Interpersonal Deception Research Articles

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) represents a merger of interpersonal communication and deception principles designed to better account for deception in interactive contexts. At the same time, it bas the potential to enlighten theories related to (a) credibility and truthful communication and (b) interpersonal communication. Presented here are key definitions, assumptions related to the critical attributes and key features of interpersonal communication and deception, and 18 general propositions from which specific testable hypotheses can be derived. Research findings relevant to the propositions are also summarized.

Testing Interpersonal Deception Theory: Effects of Suspicion on Communication Behaviors and Perceptions

One major thrust of interpersonal deception theory (IDT) is elevating receivers of deception to a central role and acknowledging the important influence that their suspicion has on their own and senders' behaviors. The current investigation considers: (a) what sender behaviors are associated with receiver suspicion, (b) bow suspicion is displayed overtly by receivers, (c) whether senders recognize suspicion when present, and (d) how suspicion influences sender behavior. Results are reported from an experiment in which interviewees gave varying forms of deceptive answers to interviewers who were or were not induced to be suspicious. Results confirmed that several sender behaviors were associated with receiver suspicion, that receiver suspicion was manifested nonverbally, that deceivers interacting with novice receivers sensed the suspicion, and suspicion altered sender nonverbal displays. However, suspicion often interacted with other communicator factors and deception type to produce complex behavioral patterns. Sender and receiver communication style also were highly correlated, regardless of suspicion level, indicating likely mutual influence. Results underscore the importance of taking communicative features into account and the unlikely prospects of uncovering a generic receiver suspicion display or a suspicion-induced deceiver display that is invariant across relationships and communication contexts.

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Deceptive Communication: Comments on Interpersonal Deception Theory

Journal Article Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Deceptive Communication: Comments on Interpersonal Deception Theory Get access James B. Stiff James B. Stiff 1James B. Stiff is an Associate Professor in the Communication Studies Department at the University of Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Communication Theory, Volume 6, Issue 3, August 1996, Pages 289–296, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00130.x Published: 17 March 2006

Testing Interpersonal Deception Theory: The Language of Interpersonal Deception

An analysis of verbal behavior was undertaken to test principles of interpersonal deception theory (IDT). It was predicted that language choice in deceptive messages would reflect strategic attempts to manage information through nonimmediate language. This linguistic profile, though, was expected to be altered in response to preinteractional factors - relational and behavioral familiarity - and interactional factors - form of deception and receiver suspicion. Results from two investigations are reported: a secondary analysis on interactions in an earlier study (Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, & Walther, 1995) and analysis of a primary experiment employing a 2 (relationship) × 2 (receiver expertise) × 2 (receiver suspicion) × 2 (truth/deception) within-subjects factorial design. As expected, senders displayed greater verbal nonimmediacy when deceiving. Expertise had a greater effect on linguistic behavior than a prior relationship with the receiver, with senders using more verbal nonimmediacy with novice receivers. Senders were more verbally nonimmediate when equivocating. Suspicion produced a mixed pattern of linguistic cues. The possibility that changes produced by preinteraction and interactional factors were strategic attempts to bolster credibility is discussed.

Interpersonal Deception Theory.

Journal Article Interpersonal Deception Theory: Reflections on the Nature of Theory Building and the Theoretical Status of Interpersonal Deception Theory Get access Judee K. Burgoon, Judee K. Burgoon 1Judee Burgoon and David Buller are associate professors of communication at the University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 8572 I Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David B. Buller David B. Buller 1Judee Burgoon and David Buller are associate professors of communication at the University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 8572 I Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Communication Theory, Volume 6, Issue 3, August 1996, Pages 311–328, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00132.x Published: 17 March 2006

Interpersonal deception: XII. Information management dimensions underlying deceptive and truthful messages

Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) proposes that among the strategies deceivers use to create credible messages is information management. Delineated here are five fundamental dimensions along which verbal content and style can be altered to manage information: (1) completeness (informational and conversational), (2) veridicality (actual and apparent), (3) directness/relevance (semantic and syntactic/pragmatic), (4) clarity (semantic and syntactic/pragmatic), and (5) personalization. Two studies employing encoding and decoding methodologies are presented that assess the degree to which (1) senders can vary discourse on demand along these dimensions and (2) receivers (observers) can recognize such variations. Participants in the first experiment engaged in separate truthful and deceptive interviews; during the latter, they enacted one of three different forms of deception (falsification, equivocation, concealment) representing different combinations of the five dimensions. Participants in the second experiment gave truthful and deceptive answers during a single interview and again enacted different deception forms. Participants and observers then rated interviewee responses on the five dimensions. Results from both studies confirmed that deceptive communication is less complete, honest (veridical), direct/relevant, clear, and personalized (attributable to the speaker) than truthful communication. Falsifications were the least truthful but seen as most complete. Equivocations were the least clear and direct/relevant and seen as such. They were also seen as the most personalized. Findings are discussed in light of IDT, McCornack's Information Manipulation Theory, and Jacobs, Dawson, and Brashers' replication of McCornack's work.

Interpersonal Deception

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) frames deception as a communication activity and examines deception within interactive contexts. One key element of the theory is the role of suspicion in prompting behavior changes. An experiment testing several suspicion-related hypotheses paired participants (half friends, half strangers) for interviews during which interviewees (EEs) lied or told the truth and interviewers (ERs) were induced to be (moderately or highly) suspicious (or not). Results confirmed that suspicion and deceit were perceived when present, suspicion was manifested through nonverbal behaviors but with different behavioral patterns for moderately versus highly suspicious ERs, and suspicion affected sender behavior. Relational familiarity moderated some behaviors. Results are discussed in terms of mutual influence processes and the dynamic nature of communication in interpersonal deception.

Interpersonal Deception

Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) posits that socially skilled individuals are better able to project truthful demeanors and evade detection than are unskilled individuals. IDT also predicts that social skills benefit receivers, making them better able to detect deception. Past research by Riggio, Thcker, Throckmorton, and Widaman in 1987 (in two separate studies) has shown that socially skilled individuals emit nonverbal behaviors that enhance believability. The present study extends Riggio's findings by investigating how social skills and nonverbal communication work in concert to predict three forms of deception/detection success: believability, accuracy, and bias. Acquainted and unacquainted dyads participated in interviews in which interviewees (senders) answered two questions truthfully and then used falsification, equivocation, or concealment to deceive on the remaining 13 questions. Results confirmed that as sender social skills increased, believability increased and receiver detection accuracy decreased, especially during equivocation. Skilled senders were more fluent and less hesitant. Senders were more believable, and truth biases were higher, if senders displayed greater involvement, positive affect, fluency, and composure and used a concealment strategy. Hesitancy was also implicated in a complex way. Only one dimension of receiver skill improved accuracy. Receivers were also more accurate if senders were less fluent.

Interpersonal deception: V. Accuracy in deception detection

Previous research on accuracy in deception detection has typically occurred in a noninteractive context, which has resulted in many potentially salient influences being ignored. Guided by interpersonal deception theory, the current experiment examined the influences of suspicion, deception type, question type, relational familiarity, and expertise on accuracy in detecting truth and deceit. An adult sample of novices and a second sample of experts (military intelligence instructors and related military personnel) participated in interviews with strangers or acquaintances during which interviewees gave some truthful answers and some deceptive answers, the latter being one of three types. Interviewers, half of whom were induced to be suspicious, followed a standard interview protocol that introduced different question strategies. Results showed that (a) accuracy was much higher on truth than deception, (b) novices were more accurate than experts, (c) accuracy depended on type of deception being perpetrated a...

