International Mobile Roaming Research Articles

Analysis of International Mobile Roaming Services with Smart Call Assistant System in GSM Originating Call

In this research, it takes a trace log data with real testing using the Polystar and TrafficNews to know the comparison operator Telkomsel network calls with and without the SCA, as well as performance data call in roaming of Roamware SCA tools to know the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) from the parameters of the Call Setup Success Rate (CSSR) and Call Drop Rate (CDR) then be processed and analyzed to find out the quality of service the influence of SCA implementation calls the overall international operators in the three countries with the highest incoming data so that it could become the next parameter in the repair services provided. Results of the study to the difference between the signals operators are implemented with the SCA system of the inbound roaming customers. CSSR percentage in average in 3 countries, Australia, China, Singapore prior to SCA system in May of 81.48%, while after system restored by SCA of 90.98%, where after the repaired system SCA standard KPIS PT. Telkomsel i.e. normal state – good, whereas the percentage KPI failure calls (CDR) in 3 countries, Australia, China, Singapore prior to SCA system in May of 18.52%, while after the repaired system SCA amounted to 9.02%, where after improved system SCA standard KPI applied PT. Telkomsel into normal state.

국제통상협상 내 국제모바일로밍 규범이 국내 시장에 미치는 영향 연구 : 포괄적·점진적 환태평양경제동반자협정(CPTPP) 통신서비스 협정문 규범을 중심으로

국제통상협상 내 국제모바일로밍 규범이 국내 시장에 미치는 영향 연구 : 포괄적·점진적 환태평양경제동반자협정(CPTPP) 통신서비스 협정문 규범을 중심으로

The Potential Of Blockchain Technology To Change International Mobile Roaming Business Model

The key objectives of this paper is to propose a design implementation of blockchain based on smart contract which have potential to change international mobile roaming business model by eliminating third-party data clearing house (DCH). The analysis method used comparative analysis between current situation and target architecture of international mobile roaming business that commonly used by TOGAF Architecture Development Method. The purposed design of implementation has validated the business value by using Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) calculation. This paper applies the TOGAF approach in order to address architecture gap to evaluate by the enhancement capability that required from these three fundamental aspect which are Business, Technology and Information. With the blockchain smart contract solution able to eliminate the intermediaries Data Clearing House system, which impacted to the business model of international mobile roaming with no more intermediaries fee for call data record (CDR) processing and open up for online billing and settlement among parties. In conclusion the business value of blockchain implementation in the international mobile roaming has been measured using TCO comparison between current situation and target architecture that impacted cost reduction of operational platform is 19%. With this information and understanding the blockchain technology has significant benefit in the international mobile roaming business.

Addressing the High Price of International Mobile Roaming (IMR) in Southeast Asia

International Mobile Roaming (IMR) is a service whereby a user who subscribes to mobile telecommunications services in one country is able to use his or her mobile device in other countries. For many years, governments around the world have expressed concerns that the price of IMR services seemed to be unreasonably high in comparison with the price of domestic telecommunications services, with demonstrable negative impact on societal welfare. These concerns have led to numerous regulatory proceedings, and to wholesale and retail IMR price controls in the European Union and also among the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Other regions have implemented various arrangements that seek to lower the cost of IMR, but in most cases it is too early to assess the results of those arrangements. Our focus in this paper is on the ten Southeast Asian countries that comprise the regional organisation ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In the ASEAN region, high prices for roaming have been a concern for many years; however, concrete measures to address high prices have been rather limited. This paper seeks (1) to provide guidance to regulatory authorities and network operators in the ASEAN region based on experience in other regions, especially Europe and the GCC; and (2) to provide context for these discussions based both on economic theory and on global experience.

ITU cost model and methodology to assist national regulatory authorities to engage with international mobile roaming

