International Administration Of Kosovo Research Articles

The Role of NATO in the Processes of Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Formation of Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Security Forces

After the NATO operation Allied Force, the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian forces in Kosovo, and the humanitarian catastrophe provoked by operations of Serbian military and paramilitary forces was ended. On the grounds of the United Nations Security Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244), NATO announced a cessation of bombing and deployment of KFOR forces under operation Joint Guardian. NATO has attained new duties connected to post-conflict reconstruction of the society. In order to implement the mission of international military and civilian presence in Kosovo it was necessary to create, in a short time, a satisfactory level of security for functioning of international military and civilian administration in Kosovo. Basic precondition was demilitarisation of Kosovo. That referred to both, Serbian forces, and forces of Kosovo Albanians - Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).Retreat of the Serbian forces from Kosovo was made under the terms of the Military Technical Agreement signed in Kumanovo, Republic of Macedonia. The retreat of the Serbian forces under the terms of that agreement was ended on the 20 of June 1999.According to the provision of article 9 point b. UNSCR 1244 there had to be made a demilitarisation of the KLA and of other armed groups of Kosovo Albanians.That was a rather complicated task for NATO because, in the institutional vacuum after the retreat of Serbian forces and authority structures, when international forces were not in the position to overtake, especially, civilian elements of authority, KLA had established temporary civilian and military authority in the major parts of Kosovo.NATO did not want to cause negative reactions of the local Albanian population by in its first activities in Kosovo. Because of that NATO, on grounds of the articles of the Rambouillet Accord and UNHCR 1244 sought an agreement with the KLA for demobilisation and demilitarisation. The agreement was accepted and signed by the KLA and under the control of military components of the international administration in Kosovo – Kosovo Forces (KFOR) the demobilisation was completed.After the demobilisation of the KLA, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was formed. KPC was structured as civil emergency organisation which acted until the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which came into power on the 15 June 2008. By the Constitution it is regulated the dissolution of the KPC and creation of a new security formation in Kosovo – Kosovo Security Forces (KSF). The authority upon work and control of activities of the KPC during that time was made by Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN (SRSG) and KFOR.The founding and training of the KSF will be leaded by NATO, whose disposal to take that engagement was confirmed by the NATO spokesperson just before coming into power of the Kosovo constitution.Political importance of the formation of the KSF in the affirmation of Kosovo independence emerges from the decree of the US President George W. Bush, by which from the 19.03.2008 was given the authorisation for the delivery of weapons to Kosovo, by which it was stated that Kosovo fulfills the conditions for obtaining of the modern equipment and utilities from the USA. That decision which in its basis signifies military cooperation has announced an overturn in the character of the development of Kosovo security forces.Engagement of NATO in relation to Kosovo have had three distinct phases characteristic for so called asymmetrical wars, all of which must be surmounted before success can occur. The first phase is the actual fighting aimed to bring fighting to an end on some terms (peace imposition). Second phase after the fighting has ended is one of adjustment and unstable peace, when the problem is maintaining the peace and beginning to improve conditions (peace enforcement). Third phase is peacekeeping during which the situation must be improved physically and politically – state building. The first phase ended after the NATO operation Allied Force.

The Role of the International Administration in the Process of the State-Building in Kosovo

The purpose of this research paper is to study the international administration in the process of the state-building in Kosovo. The paper will analyze the establishing, running and terminating the international administration in Kosovo. International administration has direct impact on state-building process. International governance in Kosovo is separated in two stages – before and after declaration of independence. This research paper will try to explain the relationship between international administration and local institutions in the process of state-building – the case of Kosovo. Two methods are used in this paper for data collection. First, process tracing theory method. Second, data collection method, through structured questionnaire with respondents from different fields. Conclusion of the paper is that, Kosovo case has shown that the success or failure of an international administration mission depends on the clarity of the establishment, development and its conclusion. DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n3s1p409

International Administration of Kosovo as a Driving Factor in Appearance of Trafficking in Human Beings

Opinions, stances of the Albanian community about self-determination and the political demands for an independent political and territorial status of Kosovo by various colonial regimes, are longstanding. The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was followed with wars among its constituent parts, and after the international military intervention, the peace was established in the region. By the Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the UNO, in its 4001 meeting, adopted in June 1999, Kosovo was set under the international civil administration, which was accompanied by the deployment of military defence structure of KFOR, reaching a number of 35 000 soldiers, and the UNMIK civilian structure comprising a staff of 15 000 officials. A lot of various international non-governmental and governmental organizations were also deployed to Kosovo, which tremendously increased the presence of persons with origin of other countries. Such a situation created some favourable conditions for the criminal groups in order to expand the phenomenon of trafficking in persons to such a place as Kosovo being until 1999, trafficking in persons appeared on a low capacity and dynamics, and mainly as a transitional country with the intent of sexual use, while domestic trafficking was still unknown. However, this criminal phenomenon has been constantly increasing and reaching a concerning level, especially after 1999, on the occasion of setting Kosovo under the international administration by the UNO, the territory of Kosovo was no longer considered only a transitional country but also as destination location for the victims of trafficking in persons. The introduction and prevalence of this criminal phenomenon is as a result of Kosovo getting opened to the world, the organization of national criminal groups in cooperation with international organized criminal network. Undoubtedly, the increased number of persons originating from other countries as personnel of the international organizations to Kosovo contributed in increasing the number of trafficking in persons, because it was established that many potential clients using victims sexually were foreign citizens. Moreover, the lack of legal infrastructure on the combat and prevention of trafficking in persons as defined by international legal acts. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2s5p315

