International Regime Complex Research Articles

Evaluating EU responsiveness to the evolution of the international regime complex on climate change

Evaluating EU responsiveness to the evolution of the international regime complex on climate change

아시아의 난민보호와 시민사회의 대응

아시아는 국제난민레짐의 형식적 제도화와 실제적 적용에 있어 공백지로 평가된다. 대부분의 아시아 국가들은 국제난민법의 공식적인 비준을 거부하고 난민의 수용을 국가 간의 협상의 대상으로 다루어 왔다. 난민협약을 비준한 소수의 국가들도 난민보호를 국가의 정당성을 인정받기 위한 수단으로 활용하고 있다. 난민위기들과 대응의 경험에도 불구하고 아시아에서 난민보호의 제도화와 실제적 이행이 제대로 작동하지 못하는 원인과 양상은 무엇일까? 그리고 이러한 난민보호의 간극을 극복하기 위한 시민사회의 대응은 어떻게 나타나고 있을까? 이 연구는 이러한 문제의식에서 시작하여 아시아 지역에서 국제난민레짐의 부재가 난민보호에 대한 무관심을 의미하지 않으며, 시민사회를 중심으로 제도화가 이루어진 국가들과 그렇지 못한 국가들에 대해 서로 다른 접근방식을 통해 난민보호의 실질적 이행을 달성하고 있음을 강조한다. 즉, 형식적이나마 제도화를 받아들인 국가에서는 시민사회가 취약한 제도화의 수준을 정치적 기회로 활용하여 실질적 이행을 강조하고, 반대로 제도화를 거부한 국가들에서는 국제레짐의 복잡성을 활용하여 난민보호를 증진시킬 수 있는 보충적 보호를 추구하고 있다는 것이다. 이러한 변화는 아시아 시민사회가 난민보호를 “비호를 구할 권리”라는 한계를 넘어 “비호를 누릴 권리”로 확장하고 있음을 보여준다.

Norm conflicts as governance challenges for Seed Commons: Comparing cases from Germany and the Philippines

A Seed Commons approach can help to highlight the common struggle of diverse seed initiatives in the Global North and South in light of the dominant pathway of enclosure and commodification of seeds that threatens food sovereignty and cultivated plant-genetic diversity. In this paper, the Seed Commons framework is applied to show how the conflicting norms and rules of the international regime complex surrounding seeds shape the scope of action for Seed Commons in Germany and the Philippines. The analysis shows that the patent and variety protection regimes have strongly influenced the design of national seed marketing and threaten to outlaw practices of Seed Commons. Despite limited practical impact for Seed Commons initiatives (so far), the norms of the Nagoya Protocol and the Seed Treaty have contributed to exceptions in national seed marketing law that provide essential scope of action for Seed Commons initiatives in Europe and the Philippines.

From Colonial to Multilateral International Law: A Global Capitalism and Law Investigation

This Forward integrates international law, international relations, and global history scholarship to understand two global trends that are in tension with each other: 1) the shift from European colonial dominance to a law-based multilateralism, which enabled a more equal and inclusive international law and 2) global capitalism which across time has been a political and economic force that, left to its own devices, promotes exclusion and inequality. Alter builds an encompassing conception of global economic law to show the interplay of colonial law, private law, domestic law and international law in enabling and constraining global capitalism across time. The investigation looks backwards so as to think forward. The larger goal of the endeavor is to imagine how an Asian law-based capitalism might continue past trends and recreate continuities despite a professed desire to be different. Just as capitalism once locked in colonial features despite the shift to multilateral international law, multilateralism and capitalism may be forces that sustain the very features of the Western Liberal International Order that China seeks to move beyond. Theoretically, the article argues that we need to conceive of global economic law as an international regime complex that in the colonial era included colonial law and private contracts, and in the multilateral era includes private contracting and extraterritorial domestic law. The various elemental units in the complex provide states and firms with options, and these options create an incentive to block or circumvent multilateral solutions. Blocking leads to multilateral non-decisions, which then unleash power-based bilateralism, coalition of the willing preferential international law, and private and market forces that step into the void. The non decisions are thus as consequential as the decisions— yet non decisions tend to fall into the blind spots if IL/IR debates. The options alongside the legal and market developments they unleash then constrain states from encasing markets so as to protect domestic, social, and political priorities. The Forward will be published in 2021, with responses appearing in 2022.