PurposeTariffs for international mobile roaming (IMR) are often viewed by governments as an additional tax on international trade and on tourism. IMR customer bills may appear to be arbitrary and sometimes excessive. The purpose of this paper is therefore to set out a pragmatic approach to assessing international charges for mobile roaming, making use of a realistic cost model of the international roaming process and its cost elements, at a level that is useful to regulatory authorities and operators.Design/methodology/approachThe discussion presented is based on industry practices for handling voice calls and data sessions with the mobile network operators (MNOs) business model, based on industry sources. The basic mechanisms use two common constructs from business analysis – business processes and use-cases – to provide a simplified form of activity-based costing. This provides a model suitable for national regulatory authorities to move towards cost-based IMR tariffs.FindingsUsing a perspective on costs based on a bottom-up survey procedure for elucidating the key information, the paper presents the cost elements for the various IMR network components and business processes, with an approach suitable for analysing both wholesale and retail pricing.Research limitations/implicationsThe method is specifically designed to overcome the key problem of such approaches, the limitations set by differences in network technologies, network topology, operational scale and the engineering, as well as MNO business model and accounting practices, which otherwise would preclude the method presented here from being vendor neutral.Practical implicationsVendor and network engineering neutrality implies the approach can be used to compare different MNOs in terms of the validity of their IMR charges and whether they are cost based.Social implicationsImpacts on society of so-called “bill-shock” have become quite common, increasingly for data sessions. The cost model presented here was developed with the intention of improving the accountability and transparency of the mobile roaming market. It thus assists in the introduction of cost-based tariffs over an economic region, such the European Union.Originality/valueThe paper examines the practical implications of building large-scale cost models for assessing the real IMR costs, a modelling exercise that has not been seen elsewhere in terms of its approach and neutrality as to MNO structure and assets.

A Short Note on Brexit: Telecommunications Issues after the Referendum

In a referendum on 23rd June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted for ‘Brexit’, i.e., to leave the European Union (EU). After some delay the government will invoke Article 50 TEU, which would begin a two-year period of negotiation for a withdrawal agreement, after which the EU treaties would no longer apply. The ‘Norway Option’ would result in signing the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, re-imposing most of the obligations and costs of EU membership, while removing almost all democratic mechanisms, but ensuring access to the single market. The ‘Albania Option’ would fall back on World Trade Organisation commitments, allowing the government considerable freedom to develop new policies and laws, but with limited access to the single market. The ‘Switzerland Option’ lies between the two.The effects for telecommunications markets, legislation and policies are potentially considerable, but depend on how the government uses the freedom from no longer being bound by the EU acquis. While it might be innovative, it is unclear in which direction this might go, nor is it obvious where the benefits might lie.Withdrawal creates a number of legislative holes, with innumerable references to EU institutions and to its objectives (e.g., completion of the single market), which would need to be filled. Some legislation (e.g., state aid rules and the list of markets subject to ex ante regulation) would disappear, potentially requiring ‘transposition’ into domestic law. With these go significant risks of litigation, a well-known problem in the sector.While ministers have promised that rates for international mobile roaming would not rise, operators would almost certainly lose access to the regulated wholesale rates in the EU-27. Indeed, there would be strong commercial incentives on both sides to raise wholesale rates for those roaming from the United Kingdom to the EU and vice versa. While the operators might try to negotiate alternative deals, there seem only limited chances of success.The repatriation of policy-making and legislative scrutiny from the EU institutions would require ‘beefing up’ of governmental and parliamentary capabilities. It would also require a much deeper engagement with business users and consumer groups, not least to counter the expert lobbying of the operators. Additionally, it would be important to boost the provision of independent views, both from academic researchers and think tanks. Without a rich debate on policies for telecommunications, any potential benefits of Brexit could easily be lost, with the greatest risk being in a mishandled transition.Scotland is “highly likely” to have a second plebiscite, potentially becoming independent, perhaps inside the EU or left outside. In any event, it would need a ministry, regulatory authority, system of appeals and parliamentary oversight, for which no plans exist.

A Short Note on Telecommunications Issues Related to Brexit

Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU), is the subject of a referendum in June 2016. A vote to leave would result in the government invoking Article 50 TEU, which would begin a two-year period of negotiation for a withdrawal agreement, after which the EU treaties would no longer apply. The unpopular ‘Norway Option’ would result in signing the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, which would re-impose most of the obligations and costs of EU membership. Otherwise, there would be considerable freedom for the government to develop new policies and legislation, subject to whatever trade agreements it could reach with other countries.The effects for telecommunications markets, legislation and policies are potentially considerable, but depend on how the United Kingdom government acts with the freedom that follows from no longer being bound by the EU acquis. While it might be innovative, it is unclear how or in what direction that might take its policies. Indeed it is not immediately obvious in which direction the benefits might lie.Withdrawal creates a number of legislative holes, with innumerable references to EU institutions and to its objectives (e.g., completion of the single market), which would need to be filled. Some legislation (e.g., state aid rules and the markets subject to ex ante regulation) exist only the EU acquis, which disappears with Brexit, potentially requiring ‘transposition’ into domestic law. While ministers have promised that rates for international mobile roaming would not rise in the event of Brexit, operators would almost certainly lose access to the regulated wholesale rates in the remaining member states. Indeed, there would be strong commercial incentives on both sides to raise wholesale rates for those roaming in the EU and in the European Union. While the operators might try to negotiate alternative deals, there are no precedents for success and precious few for governments in the European periphery.The repatriation of policy-making and legislative scrutiny from the EU institutions would require ‘beefing up’ of governmental and parliamentary capabilities. It would also require a much deeper engagement with business and consumer groups, not least to counter the special pleading of the operators, which have considerable expertise and experience in lobbying. Additionally, it would be important to boost the provision of independent views, both from academic researchers and think tanks. Without a rich debate on policies for telecommunications, the potential benefits of Brexit would be lost, with the greatest risk being in a mishandled transition.

