International Balance Of Power Research Articles

The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power

Maritimer Imperialismus: Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914. By Rolf Hobson. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-486-56671-7. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 388. Euro 34.80. Albert Hopman: Das ereignisreiche Leben eines "Wilhelminers." Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920. Edited by Michael Epkenhans. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-486-56840-X. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 1231. Euro 49.80. On 7 June 2004, the German Military History Research Office (MGFA) hosted its first program on naval history since it relocated from Freiburg to Potsdam in 1994. This occasion was prompted by the publication of two new and significant works: the German translation of Rolf Hobson's 2002 ground-breaking Imperialism at Sea (Boston and Leiden: Brill) in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies, and Michael Epkenhans's edition of Vice Admiral Albert Hopman's diaries, letters, and writings, 1901–20. The program began with a panel of "naval history experts" chaired by Jost Dülffer. The panel focused on an examination of the Weltmachthorizonte (perspectives on world power) of four Imperial naval officers: Alfred von Tirpitz (Hobson), Albert Hopman [End Page 821] (Epkenhans), Paul Hintze (Johannes Hürter) and Erich Raeder (Jörg Hillman). The discussion among the panelists and the audience was lively and underscored the significance of Hobson's groundbreaking insights regarding the origins and goals of Tirpitz's strategy. Moreover, Hobson's interpretations present new implications for the "continuity" thesis of German naval history in the period 1890–1945. Although the panel participants had not yet assimilated the impact of Hobson's prescient (and long-overdue) revisionist reassessment of Wilhelmian naval policy and politics and redefinition of the historiographical landscape of the scholarly debate over the aims of German navalism, the overarching discussion reflected the issues brought to the surface by Volker Berghahn's seminal 1971 study of the Tirpitz Plan. Bergahn had emphasized the political and social implications of Tirpitz's naval race with the British (a fleet built against the Reichstag and England). Germany's fleet-building was an attempt to preserve the politico-social status quo of the Kaiserreich's ruling elite through a radical reordering of the international balance of power. Berghahn's interpretation subsequently provided the framework for a rich debate in the 1970s and 1980s over the causes of German navalism and its influence across two world wars. Jost Dülffer's 1973 detailed analysis of fleet-building in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich further illuminated the postwar navy's role in domestic and foreign policy and documented how its leaders continued to keep alive its global ambitions to become a "world sea power." In the late 1970s and 1980s, Gerhard Schreiber demonstrated how the continuity of the navy's concept of Seemacht, blended with the officer corps' Weltmachthorizonte to create Tirpitz's unique concept of Seemachtideologie (ideology of sea power). This navalist ideology underpinned the Germany's navy's goal of "revising" the Versailles Treaty restrictions and resuming the quest for naval world power status. Critics of these scholars rejected what they saw as the "preconceived theoretical frameworks" and the role of social-political motives behind German fleet-building, both before and after Tirpitz, and the "psychological analysis" of the navy's Seemacht ideology. They argued that the documentary records of ambitious fleet plans and aggressive expressions of pursuing world power did not represent military reality and failed to see the catalyst role that the "English problem" played in Tirpitz's formulation (and the perpetuation of his legacy). In spite of Schreiber's additional documentary evidence supporting the linkage between the Tirpitz-Raeder political ideology of sea power and the actual decisions and policies made during the period 1888–1945 (which cannot be simply dismissed as "fantasies" or "utopian"), the controversy over the interpretations of Berghahn, Dülffer, and Schreiber resurfaced in Jörg Hillmann's remarks on Raeder. Challenging...