The Promise and Perils of Theorizing International Regime Complexity in an Evolving World

The Promise and Perils of Theorizing International Regime Complexity in an Evolving World

Comprehending global governance: International regime complexity vs. global constitutionalism

AbstractThe After Fragmentation special issue unites political science conversations about regime complexity with legal/normative conversations about global constitutionalism through a focus on the generation and resolution of interface conflicts, defined as moments when overlapping elements or rule incompatibilities generate actual conflicts. Yet scholars choosing among these two perspectives actually have different objectives. After reviewing the two literatures, I argue that this special issue is closer to the global constitutionalism perspective, which generally seeks legitimated order. By contrast, the regime complexity literature asks how does the fact that global governance is spread across multiple institutions in itself shape cooperation politics. Investigating what it means to get ‘beyond fragmentation’, I suggest that the potential or actuality of rule conflicts is not necessarily a problem because conflicts are a normal and even salutary aspect of politics. If conflict is not the concern, then what should we be worrying about? Both perspectives, I argue, are amoral because they normalise and help justify an international order where responsibility is spread across institutions, promoting order while failing to address fundamental problems affecting people and the world. In this respect, resolving rule conflicts does not get us beyond fragmentation.

International Regime Complexity

International Regime Complexity

Governing international regime complexes through multi-level governance mechanisms: lessons from water, forestry and migration policy

ABSTRACT Why do international regime complexes develop? Are hard-law regimes effective in integrating regime complexes for international water resources management? Are there other alternatives? This article introduces international regime complexes and argues that these form a superior alternative to hard law and traditional global integrated regimes for many global policy issues. Failure of hard law to overcome fragmentation and generate integrated policy outcomes in international forestry, migration and water resource management is presented. Additional insights are drawn from two successful cases of water management in North America to argue for international regime complexes for better multi-level governance at the regional level.

Comprehending Global Governance: International Regime Complexity v. Global Constitutionalism

This is a commentary on a special issue titled Beyond Fragmentation that unites political science conversations about regime complexity with legal/normative conversations about global constitutionalism through a focus on the generation and resolution of interface conflicts, defined as moments when overlapping elements or rule incompatibilities generate actual conflicts. The article explains the different objectives of the political science and legal/normative debates, arguing that this special issue is closer to the global constitutionalism perspective, which generally seeks legitimated order. By contrast, the regime complexity literature asks “how does the fact that global governance is spread across multiple institution in itself shape cooperation politics?” Investigating what it means to get “beyond fragmentation,” I suggest that the potential or actuality of rule conflicts is not necessarily a problem because conflicts are a normal and even salutary aspect of politics. If conflict is not the concern, then what should we be worrying about? Both perspectives, I argue, are amoral because they normalize and help justify promoting order while failing to address fundamental problems affecting people and the world. Even if scholars can fashion constitutional rules, institutions and sensibilities, the reality that politicians choose to govern the globe through often incoherent and intentionally incomplete regime complexes, more than the fact of conflict, is something we all should worry and complain more about.

Explaining coherence in international regime complexes: How the World Bank shapes the field of multilateral development finance

The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways – path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning – that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.

Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis. By C. Randall Henning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 312p. $37.95 cloth.

Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis. By C. Randall Henning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 312p. $37.95 cloth.

