International Law Of War Research Articles

Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War (review)

Reviewed by: Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War Mark Tushnet (bio) Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War. By Stephen C. Neff. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 350. Cloth, $45.00.) Stephen Neff teaches international law, and that shows from the first page of Justice in Blue and Gray, where it is already clear that international law is the book's focus. This focus can most obviously be contrasted with that of the most distinguished predecessor to Neff's work, James G. Randall's Constitutional Problems under Lincoln, originally published in 1926 and then revised in 1951. Randall does not ignore international law—he could not without distorting his legal analysis—but it is secondary to [End Page 279] Randall, domestic constitutional law primary. Neff's reversal of priorities is signaled by the fact that whereas Randall cites founders of public international law Emmerich de Vattel three times and Francis Lieber not at all, Neffcites Vattel on eight pages and throughout his book cites Lieber and the Lieber Code, a "legal masterpiece" which codified the laws of war in early 1861 (57). Legal issues associated with the Civil War have received attention more recently in Daniel Farber's Lincoln's Constitution (2003) and Mark Neely's The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1991), both fine books that are narrower in scope than Neff's. As Neff and Farber make clear, these issues receive attention today in part because they remind us of issues raised by the conduct of U.S. military operations in ongoing traditional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the apparently novel—but perhaps not so special legally—operations against terrorists on U.S. soil and elsewhere. Yet, while recurrently mentioning the laws of war today, Neff is far less present-minded than Farber. Neff addresses the early 1860s, expanding the view to a short period after 1865 because the international law of war was mostly customary international law, not treaty-based. Customary international law rests in large part on state practice and can be changed by new state practice that departs from—and might be thought inconsistent with—widespread practices by other states at the same time. One cannot know immediately whether an apparent departure from general state practice is a violation of customary international law or an indication of a nascent change in that law until the international legal system reacts to it. Neff begins appropriately by distinguishing between a nation's sovereign powers, regulated by its domestic constitution, and its powers under international law as a belligerent, regulated by the international law of war, conventionally divided into jus ad bellum (the law dealing with the initiation of hostilities) and jus in bello (the law dealing with actions such as blockades and the treatment of enemy soldiers and civilians seized during military action). Jus ad bellum plays a relatively minor part in Neff's account, primarily through that doctrine's recognition that defiance of domestic law within a nation's borders can become so widespread and organized as to amount to a civil war, thereby authorizing a nation to take actions consistent with the international law of war on its own territory. Neff shows that the principle that sovereign nations could act as belligerent powers within their own borders was embedded in the international law of war in 1861. [End Page 280] The primary questions raised by the distinction between the powers of a sovereign and a belligerent are whether, how, and to what extent the U.S. Constitution regulates actions that are consistent with international law, that is, actions taken in a belligerent rather than a sovereign capacity. Some answers are reasonably clear. The "commander in chief" clause, for example, probably resolves most questions of separation of powers once hostilities have commenced by conferring on the president the power to take belligerent acts in the absence of express congressional prohibition. More troublesome than the allocation of powers within the national government are substantive limitations on government powers. Here are many distinctions to be drawn: between actions taken on U.S. soil and those taken outside the United States...

Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan's 1905 Victory over Russia

The Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), recently commemorated with several international conference volumes, is identified by a majority of contributors as the first modern, global war. In making such a judgment, these scholars note its scale, its nationalism, its colonialism and geopolitical repercussions. What is surprising, however, is that no one has remarked on another significance: it was the first war in which both belligerents pledged to adhere to the international laws of war. In that regard, the Russo–Japanese War marks a culmination of the tireless international diplomacy to secure legal limitations on warfare in the nineteenth century. In 1904, both Russia and Japan justified their operations according to international law, for the benefit of an international audience who had five years earlier celebrated some progress with the signing of The Hague Conventions in 1899.

Jus Ad Bellum: Comparing the 1979 Soviet-Afghan and 2003 US-Iraq Wars

Although separated by almost 25 years, the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq both contravened International Law of War and Armed Conflict (ILWAC) rules and principles. Both wars were illegitimate according to the customary international law principles and UN Charter provisions of Security Council authorization, self defence and humanitarian intervention. Both wars signify ILWAC's relative meakness in comparison to the economic and political aspirations of the world's most powerful nations, who are able to ignore ILWAC provisions for their desired goals.