Russia and Europe in the New World Order

SEER,Vol. 83, No.3,JUlJy 2005 Review Article RussiaandEuropein theNew WorldOrder NEIL MALCOLM Brown,J. L. Vladimir PutinandtheJ/ew World Order: Looking East,Looking West? Rowman and Littlefield,Lanham, MD and Oxford, 2004. xiv + 366 pp. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. $36.95 (paperback). Newton, Julie M. Russia,France,andtheIdeaofEurope.St Antony's Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2003. xiv + 357 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. f55.oo. Tsygankov, Andrei P. WhoseWorldOrder? Russia's Perception ofAmerican Ideas after the Cold War. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 2004. xv + 206 pp. Notes. Tables. Bibliography. Index. $22.00 (paperback). AT a dinner in the Kremlin in I956 Nikita Khrushchev was overheard saying: 'A little country doesn't count any more in the modern world. In fact, the only two countries that matter are Russia and the United States. And Russia is superior. The other countries have no real say.'l This outburst, made at the height of Soviet self-confidence in the I950s, is a world away on one dimension from Gorbachev's appeals for international partnership at the end of the I980s, and on another from the Russian Foreign Minister's statement in 2000 that his task was one of concentrating the limited foreign-policy resources at his disposal on the most vital priorities. One way of explaining these contrasts would be to say that the international balance of power shifted sharply over the last half century, to Moscow's disadvantage. It was out-developed, outgunned, and stripped of its allies and dependencies. But in order to gain more than the crudest understanding of how this came about, not to mention in order to be able to have any idea of what possibilities the future holds for Russia's place in the world, we need to base ourselves on something more sophisticated than the materialistic 'correlation of forces' style of analysis which underlay Khrushchev's judgement. The very changes which Khrushchev sparked off, and the domestic political turmoil associated with them stimulated interest in the West in Neil Malcolmis formerHead of theRussiaandCIS Programmeat ChathamHouse,and of theRussianandEastEuropeanResearchCentreattheUniversityofWolverhampton. ' M. Wight, International Theogy. The ThreeTraditions, Leicester and London, I99I (hereafter, International Theory), p. 33. 496 RUSSIA & EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER somehow getting inside the blackbox of Soviet foreignpolicy making.2 An increasinglypopularapproachwas to supplementthe Kremlinological focus on emigre accounts, official statements and the newspaper pressby analysingthe kindof 'perceptions'thatcould be deduced from the expanding published output of Soviet foreign policy research institutes.3It was acknowledged that Soviet publications on international themes were above all directed at manipulatingWesternpublic opinion. Internationalrelationsspecialists,however, were supposedto be providing policy inputs. Senior experts mixed with officials and came to play a quasi-diplomaticrole. At the very least, writersof this kind (the mezhdunarodniki of the Academy of Sciences institutes)were attuned to what was acceptable at the policy-making level, and calibratedtheir statementsto fit. Westerncommentatorstried to draw out the policy implications of persistent differencesof opinion in the expert community. Franklyn Griffiths used the term 'transactional perceptions'to describeSovietanalysesof internationalrelationswhich appeared to be designed to supportparticularimages of the West and hence particularpolicy optionsforMoscow.4 Since the onset of glasnostand the passing of the Soviet Union the linkage between specialist writing and policy has loosened. Political affiliationshave become more transparent,but opinions are expressed more freely. They may well be just what they seem -the opinions of one individual. With the loosening of controls the range of views expressedhasbecome muchwider,sometimesalarminglyso. However, the interweaving of the specialist and the official community hlas persisted, and there is a rich source here, provided it is carefully interpreted.All three authorsunderreviewdrawon it to one degree or another. Julie Newton's study has the widest historical scope. It is a comprehensive analysis of Russian European policy as seen through the prism of Russo-Frenchrelations, divided into three partscovering the periods I958-85, I985-9 I and I 99I-200I . Because of France's role in East-Westdiplomacy in the Soviet period, and its continuing political leadership in Europe, this gives her an opportunity to look afresh at classic questions concerning Soviet strategy towards the AtlanticAlliance and the EuropeanCommunity,and to shednew light on the European dimension of post-Soviet...

Measuring and Explaining Party Change in Taiwan: 1991–2004

This article examines party platform change in a third wave democratic country, Taiwan, during its first fourteen years of full multiparty elections. A variety of datasets show that Taiwan's parties have moved from polarized positions toward a moderate center on all core electoral issues. However, the parties have not converged into indistinguishable catchall parties; instead they have instituted a state of moderate differentiation. The degree to which Taiwan's parties have moderated and been electorally successful has been intimately tied to the internal balance of power between election-oriented and ideologically conservative factions or leaders. In response to public opinion and electoral competition, Taiwan's election-oriented leaders attempted to drag their parties toward centrist positions. The key variable constraining convergent party movement and maintaining differentiation has been the strength of ideologically conservative party factions. When these ideologically oriented factions have held the upper hand in parties, they have promoted ideologically orthodox but often unpopular policies. Even when the election-oriented faction is in control at the party center, secondary factions have been able to constrain movement away from party ideals.

