasonable that the EU public would evaluate integration based upon economic criteria. Previous studies have investigated this hypothesis in two ways. First, Gabel and Palmer (1995) investigated how the differential economic benefits of integrative policy relate to individual-level differences in public support for integration. They found that EU citizens' support for integration varies consistently with the differential benefits associated with occupational skills, education, wealth, and intra-EU trade. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) investigated how objective national economic conditions and national net return from the EU budget related to national-level variation in