Japanese Neutrality in the Nineteenth Century: International Law and Transcultural Process

An international and transcultural process, the history of Japanese neutrality in the nineteenth century is marked by changing ideas of the international laws of war and the rights of neutrals among the western powers. The essay explores three points at which Japan's international history intersected with these developments in the meaning and practice of neutrality: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Sino-French conflict of 1884, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. Japan's working out a position of neutrality turns out to be one of many international and shifting attempts to construct neutrality in the nineteenth century.

The Evolution of International Laws of War

After centuries of little to no change in the norms of war, European nations began systematically signing treaties and agreements during the second half of the 19th century that placed limits on violent behaviour in war.1 The roots of these laws are in the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law,2 and the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (also known as the Geneva Convention) that compiled the existing laws of war3 and was predecessor to the systematic body of rules known as the Law of Geneva which 12 European states signed in 1864. The document also laid the framework for the Laws of The Hague, the rules concerning the conduct of hostilities agreed upon at the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1906–1907. Post WWII, laws of war advanced in 1949, when 63 countries signed the Fourth Geneva Convention, and in 1977 with the signing of the Supplementary Agreements to the Fourth Geneva Convention, and of the four supplementary agreements to the Laws of The Hague: The Biological Weapons Convention, The Environmental Modification Convention, The Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. These agreements completed the modern structure of the present Geneva Laws.

Who is a Terrorist - Drawing the Line between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies

This paper confronts and answers the difficult definitional questions raised by the threat of Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. Are terrorists analogous to other kinds of organized, dangerous criminals who should be prosecuted and punished using the federal criminal law? Or are they equivalent to enemy soldiers engaged in warfare against the United States? There are problems with either analogy because the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations has substantial differences from both paradigmatic criminal activity and paradigmatic military conflict. Thus, it is far from clear whether alleged terrorists should be treated as criminal defendants or military enemies. The paper first approaches these questions through a direct comparison between the alternative models of U.S. federal criminal law and the international laws of war. The criminal model presents one framework for defining the threat of terrorism, primarily focused on the prosecution and punishment of individual alleged terrorists for their activities. The military model offers another framework, emphasizing the dangers posed by an organized armed force engaged in planning and carrying out acts of war. Examining each model on its own terms reveals that, in their current forms, neither model is adequate for fully addressing the nature of the threat. The paper then argues that the solution is to combine the criminal and military models into a new, integrated model for defining the threat of Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. The integrated model uses the insights of each model to compensate for their respective shortcomings. In doing so, it accounts for the particular dangers which exist because Al Qaeda is a form of organized armed force, and the substantial implications that holds for the nature of the terrorist threat. At the same time, it balances the importance of personal conduct and group affiliation by reserving the most substantial consequences for activities dependent on direct, personal involvement. The integrated model concludes that most individuals involved in terrorism should be treated as criminal defendants, and only the most dangerous direct participants should be deemed military enemies. Through this integrated analysis, the new model resolves the problems with the existing criminal and military models and fully addresses the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations.

The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and Congressional Authorization

In Ex parte Milligan, decided a year after the end of the Civil War, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. military had lacked the constitutional authority during the war to try U.S. citizens living in Indiana before a military commission. Milligan is often cited as a rare and admirable instance in which the Supreme Court invalidated Executive action during wartime in order to protect civil liberties, and it is frequently invoked in challenges to government action in the current war on terrorism. The precedential effect of Milligan, however, is far from clear. Part of the uncertainty stems from the decision's apparent inconsistency with widespread military practices during and immediately after the Civil War, including most notably the use of military commissions to try thousands of individuals not formally associated with the Confederate army. Probably because of the particular way in which the government argued the Milligan case - focusing on the bounds of martial law rather than on military jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war - the Court in Milligan did not discuss this widespread military commission practice, and it is unclear to what extent the Court meant to repudiate it. The Supreme Court's subsequent treatments of Milligan only add to the uncertainty about its scope. The Court has construed Milligan as applying only to the military detention and trial of non-belligerents, but neither Milligan nor the subsequent decisions provide a clear line for distinguishing between belligerents and non-belligerents. One possible approach would be to limit military jurisdiction to individuals covered by the international laws of war, but one problem with this approach is that the petitioners in Milligan were in fact charged with and convicted of violating the laws of war. The difficult issues of military jurisdiction that were present during the Civil War turn out to be with us still today.

