Interpersonal Commitments Research Articles

Political Clientelism in Japan: The Case of "S"

One might expect the conduct of the bureaucracy in a modern industrial country such as Japan to be governed by the norm of rationality. Insecurity, which is believed to be one of the prime causes of clientelism, is not greatly felt by officials of this country who, in a material sense, enjoy considerable privileges while in office. Yet, it has been widely noted that informal alignments based on interpersonal commitments are one of the characteristics of the Japanese bureaucracy. In fact, Chie Nakane argues that the informal hierarchy and factions, the invisible organization that develops in an institution, eventually overlap and supersede the institution's formal and visible administrative organization.' This article seeks to establish a few common and distinctive features of the physiology of Japanese political clientelism. That is to say, it attempts to identify the reasons for the development of clientelism, how it works, and what part it plays in the operation of the system as a whole. The case of S, a Japanese bureaucrat, appears to be entirely typical and illustrates many of these aspects of clientelism. The story makes for rather complicated reading, but it is well to remind ourselves that clientelist politics is often very complex. The story has the merit of illustrating, in a concrete way, most of the general features of Japanese clientelist behavior to be discussed later.

Older adolescents' thinking about academic/vocational and interpersonal commitments

Sixty-eight college students listed the factors they consider or would consider when making the following commitments: choosing courses, choosing a major, choosing a career, choosing a friend, choosing a romantic partner, and choosing a lifelong partner. In addition, subjects provided their own definition ofcommitment in an unstructured essay. Subjects listed more factors, more distinct types of factors, and more original factors for interpersonal commitments than for academic/vocational commitments. There were few gender differences found in these measures, contradicting the idea that men and women think differently about different commitments. In addition, few gender or class year differences were found in the themes present in the essay definingcommitment. Conceptions of commitment, as described in essays, predicted thinking about specific commitments only slightly.

Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks

Exchange theory has the virtue of bringing both power and equity together in a single analytic framework. However, exchange theory has focused largely upon analysis of the dyad, while power and justice are fundamentally social structural phenomena. First, we contrast economic with sociological analysis of dyadic exchange. We conclude that (a) power and equity from social exchange theory carry us beyond economic theory of dyadic exchange; yet (b)for power and equity to be studied effectively, analysis of systems larger than the dyad is needed. Second, we introduce exchange networks to extend power and equity analysis into more macroscopic n-person social structures. Third, a laboratory method is reported for controlled study of exchange networks as bargaining structures. Finally, we present findings which show that (a) power is an attribute of position in a network structure observable in the occupant's behavior, even though the occupant does not know what position or what amount of power s/he possesses; (b) equity or justice concerns constrain the use of that power; (c) emergent interpersonal commitments impede the use of power; and (d) when power is unequally distributed among actors in a network, females form stronger commitments to their exchange partners than do males. In conclusion, we discuss the importance of commitment in distinguishing between economic and social exchange theory.