Regulatory Analysis of International Mobile Roaming Services

On 23-24 September 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) hosted a high-level workshop on international mobile roaming, which was convened to discuss the regulatory and industry initiatives that have sought to improve competitive outcomes for international roamers.Through the presentations and discussions, it became clear that countries were adopting three main approaches: from the interventionist approach of the European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council, to the negotiating approach of the Portuguese-speaking community, and a “third way” adopted by New Zealand and Australia of harnessing the threat of regulation to provoke meaningful change amongst mobile operators. It is in this context that ITU commissioned the present report. It aims to provide governments, ministries and regulators with the information they need to make informed decisions about which approach to international roaming is the right one for them, and how to effect the approach chosen.

The Regulation of International Roaming in the European Union: Why the MTR has No Clothes

The European Union’s ‘Regulation on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community’, adopted in 2007 and amended twice since, does not set a wholesale price cap on the termination of voice calls received by European roamers. The European Union considers that such a price cap is unnecessary because, it is assumed, the termination of calls received by European roamers is covered by national regulation of the mobile termination market. This apparent assumption is incorrect. No national regulatory authority has yet demonstrated that the termination services provided by visited networks in the context of international mobile roaming should fall within the same market as the termination services provided by mobile operators in the context of standard, direct-dial voice calls. If any authority tried to do so, it could well fail, because of differences between the services which suggest that distinct product, geographic and customer dimensions apply to the relevant market definitions.

Structural Solutions and the Evolution of International Mobile Roaming (IMR) in Europe: Where are We Headed?

In response to long-standing European concerns over high prices for international mobile roaming (IMR) within the European Union (EU), the European institutions have imposed progressively more rigorous Roaming Regulations, the most recent of which took effect in July 2012. The support for structural solutions (to enable separate provision of roaming services by firms other than the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) in the Home country) in the Roaming Regulation of 2012 represented a first serious attempt to address root causes of high IMR prices, rather than solely by intrusively regulating wholesale and retail prices. The structural solutions will not come into force until July 2014. Meanwhile, there is considerable doubt about the degree to which market players will offer the services, whether consumers will adopt them, and even if they were to be fully effective, over the degree to which they would actually influence the price of international mobile roaming services. Meanwhile, the Commission’s “Connected Continent” proposal for a Single Market Regulation proposes to phase out structural solutions before they have even begun to come into effect. We assume that the business plans of firms that otherwise might have offered the services have already been impacted, perhaps fatally. Against this backdrop, traffic off-load using public or private Wi-Fi and small cells (e.g. femtocells) is growing in popularity by leaps and bounds. Traffic off-load could conceivably serve as a partial substitute for international mobile roaming, inasmuch as it is primarily suitable for nomadic use (from a changing fixed location) rather than truly mobile service. Despite this and other limitations in its applicability to IMR, it is a promising development in an area where European policy now appears to be in a state of serious confusion.

Regulatory fallacies in global telecommunications: the case of international mobile roaming

International mobile roaming cartel agreements prompted the EU to intervene, firstly encompassing competition law measures by a cartel exemption, then initiating several competition proceedings based on the accusation of abuse of a dominant market position, and finally applying price regulations of increasing scope. The paper exposes the temporary market power regulations, including the designated local break out measures, as insufficient and misleading. The solution is to solve the cartel problem at its root, permitting visiting customers the freedom of choosing between their home operator and alternative carriers from the visited country by the implemention of carrier portability.