Who Is A 'Terrorist'? Drawing the Line Between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies

This paper confronts and answers the difficult definitional questions raised by the threat of Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. Are terrorists analogous to other kinds of organized, dangerous criminals who should be prosecuted and punished using the federal criminal law? Or are they equivalent to enemy soldiers engaged in warfare against the United States? There are problems with either analogy because the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations has substantial differences from both paradigmatic criminal activity and paradigmatic military conflict. Thus, it is far from clear whether alleged terrorists should be treated as criminal defendants or military enemies. The paper first approaches these questions through a direct comparison between the alternative models of U.S. federal criminal law and the international laws of war. The criminal model presents one framework for defining the threat of terrorism, primarily focused on the prosecution and punishment of individual alleged terrorists for their activities. The military model offers another framework, emphasizing the dangers posed by an organized armed force engaged in planning and carrying out acts of war. Examining each model on its own terms reveals that, in their current forms, neither model is adequate for fully addressing the nature of the threat. The paper then argues that the solution is to combine the criminal and military models into a new, integrated model for defining the threat of Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. The integrated model uses the insights of each model to compensate for their respective shortcomings. In doing so, it accounts for the particular dangers which exist because Al Qaeda is a form of organized armed force, and the substantial implications that holds for the nature of the terrorist threat. At the same time, it balances the importance of personal conduct and group affiliation by reserving the most substantial consequences for activities dependent on direct, personal involvement. The integrated model concludes that most individuals involved in terrorism should be treated as criminal defendants, and only the most dangerous direct participants should be deemed military enemies. Through this integrated analysis, the new model resolves the problems with the existing criminal and military models and fully addresses the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations.

Humane wars? International law, Just War theory and contemporary armed humanitarian intervention

The contemporary international law of war is torn between the pressure to incorporate a doctrine to legitimize limited armed humanitarian intervention and its traditional concerns for nations' sovereignty. Especially because of its organic, interconnected nature, the theoretical tradition of just war theory, when concretized through explicit linkage to specific standards of contemporary human rights law, offers an approach to resolving this dilemma that does not unduly privilege war-making. This approach is both consistent with international law and useful as an example of the relevance of drawing on humanistic reasoning about justice in international jurisprudence. The argument is illustrated by reference to the cases of the failure of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in 1994, the armed intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the US-led wars in Iraq in 1991 and 2003.

Covenants Without the Sword International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War

Do the international laws of war effectively protect civilian populations from deliberate attack? In a statistical analysis of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003 the authors find no evidence that signatories of The Hague or Geneva Conventions intentionally kill fewer civilians during war than do nonsignatories. This result holds for democratic signatories and for wars in which both sides are parties to the treaty. Nor do they find evidence that a state's regime type or the existence of ethnic or religious differences between combatants explains the variation in civilian targeting. They find strong support, however, for their theoretical framework, which suggests that combatants seek to kill enemy civilians when they believe that doing so will coerce their adversaries into early surrender or undermine their adversaries' war-related domestic production. The authors find that states fighting wars of attrition or counterinsurgency, states fighting for expansive war aims, and states fighting wars of long duration kill significantly more civilians than states in other kinds of wars.

Genocide, Justice and the Forensic Sensibilities of the International Committee of the Red Cross

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a private organization formed, in 1865, under the laws of Switzerland, with the aim of making wars more humane. In order to achieve this aim, the ICRC dedicated itself to the mission of giving succour to the victims of war, and of initiating the adoption of humanitarian rules of conduct of armed conflicts. In the ensuing years, the inter- national community endorsed the work of the ICRC and recognized its roles accord- ingly. In the meantime, there was no international criminal justice system in place to punish those who violated the international law of war. More than a century and a quarter after the birth of the ICRC, the United Nations initiated the creation of an international criminal justice system, with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, under the powers of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The objective was to end impunity for those who would violate international law by committing geno- cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In a quite notable development, the ICRC registered in absolute terms its position to the effect that neither it nor those who worked under its auspices may be subjected to testimony before these International Tribunals. The bases offered for this assertion of absolute testimonial immunity are the practical requirements of the work of the ICRC, as well as custom- ary international law which is said to have recognized such a rule. This paper disputes the ICRC's assertion of absolute testimonial immunity as correctly founded in law or principle, although recognizing that the important work of the ICRC does fairly warrant a judicial reluctance to summon ICRC into the witness box. Nevertheless, such reluctance must be invoked on a case-by-case basis, and is not a matter of sub- stantive rule of law.

