Inter-service Rivalry Research Articles

Of Rivals and Enemies: Military–Police Relations in Internal Armed Conflict in Mexico and Colombia

While the dynamics of civil–military relations have traditionally been studied in a dyadic structure, internal deployment changes the relationship between armed agents and their civilian principals. While soldiers fight external wars alone, at home they fight alongside other centrally controlled armed agencies such as police and gendarmeries. This article studies the relationships between militaries, civilians, and centrally controlled police and gendarmeries, which I describe as “alternative security forces (ASFs)” in two democracies with high levels of internal armed conflict, Colombia and Mexico. Based on interview and archival data, I find that while militaries and ASFs will inevitably find themselves in rivalry, the “tone and tenor” of this rivalry matters for civilian governments. While an interservice rivalry allowed for ASF-military cooperation even in the face of competition in Colombia, a zero-sum rivalry in Mexico has hindered the development of law enforcement and perpetuated an unsuccessful over-reliance on the military.

‘They treat us with scant respect’: prejudice and pride in British Military Liaison with the Soviet Union in the Second World War

Britain stationed a military mission in the USSR from 1941-45. This article examines the British conduct of the Mission at a crucial stage of the war, from November 1942 to November 1943. Prompted by a report from the head of the Mission, the Chiefs of Staff decided in February 1943 to institute a ‘new deal’, to try to end what was seen as ‘one-way traffic’ in the relationship. A new head, General Martel, was appointed, to make higher-level contacts. The attempt to try and make the relationship equal, reciprocal and symmetrical was short-lived as other military concerns moved the ‘bargaining’ approach of the ‘new deal’ back towards an acceptance of asymmetry. While the Soviet contribution on the battlefield was a weighty element in the balance, this article demonstrates that in the diplomacy of alliance military liaison, such rational calculations were accompanied by irrational factors like concern for personal or national prestige, cultural differences concerning ‘manners’, the pressures of life as a foreigner in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and inter-service rivalries in Whitehall that set the representatives in Moscow often at cross-purposes.

Innovación militar en el Ejército español durante la guerra de Marruecos (1921-1927)

The analysis of the performance by Spanish Army during the Moroccan War indicates that the strategic shock of the Annual Disaster in 1921 forced the military to modify their doctrine, organization and operational procedures to increase their effectiveness against the Riffian rebels. This analysis is based on Anglo-Saxon and Israeli military innovation theories, establishing the interrelation between their main elements to provide an explanation of processes of change during the selected timeframe. The article also analyzes the push for innovation from the senior military level, the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Navy, as well as the way in which the incorporation of new technology transformed the way to make war by Spaniards. Due to the lack of human sources, difficulties related to the explanation of bottom-up innovation processes have been found, highlighting the importance of qualitative data for military innovation studies. This historical case study is a contribution from a Political Science perspective that aims to fill a gap in the Spanish academic literature and to infer theoretical conclusions about the way military change takes place in Spain.

‘Our Efforts Have Degenerated into a Competition for Dollars’. The ‘Revolt of the Admirals’, NSC-68, and the Political Economy of the Cold War

ABSTRACTThe ‘unification’ of the United States Army and Navy under the 1947 National Security Act, combined with efforts to cut expenditures after the Second World War, spawned vicious inter-service competition that undermined civilian control of the military. The nastiest feuds were between the Air Force and Navy, and then the Navy and civilian leaders of the fledgling Department of Defence. What appears as an esoteric dispute over the utility of bombers versus aircraft carriers was merely the tip of a larger struggle over the future of American military strategy. Civilian efforts to end this destructive inter-service rivalry and force the military to live within its budgetary constraints provoked open defiance during the so-called ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ in 1949. National Security Council Paper 68 offered a way out of this predicament by outlining a quasi-Keynesian fiscal policy based on rearmament that would stimulate the economy enough to offset the additional defence spending.

