This article seeks to address a major shortcoming of the idea of Societal Multiplicity in international theory: its lack of a worked-out definition of what counts as ‘a society’. The article supplies this definition in four steps. First, it reviews some difficulties in defining ‘society’, arguing that these arise in part from the historical separation of social and international theory. Second, it interweaves resources from both traditions to argue: (a) that societal multiplicity reflects the specifically political separation of human populations; (b) that this separation arises in part due to centripetal properties of the political as a feature of social life; and (c) that an individual ‘society’ is best defined as a unit of the resultant multiplicity: a social formation that exists simultaneously as a geopolitical sub-division of the social world. Third, the article defends this definition against a series of objections – that it is too general, that it reifies the state, that it is methodologically nationalist and that it suppresses historical variety. And finally it inserts the definition into the idea of Societal Multiplicity in order to test how far, and with what consequences in International Relations and beyond, this closes the definitional gap left by the original formulation of that idea.
Read full abstract