The role of NATO in the demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army and in establishment of Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Security Force

Kosovo Liberation Army was demilitarized and demobilized pursuant to Rambouillet accord articles and 1244 Resolution, under the control of military component of the international administration in Kosovo – Kosovo Forces (NATO). Establishment of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) followed this process, with the civil emergency organizational mission, which operated until the adoption of constitution of Republic of Kosovo, promulgated on June 15, 2008. The constitution foresaw KPC disbandment and creation of a new security formation in Kosovo – Kosovo Security Forces (KSF). The decree of USA president, Xhorxh W. Bush, dated 19.03.2008 indicates the political importance of KSF creation in promotion of Kosovo’s independence.The Security Sector reform will keep its special focus in periodical review programming of KSF positional development in adaptation to new situation in security environment, reflecting concrete examples through new events, missions, tasks and roles for KSF units, always compliant with the concrete needs of the country and with the Euro-Atlantic collective protection structure standards.

Kosovo: The International Community's European Project

This article is about the post-war governance of Kosovo and the contradiction posed by the focus on multi-ethnicity on the one hand, and the development of a new Kosovar identity that transcends ethnicity on the other. Post-war Kosovo represents a bold experiment by the international community to create a society that adheres to European standards. The international administration has based its post-war reconstruction and governance of Kosovo on standards aimed at EU accession. To this end, since 1999 the international administration in Kosovo has pursued multi-ethnicity as a panacea. Far from creating the conditions conducive to greater inter-ethnic integration, the policies enacted supposedly in the name of multi-ethnicity have resulted in the further entrenchment of ethnic division. At the same time, the international administration has promoted a new Kosovo identity that transcends ethnicity and that fits with European standards. This article questions the international administration's approach in governing post-war Kosovo with the ultimate goal of EU accession. It argues that this approach has failed both in creating a more multi-ethnic society and in creating a new identity that is embraced by the people of Kosovo. This situation in turn raises questions as to whether there is a genuine will from the people of Kosovo to fulfil such standards, and therefore whether the goal of EU integration for Kosovo is a realistic one.

Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo by Iain King , Whit Mason (review)

reviews 757 extreme-right and brazen criminal gangs whom judges and prosecutors are terrifiedof challenging has coincided with entry into the EU. This suggests that the EU has been less concerned with political conditionality than with insisting that the economic rules forhouse membership are rigidlyadhered to. Itmight mean that the region remains stony ground for genuine political liberalism. Indeed, Pond was unable to discover any figures exercising power at national level with outstanding reformist credentials. Interestingly, itwas urban mayors, Klaus Johannis in Sibiu, Romania and Edi Rama inTirana who made themost favourable impression on her.What the 'Endgame in the Balkans' actually is remains unclear. Is it the growth of regional cooperation, signs of economic recovery, and the more sophisticated efforts of interna tional actors to promote durable reforms and uproot some of the causes of conflict?There isno mention of thepossibility thatRussia will tryto resurrect its influence by buying up valuable real-estate and energy holdings in Slavic stateswith which itonce enjoyed close links. Nor is theremuch of a discussion about the ability of the region to rise from peripheral economic status thanks to the rapid privatizations insistedupon by theEU. The future of theBalkans is still uncertain but the degree and slowly improving quality ofWestern engagement after 2000 suggests that itwill be less easy for local predatory forces to run amok as happened at the end of theCold War. Elizabeth Pond is tobe congratulated forproviding a vivid and detailed portrait of the region's politics and role in international relations which is sure to be widely used by international officials needing an accessible compendium to make some sense of theBalkans. Department of Peace Studies TomGallagher Universityof Bradford King, Iain and Mason, Whit. Peace atAny Price:How the World Failed Kosovo. Crises in World Politics. Hurst & Company, London, 2006. xx + 303 pp. Map. Appendix. Notes. Index. ?15.00. As the twentieth century came to a close, the world's attention was focused on the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the former Yugoslavia. After three wars resulting from the independence bids of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, thebrief calm in the formerYugoslavia produced by theDayton Accords was shattered as Kosovo challenged Belgrade's hold on theprovince. Prior to the onset of theNATO aerial intervention inMarch of 1999, an intense debate examined the legal, political and strategic implications of the proposed humanitarian intervention. When the conflict ended after eleven weeks of massive NATO bombing, thedebate shifted to the efficacyof institutionbuild ing inKosovo and the province's final status.Just as quickly as the topic of Kovoso emerged on the agendas of theworld's leading states, itdeclined. Few studies examined the on-going multilateral effortsto repair the damage of the war and to create a stable relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. In the post-September 11era there seemed littleroom in foreign policy discourse for Kosovo's rebuilding campaign. 758 SEER, 86, 4, OCTOBER 2008 Iain King and Whit Mason provide a much-needed, timely and lucid examination of the world's treatment of Kosovo after the setdement of the conflict in 1999.They are correct inpointing out that theKosovo issue isnot solved to completion and that the failure of the international community to complete itsmission could have dire consequences for the people of South eastern Europe and the international system.They provide not only a detailed assessment of the shortcomings of the rebuilding effortbut also suggest steps that, iftaken, could salvage one ofEurope's most intractable conflicts. Beyond these important contributions to our understanding of the state of affairs in Kosovo today, King and Mason's analysis reveals the opportunities and dangers of nation-building with insights that are applicable in larger endeavours in Afghanistan and Iraq. After a brief review of the events that led to theKosovo War, Peace atAny Price: How the World Failed Kosovo is divided into twomain parts. Part One reviews the four phases of the international administration inKosovo. In that section, the authors note the slide from consolidation to confrontation and stagnation, an evolution that gravely weakened the capacity of the interna tional community to successfully promote the development ofKosovo along Western lines. Part Two isorganized around the overall successes and failures of the international effort,concluding with suggestions for...

Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo

Conflict resolution?the case of Kosovo President Martti Ahtisaari Chairman of theCrisis Management Initiative; former UN secretary-general special envoyfor thefuture status process for Kosovo As you may know, I have a history of engagement inBalkan affairs. In 1992-3 Iwas heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the chairman of the Bosnia Herzegovina Working Group of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1999, together with my distinguished colleagues the former prime minister of Russia, Victor Chernomyrdin, and theUS deputy-secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, we facilitated the withdrawal of the Yugoslav/Serbian military and security forces from Kosovo and the establishment there of the international security and civil presence. This experience, I believe, prompted the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, inNovember 2005 to invite me once again to address theKosovo issue. In November 2005, the UN secretary-general acting on the basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that the situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine Kosovo's future status. In the terms of reference that Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave tome on 14 November 2005, I was told that the special envoy will report directly to the secretary-general. As the special envoy I was given maximum leeway in order to undertake my task and Iwas expected to revert to the secretary-general at all stages of the process. Our work was carried out in close consultations with the Kosovo Contact Group that includes France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. InNovember 2005, theUS under-secretary of state,Nicolas Burns, expressed the hope on behalf of theContact Group that a set of principles agreed by them would provide a political framework for parties as they entered the status talks. This document was called 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' and included tenpoints.1 Iwish particularly to draw your attention to the sixth principle, which says: The settlement of Kosovo's status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, itwill ensure thatKosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be *This paper was originally delivered at a public lecture, organised by the Royal Irish Academy's Committee Tor International Affairs, on 8 April 2008, at the Royal Irish Academy inDublin. Further information on the Kosovo Contact Group's 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' is available at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20 Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf (6August 2008). Irish Studies in International Affairs. Vol. 19 (2008). 183-187. 184 Irish Studies in International Affairs unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territoryof Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected. Imade my first trip to the region at the end ofNovember 2005 and told the leadership inBelgrade that I interpreted thementioned principle thatKosovo will not return to the pre-1999 situation tomean thatKosovo will not return back to Serbia. My hosts, particularly theprime minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits toBelgrade and Pristina, itbecame apparent that the positions and perceptions on the status were entrenched and so mutually opposed that any immediate attempt to narrow the differences would lead nowhere. On 31 January 2006 theContact Group had a ministerial meeting inLondon. In thismeeting itwas suggested that theContact Group members would individually deliver the following private messages to theKosovo status process parties: The unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation inwhich a returnof Kosovo toBelgrade's rule was not a viable option. While today's democratic leadership of Serbia cannot be held accountable for the policies of the Milosevic regime, leaders inBelgrade and Pristina must come to terms with its legacy and have important responsibilities. The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have a responsibility to participate constructively in the status negotiations and prepare...

Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo

Conflict resolution?the case of Kosovo President Martti Ahtisaari Chairman of theCrisis Management Initiative; former UN secretary-general special envoyfor thefuture status process for Kosovo As you may know, I have a history of engagement inBalkan affairs. In 1992-3 Iwas heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the chairman of the Bosnia Herzegovina Working Group of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1999, together with my distinguished colleagues the former prime minister of Russia, Victor Chernomyrdin, and theUS deputy-secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, we facilitated the withdrawal of the Yugoslav/Serbian military and security forces from Kosovo and the establishment there of the international security and civil presence. This experience, I believe, prompted the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, inNovember 2005 to invite me once again to address theKosovo issue. In November 2005, the UN secretary-general acting on the basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that the situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine Kosovo's future status. In the terms of reference that Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave tome on 14 November 2005, I was told that the special envoy will report directly to the secretary-general. As the special envoy I was given maximum leeway in order to undertake my task and Iwas expected to revert to the secretary-general at all stages of the process. Our work was carried out in close consultations with the Kosovo Contact Group that includes France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. InNovember 2005, theUS under-secretary of state,Nicolas Burns, expressed the hope on behalf of theContact Group that a set of principles agreed by them would provide a political framework for parties as they entered the status talks. This document was called 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' and included tenpoints.1 Iwish particularly to draw your attention to the sixth principle, which says: The settlement of Kosovo's status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, itwill ensure thatKosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be *This paper was originally delivered at a public lecture, organised by the Royal Irish Academy's Committee Tor International Affairs, on 8 April 2008, at the Royal Irish Academy inDublin. Further information on the Kosovo Contact Group's 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' is available at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20 Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf (6August 2008). Irish Studies in International Affairs. Vol. 19 (2008). 183-187. 184 Irish Studies in International Affairs unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territoryof Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected. Imade my first trip to the region at the end ofNovember 2005 and told the leadership inBelgrade that I interpreted thementioned principle thatKosovo will not return to the pre-1999 situation tomean thatKosovo will not return back to Serbia. My hosts, particularly theprime minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits toBelgrade and Pristina, itbecame apparent that the positions and perceptions on the status were entrenched and so mutually opposed that any immediate attempt to narrow the differences would lead nowhere. On 31 January 2006 theContact Group had a ministerial meeting inLondon. In thismeeting itwas suggested that theContact Group members would individually deliver the following private messages to theKosovo status process parties: The unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation inwhich a returnof Kosovo toBelgrade's rule was not a viable option. While today's democratic leadership of Serbia cannot be held accountable for the policies of the Milosevic regime, leaders inBelgrade and Pristina must come to terms with its legacy and have important responsibilities. The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have a responsibility to participate constructively in the status negotiations and prepare...

International Norms, Power and the Politics of International Administration: The Kosovo Case

This article examines the practices of governance enacted within the framework of the international administration of Kosovo, which was established in 1999. I analyse the complex interplay between power and the liberal-democratic norms around which the UN-led mission defined its role in the province. The international administration exercised significant power in the legal/institutional reconstruction of the province, and in its systematic attempts to socialise Kosovars into accepting Western-based norms of liberal democracy as the only reasonable foundation of their polity. At the same time, however, the norms advocated by the international administration proved to be the source of a certain degree of power for the people of Kosovo. Specifically, those norms provided the framework within which Kosovars were able to criticise the international administration, and to claim the right to greater participation in decisions regarding the province. Over the past couple of years, Kosovo has witnessed the emergence of a shared normative framework within which the international administrators and Kosovar political elites articulate often competitive truth claims about the problems of the province, and mobilise different forms of power in support of those claims.

THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO

In the context of the unprecedented level of cultural destruction taking place in Kosovo since the international community took over in 1999, the author of this article seeks to provide an answer to two questions. First, whether the Serbian-built religious heritage in Kosovo deserves any international protection. Second, whether the two international authorities in place in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR, a NATO-led military force, are under any legal obligation to protect this religious heritage. Relying on the relevant international law provisions, the author determines that items of Serbian-built religious heritage in Kosovo qualify as cultural property of international value, thereby deserving international protection. Examining further the legal mandate received by the international administration in Kosovo, the author argues that both UNMIK and KFOR exercise public authority in this province, thus placing the Serbian religious heritage in question under their jurisdiction. As a result, the author concludes that the legal obligation to ensure the protection of cultural heritage in Kosovo, although normally assigned by international law to the territorial state, here devolves upon these two international entities.

The UN as Government in Kosovo

Abstract The establishment of UNMIK, the international administration in Kosovo, marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the longstanding dispute between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians as well as a new phase in international involvement in conflict management of war-torn territories. UNMIK was not only mandated to play a central role in efforts to address the underlying cause of the Kosovo dispute, the contest between Kosovo’s independence and Yugoslavia’s sovereignty, but also to march into the largely uncharted territory of acting as the government of Kosovo. This article examines the factors that have posed major political challenges for the international administration of Kosovo and that have influenced central policy choices regarding “how to govern” and “towards what end.”