International Nuclear Order Research Articles

NATO as a nuclear alliance: NATO's nuclear capability and its evolution in the international nuclear order

NATO as a nuclear alliance: NATO's nuclear capability and its evolution in the international nuclear order

From lobbyists to backstage diplomats: how insurers in the field of third party liability shaped nuclear diplomacy

ABSTRACT Third party liability insurance in the event of nuclear accidents emerged as a pressing issue in the 1950s, triggered to a great extent by the activities of international organizations and major nuclear accidents. By the mid-1960s a tight international network of negotiators comprising insurers, lawyers, scientists, engineers, businessmen, and government officials made its appearance along with nuclear insurance pools. Experts, functionaries, diplomats and politicians with often diverging views and expertise were involved in negotiations over the newly emerging legal and regulatory problems related to radiation protection and third party liability in the event of severe accidents. This paper argues that insurers transformed their identities from lobbyists to backstage nuclear diplomats, making their role explicitly political and profoundly diplomatic in an emerging international nuclear order. Within this novel multilayered context of negotiations the nuclear insurance pools developed a unique form of nuclear diplomacy, altering both terms of ‘nuclear’ and ‘diplomacy’.

An Attitude of Caution: The IAEA, the UN, and the 1958 Pugwash Conference in Austria

This article examines the relationship between transnational and intergovernmental organizations in the formation of the international nuclear order in the 1950s. It focuses on three major events in September 1958: the second United Nations (UN) International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, the third Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (held in Tyrol), and the second General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The three nuclear conferences of 1958, linked closely in time and location, were shaped by interplays of science and politics at a unique moment in nuclear history. The analysis here sheds light on the organizational and institutional beginnings of the Cold War nuclear order and the evolving distinction between transnational and intergovernmental organizations that shaped it. The article shows that competitive dynamics affected relations between the IAEA and the Pugwash organization and between the IAEA and other organizations of the UN.

Redemption and Nutopia: The Scope of Nuclear Critique in International Studies

What should the scope of nuclear critique within international studies be? This article addresses that question by making two interrelated arguments. First that political programmes of international nuclear order are crucially underpinned by what is termed here as ‘nutopianism’: a mode of understanding nuclear power that is imbued with a spirit of technological optimism in relation to ‘peaceful’ nuclear power, but simultaneously qualified by an awareness of the destructive uses and catastrophic potentialities of nuclear weapons. Second, that such nutopianism is in turn predicated on the ‘saving power’ of ‘the atom’: the assumption that nuclear power has redeeming features crucial to human progress and economic prosperity, the development of which should be facilitated within the structures of international order. The article makes the case that although critical thought within international studies focuses on nuclear weapons within international order, it has tended to remain largely silent on the issue of ‘civil’ nuclear power beyond nuclear weapons and the complex imbrication between the two. On that basis the article considers whether a more holistic and expansive form of nuclear critique is both possible and necessary.

Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?

War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the 21st Century. Edited by Chandra Chari. London: Routledge, 2008. 256 pp., hardcover (ISBN-13: 9780415435772). This collection of essays covers familiar ground but still offers value as a largely Asian perspective on hegemony and globalization. Fourteen of the 18 contributors are from Asia, nine from India alone. In an introduction by Chandra Chari, the volume rejects the notion, popular among Western realists, that American hegemony is necessary to avoid anarchy and expects “the processes of globalization, which have economically empowered a large number of countries across the globe,” to provide new “bargaining chips” to strengthen multilateralism. Opening chapters address global perspectives. Eric Hobsbawn, the eminent British scholar, leads off with a blistering attack against the “political crazies” (p. 23) in the United States who after 9/11 abandoned the “emollient cream” (p. 22) of American Cold War policies and sought global hegemony through military might. If these crazies prevail, he predicts “another century of conflict” (p. 20). Akira Iriye and Joseph Nye, two equally eminent Harvard scholars, celebrate the “momentum toward transnationalism” (p. 33) ignited by globalization and expect that growing diversity especially on the economic and information chess boards of world affairs will check American military pretensions. William Wallace at the University of Saint Andrews worries that the world may be approaching “a nuclear tipping point beyond which a ‘cascade of proliferation’ could occur as states assume that the international nuclear order can no longer provide them with sufficient protection” (p. 56). Prem Shankar Jha, an Indian journalist, argues that “capitalism has …

The US–India nuclear deal: the beginning of a beautiful relationship?

