International Oil Industry Research Articles

Petroleum Geology of the Zhu-1 Depression, Pearl River Mouth Basin, People's Republic of China: ABSTRACT

The Pearl River Mouth basin, located in the South China Sea between Hainan Island and Taiwan has been the focus of an intense exploration effort during the l980s. In 1979 the international oil industry, acquired over 60,000 km of seismic, gravity, and magnetic data covering an area of approximately 240,000 km{sup 2}. Three major subbasins, Zhu-1, Zhu-2, and Zhu-3 were defined. Chevron in partnership with Texaco and AGIP (ACT group), concentrated their effort on the Zhu-1 depression which was interpreted to contain as much as 7,800 m of sedimentary section. This subbasin, bounded by the Wansha and Donsha massifs to the north and south, is the most inboard of the three depressions, thereby possibly prolonging anoxic lacustrine conditions prior to the Neogene marine incursion. Additionally, the Zhu- 1 depression should have directly received Miocene sediment potentially supplying the subbasin with high-quality reservoirs. Within the Zhu-1 depression, the ACT group focused in on Block 16/08, which covered the deepest part of the Zhu-1 depression. The block was awarded to the consortium in January 1983. Structuring within the block ranges from Paleogene tensional block faulting created during the early formation of the overall Pearl River Mouth basin to draping over basement highsmore » and carbonate buildups during the Neogene. The Pearl River Mouth basin exhibits classic rift basin geometry with early nonmarine continental fluvial/lacustrine deposition (Zhuhai Formation) during the Oligocene and capped by a lower Miocene marine incursion (Zhu Jiang Formation). Integrated interpretations, exploration drilling, and constant refinement of the geological model led to the discovery of two oil fields, Huizhou/21-1 and Huizhou/26-1, both of which are currently under development and will represent the first commercial oil production from the entire Pearl River Mouth basin.« less

Oil and gas dictionary

The international oil and gas industry covers such diverse areas as international politics, petroleum engineering, business and finance. Arranged in alphabetical order, this book provides an understanding for those not fully in command of the language in every area of oil and gas. It covers and explains three areas. Scientific and engineering terms are explained specifically for those with no technical background, unlike many of the existing source books which seem to require degree-level knowledge to be comprehensible. In the same way general economic and financial terms regularly used in the industry are explained specifically for those with no economic or financial background. Finally, the book explains the industry-specific terms for those who need to understand aspects of the industry but have been hindered from doing so by their inability to discover the meaning of the jargon used.

States and companies: political risks in the international oil industry

Introduction The Study of Political Risk The Relationship Between Host State and the TNC Policy and Risks Constraints and Opportunities Conclusion

A theoretical perspective on negotiations, with reference to the international oil industry

A theoretical perspective on negotiations, with reference to the international oil industry

Book Review: The International Oil Industry

Book Review: The International Oil Industry

The international oil industry: an interdisciplinary perspective, Pipeline politics: the complex political economy of East-West energy trade and Oil diplomacy in the twentieth century

The international oil industry: an interdisciplinary perspective, Pipeline politics: the complex political economy of East-West energy trade and Oil diplomacy in the twentieth century

Managing an oligopoly of would-be sovereigns: the dynamics of joint control and self-control in the international oil industry past, present, and future

The key to the success of the oil oligopoly has been the ability of its members to make commitments to each other credible despite great divisiveness and enormous uncertainties. To accomplish this, the oil companies constructed a regime of suprasovereign constraints to control the pursuit of individual self-interest. When these anti-democratic, anti-autonomous institutions functioned effectively, the corporations met challenges far greater than those OPEC subsequently faced; when they began to disintegrate, the companies' ability to hold price above marginal cost deteriorated. OPEC reinvigorated the oligopoly using the ready-made self-denial and surveillance mechanisms built by the companies, then systematically unravelled them in moving towards a “mature” cartel held together by “mere” common interest, promises, and threats. To reconstruct an oligopoly that has the cohesiveness of the corporate era, OPEC will need not only a more moderate price trajectory, but also a binding structure that gives preponderance to the most conservative members, provides prompt and accurate verification of cheating, and automatically imposes penalties in magnified form for competitive behavior (without the need for direct retaliation). Beyond predictions about the future of the oil industry, these findings have important implications for economic approaches to imperfect competition, for anti-trust analyses of collusion, and for organizational theories of hegemonic leadership.