The Failure of the International Laws of War and the Role of Art and Story-Telling as a Self-Help Remedy for Restorative Justice

This Article asks several questions that seem particularly relevant in view of the current state of war that our peace-loving society is engaged in today. What is the role of the laws and customs of war if the warriors don't play by the rules? What is the role of art and music during and after the commission of atrocities? Can art prevent further atrocities, assuage victims of catastrophic events, inspire the collective conscience of perpetrators, and protect victims from the reality of pain caused by war and the violations of the international laws of armed combat? Can a book or a film that substantially recreates and authentically memorializes large scale violations of the law act in the interests of justice? Can art provide a form of self-help equitable remedy like a declaratory judgment that offers non-monetary compensation and restorative justice to the victim as well as moral education to society in an aim toward preventing further atrocities? This challenging issue is of critical importance today as the twenty-first century finds itself once again caught up in wars, genocides, and inhumanity. This Article discusses the following four issues: (1) the legitimacy of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the laws and customs of war; (2) the failure of international humanitarian laws to deter the large scale perpetration of inhumane acts committed during World War II, as represented in the film and book, The Pianist; and (3) the role of retributive justice after World War II and the Nuremberg Trials, as compared to (4) the role of restorative justice that stories told in artistic representations of massive violations of the laws of war can provide. This Article argues that story-telling through art is a form of self-help remedy available to the victims of atrocities. Art that produces a historic and authentic record provides society at large with a form of moral education. Art, then, has the capacity to be a long-term preventive measure against the commission of genocide, war crimes, and human rights violations in the future.

Cultural Property Internationalism

Cultural property internationalism is shorthand for the proposition that everyone has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property, wherever it is situated, from whatever cultural or geographic source it derives. This article describes its historical development and its expression in the international law of war, in the work of UNESCO, and in the international trade in cultural objects and assesses the ways in which cultural-property world actors support or resist the implications of cultural property internationalism.

Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?

The growing impact of terrorist acts in the past few years has lead to dramatic changes in the internal laws of the growing number of States that suffer from terrorism, but has also lead to various attempts to adapt international law - more specifically, the International Laws of War - to the new situation or threat, as many perceive it. The Laws of War, like most areas of Public International Law, deal with the relations between nations, while hardly dealing with non-governmental entities like terrorist organisations or the individual terrorist, thereby creating an apparent legal “loophole”. One of the solutions found by States in order to deal, legally, with terrorists, was by defining them “unlawful combatants”.This essay tries to examine the development of the term “unlawful combatant”, by examining some complications that might occur from the use of the term “unlawful combatant” as an intermediate, new status in international law. By using it as a new status. States try to exclude terrorists from finding protection under the Geneva Conventions, which are intended to safeguard various individuals during armed conflicts. After examining the term “unlawful combatant”, both from an historical and legal aspect, this essay will attempt to show that the existing Laws of War, which acknowledge only two statuses – the ‘civilian’ and the ‘combatant’ – provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of terrorism in its non-governmental sense. After exploring recent policies and legal developments in Israel and the Unites States, countries that use the term “unlawful combatant”, this essay will criticise the ambiguity of these definitions, and point out future problems that might arise from this ambiguity during armed conflicts.