Interpersonal Deception VIII

This article reports on a secondary analysis offive studies performed originally by Bavelas and colleagues in 1990 to further describe the behavioral profile associated with one common type of deception, equivocation. This analysis was grounded in Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) posited by Burgoon and Buller in 1994. Ratings of information dimensions revealed that equivocal statements were found to be less clear and conversationally complete than truthful statements. Nonverbal involvement, fluency, dominance, formality cues, time spent talking, response latency, smiling, nodding, and linguistic immediacy cues were compared in responses under conflict (equivocal statements) and no conflict (truthful statements). Consistent with IDT, senders enacted information management (appearing more withdrawn) and behavior management (being more kinesically expressive). Senders also showed arousal (more tension cues), negative affect (less pleasantness), and performance decrements (more filled pauses) when equivocating. This suggested that behavior management was achieved through interchannel compensation; however, equivocation consequently contained channel discrepancies. The behavioral profile of equivocation did not depart substantially from that associated with falsification. Rather, equivocation and falsification showed a general deception profile of greater kinesic expressiveness, shorter response latencies, and more linguistic immediacy in the experiment comparing truthful, falsified, and equivocal replies.

Interpersonal Deception VII

Previous research on deception has typically examined how deceivers behave when falsifying information in a noninteractive context. Guided by Interpersonal Deception Theory, the authors propose that deception may take a variety of forms, reflecting differences in the way senders strategically control message information and the differences in the behavioral profiles accompanying those strategies. The current experiment examined the impact of deception type (falsification, concealment, equivocation), receiver suspicion, receiver expertise, and relational familiarity on strategic and nonstrategic behavior Two adult samples, novices and experts (military intelligence instructors), participated. Interviewers, half of whom were induced to be suspicious, followed a standard protocol of questions. Interviewees answered the first two questions truthfully and then enacted one of the deception forms. Participants evaluated one another's behavior after the interview, and trained coders measured the nonverbal behavior No clear behavioral profile emerged for deception in general. Instead, behaviors associated with deception were strongly influenced by deception type, suspicion, and familiarity, suggesting that preinteractional and interactional features are important determinants of sender behavior. Of the deception types, participants rated equivocation as most brief, vague, and hesitant, whereas falsification was rated lowest on these characteristics. Behaviorally, senders were best able to suppress behavioral activity when equivocating and least able to when falsifying.

Interpersonal deception: VI. Effects of preinteractional and interactional factors on deceiver and observer perceptions of deception success

Past research on deception success has focused on receiver judgments, ignoring deceiver perceptions, which may influence the ways deceivers choose to behave in interpersonal interactions. The present study investigated how several preinteractional and interactional factors affect both deceiver and observer perceptions of deception success. Preinteractional factors included three that have been found relevant to deceptive communication: social skill, self‐monitoring, and motivation. Interactional factors included receiver suspicion, plus four proposed by the four‐factor theory of deception (anxiety, affect, task difficulty, and behavioral control). Results indicated that deceivers’ perceptions of success were more affected by interactional factors (especially anxiety, interaction difficulty, and conversational normality). Conversely, observers were more affected by preinteractional factors such as deceiver social skill. However, motivation, self‐monitoring, and conversational normality affected both deceiv...

Interpersonal deception: III. Effects of deceit on perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics

Much past research on deception has examined it individually and noninteractively. Here we argue for broadening our understanding of deception by examining it as a dyadic and interactive event. Assumptions of an interpersonal perspective, articulated in Interpersonal Deception Theory, are advanced. These include recognizing the agency of both parties to interpersonal exchanges, examining such exchanges at multiple levels, incorporating measures of communicationrelated perceptions and interpretations as well as behaviors, recognizing that behaviors may be strategic as well as nonstrategic, and viewing such behavior as dynamic rather than static. An experiment reflecting this orientation is presented in which pairs of participants, half friends and half strangers, conducted interviews during which interviewees (EEs) either lied or told the truth to interviewers (ERs) who were induced to be highly, moderately, or not suspicious. Dependent measures included participant (EE and ER) perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations of EE behaviors and trained coders' ratings of actual nonverbal behaviors. Consistent with the theory, deceivers were more uncertain and vague, more nonimmediate and reticent, showed more negative affect, displayed more arousal and non-composure, and generally made a poorer impression than truthtellers. Their behaviors also connoted greater formality and submissiveness. Also consistent with the theory's premise that deceptive interactions are dynamic, deceivers' kinesic relaxation and pleasantness changed over time, in line with a behavior and image management interpretation, and degree of reciprocity between EE and ER nonverbal behaviors was affected by the presence of deception and suspicion.

