International Risk Sharing Research Articles

Social Status, Portfolio Externalities, and International Risk Sharing

We show that a model of “the spirit of capitalism”, or the concern for social status, can generate a high degree of international risk sharing as measured by asset prices, even when consumption and portfolio holdings exhibit “home bias”. We also show how portfolio externalities can arise in the model and highlight the caution that one needs in interpreting asset-price-based measures of international risk sharing: in the presence of portfolio externalities, even when the measured degree of risk sharing is perfect, it is still possible for government policies to induce investors to hold better-diversified portfolios and attain higher welfare.

From Russia with love: International risk-sharing, sanctions, and firm investments

We propose a novel explanation for why sanctions on Russian firms might not work as intended: these firms’ ability to diversify sanction risks via partner countries friendly with Russia. Using indirect links with partner firms as a plausibly exogenous proxy for this risk-sharing channel, we show that exposed Russian firms were able to leverage these links to alleviate the negative impacts of sanctions in 2014.

The Flight to Safety and International Risk Sharing

We study a business cycle model of the international monetary system featuring a time-varying demand for safe dollar bonds, greater risk-bearing capacity in the United States than the rest of the world, and nominal rigidities. A flight to safety generates a dollar appreciation and decline in global output. Dollar bonds thus command a negative risk premium, and the United States holds a levered portfolio of capital financed in dollars. We quantify the effects of safety shocks and heterogeneity in risk-bearing capacity for global macroeconomic volatility, US external adjustment, and policy transmission, as of dollar swap lines. (JEL E32, E43, E44, E52, F44, G11, G15)

Inefficient international risk-sharing

Complete financial markets are widely believed to be beneficial for the international economy, since they enable cross-country risk-sharing. Using a two-country New Keynesian model, we show that this is not the case if the source of income fluctuations is a country-specific markup shock. When preferences involve the wealth effect on labor supply and imply that Home and Foreign goods are Edgeworth substitutes, the absence of risk-sharing in autarky acts like a favorable markup shock, reducing the variability of relative inflation and output gaps created by the shock. Thus, welfare can be higher under autarky than under complete financial markets, indicating that international risk-sharing can be undesirable. However, if the wealth effect on labor supply is absent or Home and Foreign goods are Edgeworth complements, welfare reversals do not occur.

ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING AND EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES USING A TWO-COUNTRY DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (DSGE) MODEL UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION STRUCTURE

In this study, in order to investigate the different forms of capital flow between developing and developed countries in the steady state, a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, under asymmetric information, is developed. For simulating countries, the parameters of previous studies are used. The results showed that international risk-sharing can explain the Lucas paradox. In both symmetric and asymmetric information structures, net foreign assets in the forms of stocks in steady state are negative for developing countries. In other words, in the steady state, capital exits from the developing country in the form of bonds and enters these countries in the form of stocks. Besides, net capital inflows in the form of stocks and net outflows of capital in the form of bonds in the present model under asymmetric information are larger than that under symmetric information structure. Furthermore, impulse function results show that the two countries are highly correlated. So, the occurrence of a shock in one country changes the production and consumption of another country. But the impact of the shock on macro variables in the country itself is greater than in another.

A Disaster Under-(Re)Insurance Puzzle: Home Bias in Disaster Risk-Bearing

We examine disaster reinsurance from the perspective of international risk-sharing. We find that losses from disasters are shared internationally to a generally very limited extent, unlike what the theory of international risk-sharing suggests. We propose a new dataset of cross-border reinsurance payments for 93 disasters of 44 economies in 1982–2017. Combining these balance of payments data with industry data, we find that the lack of disaster risk-sharing through international reinsurance results from low participation in primary insurance as well as limited use of reinsurance. Regression analysis finds that countries with higher levels of economic or financial development tend to insure a larger share of disaster losses while proxies for disaster myopia are associated with less insurance. Regarding the share of insured losses that is internationally reinsured, small size and de facto financial integration tend to raise the reinsurance share, while high levels of external wealth and low foreign firm presence in insurance are associated with less reinsurance. Advanced economies with little fiscal space that provide ex-post government disaster insurance without international reinsurance could experience disaster risk morphing into financial risk.

Sovereign default and liquidity: The case for a world safe asset

This paper presents a positive and normative study of a world financial market when sovereign countries can default on their debt. We construct a tractable model that enables us to study sovereign default in general equilibrium. The amount of safe assets is thus endogenous and determined by international risk-sharing. We characterize the equilibrium structure and we show that the market equilibrium can generate multiple equilibria. In addition, the market equilibrium is not constrained-efficient because countries do not fully internalize the value of their debt being used as liquidity. We prove that a world fund issuing a safe asset increases aggregate welfare. The fund's relationship with the IMF's Special Drawing Rights is discussed.

