Interindividual-intergroup Discontinuity Effect Research Articles

Is there no “I” in “Team”? Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect in a Cournot competition experiment

• We study individual versus team decisions in a Cournot duopoly experiment. • In a “standard” experiment individuals’ and teams’ decisions are indistinguishable. • Outputs decisions of individuals and teams are both around the Cournot-Nash outcome. • We conducted a second experiment with arguably a recommendation to collude. • Now we find that individuals choose lower outputs and collude more than teams. Even though firms consist of teams of individuals, industrial organization experiments are typically conducted under the unitary player assumption with individuals representing firms. Against this practice, there is evidence that individuals’ decisions differ from those made by teams, and also from individuals’ decisions which affect both oneself and others. This study examines the empirical scope of the unitary player assumption (alternatively the “interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect”) in the context of a Cournot competition experiment. In the first, standard, experiment (216 participants), we find no evidence for the discontinuity effect. Output choices of both individuals and teams are around the Cournot outcome. In a second experiment (198 participants), we use a recommendation to shift participants’ initial disposition towards the (off-equilibrium) collusive output. This triggers the discontinuity effect; individuals choose lower outputs and collude more than teams. This effect is persistent in the second half of the experiment, and is not caused by team-member discussion or by seating team members together. We discuss the interpretations and implications of our results.

Editorial: Parochial Altruism: Pitfalls and Prospects.

Editorial: Parochial Altruism: Pitfalls and Prospects.

Social categorization and group‐motivated interindividual–intergroup discontinuity

AbstractResearch on the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect has demonstrated that intergroup relations are often less cooperative than interindividual relations. The aim of the present paper is to test whether mere social categorization suffices to create a group‐motivated discontinuity effect. In two experiments, we manipulated actors' personal versus social identity salience, whereas controlling for actors' outcome independence (1 : 1) versus interdependence (3 : 3). Making actors' social identity salient using a minimal group treatment was sufficient to increase defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, irrespective of whether this was in an interindividual or intergroup interaction (Experiment 1). Using a Mutual Fate Control matrix in Experiment 2, results indicate that this effect can be attributed to actors' increased motivation to maximize relative differences to outgroup opponents under social identity salience. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Self-Interest Masquerading as Ingroup Beneficence

An altruistic rationalization explanation of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect proposes that intergroup interactions are more competitive than interactions between individuals because group membership creates an opportunity to rationalize selfishly motivated competitiveness as being enacted for the ingroup’s sake. To test this explanation, we compared participants whose decisions did not influence the earnings of other participants, and who therefore had no opportunity for altruistic rationalization of competitiveness, with participants whose decisions did influence the earnings of other participants, and who therefore did have an opportunity for altruistic rationalization. Competition in a prisoner’s dilemma game was greater when opportunities for altruistic rationalization were present, but this effect was significant only for participants who were low in dispositional proneness to guilt, a trait that motivates prosocial behavior. In other words, we found that dispositionally selfish individuals were most likely to become more competitive when opportunities for altruistic rationalization were present. These findings provide evidence for an additional mechanism driving the discontinuity effect.

Group cooperation under uncertainty

Previous research has shown an ‘interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect’: intergroup interactions generally lead to less cooperative outcomes than interindividual interactions. We replicate the discontinuity effect in the deterministic prisoner’s dilemma, but find that groups are more cooperative than individuals in a stochastic version of the game. Three major factors that underlie the usual discontinuity effect are reduced in the stochastic environment: greed, fear, and persuasion power. Two group mechanisms are proposed to explain the reversed discontinuity effect: the motivation to avoid guilt and blame when making decisions that affect others’ welfare, and the social pressure to conform to certain norms when one is in a group setting.

Death in Groups: Mortality Salience and the Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity Effect

Past research has shown that mortality salience (MS) increases aggression toward a worldview-threatening other. The present study evaluated whether MS would have a larger impact on aggression under group as opposed to individual interactions, and whether the tendency for groups to be more aggressive than individuals (i.e. interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect) would be magnified under conditions of MS. Participants assigned to an individual or a three-person group condition wrote down thoughts about dental pain or mortality. Later, participants read a worldview-threatening essay from another individual or group at a rival university and subsequently allocated hot sauce for the others to consume. Results supported the primary hypotheses: those writing about death were more aggressive than those writing about dental pain; groups were more aggressive than individuals; those in the MS condition tended to show more aggression; and the discontinuity effect was more visible among those in the MS condition. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the domain of correspondent outcomes: The roles of relativistic concern, perceived categorization, and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.

