The absence of domestic competition laws in some nations, the weak enforcement of existing competition laws in other nations, and the inability of competition lawenforcement authorities to exchange confidential information, collectively permit the continued existence of private restraints which have the potential to seriously undermine the trade liberalization gains that have been achieved through successive rounds of GATT negotiations. This paper advocates a two-track approach to addressing this problem, by (i) pursuing practical results through increased bilateral cooperation and the promotion of minimum standards in the short to mid-term, while, at the same time, (ii) continuing to pursue a second track of attempting, over the mid to long-term, to achieve a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, and perhaps even a multilateral code for private restraints which have an international dimension. In the authors' view, pursuit of the more modest initiatives contemplated by the first track should have a boot-strapping effect on the second track, in terms of substantially moving forward the time at which an international dispute settlement mechanism and an international competition law code for cross-border restraints may become politically possible, and ultimately, a reality. The paper further suggests that a multilateral framework for addressing anti-competitive restraints is preferable to (i) the piece-meal approach that is likely to develop in the absence of such a framework, and (ii) the use of negative-sum unilateral tools such as trade sanctions or the extra-territorial exercise of domestic competition laws.