Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo

Abstract

Conflict resolution?the case of Kosovo President Martti Ahtisaari Chairman of theCrisis Management Initiative; former UN secretary-general special envoyfor thefuture status process for Kosovo As you may know, I have a history of engagement inBalkan affairs. In 1992-3 Iwas heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the chairman of the Bosnia Herzegovina Working Group of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1999, together with my distinguished colleagues the former prime minister of Russia, Victor Chernomyrdin, and theUS deputy-secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, we facilitated the withdrawal of the Yugoslav/Serbian military and security forces from Kosovo and the establishment there of the international security and civil presence. This experience, I believe, prompted the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, inNovember 2005 to invite me once again to address theKosovo issue. In November 2005, the UN secretary-general acting on the basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that the situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine Kosovo's future status. In the terms of reference that Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave tome on 14 November 2005, I was told that the special envoy will report directly to the secretary-general. As the special envoy I was given maximum leeway in order to undertake my task and Iwas expected to revert to the secretary-general at all stages of the process. Our work was carried out in close consultations with the Kosovo Contact Group that includes France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. InNovember 2005, theUS under-secretary of state,Nicolas Burns, expressed the hope on behalf of theContact Group that a set of principles agreed by them would provide a political framework for parties as they entered the status talks. This document was called 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' and included tenpoints.1 Iwish particularly to draw your attention to the sixth principle, which says: The settlement of Kosovo's status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, itwill ensure thatKosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be *This paper was originally delivered at a public lecture, organised by the Royal Irish Academy's Committee Tor International Affairs, on 8 April 2008, at the Royal Irish Academy inDublin. Further information on the Kosovo Contact Group's 'Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status' is available at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20 Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf (6August 2008). Irish Studies in International Affairs. Vol. 19 (2008). 183-187. 184 Irish Studies in International Affairs unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territoryof Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected. Imade my first trip to the region at the end ofNovember 2005 and told the leadership inBelgrade that I interpreted thementioned principle thatKosovo will not return to the pre-1999 situation tomean thatKosovo will not return back to Serbia. My hosts, particularly theprime minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits toBelgrade and Pristina, itbecame apparent that the positions and perceptions on the status were entrenched and so mutually opposed that any immediate attempt to narrow the differences would lead nowhere. On 31 January 2006 theContact Group had a ministerial meeting inLondon. In thismeeting itwas suggested that theContact Group members would individually deliver the following private messages to theKosovo status process parties: The unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation inwhich a returnof Kosovo toBelgrade's rule was not a viable option. While today's democratic leadership of Serbia cannot be held accountable for the policies of the Milosevic regime, leaders inBelgrade and Pristina must come to terms with its legacy and have important responsibilities. The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have a responsibility to participate constructively in the status negotiations and prepare...