THE TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL OIL PRODUCTION

In this paper a general equilibrium model of the international oil industry is developed and used to examine the impact of changes in the taxation of foreign oil production on the world economy. The analysis indicates that replacement of the foreign tax credit by a deduction for foreign oil extraction payments will result in a significant decrease in U.S. investment in foreign oil production, with only a negligible increase in domestic oil investment and production. Most of the capital withdrawn from foreign oil production will be shifted into foreign non-oil production, and due to the resulting loss of infra-marginal returns and a modest negative terms of trade effect, there will be a slight decline in national welfare. These effects are contrasted with the very different effects arising from the corresponding replacement of the foreign tax credit by a deduction for foreign taxes on non-oil production.

The Trend of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry in the 1980s

Few industries during the last ten years have undergone such rapid changes as the international oil industry. During this decade, radical changes occurred in the conditions under which international oil companies acquire and trade crude oil. These external events initiated a far-reaching adjustment process that is likely to continue. In addition to changes in the upstream sector of the oil industry (exploration and production), the two quantum jumps in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 have drastically altered the conditions of downstream operations (refining and marketing). Two decades of unprecedented growth in oil demand, which had made the world economy heavily dependent on oil, have been reversed. Since 1979, oil demand has fallen more sharply than total energy demand, thereby reducing the relative importance of oil in the energy economy. While GNP in real terms in the Western industrialized countries (OECD)/sup 1/ rose slightly (by 3%) from 1979 to 1982, primary energy demand fell by 8%, and oil demand slipped by 19%, or a total of 7 mbd (million barrels per day). These developments forced the oil industry to shrink and adjust to the new environment. The oil industry is facing a two-sided problem: Under heavy competitive pressure it ismore » forced to reduce refining, transportation, and marketing capacities and at the same time to invest considerable amounts in rebuilding its resource base and modifying its refineries to meet shifting demand patterns.« less

OPEC'S Decade: Has It Made a Difference?

No one can deny that the past ten years have witnessed great changes in the international oil industry. A decade ago, the seven largest international oil companies—Exxon, Shell, British Petroleum, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, and Gulf—still dominated the industry in virtually every respect. In 1972, these seven companies accounted for three fifths of the noncommunist world's production of crude oil and refined products, and similar shares of transport and marketing as well. Even these figures fail to reflect the relative profitability of these "seven sisters." They controlled only one third of oil production in the United States, where costs were relatively high and profits correspondingly lower. By contrast, they controlled 88 percent of production in the low-cost, high-profit areas such as the Middle East and Latin America. Among these seven major companies, there were sizable disparities. Exxon, for example, had crude oil production that was nearly three times as large as Mobil's. Taken together, though, the seven big companies probably earned close to three fourths of all oil industry profits.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The international oil industry in the 1980s

Few industries have undergone such rapid changes during the last ten years as the international oil industry. During this decade, there have been radical changes in the conditions under which international oil companies acquire and trade crude oil. In addition to the changes in the upstream sector the two quantum jumps in oil prices have drastically altered the conditions of downstream operations. Since 1979 oil demand fell more sharply than total energy demand, thereby reducing its relative importance in the energy economy. These events initiated a far-reaching adjustment process which is likely to continue.

OPEC's Decade: Has It Made a Difference?

No one can deny that the past ten years have witnessed great changes in the international oil industry. A decade ago, the largest international oil companies—Exxon, Shell, British Petroleum, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, and Gulf—still dominated the industry in virtually every respect. In 1972, these companies accounted for three fifths of the noncommunist world's production of crude oil and refined products, and similar shares of transport and marketing as well. Even these figures fail to reflect the relative profitability of these seven sisters. They controlled only one third of oil production in the United States, where costs were relatively high and profits correspondingly lower. By contrast, they controlled 88 percent of production in the low-cost, high-profit areas such as the Middle East and Latin America. Among these major companies, there were sizable disparities. Exxon, for example, had crude oil production that was nearly three times as large as Mobil's. Taken together, though, the big companies probably earned close to three fourths of all oil industry profits.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Thailand Gas Project--A Cooperative Effort of World Bank, Government of Thailand, and Private Enterprise: ABSTRACT