Cross-Country Unemployment Insurance, Transfers, and Trade-Offs in International Risk Sharing

We assess to which degree an international transfer mechanism can enhance consumption risk sharing as well as allocative efficiency and apply our results to the implicit transfers generated by a potential European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS). Specifically, we first develop a simple model with nominal rigidities to build intuition by deriving analytical results. We then use a rich DSGE model, calibrated to the Core and the Periphery of the euro area, to quantitatively analyze the changing dynamics that a EUBS brings about. We find that a EUBS can provide risk sharing by stabilizing relative consumption as well as unemployment differentials. Following supply shocks, however, the cross-country transfer embodied in the unemployment benefits is spent to a large degree on relatively inefficiently produced goods in the receiving countries. This renders the allocation even more inefficient by opening country-specific labor wedges further, also after government-spending shocks. Yet, since this trade-off between allocative efficiency and consumption risk sharing does not exist after certain demand shocks, the welfare effects of a EUBS depend on the cause for international unemployment differentials. A EUBS that is only active after specific shocks would therefore maximize overall welfare. Even without this feature, a EUBS would raise Core’s welfare in the quantitative model, leaving Periphery’s welfare almost unchanged.

The Flight to Safety and International Risk Sharing

We study a business cycle model of the international monetary system featuring a time-varying demand for safe dollar bonds, greater risk-bearing capacity in the U.S. than the rest of the world, and nominal rigidities. A flight to safety generates a dollar appreciation and decline in global output. Dollar bonds thus command a negative risk premium and the U.S. holds a levered portfolio of capital financed in dollars. We quantify the effects of safety shocks and heterogeneity in risk-bearing capacity for global macroeconomic volatility; U.S. external adjustment; and the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, including dollar swap lines.

What Types of Capital Flows Help Improve International Risk Sharing?

What Types of Capital Flows Help Improve International Risk Sharing?

New evidence on international risk-sharing in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

This paper explores income and consumption smoothing patterns among ECOWAS countries during the period 1980–2016. It is relevant given the willingness of heads of state in the region to create a single currency. Indeed, in a monetary union, asymmetric shocks are not problematic if risk-sharing mechanisms, other than the exchange rate, are in place to allow countries to adjust to specific shocks. The paper provides more information on the accounting decomposition of national aggregates allowing a better understanding of risk-sharing channels. Unlike previous studies in this area, we show that official development assistance and gross saving smooth out asymmetric shocks between ECOWAS countries. Besides, net taxes on products and production, respectively, social contributions and social benefits limit net primary incomes’ effectiveness, respectively, net secondary incomes to smooth asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that even if the degree of risk-sharing increases over time, it has remained limited. Also, market- based risk-sharing mechanisms are ineffective when they are most needed. That’s why ECOWAS countries need a supranational fiscal that could provide an additional tool to smooth asymmetric shocks in the region.

New Evidence on International Risk-Sharing in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

New Evidence on International Risk-Sharing in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

A Review of International Risk Sharing for Policy Analysis

This paper offers a comprehensive view of international risk sharing and of related policy issues from the perspective of the European Union. The traditional analyses contemplate three risk-sharing channels: the capital markets channel (through cross border portfolio investments), international transfers and the credit markets channel (via savings). Comparative analyses reveal that, on average, about 80% of the shock remains unsmoothed in Europe while only about 18% of the shock is transmitted to consumers within the US. From aggregated figures, there is space for improving, particularly, the cross-border investments channel in Europe. In this sense, the completion of the Banking and Capital Markets Union are expected to boost risk sharing across European member states. We also review new additional issues usually not contemplated by the traditional literature as depreciation, migration and the role of sovereigns and two new additional channels recently considered in the literature: government consumption and the real exchange rate. Finally, we also examine recent analysis related to the geographic distribution of risk sharing.

A Review of International Risk Sharing for Policy Analysis

This paper offers a comprehensive view of international risk sharing and of related policy issues from the perspective of the European Union. The traditional analyses contemplate three risk-sharing channels: the capital markets channel (through cross border portfolio investments), international transfers and the credit markets channel (via savings). Comparative analyses reveal that, on average, about 80% of the shock remains unsmoothed in Europe while only about 18% of the shock is transmitted to consumers within the US. From aggregated figures, there is space for improving, particularly, the cross-border investments channel in Europe. In this sense, the completion of the Banking and Capital Markets Union are expected to boost risk sharing across European member states. We also review new additional issues usually not contemplated by the traditional literature as depreciation, migration and the role of sovereigns and two new additional channels recently considered in the literature: government consumption and the real exchange rate. Finally, we also examine recent analysis related to the geographic distribution of risk sharing.