Budgets and Strategy: The Enduring Legacy of the Revolt of the Admirals

THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II posed new challenges for the United States. Since resources would be scarce relative to requirements, officials hoped to extract efficiencies through reforms, including the “unification” of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy. The result turned out to be a poisonous interservice rivalry that hamstrung the military in developing unified strategic plans and budgets consistent with national policy. Civilian attempts to break the impasse by mandating specific cuts only exacerbated the situation by provoking the navy into open defiance. The Korean War and the opening of the fiscal spigot under National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) resolved the crisis but bequeathed a troubling legacy. Henceforth, managing interservice rivalry was possible only by loosening the government’s purse strings and delegating responsibility for allocating funds to the services. The correlation between aggressive civilian reform and military setbacks at the start of the Korean War also discredited the notion that civilian leaders should play a significant role in determining how the services spend their money. The services have, in turn, used their power to divide budgets equally, thereby minimizing interservice friction over money but undermining the intention of the National Security Act to promote greater efficiency.1

Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State by Brian E. Crim

Reviewed by: Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State by Brian E. Crim Jared S. Buss (bio) Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State. By Brian E. Crim. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018. Pp. 264. Hardcover $39.95. Brian E. Crim's Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State is a valuable contribution to Cold War scholarship and the history of technology. Crim sleuths through a trove of declassified documents to reveal complex layers of debate about Project Paperclip, the military-led incorporation of German scientists and engineers into the American postwar scene. By describing the absorption of "our Germans" into the national security state or military/civilian apparatus of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC), the book highlights contentious debates, shifting priorities, increasing pressures for immigration expediency, and other considerations about the past, current, and future capabilities of German-born scientists and engineers. The moral debate about utilizing "our Germans" is ever-present, from public media to internal State Department resistance. The author demonstrates how moral and ethical considerations about engineers' pasts became secondary considerations amid the obvious military priorities of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union became a far more immediate threat. By showcasing interservice rivalries, departmental infighting, and various strong-arm tactics of military personnel, the book reveals the avenues of tacit or enthusiastic support for Project Paperclip and the lingering resistance and doubts about the "Nazi scientists." The tensions of these debates are fascinating, particularly when questions arise as to the reputation of the "German mind," the future potential of propagandized German "wonder weapons," and the viability of V-2 rocket technology. Crim also explores the contradictory goals of American efforts to obtain the best of German [End Page 917] minds while bolstering the capabilities of West Germany, which would depend on thriving centers of research and development. Because the United States recruited thousands of German scientists, Project Paperclip had far-reaching consequences for superpowers and their allied and/or satellite nation-states. Crim examines competing priorities, contradictory goals, and constant infighting among both military and civilian factions. Thus, Our Germans is an interesting case study of the nexus of military and industrial cooperation/competition regarding state-sponsored research and development. Crim navigates these debates with attention to details, which both enrich the book and complicate the narrative. Although Our Germans is a short book, readers will encounter a demanding collection of code-names, military jargon, and abbreviations of agencies, departments, and organizations. Some readers may become frustrated by the descriptive sections of the book, which include excerpts from military documents. The primary sources affect the readability of the book due to operational language of military or governmental personnel. Other readers, particularly historians of spaceflight, will appreciate the work's treatment of von Braun and his rocket team. The book recognizes von Braun's importance as a public figure associated with "our Germans," yet it explores the larger scope of Paperclip, in which the rocket team played a lesser role compared to other fields, especially aeronautics. Some scholars may wish for an overview of Paperclip that further decenters von Braun, in turn steering readers away from more sensationalistic and popular accounts that expose the alleged Nazi contributions to postwar American science and technology. In this regard, Crim's arguments may disappoint some scholars. For example, the author asserts that the German wartime research center of Peenemünde served as an influential model during the expansion of the American military-industrial complex (MIC) with its competing interests and shrewd personnel who learned to navigate, chart, and even direct the currents of big science. "Big science knows no ideology," Crim argues (p. 12). Many of the Germans "became a permanent component of the MIC they served, and in no small part, created" (p. 85). Historians may wonder how groups of postwar Germans could so heavily influence a system of military and industrial coordination that originated with the First World War, if not the American Civil War's coordination of industrialists, factories, and weapons specialists. Arguably, the book gives far too much credit to "our Germans," especially the rocket team. Nevertheless, these criticisms are minor. Our Germans should appeal to many different...