Discrimination in International Mobile Roaming Regulation: Implications of WTO Law

High international mobile roaming charges have created concerns for consumers and regulators around the world, leading to discussion and activity in a range of international organizations as well as national and regional bodies, including in the course of ongoing negotiations. Policy-makers seem inclined to intervene in the market to reduce these charges, but the complexities of international telecommunications and the way in which roaming services are supplied present a barrier to a practicable regulatory solution at the local level. Proposals for bilateral agreements have therefore emerged in some jurisdictions, often involving capping wholesale roaming charges imposed by domestic telecommunications operators on foreign telecommunications operators from particular countries on a reciprocal basis. Before concluding any such agreement, governments must ensure that they fully consider their international trade obligations, including the most-favoured nation obligation in Article II of the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services. A potential violation of this obligation could be avoided if the roaming arrangement is carefully structured to ensure that it falls within the exception for economic integration in Article V of that agreement. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.

Regulatory Fallacies in European Telcommunications: The Case of International Mobile Roaming

Regulatory Fallacies in European Telcommunications: The Case of International Mobile Roaming

Discrimination in International Mobile Roaming Regulation: Implications of WTO Law

In August 2012, the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development and the Australian Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy released a Draft Report on Trans-Tasman Roaming. Using these recent developments in the Trans-Tasman market as a case study, this article examines the implications of WTO law for countries seeking to agree on regulatory strategies to address international mobile roaming. In particular, this article explores from the perspective of Australia the WTO-consistency of a potential agreement between Australia and New Zealand to impose legislative price caps at the wholesale level, and corresponding domestic measures to implement such an agreement.

A Review of International Mobile Roaming to December 2011

The European Commission reported on the implementation of the current Roaming II Regulation and proposed the Roaming III Regulation to run until 2022. This combined wholesale and retail price caps for voice, SMS and data (the retail data price cap being new). It also proposed the introduction of so-called structural measures intended to introduce sufficient competition to allow the withdrawal of price caps. Further reviews of the regulation are planned. A wide range of issues have been raised by the legislators, which will require to be resolved if the legislation is to be agreed and in place for the end of June 2012.Elsewhere, a number of commercial offers have been made with significantly reduced prices. For example, a consortium of Asian operators offers unlimited data access for USD 12 per day. China Mobile has reduced roaming rates in Europe to RMB 2 per minute. Russian operators have struck deals with operators in the Baltic states to offer mutual reductions, while the Polish and Russians governments helped operators to coordinate price reductions. The Gulf Cooperation Council has directed the reduction of rates between the six countries. The Australian and New Zealand governments have an inquiry underway, examining the reasons for the high prices of roaming between the two countries. The USA has acted to ensure national roaming for data services.

Roaming III: Regulating International Mobile Roaming Charges to 2022

The European Commission has proposed its third Roaming Regulation to cap the prices charged for international mobile roaming, to ensure transparency of prices and to eliminate the risk of bill shock. The present proposal would come into force in 2012 and extends until 2022. It adds a price cap for data roaming and reduces the existing caps on voice and SMS. It proposes structural changes to allow MVNOs to buy wholesale IMR charges independently and to separate the purchase of IMR from domestic services on the domestic market. The proposal now goes to the European Parliament and Council for debate.

Regulatory intervention or disruptive competition? Lessons from East Africa on the end of international mobile roaming charges

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the conditions that enabled the end of roaming charges in East Africa in 2006, achieving in weeks what European regulators had struggled with for nearly a decade. To do so it aims to explore the factors that drove marginalized operator Zain to seize the competitive advantage created by it having licenses in three adjoining markets.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws on the theory of disruptive competition and innovation pioneered by Clayton Christensen to explain the innovative and disruptive nature of the Zain business model. It is drawn on to explain why, despite Zain being unable ultimately to dominate its competitors, it had a sustained disruptive effect on the entire market. This provides a theoretical lens through which to view the empirical evidence acquired through in‐depth interviews and market analysis. This is used to develop a detailed case study on the dropping of roaming charges in East Africa.FindingsThe case study demonstrates the importance of an enabling policy and regulatory environment, which allowed operators to integrate historically separate national networks into cross‐border operations, undermining roaming markets in the region and ending roaming charges in East Africa forever. With the high price of communications in East Africa and the premium charges placed on international mobile roaming, the effect of this move was to compel other regional operators to follow suit, and further, to institute various other pricing strategies in an attempt to retain or recover their dominant positions. As a result, not only did roaming charges disappear across major networks, but the prices of various other mobile services also fell as subscriber numbers soared.Research limitations/implicationsResearch in this area is severely constrained by the inability to access pricing, traffic and revenue data from operators that is regarded as competitively sensitive. As a result it is often difficult to assess the immediate gains and losses of competitors and failure to get consistent data over time, the ability to assess lags and long‐term positions. A longer term review of the impact of these developments on pricing and the dynamics of the East African market in future would provide valuable insight into the longer term effects of these developments.Practical implicationsAs policy makers and regulators elsewhere in Africa start to emulate European “best practice” regulation, despite the difficulties mature and resourced regulators in the European Union face in instituting legally binding maximum tariffs for roaming, a valuable alternative policy and regulatory strategy exists in the creation of enabling competitive environments in which incentives to reduce to eliminate roaming charge, rather than retain environments in which international call termination on roaming phones can be arbitraged.Social implicationsEven though ultimately Zain was not successful as a disruptive competitor, it forced the dominant operators to reduce their roaming charges that resulted in sustained welfare gains.Originality/valueThis paper provides both novel theoretical insight and empirical evidence to explain the end of roaming charges in East Africa. It nuances perceptions in the popular and technical press that this was purely a market strategy that could be emulated anywhere else. It highlights the necessary enabling policy and regulatory environment that needed to be created and provides empirical evidence of the impact on competition in the market and analyses the outcomes of Zain's short term business strategy, against the longer term disruptive effect on the market.