A Role for Public Health History

A Role for Public Health History

Perceptions of Israel in the Armies of Syria, Egypt and Jordan

The reasons for change in state elites' perceptions of the adversary are fiercely contested by realists, constructivistis and neo-liberals in the international relations literature. A series of events -beginning with the October 1973 war and culminating in the Oslo peace process — offers a unique opportunity to assess the value of these theories in explaining change in the perceptions of Israel and Zionism in Syria, Egypt and Jordan. This study is based on articles on Israel and Zionism that appeared in the official army journals of these three states. The analysis suggests that, since the 1973 war, Egypt has perceived Israel as a formidable foe that must be restrained, Syria continues to deny Israel's legitimacy, and Jordan's perceptions of Israel changed dramatically from demonization to recognition. The realist paradigm, which focuses on changes in the regional and international balance of power, does best in explaining variations in the portrayal of Israel amongst these actors. Nevertheless, none of the theories offers a complete, timeless explanation of the issue. The limitations of any single theory to account for change in the perceptions of the adversary suggest that caution should be used in attempting to capture the complexity of social and political life in any single overarching theory.

The Purposes of Framework Legislation

Much recent scholarship studying Congress has focused on issues of institutional design and assessed procedural innovations to determine why rules have been changed or retained and to describe the effects of certain design features on outcomes. Notwithstanding the focus on procedure, one component of contemporary legislative process has not received sustained attention. There is no systematic study of legislation. Framework legislation creates rules that structure congressional lawmaking; these laws establish internal procedures that will shape legislative deliberation and voting with respect only to certain laws or decisions in the future. Often these procedural frameworks are part of more comprehensive laws that include delegations of authority to the executive branch or that have legal effects beyond shaping congressional procedure. Although these aspects of the laws that include framework legislation are relevant to the details of the framework and may explain why Congress decides to set up a framework, my objective is to focus primarily on the internal procedures, discussing the larger context only as it illuminates the decision to use frameworks and their design. This paper begins the study of framework legislation as a distinct legislative phenomenon in the United States. In this article, I first provide specific examples of framework laws. I then present five purposes served by framework legislation: enacting a symbolic response to a problem salient to voters; providing neutral rules for future decision making; solving collective action problems in areas where they are particularly acute; entrenching certain macro-objectives so that future decisions are more likely to align with them; and changing the internal balance of power in Congress. With a clearer understanding of the purpose of framework legislation, future work can more systematically describe its effects on the legislative process and provide recommendations for its use and reform.

E. H. Carr: a ‘historical realist’ approach for the globalisation era

Realist international relations scholars have approached the connection between economics and security in two ways. Cold War-era realists derived the national interest from the international balance of power, and assessed the utility of both military and economic instruments of statecraft. A second realist approach, advanced by E. H. Carr in his 1939 The Twenty Years' Crisis, places interstate competition in the context of another struggle over wealth and power in which no-one's primary concern is the national interest. That is the realm of capitalism (and resistance to capitalism). That deeper set of connections between economics and security was overlooked in Cold War IR literature, at considerable cost to our understanding of world politics. Understanding why Carr's ‘historical realism’ was bypassed can help pave the way for a more fruitful realist approach to comprehending a new era in world politics.

Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending

Although foreign policy choices, especially on security questions, are often treated as autonomous state responses to international pressures, these events and conditions do not affect society in a uniform way. International conditions influence policy, but their implications depend on the interests of the domestic political faction controlling the state. Because decisions about military strategy and force structure are closely linked to the international balance of power, they offer an especially demanding test of this argument. This article offers evidence that Republican and Democratic presidents systematically differed on the allocation of resources within the Pentagon during the Cold War. Republicans directed spending toward strategic forces, while Democrats stressed conventional forces. Furthermore, although Soviet gains in relative nuclear capabilities influenced Democrats' decisions about strategic forces, they had little or no influence on Republican choices. These differences make sense in light...

