Abstract
Britain stationed a military mission in the USSR from 1941-45. This article examines the British conduct of the Mission at a crucial stage of the war, from November 1942 to November 1943. Prompted by a report from the head of the Mission, the Chiefs of Staff decided in February 1943 to institute a ‘new deal’, to try to end what was seen as ‘one-way traffic’ in the relationship. A new head, General Martel, was appointed, to make higher-level contacts. The attempt to try and make the relationship equal, reciprocal and symmetrical was short-lived as other military concerns moved the ‘bargaining’ approach of the ‘new deal’ back towards an acceptance of asymmetry. While the Soviet contribution on the battlefield was a weighty element in the balance, this article demonstrates that in the diplomacy of alliance military liaison, such rational calculations were accompanied by irrational factors like concern for personal or national prestige, cultural differences concerning ‘manners’, the pressures of life as a foreigner in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and inter-service rivalries in Whitehall that set the representatives in Moscow often at cross-purposes.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.