International Mobile Roaming – An Update

Governments in a number of countries are concerned about the high surcharges for international mobile roaming and instances of “bill shock”. Russia has used competition law to force down excessive prices. Singapore has introduced consumer protection against bill shock. The USA has consulted extensively on measures to address bill shock. The governments of Australia and New Zealand have held bilateral discussions. The European Commission is preparing its final report on the Roaming Regulation, due in June 2011. It has held a consultation in which the consensus was in favour of a further regulation from 2012 to 2015, continuing price caps, with a further review in 2014. There has not been the anticipated increase in usage, with customers not having changed their behaviour. While operators want to end the regulation, the alternatives seem to be ineffective or counter-productive. The precise levels are uncertain as is the possibility of a retail cap for data roaming. A number of niche services are available to bypass conventional roaming but have had no effect on the behaviour of conventional mobile operators. At a wholesale level there has been a growth in the use of hubs, which allow operators access to large numbers of foreign networks for outbound roaming at undiscounted prices, but with options to negotiate prices and inbound roaming. As yet, these do not seem to have increased competition or reduced prices. Discussions continue in international and inter-governmental bodies including: APEC, Arab League, ASEAN, CITEL, GCC, ITU and OECD. Yet, there remain significant challenges in finding a workable legal basis outside that of the European Union treaties, not least in complying with existing commitments to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Revised from the version of March 2011.

International mobile roaming in the Arab states

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to review how the Arab states individually and especially collectively have tackled the question of persistently high charges for international mobile roaming.Design/methodology/approachThe approach takes the form of a review of the decisions and decision‐making processes of the League of Arab States, of the Gulf Cooperation Council and of certain of its member states in the matter of international mobile roaming charges.FindingsThe weaknesses of partial liberalisation and of flawed systems of governance of telecommunications markets at the national level are compounded at trans‐national level by divergence of interest. Lack of experience in dealing with consumer issues and competitive analysis have limited the ability of institutions to respond.Research limitations/implicationsData on roaming markets are very limited, making analysis difficult. Transparency of decision making by international institutions is often weak or selective.Practical implicationsThe decision to try to use price caps neglected the opportunity to try to complement the actions of Zain in abolishing roaming surcharges.Social implicationsThe regulators and ministers have pursued their own interests with little regard for consumers. They have failed to quantify the likely benefits of their proposed price caps on roaming charges.Originality/valueThis paper complements others on different regions. It sheds some light on telecommunications in the Arab world, a subject which is infrequently addressed in the academic literature.

International Mobile Roaming: Progress and Challenges in African Markets

The persistence of high prices for international mobile roaming services, in contrast to falling national mobile prices, has been a recognised item on the global regulatory agenda for half a decade. In Africa, there have been studies and discussions about regulatory options in regional economic groups and in the various networks of national regulators. As yet, there has been no transnational regulatory action. Yet the initiative of one large operator saw the introduction of transnational tariff schemes (ie without a surcharge for roaming), forcing competitors to collaborate in order to respond, if they wished to attract and to retain customers. This has both saved money for consumers and greatly reduced the need for regulatory interventions that might have proved counterproductive. In some countries this type of offer remains impossible, because international gateways are a monopoly, having yet to be opened to competition.