The Norwegian Constitution of 17 May 1814—international influences and models

SUMMARY In this article Kåre Tønnesson presents an analysis of the framing of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 at the constituent convention which met in the manor house of Eidsvoll. The context was the threat of the enforced transfer of the sovereignty over Norway from the Danish monarchy to the Swedish. The aim of the constitution was to pre-empt this change and secure the recognition of an independent Norwegian state, based upon the principle of national sovereignty. The article shows how the Norwegian legislators drew on a broad spectrum of ideas found in the existing constitutions and political theories of eighteenth-century North America and Europe to define the internal balance of power between executive and legislature, the scope of the proposed franchise and the definition of the rights of the citizens. Out of the materials they had collected from abroad they created a consensus for a constitution that has survived, although considerably modified by amendments and constitutional practice, for nearly two hundred years.

Sino-Latin American Relations: Sources and Consequences, 1977–1997

Diplomatic and economic relations between Latin American countries and the People’s Republic of China have become increasingly relevant for both sides, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and scientific and technological cooperation. Relations have also intensified because of changes in the international balance of power; the PRC’s Third World policy is shaped by the friction between the PRC and the world’s great powers, including the United States. Competition from Taiwan for Latin American opportunities is another significant influence.

A Meaning for Machines: Modernity, Utility, and the Eighteenth‐Century British Public

When Britons of the late eighteenth century contemplated the transformations that were occurring in industrial production—what by the 1830s Europeans would commonly call their Industrial Revolution—the changes were too immediate, and also too regionally located, to be easily comprehended. Whatever slouched its way toward Bethlehem to be born was then ill defined, its implications uncertain. Even so, late eighteenth-century Britain was not without its prophets, nor was the new industry without its advocates. In 1766, the industrialist Josiah Wedgwood wrote privately to a friend about “the extensive capability of our manufacture for further improvement” and called its coming perfection “a revolution [that is] at hand.” Foreign spies likewise contemplated the consequences: from England in 1794 one reported, “I . . . saw with dismay that a revolution in the mechanical arts, the real precursor, the true and principal cause of political revolutions [by which he meant upheaval in the international balance of power] was developing in a manner frightening to the whole of Europe, and particularly to France, which would receive the severest blow from it.” By then the French revolutionaries knew that British industrial prowess was mortally threatening. The engines of this transformation would shatter Continental complacency. Eighteenth-century practitioners and theorists of the newly emerging science of political economy also and more publicly fixated on the promises inherent to the spreading mechanization of skill and labor. This was the message

NATO as the UN Security Council's Instrument: Question Marks From the Perspective of International Law?

In the previous contribution, Dekker and Myjer maintain that, from the viewpoint of international law, there are at least two problematic issues with regard to NATO's actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first issue concerns the way in which the Security Council has, in a legal sense, shaped its authority over NATO's actions. The second issue is the question of whether NATO is entitled, under its own constitution, to execute such actions. The contribution of Dekker and Myjer was prompted by NATO's air strikes in defence of Sarajevo, which took place in August and September 1995. Their criticism also applies to the current actions that NATO is undertaking in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, as they later elaborated in the periodical Transaktie. First and foremost, it must be noted that Dekker and Myjer deserve full credit for pointing out these legal aspects of these recent NATO actions. That being said, their two main points of criticism are debatable and, in our opinion, paint a less than consistent picture of the possibilities that the UN and NATO have to offer, in particular the possibilities that may or may not be provided by those organizations' constitutions to flexibly respond to the demands posed at the present time, as well as the room to manoeuvre that is available under the changed international balance of power.

The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to ‘Freedom Fighters’?

Doctrines have been a prevalent form of foreign policy in American history. What explains their origins? This study addresses this question by examining the Reagan Doctrine, a declared policy which pledged aid to anti-communist guerrillas in the Third World. This case study examines the utility of the ‘structural realist’ theory, focusing on the international level of analysis.Structural realism stresses the international balance of power, international conditions, limits on the government's freedom to make policy and the national interest. Sources of the Reagan Doctrine are found both in the international environment as a whole and in the individual countries where the Reagan Administration openly aided insurgents: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia.The findings indicate that the structural realist perspective is necessary to explain the Reagan Doctrine, but not sufficient. In particular, it fails to account for the role of political elites and their beliefs in foreign-policy making.

