Interpretation Of Tax Law Research Articles

The Limitations of Tax Law Interpretation in the United States

This paper has been prepared in response to the 2013 International Tax Law Conference: The Internal and External Limitations of Tax Law Interpretation, Comparative Legal Approaches from Different Countries in Korea. That Conference was held to consider a case under Korean law where the Korean Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional Court found that where a certain revenue statute was replaced, both the statute and its addendum (or supplemental provisions) are nullified unless special circumstances exist. The impetus of the conflict in the case that stimulated this conference is the divergent findings of whether there were special circumstances where a certain revenue statute was replaced which would have allowed for the continued use of the relevant portion of the prior statute’s addendum; while the Supreme Court of Korea found such special circumstances, the Constitutional Court could not. Further, the Constitutional Court found limited unconstitutionality, which determinations the Constitutional Court contends that it has the authority to make and that such findings are binding on other courts and government agencies. The Supreme Court disagreed, declaring that such findings of limited unconstitutionality were beyond the scope of the Constitutional Court and thereby not binding on courts or government agencies. United States federal tax law is prescribed through federal statute enacted by Congress, administrative regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service, a bureau within the Executive Branch’s Department of Treasury, and case law advanced by federal courts at all levels including the specialized United States Tax Court. However, each of these sources derives its authority from the federal Constitution. The primary principle when interpreting revenue legislation requires an application of a plain meaning approach to the statute. However, that plain meaning approach must examine the law holistically, giving due meaning to each word, affording proper consideration to the law as a whole, and finally, with consideration of the surrounding body of law in which that statute is situated. This integrated approach to plain meaning itself will often produce disparate interpretations, and in the many instances when plain meaning is absent the varied auxiliary interpretative methods result in still more inconsistent perceptions. The United States’ lack of a specialized court for determining solely constitutional matters lends that such a conflict on point would not arise under U.S. law and given the U.S. Constitution’s provision in Article III, § 1 that “[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” makes clear the federal judicial hierarchy in the American court system. Additionally, given the Ramseyer and Cordon Rules which require that any bill reported by Committee to the House or the Senate must include in the Committee Report or an accompanying document both the text of the statute or part thereof which is proposed to be repealed and a comparative print showing by appropriate typographical devices the omissions and insertions proposed, it would be difficult for a court to find a lack of legislative intent if such a document reflected the expected textual strikethroughs. With regard to statutory interpretation, however, U.S. law may prove to be more useful. In the Korean case, the Supreme Court based its finding of specials circumstances and “saving” of the earlier addendum on both legislative intent and lack of burden on affected taxpayers. While this evidence may fall flat when presented to Scalia, Thomas, or another textualist judge, it is clear that this “unexpressed legislative intent” has a secure place in U.S. jurisprudence. Indeed, the Korean case merely seeks to fill blatant gaps, a far more conservative objective than what several U.S. cases succeeded in achieving.

“Temporary” Tax Provisions and Uncertainty: Evidence from a Survey of Professional Tax Preparers

INTRODUCTION Toward the end of 2012, the popular press was awash with reports about the ‘‘fiscal cliff’’ and the efforts to avert it. A major aspect of this ‘‘cliff’’ was the expiration of many temporary tax provisions. Most of these tax laws had—temporarily?—reduced taxes for individuals and businesses. Thus, some politicians, lobbyists, and tax experts believed that they were contributing to the growing national deficit. However, for most of the expiring provisions, this was hardly the first time they faced expiration. Some have been extended so many times that taxpayers could be excused for believing they were permanent aspects of the tax code. During November of 2012, we conducted a comprehensive survey that asked Certified Public Accountants (‘‘CPAs’’) and other tax professionals to describe their opinions about the continuance of ‘‘temporary’’ provisions in the tax code. Our objective was to see if the multiple extensions of many of these temporary provisions have led CPAs (and their clients) to conclude that these provisions are to be treated as if permanent. Further, we wanted to know if the tax professionals’ opinion on these tax laws affects the advice they give to their clients. We find that in November of 2012, professionals, on average, believed that many provisions would be temporarily extended, but only few made permanent. This finding is not substantially different for responses received before versus after the 2012 elections (November 6, 2012). Since its last major overhaul in 1986, the Internal Revenue Code (‘‘IRC,’’ ‘‘tax code,’’ or ‘‘Code’’) has increasingly taken on a vast array of temporary provisions. Congress passed some of these provisions as temporary because they filled a need that was seen as temporary (such as an economic stimulus during an economic downturn). Other tax laws are, or were, temporary because there was no bipartisan support for a more permanent tax code change (such as the Bush era tax rate changes and the elimination of the estate tax for the year 2010 with a ‘‘sunset’’ provision). Regardless of the reason why these provisions were adopted into the Code ‘‘temporarily,’’ lawmakers have extended many of them multiple times. Furthermore, the Code includes various sections that tax professionals and politicians generally acknowledge as being outdated (such as the alternative minimum tax, ‘‘AMT’’) or in need of inflation adjustment, but without bipartisan