International Risk-Sharing and Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small Commodity-Exporting Economy

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy regimes for a small commodity-exporting economy. In line with the existing literature, welfare analysis shows that a flexible exchange rate regime tends to outperform a fixed nominal exchange rate. However, this paper shows that the welfare costs of a nominal peg vary considerably with the extent of international risk-sharing. In a model with complete and frictionless asset markets, real exchange rate volatility is small, and welfare losses from the nominal peg are negligible. By contrast, under financial autarky, a fixed nominal exchange rate generates significant volatility in inflation and results in large welfare costs. I also consider the welfare properties of flexible regimes, showing that core consumer inflation targeting and non-commodity domestic inflation targeting are not generally optimal, although their welfare costs are small compared to those of a fixed regime. Furthermore, the welfare ranking of these two regimes might depend on the currency in which the tradable goods are priced (producer-currency pricing vs. local-currency pricing).

Globalization and international risk-sharing: The role of social and political integration

This study explores the relationships among various dimensions of globalization (i.e., economic, social, and political) and international risk-sharing, by exploiting the KOF globalization indices over a long time horizon (1970–2014) and for several groups of countries (i.e., World; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); European Union (EU); European Monetary Union (EMU); high-income economies (HI); and low and middle-income economies (LMI)). To this end, we follow a standard regression-based approach augmented by interaction terms. To date, the empirical literature has only investigated the economic and financial facets of globalization; we, on the other hand, find a significant relationship between risk-sharing and noneconomic aspects of globalization. For several groups of industrialized countries, social and political integration positively correlate with risk-sharing. The economic factor does not explain all the improvements that relate to globalization, and political integration plays a remarkable role in shaping risk-sharing opportunities, both among EMU/EU countries and on a global scale. For advanced economies, in an increasingly globalized world, political integration should be of great concern.

Financial Intermediation, International Risk Sharing, and Reserve Currencies

I model the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying financial development. The most financially developed country takes greater risks because its financial intermediaries deal with funding problems better. In good times, the more financially developed country consumes more and runs a trade deficit financed by the higher financial income that it earns as compensation for taking greater risk. During global crises, it suffers heavier losses. Its currency emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during crises, thus providing a good hedge. I provide evidence that financial net worth plays a crucial role in understanding this asymmetric risk sharing. (JEL E44, F14, F32, G01, G15, G21)

Transport Costs, Relative Prices, and International Risk Sharing

This paper studies the role of the transport costs in accounting for the puzzling behaviors of relative prices and risk sharing across countries. We show that introducing the transport costs in an otherwise standard competitive model improves its ability to rationalize the deviations from the law of one price and imperfect international risk sharing. Our analysis suggests that the purchasing power parity puzzle and the consumption correlation puzzle can naturally arise in the presence of real frictions, even under the assumption of complete financial markets.

A Quantitative Assessment of the Role of Incomplete Asset Markets on the Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rate

I develop a two-country New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and incomplete international asset markets that provides novel insights on the effect that imperfect international risk-sharing has on international business cycles and RER dynamics. I find that business cycles appear similar whether international asset markets are complete or not when driven by a combination of non-persistent monetary shocks and persistent productivity (TFP) shocks. In turn, international asset market incompleteness has sizeable effects if (persistent) investment-specific technology (IST) shocks are a main driver of business cycles. I also show that the model with incomplete international asset markets can approximate the RER volatility and persistence observed in the data, for instance, if IST shocks are near-unit-root. Hence, I conclude that the nature of shocks, the extent of financial integration across countries and the existing limitations on asset trading are central to understand the dynamics of the real exchange rate and the endogenous international transmission over the business cycles.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance and International Risk Sharing

We discuss how cross-country unemployment insurance can be used to improve international risk sharing. We use a two-country business cycle model with incomplete financial markets and frictional labor markets where the unemployment insurance scheme operates across both countries. Cross-country insurance through the unemployment insurance system can be achieved without affecting unemployment outcomes. The Ramsey-optimal policy however prescribes a more countercyclical replacement rate when international risk sharing concerns enter the unemployment insurance trade-off. We calibrate our model to Eurozone data and find that optimal stabilizing transfers through the unemployment insurance system are sizable and mainly stabilize consumption in the periphery countries, while optimal replacement rates are countercyclical overall. Moreover, we find that debt-financed national policies are a poor substitute for fiscal transfers.