The United States and Sputnik: A Reassessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower's Presidential Legacy

Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy as President of the United States from 1953 to 1961 has experienced a dramatic reversal in scholarly assessment. Previously denounced as a "do-nothing" president whose ignorance and complacency tarnished the prestige of the executive office, the declassification of National Security Archives, the publication of Eisenhower's memoirs, and the memoirs of those closest to the president has contributed to a shift in Eisenhower's reputation from animosity to admiration. Scholars now praise Eisenhower for his modesty, wisdom, and resourcefulness. This paper contributes to the ongoing historiographical revaluation of Eisenhower's presidential legacy by examining his handling of an overlooked episode of American history - the Sputnik Crisis of 1957. Upon receiving word of the successful launch of the Soviet satellite in October 1957, Eisenhower surrounded himself with scientists, academics, and engineers to formulate the most appropriate policy responses to Sputnik, and to refute Congressional calls for increased military spending. As such, Eisenhower accelerated the American satellite program, established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), reorganized the Department of Defense to eliminate inter-service rivalry, and provided for moderate infusions of federal funding into post-secondary education via the National Defense Education Act. Indeed, Eisenhower's strategic handling of the Sputnik Crisis cements Eisenhower's reputation as an effective, proactive, and overall effective president.

Book Review: The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, 1909–40

Book Review: The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, 1909–40

Accidental Nuclear War and Russell’s “Early Warning”

84 Reviews c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR AND RUSSELL’S “EARLY WARNING” Ray Perkins, Jr. Philosophy / Plymouth State U. Plymouth, nh 03264–1600, usa perkrk@earthlink.net Eric Schlosser. Command and Control: NuclearWeapons, the Damascus Accident and the Illusion of Safety. NewYork: Penguin P.; London: Allen Lane, 2013. Pp. xxiii + 632. isbn: 978-1594202278. us$36; cdn$38; £25. ric Schlosser has given us a very important and much needed look at the history of us nuclear weapons safety. The book is well researched and, despite its subtitle, is more than a history of nuclear weapons safety. In the course of developing his thesis that nuclear weapons have been—and continue to be—a shockingly dangerous part of the post-wwii world, we get not only a tutorial on nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but a fascinating and eyeopening account of the dynamic of the nuclear arms race, replete with interservice rivalries, ideological fanaticism, and the struggle for civilian control. It was this dynamic which gave us obscenely bloated nuclear arsenals and a military leadership that too often favoured weapons reliability over safety. The story is cogently covered in the course of recounting in considerable detail what has to be one of the most frightening of us nuclear weapons accidents (and there were hundreds1 )—viz. the 18 September 1980 accident in 1 A Sandia Laboratory study found at least 1,200 “serious” accidents involving nuclear weapons between 1950 and 1968. The most serious are called “broken arrows” in Defense Department parlance. These include unauthorized launch, release of a b= Reviews 85 c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM Damascus, Arkansas involving a Titan ii icbm with a nine-megaton warhead .2 During a check for a possible fuel system leak, a mechanic near the top of the missile (in a hardened silo beneath ground) dropped a nine-pound wrench socket which fell 70 feet and punctured the fuel tank; eight hours later, despite efforts to contain highly flammable fuel vapours, the missile exploded covering the complex in a huge fireball and toxic gases. The warhead, the largest in the us arsenal at the time, was catapulted 1,000 feet into the air and landed a quarter mile away, largely intact. By good luck (and the grace of God?)3 , there was no thermonuclear detonation—especially fortuitous since the warhead had long been identified by its designer (Sandia Laboratory) as one of the least safe in the us arsenal, i.e. one of the most likely to detonate in “abnormal environments” (such as intense heat). Sandia had petitioned the Pentagon for more than a decade to retire or retrofit the warhead (p. 334). The Damascus incident concerns, directly or indirectly, most of the book. But the story is told rivetingly with many detours into weapons history, technical information and a cast of interviewees connected with the nuclear military -industrial complex at various levels. One of Schlosser’s most important characters, and from whom he gets much of his information, is Bob Peurifoy, a longtime nuclear weapons engineer and vice-president at Sandia who waged a heroic thirty-year campaign against Pentagon resistance to nuclear weapons safety. With the help of the Freedom of Information Act and recently declassi fied material, Schlosser provides the reader with literally scores of examples of terrifying nuclear accidents, including events that could easily have led to weapon, fire, explosion, release of radioactivity or full-scale detonation. dod reported only a small percentage of accidents until 1959, after which they reported about 130 per year (p. 327). Most of Schlosser’s data on nuclear accidents—and he cites dozens of examples throughout his book—come from the declassification of dod material since the end of the Cold War and skillful use of the Freedom of Information Act. There has long been some information regarding nuclear mishaps accessible to careful readers of the us press—to be sure only a tiny percentage, but enough to justify public concern. Bertrand Russell’s was a voice that sounded early warnings based upon information that...