Mapping the fragmentation of the international forest regime complex: institutional elements, conflicts and synergies

In the field of global environmental governance, a plethora of international regimes have emerged over the past decades. In some issue areas, multiple regimes aim to govern the issue, sometimes reinforcing, oftentimes conflicting with each other. Consequently, international regime complexes are an empirical phenomenon, which are inherently characterized by specific degrees of fragmentation. For any given issue area, one of the key questions is whether the institutional fragmentation encountered in such regime complexes is synergistic or conflictive in nature. Scrutinizing this question poses methodological challenges of how to delineate a regime complex and how to assess its fragmentation. Drawing on the highly fragmented case of the international forest regime complex, this paper aims to map its institutional fragmentation and to analyse the degrees to which it is conflictive or synergistic. For this we conceptualize the notion of institutional elements and develop a novel method for mapping regime complexes based on their core institutional elements. We then employ tools from the sub-discipline of policy analysis on the complex’s institutional elements for analysing in detail, which of the elements are mutually synergistic and conflictive with other elements of the regime complex. Our results indicate that synergistic relations mostly exist among rather vague elements, often built around sustainability as a core principle. On the contrary, conflictive relations prevail as soon as the elements are designed in more concrete and substantial ways. We conclude that the forest regime complex displays only degree of seemingly synergistic fragmentation through a number of non-decisions and the use of “sustainability” as an empty formula. De facto, conflictive fragmentation prevails among elements of concrete subject matter. This raises questions on whether vast parts of regime complexes merely serve symbolic functions, while conflicts on substance are being camouflaged.

The Strategic Use of International Investment Law in Colombia – Textiles: Navigating within the International Regime Complex for Development

AbstractTrade-based money laundering (TBML) is a major concern in Colombia, where criminal organisations employ under-invoicing to conceal drug-trafficking proceeds. In response, Colombia imposed a compound tariff on certain Panamanian importations that were considered linked to this phenomenon. Alleging that the policy measure infringed Colombia’s tariff concessions, Panama activated the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism. The dispute revolved around Article II:1 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994. Colombia argued that this norm should be interpreted as to encompass licit trade only. Colombia looked for normative support in the investment treaty regime by establishing a parallel between undervalued imports and illegal investments. Therefore, just as investment treaty tribunals abstain from extending international legal protection to illegal investments, the WTO adjudicating bodies should not extend tariff concessions to importations linked to TBML activities. This article contends that by transplanting a more favourable doctrine of legality from the investment treaty regime to the multilateral trade regime, Colombia engaged in strategic regime shifting. Accordingly, drawing on regime complexes analysis, the article argues that by considering development a common issue-area, it is possible to articulate strategic connections between both regimes.

The International Law of Property

On the surface, the two books under review seem to have little in common. The Bonnitcha/Poulsen/Waibel (BPW) book, written by two legal academics and a political scientist, provides a balanced, fact-grounded account of international investment agreements (IIAs) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This is the “international treaty regime” in that book's title which the authors argue needs to be distinguished from the broader “international regime complex” that their book explicitly does not address, namely the number of other international instruments that at least incidentally also protect foreign investments (including, for example, political risk insurance, tax treaties, certain World Trade Organization agreements, and certain human rights treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) (p. 7 and Figure 1.2). As one of the encomiums on its back cover page suggests, the BPW book seeks to answer the fraught competing contentions of defenders and critics of the regime that all too frequently generate “more heat than light.” Their book dispassionately synthesizes the available legal, economic, and political literature relevant to understanding the investment treaty regime's oft-proclaimed “legitimacy crisis.” It seeks to supply lawyers needing political context and political scientists needing legal knowledge with the unfiltered facts required to assess whether such a “crisis” exists and, if so, what the ways forward might be.