About Schmitt: Partisans and Theory

About Schmitt:Partisans and Theory A. C. Goodson (bio) Carl Schmitt's intervention on the partisan came late in a career whose high public profile had made him illustrious, then notorious. In the wake of the Nazi cataclysm he was a historically disappointed man, and through the partisan he visited a pox on both houses of the polarized Cold War world. The origin of his essay in a Spanish academic commission of the Franco period confirms his historical isolation. Yet his disillusion with the choices Europeans were faced with was widespread. "We must endure, and stand between two fools," William Empson complained of this historical double-bind1 (2001, 102). That Schmitt's essay should be revived in post-Cold War rethinking of political modernity is indicative of disillusion with the troubles of the New World Order proclaimed on behalf of the victors. His partisans have been taken up by a distinguished readership that includes leading political theorists and postmodernists. This translation, the first of Schmitt's partisan theory into English, provides domestic readers a view through his wide-angle lens, which captures the romantic origins of the partisan as well as the "cosmo-pirates and cosmo-partisans" (Schmitt 1963, 83) he sees in our future. These stick figures came uncannily [End Page 1] alive on 11 September 2001, making a prophet of their author and recalling his essay from its Cold War limbo. Politische Theologie (Political Theology) was the title of Schmitt's influential broadside of 1922 on the cultural condition of modernity. He was Catholic by birth (1888 in the Prussian Rhineland), a subject of the Holy Roman Empire by elective affinity. His enthusiasm for the monument to Otto the Great (912-973), expressed in a letter of 1934 to Ernst Jünger (Jünger and Schmitt 1999, 24) speaks volumes about his responsiveness to a theocratic political past. Celebration of this past was standard fare in the imperial dreaming of the period.2 Schmitt's titular role as Staatsrat (state counsel) to the Third Reich confirmed his sense of mission in reviving a truly ancien régime. It also meant that he was held after the war for possible prosecution at the Nürnberg Tribunal on war crimes. He was released after extensive questioning—by a German-Jewish interrogator whose vindictive attitude he bitterly resented—showed him to be free of direct responsibility for the Holocaust. His own political theology is evident in his forthright identification of the enemy in a categorical binary of friend and foe that underwrites his mythification of the partisan. Writing in 1946, in the rearview mirror of his collusion with Goering and his Führer, Schmitt reverted to his identity as a professional jurist: "I am at home as a teacher and researcher in two juridical fields, international law and constitutional law. Both disciplines are branches of public jurisprudence. Work in these areas is publicity [publizistisch] in the strongest sense of the word. It deals with questions of broad import in domestic as well as international politics. It is immediately exposed to the dangers of the political, in consequence. The jurist in such fields cannot evade such danger even by disappearing into the Nirvana of a pure positivism" (1950, 55, my translation). The defensive tone is unmistakable, and so is the defiance. The partisan essay reflects the point of view of a legalistic mind under historical pressure. Visceral dislike of parliamentary democracy and its principal international sponsor is reinforced by doubts about the legality of the Nürnberg trials. Fear of the Soviet colossus lurking menacingly across the Elbe in German territory inspires rumination on the key role played by Russian partisans in defeating the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. His [End Page 2] instinctive sympathy with the partisan's defense of home and hearth runs head-on here into his own national pride. Beneath the veneer of the professional jurist lurks a political player manqué. Schmitt's escape from legal positivism amounts to a plea for an international law of war that contains conflict within effectively defined limits without criminalizing it, as the Nürnberg Tribunal had done. Nothing is more characteristic of the role of jurist as publicist than his...

Mediums and Messages: An Argument Against Biotechnical Enhancements of Soldiers in the Armies of Liberal Democracies

Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force (in short, that just wars are morally possible), one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself (assuming throughout the discussion that the state is a just combatant in a just war) can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle? For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve.

Međunarodno pravno regulisanje krivično pravne zaštite ratnih zarobljenika u XIX veku

The author writes about International conventions and other legal acts in the field of Law of War in the 19th century, with special emphasis on the criminal law protection of prisoners of war. She underlines that although the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual of the Laws and Customs of War were not international conventions, they still represented very important international instruments, which had a great impact on the International Law of War in the 20th century. A number of principles established in those acts were later adopted in the Hague and the Geneva Conventions.

It's War Jim, But Not as We Know it: A 'Reality Check' for International Laws of War?

International Humanitarian Laws of Armed Conflict effectively prohibit the use of terror-violence as a means or method of warfare in all circumstances of armed conflict. However, as new ``terrorist'' enemies do not appear to share this humanitarian consensus, it becomes crucial to contextualise accurately any characterisation of the recent ``war'' on ``global terror'' as a ``war'' to which International Humanitarian Law can attach. What needs to be remembered, first, is that technological innovation can destabilise accepted frameworks for waging war. Thus, any laws intended to curtail the use of particular means and methods of warfare will reflect the contemporaneous environment within which such laws were formulated. Secondly, modern laws of war evolved from nineteenth century reciprocal pacts designed to ensure minimal levels of restraint between ``civilised'' peoples. While any strict contractual approach to mutuality-in-restraint has been superceded in the post-1945 era by more universalised obligations, the interests reflected in this original mutuality of interest warrant examination when distinguishing today between ``justifiable'' and ``unjustifiable'', or ``licit'' and ``illicit'', uses of violence.

Applying International Laws of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past Attempts, Future Strategies

Applying International Laws of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past Attempts, Future Strategies

The Panama invasion and the laws of war

This article considers the conduct of armed parties in the invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989 by United States forces, in relation to the standards established by the international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The article confines itself to the conduct of US and Panamanian armed forces from the commencement of hostilities, and does not consider arguments for or against the invasion itself. The authors, on behalf of the US‐based Americas Watch, a human rights monitoring organization, visited Panama in January 1990, and collected information contained in the article. The article concludes that US forces failed in their Geneva Convention obligations with respect to the detentions of Panamanian POWs and civilians. It also concludes that US forces failed to exercise precautions to minimize collateral civilian casualties in the attack on the Panamanian military headquarters. It finds that Panamanian forces put non‐combatant civilians at risk by dressing in civilian clothes and firing from...