‘The Navy Principle is Now ‘Safety First’’: Naval Aspects of the Papuan Campaign in the Second World War

Inter-service rivalry and personality friction characterized various stages of the US war effort in the Pacific against the Japanese. The fighting at Buna exemplified these problems, in which inter-service friction (among other reasons) deprived Allied troops of needed naval support during the Papuan campaign of 1942–43.

Fly Boy by E. Walters

Walters, Eric. Fly Boy. Toronto: Puffin Canada, 2011. Print. What boy hasn't dreamed of piloting a high-performance military aircraft over enemy territory? For young Robbie McWilliams, still only seventeen, that day can't come soon enough, so he takes matters into his own hands and enlists in the Royal Canadian Air Force with the documents of his deceased older brother. This is the premise of Eric Walters' YA novel Fly Boy, set in the middle of the Second World War. Walters has crafted a cleanly-written and realistic novel that gradually takes Robbie from the familiar school-like environment of training camp in Brandon, Manitoba to the air war over occupied Europe. Along the way, Robbie makes new friends; encounters elements of the adult world, such as drinking, gambling and inter-service rivalries; and comes to realize that war is not fun or glamorous, but indiscriminate and brutal. "Nothing would make me happier than to have it end today," he writes to his friend Chip. A foreword to the book by Flight Lieutenant Philip Gray voices the same message and vouches for the veracity of Walters' account: "most frightening of all, we were becoming really good at our jobs," he writes. The pace of the book is one of its pleasures. It takes almost half of the book before Robbie arrives "in theatre," and so the reader experiences the same anticipation mixed with impatience. Each aspect of the training regimen is given ample space to impose its strangeness on the young recruit, and these sequences are intercut with Robbie's letters home: to his mother to keep up the deception that he is at boarding school, and to his friend Chip, wherein he expresses his true thoughts. Robbie had entered the air force hoping to become a pilot like his father, a prisoner of war when the book begins, but his skills as a navigator see him fast-tracked at the expense of his dream. Good navigators are rare, and his country needs him to be one. Only eight of the twenty-six chapters are "action" chapters in the air, but this keeps them fresh, since an endless stream of missions would be too realistically monotonous. Instead, time is devoted to developing Robbie's relationships with his crew mates. The book also includes many small historical details, such as the contents of an escape kit or the meaning of specialized air force terms. Though the conclusion of the novel may be somewhat less than satisfying to some, it does, however, set up the possibility of a sequel quite nicely. Boys will enjoy reading this book, especially those interested in military history. Recommended: Three stars out of four Reviewer: John Huck John Huck is a metadata and cataloguing librarian at the University of Alberta. He holds an undergraduate degree in English literature and maintains a special interest in the spoken word. He is also a classical musician and has sung semi-professionally for many years.

Military command in the last decade

On 11 September 2010, the United States commemorated the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. In those nine years, British forces have been engaged in military operations of unexpected location, intensity, scale and duration. While the performance of British troops has been repeatedly praised on these operations, there has been growing disquiet among commentators and, indeed, among the military establishment itself about the conduct of these campaigns. Specifically, the issue of British military command has come under increasing scrutiny. This article examines command frictions at the strategic and operational levels and seeks to provide a sociological explanation of these difficulties. It claims that British commanders have failed to identify a coherent strategy over the past decade while in-theatre operational command has often been characterized by an ad hoc-ery, incoherence and inconsistency. The article suggests that a ‘laissez faire’ command culture has been evident at strategic and operational levels. While individual mistakes may not be irrelevant, the article explores the way in which this command culture may be a product of institutional pressures within defence and, above all, a product of inter-service rivalry. However, the laissez faire system of command in the armed forces may also be a reflection of much deeper cultural presumptions and preferences within British professional society itself which has always had a strong tendency towards pragmatism, decentralization and shorttermism. The article concludes by offering some suggestions as to how military command might be reformed in light of its potentially profound cultural origins.