Most prior research on the tendency for groups to be less cooperative than individuals (the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect) has used the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). Experiment 1 examined the discontinuity effect with 3 additional matrices: Chicken, Leader, and Battle of the Sexes (BOS). Unlike the PDG, these matrices are characterized by correspondence of outcomes. The discontinuity effect was significant for the PDG and Chicken matrices only. With the BOS and Leader matrices, both individuals and groups pursued outcome maximization through coordinated turn taking. Despite the lesser competitiveness, sets of interacting participants in the BOS and Leader conditions did perceive that they were 2 groups. Experiment 2 examined the discontinuity effect in 2 Chicken matrices with varying outcomes associated with mutual competition. Consistent with the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the discontinuity effect was eliminated for the matrix in which mutual competition was associated with very low outcomes. Although concern for relative in-group standing gave rise to intergroup competition even in the domain of correspondent outcomes, such concern was constrained to the extent that it interfered with outcome maximization.

Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

Individuals are often given the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of a group or an organization. However, little is known about preferences or behavior in such contexts. In an adapted trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group-representatives differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous situation. Group-representatives are given the responsibility of unilaterally and privately making a decision on behalf of a three-person group. Results from both the main and the follow-up studies show that people trust less and reciprocate less as group-representatives, and thus demonstrate that the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect not only exists in group behavior but also in individual behavior of group-representatives. Moreover, results show that trusting behavior is driven by reciprocity expectations, while reciprocating behavior is not sensitive to the first mover's behavior, i.e., the level of trust experienced.

Are Japanese groups more competitive than Japanese individuals? A cross‐cultural validation of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect

The interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect is the tendency for relationships between groups to be more competitive than the relationships between individuals. It has been observed robustly in studies conducted in the United States, which is a society characterized as “individualistic.” In this study, it was explored whether the effect was replicable in a “collectivistic” society such as Japan. From the traditional view in cross‐cultural psychology, which emphasizes the collectivistic nature of East Asian peoples, it was expected that the discontinuity effect would be greater in Japan than in the United States. On the other hand, based on recent empirical findings suggesting that North Americans are no less group‐oriented than East Asians, it was expected that the discontinuity effect would be no greater in Japan than in the United States. One hundred and sixty Japanese university students played a 10‐trial repeated prisoner's dilemma game: 26 sessions of interindividual and 18 sessions of intergroup. Following exactly the procedure of prior experiments in the US, individuals and groups were allowed face‐to‐face communication with their opponents before making their decisions, and participants in the intergroup condition were further allowed to converse freely with their in‐group members. Results replicated previous findings in the United States; groups made more competitive choices than did individuals. In addition, neither the magnitude of the discontinuity effect, nor the frequency of competitive choices made by the groups, were larger in Japan than they were in the majority of prior studies conducted in the United States. These findings suggest cross‐cultural robustness of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect. Also, interestingly, they contradict the simple distinction between individualism and collectivism. Implications for studies of culture and group processes are discussed.

Reduction of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: The role of leader accountability and proneness to guilt.

Two experiments contrasted interactions between group leaders with interactions between individuals in a mixed-motive setting. Consistent with the idea that being accountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to benefit the in-group, Experiment 1 found that accountable leaders were more competitive than individuals. Consistent with the idea that being unaccountable to the in-group implies normative pressure to be cooperative and that high guilt proneness provides motivation to be moral, Experiment 2 found that when guilt proneness was high, unaccountable leaders were less competitive than accountable leaders and did not differ significantly from individuals. In other words, the robust interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect was eliminated when groups had unaccountable leaders who were high in guilt proneness.

A comparison of human aggression committed by groups and individuals: An interindividual–intergroup discontinuity

Experimental research comparing aggressive behavior committed by groups and individuals is important but sparse. This experiment compared aggressive behavior (i.e., amount of hot sauce allocated for others to consume) in four types of interactions: intergroup, interindividual, group-to-individual, and individual-to-group. The results revealed that intergroup interactions were significantly more aggressive than interindividual interactions. In addition, groups allocated and received significantly more hot sauce than individuals. These effects were not explained by diffusion of responsibility or trait aggressiveness. The experiment reveals two noteworthy conclusions: (1) the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect extends to aggressive behavior and (2) interactions in which a group is either the source or target of aggression are situational influences that can increase it.

Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect.

This quantitative review of 130 comparisons of interindividual and intergroup interactions in the context of mixed-motive situations reveals that intergroup interactions are generally more competitive than interindividual interactions. The authors identify 4 moderators of this interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, each based on the theoretical perspective that the discontinuity effect flows from greater fear and greed in intergroup relative to interindividual interactions. Results reveal that each moderator shares a unique association with the magnitude of the discontinuity effect. The discontinuity effect is larger when (a) participants interact with an opponent whose behavior is unconstrained by the experimenter or constrained by the experimenter to be cooperative rather than constrained by the experimenter to be reciprocal, (b) group members make a group decision rather than individual decisions, (c) unconstrained communication between participants is present rather than absent, and (d) conflict of interest is severe rather than mild.