PAR INTER PARIBUS: THE NATURE OF POWER IN COOPERATION: LESSONS (FOR THE UNITED STATES) FROM THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

ON ONE MAJOR ISSUE in the world economy there is little controversy that the international balance of power is in flux. Following the Second World War, when new multilateral organizations were created to promote peaceful interaction among nations of the world, the United States was the writer, producer, and main actor ofthe script. Its position in the world was reflected in the power it wielded formally and informally in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the two major international financing institutions of the postwar era. Since then, US dominance has waned. With decolonization, the rise of the Pacific rim and the end of the Cold War, just how nations of the world will interact remains unclear; resources, ideologies and market forces have shifted the balance of power away from a bipolar split toward pluralism. How state power might be exercised in this emerging world is also unclear. Few models exist which shed light on the issue. The African Development Bank provides one model of how power is, and is not, exercised within a pluralistic international regime.l Founded in 1963 without the leadership, or even assistance, of the United States, the African Development Bank (ADB), like the World Bank and the IMF, was designed to formalize 'a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area'2an international regime as defined by Stephen Krasner within the lexicon of international political economy. In the ADB's case, the issue area was (and remains) the securing and control by Africans of development resources intended for the African states. The ADB was designed to modify the behaviour of states in two ways: first, to create a formal institution in which African states could distribute scarce resources as equitably as possible among themselves; second, to provide a channel through which developed

Post‐cold war security in East Asia

As one of the two primary regions of East-West competition throughout the cold war, the winds of strategic change now sweeping through the Asia-Pacific region are nothing short of extraordinary. The international balance of power has shifted from one of strategic bipolarity dominated by superpower competition to a more diffuse and complex multipolarity. President Bush has recognized this geopolitical transformation with his call for a ‘new international order’. Yet little consensus has been reached thus far on what specific policies will need to be incorporated to achieve this vision. Western and Asian policy planners need to focus on how a more stable and enduring regional security order can be structured. Locally, ethnic strife, succession crises and insurgency movements must be addressed and mitigated. Regionally, hegemonic competition in power vacuums created by superpower retrenchment must be minimized while resource and sea lane access are preserved. Globally, Asia-Pacific national sovereignties and Asia-Pacific economic growth in an increasingly interdependent world must be maintained.

Les années staliniennes de Tito (1945-1948)

Tito's Stalinist years (1945-1948), Jofy Pirjevec. Sheltered by a « Popular Front », the Yugoslav Communist Party wanted after 1945 to build socialism according to the Stalinist pattern : police terror, democracy under surveillance, five-year plans and Stakhanovism. With the Trieste affair and the changes in the international balance of power up to the beginning the Cold War, Stalin's and Tito's subtle games became graduallly incompatible. In 1947-1948, the Titoist schism was completed, the two adversaries having wrongly assessed one another.