WHAT'S NEW?

Much attention on the Strategic Defence and Security Review focused on the issues of deterrence and inter-service rivalry. But a number of other important choices, not obviously apparent in the document, might instead suggest the direction in which British defence policy has evolved. The outcome may be affordable, but is it at the cost of shortterm coherence?

Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (review)

Reviewed by: Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs David Zimmerman (bio) Arms, Economics, and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs. By G. C. Peden. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xiii+384. $99. By trying to link developments in British military technology to economics and strategy between World War I and the height of the cold war, G. C. Peden has attempted a hugely ambitious task. Peden is quite correct in pointing out that Britain remained one of the world's great powers and leading innovators until the rising costs of new weapons systems and the relative decline in the country's economy caused its eclipse in the late 1960s. Though not without its shortcomings, Peden's is a laudable effort. Its great strength is that it puts strategic- and weapons-system acquisition into proper economic context. His account of the relationship of finance to World War II industrial production is the most succinct available, and he deftly deals with the ongoing controversy over Correlli Barnett's harsh critique of Britain's industrial performance. Britain's intent to equip only a fifty-five-division army, explains Peden, meant that it did not need to produce as many tanks as Germany required for its much larger army. Similarly first-rate is Peden's description of Britain's ultimately doomed struggle to keep pace with sophisticated and costly weapons-system development during the cold war. It was the ever-increasing expense of new weapons, as much as Britain's relative decline, that forced the nation to cede its position as a great power. Perhaps nothing is more difficult in writing the history of military technology than tracing the course of a weapon's development from the decision to pursue research to the eventual deployment in combat. Weapons-system acquisition involves complex and ever-changing factors, including military tactical doctrine, strategic threat analysis, interservice rivalries, politics, finance, industrial capacity and capability, and technological and scientific research and development. To attempt an all-encompassing study [End Page 738] such as this is very brave indeed, and an author must be careful not to oversimplify the technological complexities of weapons systems. Unfortunately, Peden's book has a large number of errors, for instance in the account of First and Second World War antisubmarine warfare technology. While correctly pointing out that convoys were the single most important factor in defeating U-boats in 1917–18, Peden gives far too much credit to the development of hydrophones and makes no mention of the invention of active sonar by French scientists. Hydrophones on the whole did not work. Despite the deployment of some 10,000 of these devices, ship-borne hydrophone detection played a role in the sinking of only three or four German submarines. Peden does not cite Willem Hackmann's history of the development of sonar, implying that radio intelligence during World War II consisted primarily of enigma intercepts. But David Syrett has conclusively argued that strategic and tactical high-frequency direction-finding were far more important than decryption in redirecting convoys around submarine patrol lines. Surprisingly, several major themes of Britain's wartime industrial mobilization are not fully explored. Quite correctly, Peden explains that the dominions provided little assistance in the rearmament program of the 1930s. In addressing World War II, however, he makes little mention of the industrial and financial contributions made by Canada, Australia, and other components of the empire, and he does not mention the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, perhaps one of the best examples of successful imperial planning for a long war. Shortcomings in design and industrial-production techniques caused numerous problems in weapons development and manufacturing in the United Kingdom, and in transferring these for overseas production. Peden argues that such issues were no worse than in Germany, but it would be hard to find a German equivalent to the scandalously inferior British tank designs. While this book is not perfect, it is still a very useful study on a very important topic. There is little doubt that Britain's decline as a great power is one of the most important developments of the twentieth century. Peden greatly contributes to our understanding of...

Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry (review)

Reviewed by: Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry Byron K. Callan Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry. By James Hasik. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-226-31886-8. Tables. Notes. Index. Pp. 189. $35.00. Small business firms have played an important role in the development of contemporary weapons systems and technologies. This is particularly true of sectors where there has been rapid technological change, such as the aircraft industry in the first part of the last century and more recently in defense information technologies. But even in seemingly mature markets, small firms can play critical roles engendering major military innovation. For example, Higgins Industries of New Orleans developed the Eureka workboat in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Eureka was ideally suited for the bayous and swamps of Louisiana where it was initially used in logging operations. In 1939, Higgins received a contract from the Navy for an experimental landing craft based on the Eureka and subsequent designs were critical to the conduct and execution of U.S amphibious operations in the Second World War. [End Page 1028] James Hasik's Arms and Innovationhas a contemporary focus, but provides a useful framework for historians to consider the structure and evolution of defense industries, and the role of small enterprises in developing weapons and supporting products. Hasik uses six case studies of current or recent U.S. defense procurements to discuss the role of small firms in the arms industry. These vignettes on weapons such as the Predator unmanned air vehicle, the Joint Direct Attack Munition, and the Space-Based Infrared Sensor are used to illustrate why small firms succeeded, or were unsuccessful, in developing and producing defense products. The case studies are well chosen as they include commercial products adopted for military use, and purpose-built weapons and software products Hasik identifies three circumstances where small firms could be "relatively advantaged" over larger enterprises. The first is "innovative" markets that don't require capital-intensive research and development and for which the vector of technological change is uncertain. Another is in circumstances where a high degree of skill is needed but where ensuing production runs could be low. The third is where there are already large players but where there is room for smaller firms to prosper. He also discusses circumstances where small companies should consider an alliance with larger enterprises. The audiences Hasik directs his recommendations to are aspiring and current defense contractors both large and small and government procurement and policy personnel. Hasik does not believe that small firms hold all the keys to weapons innovation and indeed the purpose of his study of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is to highlight instances where a small firm was not as well equipped as a large one (in this case Boeing) to undertake high level serial production of a weapon. However, he believes "small firms have an important role to play in the cycles of military-industrial development…" There were some areas that Hasik could have been explored in greater detail. Little was said about how small firms were able to make their skills and products initially known to potential military customers. In some instances, the U.S. Congress has played a critical role in shepherding and protecting smaller firms and this could have been discussed, particularly in the instance of the Predator program. And inter-service rivalries can also help a smaller firm find willing new customers. Little was said about the funding and policy initiatives that could provide entrance points for smaller innovative firms in defense markets. However, Arms and Innovationdeserves a place in the library of anyone interested in military procurement and weapons development. For the historian, the framework Hasik used may be helpful in identifying the circumstances in earlier time periods that allowed smaller firms and enterprises to bring forth new military tools. [End Page 1029] Byron K. Callan Darien, Connecticut Copyright © 2009 The Society for Military History

The Special Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War

Cyprus, together with Gibraltar and Malta, constituted the ‘crown jewels’ of British sea power in the Mediterranean during the Second World War. Being deployed on Cyprus the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force could fight the Germans and Italians in the Southeast Mediterranean, thus inhibiting the continuous supply with troops and war material of the Africa Corps of Field Marshall Ervin Rommel. This article aims to shed light on the activities of the Special Operations Executive on the island. Citing recently declassified files we assess the espionage and propaganda as well as the guerrilla warfare contingencies in case of an Axis invasion of Cyprus. We provide a critical assessment of the British guerrilla warfare strategy, arguing that the SOE and the 25th Army Corps based on Cyprus had not been well prepared to counter aggression due to inter-service rivalries, bad planning and lack of manpower. Besides, the SOE distrusted the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots to the extent that the training of guerrillas was planned to commence only after a successful invasion and the occupation of the island. Finally, SOE officers considered the Cypriot communists with their anti-colonialist declarations as another threat to be confronted with special operations.

American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology (review)

