It has been more than 15 years since the philosopher Enrique Dussel published Ethics of Liberation in the Age of Globalization and Exclusion in Spanish; its recent publication in English points to how it has become a touchstone for contemporary critical thinking. The importance of this work lies, on the one hand, in how it demonstrates the force of philosophical thought that reproduces itself in the periphery of the world-system and, on the other hand, in how it poses theoretical, ethical, and political questions radically important for humanity in this third millennium. In this sense, the book questions the hegemonic ethics that postulates the “save who you can” ideology of capitalism and even justifies social Darwinism.We have before us a work that from the introduction confronts the hegemonic vision of history — in Walter Benjamin's sense of the term — as not part of the Hellenic world but of North Africa and the Middle East, relativizing the role of Europe in the formation of a global culture. One should note that this historical description has the “philosophical intent” of calling into question the myth of modernity, the ideology of progress, and alleged Western superiority (p. 1).In the first part, “Foundation of Ethics,” the author states the three primary principles (or moments) that configure the architectural framework of the book. First is the “material principle,” which touches upon “suffering corporeality” derived from the victim's negative experiences (p. 284). Second is the “formal principle of morality” (p. 141), which refers to the application of the truth/validity norm and furthermore most valuably reformulates the “discourse ethics” proposed by Karl-Otto Apel (p. 121); this principle maintains a fruitful dialogue with and complements the material principle. Last is the “principle of feasibility,” which focuses upon context or environment, consequently weighing what is factually possible. With this principle, the instrumental role of reason is properly placed by precisely subsuming it to a single objective: the production, reproduction, and development of human life in community. Yet the author mentions that no perfect system or institution exists, maintaining that every system always produces an unintentional negative effect.In the second part, “Critical Ethics, Antihegemonic Validity, and the Praxis of Liberation,” the author lays out the other three principles that configure the ethics of liberation. First is the “ethical-critical principle,” a structurally central component and part of the negativity of the victims. Following the reflections of Karl Marx, critical theory, and Emmanuel Levinas, Dussel postulates the creation of a new ethical system based upon a universal rationality of liberation that has as a reference point the alterity and exteriority of the victim. Second, the “principle of validity” addresses the necessity and possibility of a situation of intersubjective consensus to conform to this new ethics. Following the thinking of Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, the author rehabilitates the role of utopia in ethical and social projects. The last principle, the “liberation principle,” is the moment when the victims raise themselves to a radical transformation of the system, or, in other words, when they leave the situation of material negativity in which they find themselves. In this regard, the author addresses a prickly subject for contemporary political philosophy: violence. While the author suggests that we are not naive to advocate violence, he notes that it exists as an unavoidable resource with which you always have victims. The author also retakes the most valuable aspect of Marxist philosophical thought by approaching the question of the constitution of subjects, of historical actors who, in their praxis, envision building a just, free, and democratic society.Finally, the validity and coherence of the ethical material proposed by the author reveal themselves obviously, since it takes as its starting point the pain of the bodily reality of the victims in order to rebuke the destructive logic of this “actually existing modernity.” In this sense, I maintain that Ethics of Liberation marks an important point not only in the trajectory of this Argentine philosopher but also in the development of the history of contemporary thought. For this, I consider the publication and diffusion of this monumental work in the English-speaking world important.