The United States (US)–India nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. Given its far-reaching implications, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has sparked off a heated debate in India, the US and the larger international community. This article examines the debate surrounding the nuclear pact. It argues that the nuclear agreement is about much more than mere nuclear technicalities: it is about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power and a broader need for a new international nuclear order in the face of a global nuclear non-proliferation regime that seems to have become ineffective in meeting the challenges confronting the international community today.

International nuclear order: a rejoinder

The article‘Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment by William Walker opened the special issue of International Affairs which was published in May 2007. In it, he claimed that the United States departed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, at the height of its hegemonic influence, from a conception of international nuclear order that it had held to, with few interruptions, over several decades. By so doing, it contributed substantially to the order's currently perceived demise. In responding to criticisms from other participants in the special issue, William Walker defends his arguments while acknowledging the enlightenment trope's fragility; reemphasizes the essential contractual nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which some critics denied; stresses the order's reliance on a judicious balancing (which has temporarily been lost) of realist and constitutional strategies; rejects assertions that the NPT is not a disarmament treaty; argues that the‘muddling through'advocated by some authors cannot suffice; and offers reasons why the despondency of several among them may have been overplayed, and why a new phase of consolidation of order might (just might) lie ahead, not least because of the reconsideration of US international strategies that has begun and the widely perceived urgency of preventing further proliferation and avoiding a resumption of arms racing.

Analysing international nuclear order

William Walker's article, ‘Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment’, raises fundamental questions about the history of efforts to construct order in international politics in relation to nuclear arms and weapons-related capabilities. However, Walker's ‘enlightenment’ and ‘counter-enlightenment’ tropes are clumsy and unsatisfactory tools for analysing contemporary policies concerning nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament. Walker holds that in the 1960s and 1970s most of the governments of the world came together in pursuit of ‘a grand enlightenment project’. This thesis cannot withstand empirical scrutiny with regard to its three main themes—a supposed US-Soviet consensus on doctrines of stabilizing nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability, a notion that the NPT derived from ‘concerted efforts to construct an international nuclear order meriting that title’, and the view that the NPT embodied a commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament. Walker's criticisms of US nuclear policies since the late 1990s are in several cases overstated or ill-founded. Walker also exaggerates the potential influence of the United States over the policies of other countries. It is partly for this reason that the challenges at hand—both analytical and practical—are more complicated and dif cult than his article implies. His work nonetheless has the great merit of raising fundamental questions about international political order.

Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment

Given the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapons, how can states establish an international order that ensures survival while allowing the weapons to be used in controlled ways to discourage great wars, and while allowing nuclear technology to dif use for civil purposes? How can the possession of nuclear weapons by a few states be reconciled with their renunciation by the majority of states? Which political strategies can best deliver an international nuclear order that is effective, legitimate and durable? These have been central questions in the nuclear age. This article suggests that the effort to construct such an order displayed the characteristics of an enlightenment project, with its emphasis on balance and rationality, the quest for justice and trust among states, the feasibility of instrumental regulation, and the attachment to hope and progress. With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its heart, it necessarily gave precedence to diplomacy and containment over preventive war. The reasons why this conception of nuclear order was discarded by its erstwhile champion, the United States, in favour of one bearing traits of counter-enlightenment, are explored. Its alternative strategy can now be declared a failure. Avoidance of a greater disorder depends on recognition that the problem of nuclear order is more than the problem of proliferation, or of non-compliance, and on recovery—whatever the difficulties—of the cooperative yet pragmatic sensibility that lay behind the prior approach to order.

Who killed nuclear enlightenment?

William Walker is right to link the international nuclear order to the international political order, and to assert that the attempt to construct a rational nuclear international order around the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is in a shambles. But he puts too much of the blame on the Bush administration (which he is right to criticize) and tends to neglect the fl awed character of the project itself (and the recent changes in the political international order which have an inevitable bearing on the nuclear one).

Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order

Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order

Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order

Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order