Reviewed by: American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology William J. Astore American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology. By Barton C. Hacker with the assistance of Margaret Vining. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006. ISBN 0-313-33308-4. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendix. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xxiii, 205. $45.00. This volume looks at the American military's engagement with warfare and technology from the Revolutionary War to the 1991 Gulf War. Enlivened by photographs and potted biographies of influential technocrats and military leaders, it is an attractive primer that should prove useful to readers looking for a straightforward and jargon-free introduction to the complex relationship existing between the American military and its tools (and toolmakers) of war. Along with military technologies and their social contexts, [End Page 1193] the authors also address medical contributions, including Walter Reed's efforts to suppress typhoid and yellow fever, and scientific contributions, notably J. Robert Oppenheimer's work on the atomic bomb. For the most part the authors avoid controversy. In a statement of breathtaking simplicity, they note that a uranium bomb "destroyed Hiroshima, a plutonium bomb Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered" (p. 104). No mention is made of opposition to or criticism of the use of atomic bombs, whether by scientists before August 1945 or by postwar critics citing Cold War imperatives. Perhaps the authors believe enough ink has been spilled on this controversy, but some reference to the intense debate surrounding the Fiftieth Anniversary exhibit at the Smithsonian would have highlighted the ironies, tragedies, and emotions generated by modern weaponry and war. Sidebars that highlighted salient issues in the historiography of technology and the U.S. military would have enhanced the value of this book. Notably absent is any critical discussion of biological and chemical weaponry. Meanwhile, the select bibliography fails to list works by Lewis Mumford (perhaps the most incisive critic of the U.S. military's "megamachine") or relevant articles from the Journal of Military History, Technology and Culture, and similar scholarly journals. While a book that takes time to define terms like "bullet" and "bayonet" is obviously intended for the uninitiated, one might also expect guidance with respect to more advanced themes. Controversial themes and issues such as interservice rivalries, political and economic pressures, and President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex are not developed fully. Curiously, although published in 2006, the timeline of this book ends in 1999 with air attacks in Kosovo. Similarly, the last chapter ends with a rushed account of the Gulf War of 1991 and the concept of a "Revolution in Military Affairs." One might imagine a different (and timelier), post 9-11 conclusion, perhaps stressing the difficulties of asymmetrical warfare and the unpredictable and often surprisingly labile nature of technology (e.g., "civilian" cell phones used as triggers for roadside bombs). The American military's enormous investment in high-tech weaponry in the 1980s and 1990s was geared primarily to conventional conflicts against like-minded opponents; the wisdom of this investment is now being tested in low-intensity conflicts and messy urban settings like Iraq. Here the authors could have built on their discussion of the Vietnam War, where they note that American technical virtuosity did not produce victory, forcing the military to reconsider its emphasis on superior technology as uniquely efficacious. Nevertheless, the strength of this volume is that it provides solid historical underpinnings for more advanced discussions about, and research into, these and similar subjects. William J. Astore Pennsylvania College of Technology Williamsport, Pennsylvania Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History

The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the Transfer of the von Braun Group to NASA, 1958-1959

The Army–Air Force struggle over ballistic missiles and space policy in the late 1950s was one of the worst episodes of U.S. interservice strife during the Cold War. The papers of General J. B. Medaris provide an important new window onto the process by which the Army avoided transferring its ballistic missile and space capability to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958, and then reluctantly did so in 1959, in part to prevent the Air Force from obtaining it. Medaris's papers illustrate how interservice rivalry shaped the actions of the Secretary of the Army and the leadership of Army Ordnance.

The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal

The author is critical of the methodology and conclusions of an essay by Robert Burrell published in the October 2004 JMH asserting that the invasion of Iwo Jima in 1945 was unnecessary and in part a function of inter-service rivalry. Burrell is engaging in retrospective criticism, neglects the role of the impending invasion of Japan, and engages in the sort of parochial-mindedness he detects in the Army Air Forces and the Navy. Captain Burrell's response is appended.

The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar Organization of Medical Intelligence

The US Army's medical intelligence program developed during World War II to meet the requirements for information on the medical threat facing soldiers deployed in the first truly global military conflict. The war served as a proving ground for the application of medical intelligence on a strategic, operational and tactical level. However, hasty postwar demobilization decimated many wartime intelligence programs, including medical intelligence. The US intelligence community recognized the utility of medical intelligence as part of the overall strategic scientific and technical intelligence program and sought ways to rebuild the program. During the post-World War II debates over the unification of the military services and the responsibilities of the nascent CIA, the ‘Hawley Board’ was one of several committees which studied the problems facing the medical intelligence program. Although there was broad consensus on the need for better coordination of medical intelligence, the intelligence community ultimately failed to adopt the recommendations of the Hawley Board. The principal reasons behind the failure of the Hawley plan were the re-emergence of prewar interservice rivalries, the dominant role of the Army medical intelligence program, and the lack of a joint military–CIA vision of a centralized medical intelligence service.