We ll versed with the history and practice of Japan’s security policy, Auslin and Green (2007) have done an excellent job overviewing its history, examining its core doctrines, and giving their thoughts on its current adaptations. My comments take up their third section, the current adaptations of the key three doctrines (a fear of isolation, the calculation of the geopolitical strength of China, and accommodation to the prevailing international power structure) and attempts to add a few points that need to be taken up. First, the fear of isolation. Since Japan regained its independence in 1952, this pillar has been called the United Nations-centered diplomacy. The latest version of this is Japan asserting that she is underrepresented in multilateral institutions like the United Nations. It is widely understood that Japan has not been able to represent itself very effectively in many multilateral institutional settings, at least to the likings of many Japanese leaders. One can argue that this is largely because Japanese leaders are not used to such multilateral diplomacy. They seem to be more at ease with bilateralism, discussing tete-a-tete, or playing haragei (Inoguchi, 2007). Even in multilateral settings, bi-multilateralism is preferred. This means that multilateralism is composed of many bilateralisms in multilateral arenas. Thus, Japan requesting France to give strong support to Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council is an option Japan ought to pursue. But Japan making the same request to the European Union arouses an eerie feeling on the part of the European Union. Are Japanese possibly inept at multilateral diplomacy since within the European Union the representation issue of the United Nations is a difficult issue, and, hence, in principle, it does not touch on the United Nations issue at all? Or should they regard Japan’s request to the European Union as the latest indication of Japan’s upgrading of the European Union in Japan’s diplomatic practice? Second, the calculation of China’s geopolitical strength. The East Asian setting of Japan’s security policy is dissimilar to the West European-originated international relations situation (Sakai, 2007). There the distinction between the international and the imperial order is not very clear. The international order is the Westphalian order. The imperial order is something beyond the international order. It is where not only substance, but style, is deemed possibly much more important. It is true that Prime Minister Wen Jiabao did not bring about much substance, but it is also true that at this phase of Japanese‐ Chinese relations, style is no less important. That is why whereas Prime Minister Shinzo Abe broke the ice and achieved a breakthrough last autumn, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao melted the ice and made one more step forward this spring. What Koizumi did in paying
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