The opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, dealing with the cornpetence of the Dominion Parliament to implement international labour conventions, has received widespread comment not only in Canada and in England but particularly in Australia and even in the United States. The Commonwealth of Australia, like Canada, suffers certain disabilities peculiar to federations, because there, too, the power to legislate on conditions of labour rests in general with the Legislatures of the several states and not with the central Parliament. It is interesting, therefore, to compare Canadian and Australian procedures with respect to international labour conventions.The Commonwealth constitution contains no exact parallel either to section 132 of the British North America Act, giving to the Dominion express power to perform obligations of Canada arising under treaties made between the British Empire and foreign countries, or to the residuary powers of the Dominion under section 91. The Commonwealth Parliament is endowed with the power of legislation only upon certain enumerated subject-matters, the residuary powers remaining with the states. Somewhat comparable to section 132, however, is the provision in section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act that the Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have power “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … (xxix) External Affairs”. In regard to the meaning of this provision a Commonwealth communication of February 26, 1909, was addressed to the secretary of state for the colonies, informing him that the law advisers of the government had expressed the view that the Commonwealth Parliament possessed the power under section 51 (xxix) “to make such legislative provision as is necessary to secure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, and that accordingly the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are substantially identical with those of Canada”. This interpretation had been reaffirmed by Justice Evatt in 1933.