The Problem of the Marginal Communities’ Representation in Richard Rorty’s Philosophy

Abstract

This article reviews the problem of the marginal communities’ representation in Richard Rorty’s philosophy. The purpose of the research is to analyze a specific character of the legitimating the marginal communities’ representatives in the levels of the social formations, participative democracy, and social antagonism. A theoretical base of the research consists of the works by R. Rorty, A. Badiou, P. Bruckner, J. Ranciere, K. Marx, and B. Latour. On the example of the USA, the right for a state as the legal institution to represent the national interests was reasoned in spite of the cases with the violation of the principle of the fundamental moral action in its history (slavery; the Vietnam war), due to the constructive character of the social experiments and the realization of their creative character. The issue of self-identification with the Other is revealed, based not on the similarity with the particular individuals but rather on the empathy to the other culture’s autonomous subject, who has the right for respect and dignity. The ways of achieving a balance between a social antagonism in the pluralism of the opinions and an intersubjective consensus between the members of a liberal community, necessary to omit the shaping up of a tyranny, are also analyzed. The necessity of toleration of the polyphonic discussions is explained on the example of a possible dictatorship in the ethically unified community, regulated with the strict repressive imperatives. Generally, the inclusivity of a Rortian liberal utopia, where the representatives of different social groups have the voting rights and are solidarized on the principles of the sentimental education, have been analyzed. This research will find its application in the following analysis of the factors of the otherness in the sentimental education.Manuscript received 18.02.2020