After Union Oil's discovery of large offshore reserves of gas in the early 1970s, Thailand was presented with an opportunity to reduce its almost complete dependence on oil imports for its commercial energy supplies. This, however, required considerable changes in the structure of its energy supply and the creation of a new industry in which Thailand had no previous experience. Faced with this challenge, the government of Thailand investigated several possible alternative scenarios, and associated the World Bank, which had a long experience in the power sector, the major potential gas consumer. This cooperation, involving the public sector, the international oil industry, and the international financial community resulted in one of the first successful developments of nat ral gas by an international oil company for the purpose of meeting the domestic demand of a developing country. The paper presents the various issues that had to be faced during the preparation and implementation of this project and elaborates on its possible value for other countries. End_of_Article - Last_Page 959------------

Review: Food and Fuel: Opec and the International Oil Industry

Review: Food and Fuel: Opec and the International Oil Industry

Opec and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure

Opec and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure

Opec's Importance in the World Oil Industry

HE role of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the recent history of the international oil industry has been greatly misunderstood. Widely regarded as an aggressive producers' organisation, a cartel forcing up the price of oil and successful because of the unity of its members, it is both courted and feared by the consuming countries. Many are the voices (perhaps less numerous now than earlier) predicting its demise under the strains created by the conflicting interests of its members. The disintegration of the organisation would probably be warmly welcomed in much of the rest of the world. This view of OPEC is not based on a careful study of the role it has actually played. In fact, to attempt the destruction, or even weakening, of OPEC as an organisation would be folly. If OPEC did not exist, it would be in the interest of the industrial world to promote its creation in some form. To establish these points is the purpose of this paper.

Contribution à la théorie de la rente pétrolière

The newly introduced notion of oil rent has led to a more accurate understanding of the international oil industry. But the theory of rent isn't always analyzed correctly which brings about insuperable difficulties. The total oil rent doesn't include any monopoly rents, it is but a sum of differential rents whose maximum level is fixed by the reproduction price of U.S. coal. That rent whose existence is mostly independent of the agents involved entails the cartellization of the sector. Seen from that angle, excess profits made the cartel and not the other way round. The consumer States share in the total rent: they collect a significant part of it. What is called "the energy crisis" is, for the time being, but a serious problem of redistribution of the total oil rent.

OIL EXPLORATION STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper focuses on the roles of governments of developing countries in the oil exploration area; roles ranging from passive tax collectors to production sharers to full State ownership and control. The historical failure of governments to take full control of this key area is seen as partially due to myths: that only the big international oil companies have the necessary technology and capital and can afford the risk of oil exploration and development. Three case studies showing the large benefits to a developing country from full State control are examined: Mexico, India and Vietnam. It is concluded that only full State control can ensure that the riches of oil can be harnessed for a developing country, and governments are urged to develop greater knowledge both about the international oil industry and their country's potential resources.

OPEC AND THE STRATEGY OF EXPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION

One of the most pressing policy objectives of oil producing countries is that of transforming a raw material producing! exporting economy to one that is capable of exporting semi‐processed, processed and manufactured goods. This policy objective was stressed by OPEC Secretary General Ali M. Jaidah when he addressed representatives of the international oil industry in October of last year in Vienna. On that occasion, the Secretary Generai spoke of the need for “the speedy transformation of the role of OPEC Member Countries from that of raw material exporters to manufacturers by carrying out certain downstream operations, especially with regard to refining and petrochemicals.” In this way, the Secretary General said, the national oil industries should become the central pivot in the process of industrialization. In the following article, Professor Alnasrawi outlines the main theoretical arguments for an industrialization strategy based on the concept of export substitution – i.e. placing the emphasis of development policy on non‐traditional, non‐primary exports; some of the difficulties which such a strategy is bound to encounter; and, finally, the applicability of that strategy to OPEC Member Countries.

ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM TRANSPORT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Dramatic changes in the institutional structure of the international oil industry in recent years have created new responsibilities and opportunities for developing countries in petroleum transport. The article discusses the prospects for changes in the ownership/control pattern of seaborne oil movements and the need for both oil producing and oil importing developing countries to pursue national plans to acquire shipping tonnage and expertise, without being deterred by the present depressed conditions of the world shipping industry. Drawing from the experience in India, it deals with some features and problems of petroleum transport by sea, pipeline, rail and road. It stresses the importance of co‐operation among developing countries through common operation of deep‐water terminals and large size tankers to optimise transport costs.