Interpersonal deception: II. The inferiority of conversational participants as deception detectors

This experiment compared the deception detection skills of conversational participants and observers. Participants were expected to have a more pronounced truth‐bias than observers. They were also predicted to be less accurate detecting deception than observers because of the cognitive and communication requirements of conversational management. Each of fifty observers viewed two videotaped interactions between an interviewer (i.e., conversational participant) and two interviewees (i.e., sources) who either told the truth or deceived. Conversational participants attributed more truth to sources than did observers and they were less accurate detectors than observers. When not told about the deception manipulation, observers relied on more accurate behavioral cues than participants. When informed about deception, participants relied on inaccurate facial cues, whereas observers relied on inaccurate vocal cues to judge deceit.

Interpersonal deception: I. Deceivers’ reactions to receivers’ suspicions and probing

Mutual influence in deception was investigated in a study on the effectiveness of probing as a detection strategy. It was proposed that receivers communicate suspicion in probing questions, causing deceivers to alter their nonverbal presentations and appear more convincing, and that detection when probing is improved by suspicion and familiarity with the source. Interviews were conducted in which the source (a stranger or friend) either told the truth or lied to receivers. Half of the receivers were induced to be suspicious and half probed for additional information. Receivers in the suspicion condition actually encoded less suspicious probes, suggesting that they attempted to deceive sources about their suspicions. However, their nonverbal behavior belied more cognitive activity, perhaps due to increased scrutiny of sources’ communication. By comparison, deception triggered more suspicious probes. Sources accurately perceived suspicion and were more sensitive to suspicion communicated by friends, implyin...

“Ask me no questions, I'll tell you no lies”;: Situational exigencies for interpersonal deception

Seventy‐five subjects recorded all instances of interpersonal deception over a three week period. The 940 acts of deception were coded according to type and frequency, motivation, and characteristics of recipients. Seven types emerged with lies accounting for 81% of all deceptive acts recorded. The frequency of deception was 4.2 acts of deception per subject per week, substantially less than in previous studies. The sixteen motivation categories revealed important differences from patterns identified in earlier studies. A cross tabulation of motivation categories and recipient categories revealed statistically significant patterns. The study also identified five situational exigencies affecting how deception is used as a problem‐solving strategy.

Cost-benefit indexes of deception in nonviolent crime

Data on federal crimes for the years 1976-1977 are examined for the categories of fraud, embezzlement, and forgery-counterfeiting as compared with those of stolen property. A frequency analysis of the number of arrests by category of crime is conducted, and the numbers are subdivided by age and sex of perpetrator. The findings support the hypothesis that the cost-to-benefit indexes of crimes involving interpersonal deception are considerably lower than other nonviolent crimes of monetary gain. It is suggested that, as in many other social animals, human deception may be adaptive.

An Analysis of Self-Deception

People are not uncommonly accused of having deceived themselves about something. Ordinarily there is not thought to be anything puzzling about such accusations. On reflection, however, it might appear that there is something paradoxical in the notion of self-deception, since it obviously won't do just to say that self-deception is the same as interpersonal deception except that the deceiver and the deceived happen to be the same person. When A deceives B into believing that p, A tells B that p is the case, or leads him to believe that p is the case, when he knows that not-p is the case. But if A and B are the same person, this would imply that A believed that p was not true and that p was true, which is if not impossible, at least paradoxical. We need some analysis of the notion of self-deception that avoids this apparent paradox. One approach might be to appeal to some notion of unconscious knowledge or belief. So we could say that A unconsciously knew that not-p but consciously believed that p, thus avoiding the paradox. But this may lead into deep waters, involving as it does the controversial and somewhat obscure notion of the unconscious.' We shall develop an analysis of self-deception that both resolves the apparent paradox and avoids any appeal to such puzzling notions as the unconscious. We shall develop the analysis through a discussion of examples. The general formula appears in section V.