Asymmetrical States and Global Geopolitical Equilibrium

ASYMMETRICAL STATES AND GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM Saul B. Cohen W„, 'hen the International scene was dominated by a small number of nations, world equilibrium was maintained by a relatively straightforward balancing of interests, often through shifting alignments. There are now approximately 170 sovereign states, including many with the ability to upset the global balance through direct or indirect action, and so the problem of maintaining stability is much more complicated. Civil conflict and local wars, international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, and international monetary crises all have worlddestabilizing effects. Nevertheless, ifwe view the international system as subject to general development processes, we have reason to be optimistic about the prospects for overall geopolitical stability.1 Any system that is in dynamic equilibrium will be characterized by short-term disturbances or perturbations . As long as the system is open to change as a result of such pressures, and as long as it progresses toward higher stages of integration , it can maintain its equilibrium. In applying general-systems theory to the international scene, it is important to focus on geopolitical structure. Most recently this structure has evolved through the rise to prominence of the region as an "action setting" for relations among states. Within or adjacent to such regions, 1. Saul B. Cohen, "A New Map of Geopolitical Equilibrium: A Developmental Approach," Political Geography Quarterly 1 (July 1982): 223-41. Saul B. Cohen is president of Queens College, City University of New York. His recent publications include "Theory and Traditional Political Geography" and "American Foreign Policy for the Eighties." Both appear in Pluralism and Political Geography: People, Territory, and State, by Nurit Kliot and Stanley Waterman, eds. (Croom Helm, Ltd., 1983). 193 194 SAIS REVIEW major powers and other leading states provide overall political, economic , and ideological direction. At the same time, certain states reject such leadership, in effect becoming asymmetrical to their region. In the short run, these states are regionally and even globally destabilizing. In the long run, they create perturbations that facilitate the process of dynamic equilibrium. This paper presents such a thesis, first by reviewing recent changes in the global geopolitical structure, then by tying these changes to a theory of geopolitical development, and finally by discussing the role of asymmetrical states in this evolution. Substantial changes have occurred in the global geopolitical structure over the past five decades.2 Germany's attempt to dominate the globe was followed by a bipolar world in which the United States and the U.S.S.R. shared dominance in the 1950s and 1960s. This was, by the late sixties, supplanted by a multipolar system. At that time the European Communities , Japan, and China began to approach near-parity with the two superpowers in the political and economic spheres. Less than a decade later a number of additional nations had achieved international significance . Although these newcomers lacked the global reach of the five major power cores, they had sufficient strength within their regions to be reckoned as second-order powers.3 Referred to as the "new influentials," they are sometimes courted as allies by major powers or by small clientstates because of their real or imagined abilities to influence events within or even outside their regions. The countries now possessing global significance of the first or second order have grown both in number and geographical spread. As a result, a more complex global geopolitical structure has come about (see map).4 The international balance of power is no longer based upon 2.Only a half century ago it seemed possible that a single state could come to dominate the world order. This threat was not dispelled until Germany's defeat in the Second World War. The conceptual underpinnings for one-power world dominance were articulated in two competing geopolitical theories—MacKinder's Heartland and Spykman's Rimland concepts. The Heartlandic view offered two options for world control, both through rule of Eastern Europe. German control of the region would have meant that it could command, successively, the Russian Heartland, WorldIsland (Eurasia) and the World. Soviet control would have meant command of Western Europe, World-Island and the World. In the Rimlandic view, a Germany in control of the...

Two Chinas Revisited

If we no longer have Richard Nixon to kick around, we nonetheless have the former president's advice. On U.S. policy toward China, he states: “China, with its population and resources, is eventually going to be a superpower. It is vital that we help them become a superpower associated with the West rather than one that is against us.”Sounds reasonable enough, until we consider the options. To announce such a goal might, in the short term, play hob with our diplomatic bargaining positions vis-à-vis Beijing itself or come at the expense of our traditional allies in Asia. And if this is to be the polar star of U.S. foreign policy over the long term, as Nixon suggests, what about other legitimate U.S. interests; what about the notion of the proper play of the international balance of power and America's concern for human rights and democratic values?

Prospects for Non-Alignment: India's Role

Non-alignment is not a dinosaur. Never less than one-half and now almost two-thirds of the members of the United Nations Organization have styled their approach to external affairs as non-alignment. In the course of the last three decades and more, not one of the non-aligned nations has forsaken it in favour of alignment, not even in the most adverse of circumstances. On the other hand, there have been instances when some aligned countries have opted for non-alignment. The non-aligned countries are no Rip Van Winkles either. Ever alert to the realities of international affairs, they constantly endeavour to effect changes in the international power balance. During the fifties and the sixties, they helped to bring about a change in the international security order in the face of a strident Cold War. Since the beginning of the seventies, they have been working for the setting up of a New International Order (NIO) in all its three major facets, viz., the economic (New International Economic Order), the technological (New International Technological Order) and the informational (New International information Order). Non-alignment, personal preferences notwithstanding, has certainly succeeded to some extent in shaping the international system as it appears today. As the driving force of the resource-rich as also the resource-scarce yet volatile regions of the le tiers monde,1 non-alignment has almost always evoked extreme reactions, ranging from outright condemantion to lofty praise. However, having to live with non-alignment, it is necessary to ask what course non-alignment would take in the hands of its powerless votaries in the years ahead against the hindsight of what it has achieved so far. This paper endeavours to examine at some length the success and continued relevance of non-alignment with the focus on India.

Minimizing Staff Resistance to Federally Mandated Policies

Schools' internal balance of power has shifted. Therefore, policy making should be modified. P. L. 94-142 is a case in point.