Evolution of the Rules Pertaining to the Issuing of ‘Official’ Interpretations of Tax Laws in Poland

Abstract Interpretations of the tax law (currently referred to as general and individual interpretations), issued by tax authorities, are a fairly new institution in Poland. They were introduced into the legal system by the Tax Ordinance Act of 29 October 1997. From that time these regulations were deeply changed three times. Now it seems that Polish legislator has finally succeeded in elaborating an appropriate model for binding interpretation of tax law that protects the interests of taxpayers. However, discussed regulations seem to need some other amendments. The objective of this article is to present the evolution of the provisions pertaining to the issuing of the so-called official interpretations of tax law and to point at certain shortcomings of the present regulations.

Legal Interpretation of Polish Tax Law Based on the Institution of Remuneration of Excess Payment – Selected Issues

Abstract In order to achieve a desired effect of tax legal interpretation, its linguistic mechanisms are frequently insufficient. Elements of paralinguistic interpretation are more and more often indispensable. It applies inter alia when domestic tax law regulations must be verified in the light of the EU tax law. However, the study depict interpretative problems regarding the institution of remuneration of excess payments, which is regulated in Polish tax law. Considerations presented in this article confirm that legal interpretation of tax law is a complicated process. It is important to establish correct system connection between the analyzed legal regulations and other provisions, often contained in other legal acts. Moreover, it seems necessary to refer to the purpose-oriented interpretation of the law. Only then a chance for a satisfactory final result of the provision’s legal interpretation can be guaranteed. What is more, such an effect will create an element being a part of a logically composed and arranged unity.

The Purposive Interpretation of Polish Tax Law

Abstract The results of the linguistic interpretation should be verified through systemic and purposive methods of interpretation. That process is especially desirable in the cases where the result of the linguistic interpretation is not unequivocal. Whereas, as practice demonstrates, the quality of tax law is not the best, it is impossible to overestimate the role of the non-linguistic method of interpretation. The object of this paper was to present the role which the linguistic interpretation may play in interpreting the tax law. However it was also important to: place the purposive interpretation among the methods of tax law interpretation and to present static and dynamic elements in tax law interpretation. Within the frames of this paper one can find out about historical interpretation of tax law, economic method of tax law interpretation and purposive interpretation directives. The above considerations allow for posit a thesis according to which purposive interpretation is an indispensable element of the process of interpreting a legal text. Its role in the scope of norms of tax law is, however, peculiar, since it serves only to verify the results of linguistic interpretation. However, it can be indicated that the growth in importance of purposive interpretation is direct proportional to the fall in the quality of tax law regulations.

La deóntica jurídica como clave en la interpretación de las leyes fiscales

Uno de los principales obstáculos en la aplicación de las leyes es el significado que se les da, lo que se complica más cuando se trata de normas impositivas, pues la renuencia al pago público es de todos conocidos. Es por ello que en este trabajo se estudia una de las bases para la interpretación de las leyes fiscales a través de la deóntica jurídica. Los operadores deónticos son: permisión, que permite “hacer” o “no hacer” una conducta; obligación, que implica “hacer”; y prohibición, que significa “no hacer”. <br /><br />El primero se refiere a derechos y, por tanto, su incumplimiento no implica sanción alguna, mientras que la contravención de las otras dos sí. Junto a los operadores deónticos debemos entender los diversos tipos de normas: descriptivas (que definen), prescriptivas (que obligan o prohíben) o atributivas (que permiten), completando así la importancia de los operadores deónticos en la interpretación de las leyes fiscales.

Limitation of Tax Law Interpretation

Limitation of Tax Law Interpretation