Conceptualizing Change in the International Investment Regime Complex

Dozens of countries are reviewing their extant international investment agreement commitments, fueling the global debate about the future of investment protection in trade and investment agreements. Although the rate of new international investment agreements has slowed, intra-developed country agreement negotiations are on the rise. This paper contributes to the nascent literature on conceptualizing change in the international investment regime complex. I first outline the contours of state-led reform efforts to show they are procedural and incremental in nature, rather than substantive and transformative. I then argue we can understand the incremental evolution of the international investment regime complex through the lens of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is not a static condition and its requirements change over time. The politicization of international investment agreements and the expansion of the community to whom legitimacy is owed create space for new legitimacy requirements for the regime complex. However, the ability of states to fulfill these requirements is heavily mediated by the existing social structure and institutionalized norms of the regime complex.

The Contested Authority and Legitimacy of International Law: The State Strikes Back

Written to engage IR theory debates, this chapter argues that the crafting, invocation, interpretation and application of international law are a primary means through which states collectively rule and contest politics in international relations today. Yet since international law (IL) draws its legitimacy and authority from public affirmations of and diffuse support for the rule of law, public support for the rule of law is a permissive condition for IL to be politically constraining. After explaining how national and transnational legal practices constitute international law’s de facto authority, the chapter explores both ordinary and extraordinary contestations of IL authority. Ordinary contestation takes place within a legal field, when lawyers, stakeholders, judges and government officials debate and contest over the meaning of international law. Political tactics are also part of ordinary contestation, but because the curators of IL authority are transnational, a state may be unable to impose its preferred IL interpretation. Where states fail to impose a preferred interpretation, three extra-ordinary contestation strategies can be used to escape IL authority: 1) states can seek to replace international law’s authority with domestic law’s authority; 2) states can pit different international laws against each other by maneuvering within and around international regime complexes; and (3) states can attack the legitimacy and authority of international law altogether. Where authority challenges enhance IL accountability, they are to be welcome. But each strategy can also be used to tear at the fabric of IL authority, potentially undermining the permissive conditions that make IL both constraining and effective.

Food Security and Biofuels Regulations: the Emulsifying Effect of International Regime Complexes

International institutions are proliferating over a wide range of issue areas, creating what have recently been described as regime complexes. More than complicated arrangements, regime complexes are structures: they are more than the sum of their parts, i.e. individual international regimes. While the concept of international regimes holds strong promise in this direction, academic research on regime complexes has mostly focused on how agents shape regime complexes but less on how complexes influence agents. This contribution aims at filling this gap by studying the effects that regime complexes might have on global governance, focusing more narrowly on the effects of regime complexes on non-state actors’ (NSAs) strategies with regard to agenda setting for new international regulations. More precisely, we hypothesise that regime complexes create an ‘emulsifying effect’ for pro-active NSAs to push for new regulations whereby the collective effect of non-state actors within and across regime complexes become greater than the sum of their individual effects within individual regimes. We use the examples of food security and biofuels regulations at the international level as a case study with a special focus on the European Union.

C. Randall Henning. 2017. Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press)

C. Randall Henning. 2017. Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press)

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes

AbstractHow do states resolve jurisdictional conflicts among international institutions? In many issue areas, global governance is increasingly fragmented among multiple international organizations (IOs). Existing work argues this fragmentation can undermine cooperation as different institutions adopt conflicting rules. However, this perspective overlooks the potential for interinstitutional coordination. I develop a theory ofinstitutional deference: the acceptance of another IO's exercise of authority. By accepting rules crafted in another IO, member states can mitigate rule conflict and facilitate a division of labor within the regime complex. I use an original data set of over 2,000 IO policy documents to describe patterns of deference in the counterterrorism, intellectual property, and election-monitoring regime complexes. Empirical tests support two theoretical claims. First, institutional deference is indeed associated with a division of labor among institutions: IOs that defer to each other are more likely to focus their rule-making efforts on separate subissues. Second, deference is a strategic act that is shaped both by efficiency concerns and power politics. Statistical tests confirm that deference is used to efficiently pool resources among disparate organizations, and that IOs with weaker member states tend to defer to organizations with more powerful members.

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes—ERRATUM

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes—ERRATUM